THE

WORKS

OF

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This VOLUME contains,

A dissertation on the effects of the arts and sciences with regard to manners.

A dissertation on the origin and foundation of the inequality among mankind.

A dissertation on political oeconomy.

THE EFFECTS OF THE ARTS AND SCIENCES With regard to MANNERS.

A

DISCUSSION of the QUESTION Proposed by the ACADEMY of DIJON,

"Whether the restoration of the Arts and "Sciences hath contributed to the purity of "Manners."

DECIPIMUR SPECIE RECTI.

PREFACE.

THE following pages contain a discussion of one of the most sublime and interesting of all moral questions. It is not composed, however, of those metaphysical subtilties, which of late have so much infected every branch of literature, and from which even our academical theses are not always exempted. It is indeed nothing more than a simple investigation of one of those truths on which the happiness of mankind depends.

I foresee that I shall not easily be forgiven in having taken the unpopular side of the question.

The writer who openly attacks what is univerſally admired, will of courſe be univerſally cenſured: nor will his having obtained the approbation of a few ſenſible men, enſure him that of the public. But no matter: my reſolution is taken: nor am I at all ſolicitous to pleaſe either pretenders to wit, or people of faſhion. There are men in all ages formed to adopt the prevailing opinions of their peculiar communities. Thus our preſent philoſophers and free-thinkers, if they had lived in the time of the league, had been nothing more than mere fanatics. Such readers are not to be regarded by thoſe who write for poſterity.

A word more, and I have done. As I did not much expect the honour this piece hath received, I augmented and altered it, after I had ſent it to the academy, in ſo much as to make it almoſt a new piece. In this publication, however, I thought it neceſſary to reſtore it to its priſtine form; being that in which it was favoured with the prize: except that I have taken the liberty to ſubjoin a few notes, and have left two alterations which are eaſily perceived, and are ſuch as the academy poſſibly might not have approved. The reſpect, gratitude, and even juſtice, due to that body, require of me this acknowledgment.

INTRODUCTION.

THE queſtion before me is, "Whether the reſtoration of the arts and ſciences hath contributed moſt to the purity or corruption of manners?" The ſide I ſhall take in determining it, is

is that, gentlemen, which becomes an honeſt man, ſenſible of his own ignorance, and yet in his own opinion no leſs eſtimable on that account.

I perceive it will be difficult to treat this ſubject with propriety before the tribunal who are now to judge of what is advanced. How ſhall I preſume to cenſure the ſciences before one of the moſt ſcientific aſſemblies in Europe, to commend ignoranee to an Academy celebrated for its knowledge, and to conciliate a contempt for ſtudy with the reſpect due to the truly learned?

I was aware of theſe inconſiſtencies, but not diſcouraged by them; I excuſed myſelf by reflecting that I ſhould not make an attack on ſcience, but engage in the defence of virtue, and that even in the eyes of the virtuous, who are ſtill more attached to probity than even the learned to erudition.

What have I then to fear? The knowledge and penetration of the aſſembly to whom my performance is addreſſed? This I acknowledge; but it is on account of the merits of the compoſition, not the deſign of my piece. Equitable ſovereigns have not heſitated to decide againſt themſelves, when they have ſat as judges in a doubtful cauſe; and indeed the moſt advantageous ſituation in which a juſt claim can be exhibited, is that of being laid before an enlightened and juſt arbitrator, who is at once judge and party in the cauſe.

To this encouraging motive I may add another which has finally determined me. And this is, that, after having maintained the cauſe of truth to the beſt of my natural abilities, whatever be my apparent ſucceſs, there is one prize

I cannot fail of poſſeſſing in ſecret; which is the conſcious ſatisfaction ariſing from it in my own breaſt.

PART THE FIRST.

IT is a noble and beautiful retroſpect, to take a view of man, riſing in a manner by his own efforts out of nothing, and diſſipating by the light of reaſon that darkneſs with which he was by nature inveloped; to ſee him raiſe himſelf in imagination beyond his native ſphere; penetrating the celeſtial regions, and, like the ſun, encompaſſing, with giant ſtrides, the vaſt extent of the univerſe: To behold him again deſcend into himſelf, a taſk ſtill more noble and difficult! there to inveſtigate his own nature and faculties, and thence diſcover the deſign of his creation and his duty to his fellow-creatures. The operation of all theſe miracles hath been renewed within a few generations.

Europe having relapſed into the barbariſm of the primitive ages; the inhabitants of this part of the world, at preſent ſo greatly enlightened, long lived in a ſtate ſtill worſe than that of ignorance. A ſcientific jargon, more deſpicable than mere ignorance, had uſurped the name of learning, and formed an almoſt invincible obſtacle to its reſtoration.

Things were arrived at ſuch a paſs, that it even required a total revolution in the ideas of mankind, to bring them back again to common ſenſe. This was at length brought about by means from which it was leaſt expected. It was the ſtupid Muſſulman, that perpetual ſcourge of let-

letters, who was the immediate cauſe of their revival among us. The fall of the throne of Conſtantine carried into Italy the ruins of ancient Greece; with which precious ſpoils France in her turn was enriched. The ſciences ſoon followed literature, and the art of thinking united itſelf to that of writing; a mode of gradation which may ſeem ſtrange, and which is perhaps but too natural. The world now began to perceive the principal advantage of an intercourſe with the muſes, *viz.* that of rendering mankind more ſocial, by inſpiring a mutual deſire to pleaſe, by performances worthy of reciprocal approbation.

Man is ſubject to intellectual as well as to corporeal neceſſities. The latter conſtitute the fabric of ſociety, and the former the ornaments of it.

So long as government and the laws provide for the ſecurity and happineſs of a people, the arts and ſciences, leſs deſpotic though perhaps more powerful, conceal the iron chains of ſlavery a garland of flowers. They ſtifle in the breaſts of mankind that ſenſe of liberty, for the enjoyment of which we ſeem to have been born; and, by making us enamoured with ſlavery, form what is called a poliſhed people *.

* Sovereigns behold always with pleaſure, a taſte for the arts of amuſement and ſuperfluities, when they do not require an exportation of bullion, increaſe among their ſubjects. They very well know, that, beſides its nouriſhing that littleneſs of mind which is favourable to tyranny, the people in creating artificial wants are only forging their own chains. Alexander being deſirous of keeping the Ichthyopages in a ſtate of dependence, he compelled them to give over fiſhing, and ſubſiſt on the

Neceſſity erected thrones; the arts and ſciences have ſupported them. It is yours, ye potentates of the earth, to diſtinguiſh literary talents, and protect thoſe who cultivate them. It is yours, ye poliſhed nations, to merit ſuch protection. Yes, ye happy ſlaves, it is to literature and the ſciences you owe that delicacy of taſte which is ſo much your boaſt; that candour of diſpoſition, that urbanity of manners, which render your converſation ſo agreeable and eaſy. In a word, it is to them you owe the appearance of all the virtues, without being in poſſeſſion of one.

It was by this ſpecies of politeneſs, which is ſo much the more captivating as it ſeems leſs affected, that Athens and Rome were ſo much diſtinguiſhed in the boaſted times of their ſplendor and magnificence: and it is doubtleſs by the ſame means that our own age and nation will diſtinguiſh itſelf above all thoſe of antiquity. A philoſophical preciſion void of pedantry; a complacency free from affectation, equally diſtant from the ruſticity of the Germans and the buffoonery of the Italians; theſe are the effects of a taſte acquired by liberal ſtudies, and improved by converſation with the world. How happy would it be for thoſe who live among us, if our external appearances were always a picture of the inward diſpoſition of our hearts; if decorum were but virtue; if the maxims we profeſſed were the rules of our conduct; and if real philoſophy

the cuſtomary food of civilized nations. The American ſavages, who go naked, and live on the product of the chace, could never be ſubdued. In fact, what yoke can be impoſed on men who ſtand in need of nothing?

loſophy were inſeparable from the appellation of a philoſopher! But ſo many good qualities ſeldom go together; virtue delights not in ſo much pomp.

A ſuperb dreſs may denote opulence; an elegant one a man of taſte; but the healthy and robuſt are known by different indications. It is under the ruſtic habit of a labourer, and not beneath the lace or embroidery of a courtier, that we ſhould look for bodily ſtrength and activity.

Exterior ornaments are no leſs foreign to virtue, which is the ſtrength and activity of the mind. The man of probity is an athletic, who loves to combat his adverſary naked; deſpiſing thoſe paultry trappings, which prevent the exertion of his ſtrength, and were for the moſt part invented only to conceal ſome deformity.

Before art had poliſhed our manners, and taught our paſſions to ſpeak the language of affectation, our morals were rude but natural; while a difference in point of behaviour denoted at firſt ſight a difference of diſpoſition. Human nature was not in itſelf better; but mankind found their ſecurity in the facility of reciprocally knowing each other's character: and this advantage, of which we know not the value, prevented their being guilty of many vices.

At preſent, more ſubtile reſearches, and a more refined taſte, have reduced the art of pleaſing to a vulgar ſyſtem. Hence it is that a ſervile and fallacious conformity prevails in modern manners; ſo that one would think our minds were all caſt in the ſame mould. Politeneſs requires this thing, decorum that; ceremony

mony has its forms, and fashion its laws, by which we are constantly prevented from following the dictates of our own genius or understanding.

We dare no longer appear what we really are, but lie under a perpetual restraint; in the mean time the herd of mankind, which we may call the world, act all under the same circumstances exactly alike, unless some very particular and powerful motives prevent them. By these means, we are ever at a loss with regard to a man's true character; and, even to know one's friend, must wait for some critical and pressing occasion; that is, till it is too late; as it is on those very occasions such knowledge is of any use to us.

What a train of vices must necessarily attend this uncertainty! Sincere friendship, real esteem, and perfect confidence, are banished from among men: while umbrage, suspicion, fear, coldness, reserve, hate and fraud, lie constantly concealed under that uniform and deceitful veil of politeness, that boasted candour and urbanity, for which we are indebted to the superior knowledge of this enlightened age. Oaths and imprecations are become vulgar, and the name of our Creator is no longer profaned in polite company; whose delicate ears nevertheless are not in the least offended at the most horrid blasphemy. We are grown too modest to boast our own merit; but scruple not to enhance it, by derogating from that of others. We do not rudely attack even our enemies, but artfully calumniate them. Our prejudices against other nations diminish, but so at the same time doth our love for our own country. To a despicable ignorance hath succeeded a dangerous scepticism. Some vices indeed are condemned, and others grown

un-

unfashionable; but then we have still many that are honoured with the names of virtues, and it is become necessary that we should either have, or at least affect to have them. Let who will extol the moderation of our modern sages; I see nothing in it, for my part, but a refined species of intemperance as unworthy of my commendation as their artificial simplicity*.

Such is the purity which our morals have required; thus it is we are become virtuous. Let the arts and sciences reclaim the share they have had in this salutary work. To this I shall add but one reflection more; which is this, that if an inhabitant of some distant country should endeavour to form an idea of European morals from the state of the sciences, the perfection of the arts, the decorum of our public entertainments, the politeness of our behaviour, the affability of our discourse, our constant professions of benevolence, and from those tumultuous assemblies of people of all ranks that appear from morning till night solicitous to oblige each other; such a stranger, I say, would conceive our system of morals to be totally contrary to what it really is.

Where there is no apparent effect, it is idle to look for a cause: but here the effect is certain; it is an actual depravation, our minds being corrupted in the same proportion as the arts and sciences are improved. Will it be said, that this is a misfortune peculiar to the present age? No,

* "I like," said Montaigne, "to converse and hold an argument; but it is with very few people, and that for my own gratification. For to do this, by way of affording amusement for the great, or of making a parade of one's talents, is in my opinion an employment very ill-becoming a man of honour."

No, gentlemen, the evils reſulting from our vain curioſity are coeval with the world. The daily ebbing and flowing of the tides are not more regularly influenced by the moon, than the morals of a people by the progreſs of the arts and ſciences. Virtue hath diſappeared in proportion as their light hath been diſplayed above the horizon, and the ſame phenomenon hath been conſtantly obſerved in all times and in all places.

Turn your eyes to Egypt, the firſt ſchool of mankind; that ancient country, famous for its fertility under a barren ſky; the ſpot from which Seſoſtris once ſet out in his expedition to conquer the world. Egypt became the mother of philoſophy and the fine arts; ſoon after which it was conquered by Cambyſes, and then ſucceſſively by the Greeks, the Romans, the Arabs, and finally by the Turks.

Let us next take a ſurvey of Greece, once peopled by heroes, who twice made themſelves maſters of Aſia. Letters, as yet in their infancy, had not corrupted the diſpoſition of its inhabitants; but the progreſs of the ſciences ſoon produced a diſſoluteneſs of manners and the impoſition of the Macedonian yoke: from which time Greece, ever ſince learned, voluptuous and enſlaved, hath experienced nothing but a change of maſters amidſt all its revolutions. Not the eloquence of Demoſthenes himſelf could reanimate a body once enervated by luxury and the arts.

It was not till the days of Ennius and Terence that Rome, founded by a ſhepherd, and rendered illuſtrious by huſbandmen, began to degenerate. But after the appearance of an Ovid, a Catullus, a Martial, and the reſt of thoſe numerous

merous obſcene authors, whoſe very names are ſufficient to put modeſty to the bluſh, Rome, heretofore the temple of virtue, became the theatre of vice, a ſcorn among the nations, and the object of deriſion even to barbarians. Thus the capital of the world at length ſubmitted to the yoke of ſlavery it had impoſed on others; the very day of its fall being that in which it conferred on one of its citizens the title of umpire in ſubjects of taſte.

What ſhall I ſay of that metropolis of the eaſtern empire, which by its ſituation ſeemed calculated to be the capital of the world; that aſylum of the arts and ſciences, when they were baniſhed from the reſt of Europe, more perhaps through policy than barbariſm? The moſt profligate debaucheries, the moſt abandoned villanies, the moſt atrocious crimes, plots, murders and aſſaſſinations, form the chain of facts which conſtitute the hiſtory of Conſtantinople. Yet from this pure and poliſhed ſource are derived thoſe boaſted rays which have illuminated the preſent age.

But wherefore ſhould we recur to paſt ages, for proofs of a truth of which the preſent affords us ſufficient evidence. There is a vaſt empire in Aſia, in which the paths of literature are reſpected as leading to the firſt and moſt honourable employments in the ſtate. If the ſciences improved our morals, if they inſpired us with courage and taught us to lay down our lives for the good of our country, the Chineſe ſhould be of courſe a wiſe, free, and invincible people. But, if there be hardly a vice which they do not practiſe; if there be hardly a crime to which they are not familiar; if neither the

ſagacity

ſagacity of their miniſters, the pretended wiſdom of their laws, nor the multitude of inhabitants who people that vaſt empire, could preſerve them from ſubjection to the yoke of the rude and ignorant Tartars, of what uſe were their men of ſcience and literature? What advantage hath that country reaped from the honours beſtowed on its literati? That of being peopled by a race of ſcoundrels and ſlaves!

Let us oppoſe to theſe inſtances that of the morals of a few nations; who, being preſerved from the contagion of uſeleſs knowledge, have by their virtues become happy in themſelves, and afford a ſhining example to others. Such were the firſt inhabitants of Perſia; a nation ſo ſingular, that virtue was taught among them in the ſame manner as the ſciences are with us. They ſubdued Aſia with great facility, and poſſeſs the excluſive glory of having the ſimple hiſtory of their political inſtitutions regarded by poſterity as a philoſophical romance. Such were the Scythians, of whom are tranſmitted from antiquity ſuch wonderful commendations. Such were the Germans, whoſe ſimplicity, innocence and virtue, afforded a moſt delightful contraſt to the pen of an hiſtorian wearied with deſcribing the baſeneſs and villanies of an enlightened, opulent, and voluptuous nation. Such had been even Rome in the days of its poverty and ignorance. And ſuch we have ſeen, even in our own times, that ruſtic nation, whoſe juſtly boaſted courage not even adverſity hath been able to depreſs, and whoſe fidelity not example hath been able to corrupt *.

It

* I dare not ſpeak of thoſe happy nations, who knew not even

It is not through ſtupidity that the latter have preferred other exerciſes to thoſe of the underſtanding. They were not ignorant that in other countries there were idle men who ſpent their time in diſputing about the ſovereign good, and about vice and virtue. They knew alſo that theſe vain reaſoners, while they were laviſh in their own praiſes, indiſcriminately ſtigmatiſed other nations with the contemptuous appellation of Barbarians. But they conſidered the morals of theſe polite people, and thence were inſtructed to diſpute their learning *.

Can it be forgotten, that, in the very heart of Greece, aroſe a city as famous for the happy ignorance of its inhabitants, as for the wiſdom of its laws; a republic of demi-gods rather than of men, ſo greatly ſuperior ſeemed their virtues to thoſe of mere humanity! Hail, Sparta! thou eternal diſgrace to the vanity of ſcience; who, while the vices, conducted by the fine arts, were introduced into Athens, even while its tyrant

even the name of many vices, which we find it ſo difficult to ſuppreſs; the ſavages of America, whoſe ſimple and natural policy is by Montaigne preferred, without heſitation, not only to the laws of Plato, but to the moſt perfect ſyſtem of government philoſophy hath ever ſuggeſted. He cites many ſtriking examples, for thoſe who are capable of admiring them. But what of all that? ſays he; the poor creatures are not worth a pair of breeches!

* What are we to think was the real opinion of the Athenians themſelves reſpecting eloquence, when they were ſo very careful to baniſh declamation from that upright tribunal againſt whoſe deciſion their gods never appealed? What did the Romans think of phyſicians, when their art was prohibited in their republic? And when the remains of humanity left among the Spaniards induced them to forbid the exportation of lawyers to America, what idea muſt they have had of the ſcience of juriſprudence? May it not be ſaid that they imagined by this ſingle expedient to make a reparation for all the outrages they had committed againſt the poor unhappy Indians?

was carefully collecting together the works of the prince of poets, didſt baniſh from within thy walls at once the artiſts and the arts, the learned and their learning.

This difference of conduct was ſufficiently diſtinguiſhed by the conſequential event. Athens became the ſeat of politeneſs and taſte, the country of orators and philoſophers. The elegance of its buildings was equal to that of its language; while on every ſide were preſented marble and canvas, animated by the hands of the moſt ſkilful artiſts. It is from Athens that we derive thoſe aſtoniſhing performances which will ſerve as models to all ſucceeding corrupted ages. The picture of Lacedæmonia is not ſo highly coloured.

Of Sparta, the neighbouring nations obſerved, that "men were there born virtuous, their native air ſeeming to inſpire them with virtue." But all its inhabitants have left us, is the memorial of their heroic actions; monuments that ſhould be eſteemed more valuable than the moſt curious relics of the Athenian marbles.

It is true, that among the Athenians there were ſome few wiſe men who withſtood the general torrent, and preſerved their integrity even in the company of the muſes. But let us attend to the judgment which the principal, and moſt unhappy of them, paſſed on the artiſts and literati of his time.

"I have examined the poets," ſays he, "and "I look upon them as people whoſe talents im- "poſe both on themſelves and others: they give "themſelves out for wiſe men, and are taken "for ſuch; but in reality they are ſtrange fools."

"From the poets," continues Socrates, "I "turn-

"turned to the artiſts. Nobody was more ig-
"norant of the arts than myſelf; and of courſe
"nobody was more fully perſuaded that the ar-
"tiſts were poſſeſſed of amazing knowledge.
"I ſoon diſcovered, however, that their ſitua-
"tion was no better than that of the poets;
"both the one and the other being ſubject to
"the ſame prejudices. Becauſe the moſt ſkil-
"ful of them excel others in their particular
"profeſſions, they think themſelves wiſer than
"all the reſt of mankind. This arrogance, in
"my opinion, tarniſhed entirely the luſtre of
"their knowledge; ſo that, taking upon me
"the prerogative of an oracle, and aſking my-
"ſelf whether I had rather be what I am, or
"what they are, to know what they know, or
"to know that I know nothing? I very readily
"anſwered, In the name of God, let me re-
"main as I am.

"We know none of us, neither the ſophiſts,
"the poets, the orators, the artiſts, nor myſelf,
"in what conſiſts the *true*, the *good*, or the
"*beautiful*. But there is this difference be-
"tween us; that, though none of theſe people
"know any thing, they all conceit they know
"ſomething; whereas for my part, if I know
"nothing, I make no doubt of my ignorance.
"So the ſuperiority of wiſdom, imputed to me
"by the oracle, is reduced merely to my being
"fully convinced that I am ignorant of what I
"do not know."

Thus we find Socrates, the wiſeſt of men in the opinion of an oracle, and the moſt learned of all the Athenians in the opinion of all Greece, making a profeſſed panagyric on ignorance. Were he now alive alſo, there is little reaſon to think

that our modern ſcholars and artiſts would induce him to change his mind. No, gentlemen, that honeſt ſage would ſtill perſiſt in deſpiſing our vain ſciences. He would lend no aſſiſtance to ſwell the numerous catalogue of books that flow in upon us from all quarters: but would leave us only, as he did heretofore to his diſciples, the example and memorial of his virtues; the nobleſt method of inſtructing mankind.

Socrates began at Athens, and the elder Cato proceeded at Rome, to inveigh againſt thoſe ſeductive and ſubtile Greeks, who corrupted the virtue and diminiſhed the courage of their fellow-citizens. The arts and ſciences, however, ſtill prevailed. Rome abounded with philoſophers and orators, while its military diſcipline was neglected, agriculture was held in contempt, and patriotiſm gave place to the formation of parties. To the ſacred names of liberty, and obedience to the laws, ſucceeded thoſe of the founders of particular ſects, as Epicurus, Zeno, and Arceſilas. It was even a ſaying among their own philoſophers, that "their men of learning had eclipſed their men of probity." Before that time the Romans were ſatisfied with the practice of virtue; and were undone when they began to ſtudy its theory.

What would the great ſoul of Fabricius have felt, if to his misfortune he had been called back to life, to have ſeen the pomp and magnificence of that of Rome, which his arm had ſaved from ruin, and his reſpectable name rendered more illuſtrious than all its conqueſts. "Ye gods! "(would he have ſaid,) what are become of thoſe "thatched roofs and ruſtic hearths which were "formerly the habitations of temperance and

"vir-

" virtue? What fatal ſplendour hath ſucceeded
" the ancient Roman ſimplicity? What is this
" foreign language, this effeminacy of manners?
" What is the uſe of theſe ſtatues, paintings,
" and edifices? Ye ſenſeleſs people, what is it
" you have done? You, who are the lords and
" maſters of the earth, have made yourſelves
" ſlaves to the frivolous nations ye have ſubdued.
" Ye are governed merely by talkers and rheto-
" ricians; and it has been only to enrich archi-
" tects, painters, ſtatuaries, and ſtage-players,
" that you have ſhed ſo much blood in the re-
" duction of Greece and Aſia; while even
" the ſpoils of Carthage are become the reward
" of a flute-player. Romans! Romans! haſten
" to demoliſh thoſe amphitheatres; break to
" pieces thoſe marble ſtatues; burn thoſe paint-
" ings; and drive from among you thoſe ſlaves
" who keep you in ſubjection, and whoſe fatal
" arts have corrupted your morals. Let others
" render themſelves illuſtrious by ſuch vain ta-
" lents; the only talent worthy of Rome is that
" of conquering the world, and extending the
" practice of virtue. When Cyneas took the
" Roman ſenate for an aſſembly of kings, he
" was not ſtruck either with uſeleſs pomp, or
" ſtudied elegance. He was not captivated by
" that futile eloquence, which is now the pride
" of your frivolous orators. What was it, then,
" which ſtruck Cyneas with the idea of our ſe-
" natorial majeſty? O, my fellow-citizens, he
" beheld a ſight, the nobleſt that ever exiſted
" under heaven, a ſight which not all your rich-
" es or your arts can produce; this was an aſ-
" ſembly of two hundred virtuous men, wor-

" thy to command in Rome, and to govern the " world."

But let us lay aſide the diſtance of time and place, and examine what hath happened in our own time and country; or rather let us ſet aſide thoſe odious deſcriptions that may offend our delicacy, and ſpare ourſelves the pains of repeating the ſame circumſtances under different names. It was not for nothing that I invoked the name of Fabricius; for what have I put into his mouth that might not have come with as much propriety from Lewis XII. or King Henry IV.? It is true, that in France, Socrates would not have been compelled to drink poiſon; but he muſt have ſwallowed a potion infinitely more bitter, the moſt inſulting raillery and contempt, an hundred times worſe than death.

Thus it is that luxury, profligacy and ſlavery, have been, in all ages, the ſcourge of our ambitious endeavours to emerge out of that happy ſtate of ignorance in which the wiſdom of providence had placed us. That thick veil with which it hath covered all its operations, ſeems to be a ſufficient proof that it never deſigned us for ſuch fruitleſs reſearches. But is there, indeed, one leſſon it hath taught us, that we have rightly profited by, or have not with impunity neglected? Be rightly inſtructed, however, for once, ye people, and know that nature would have preſerved you from ſcience, as a tender mother ſnatches a dangerous weapon out of the hands of her child. Know that all the ſecrets ſhe hides from you, are ſo many evils from which ſhe protects you; the very difficulty you experience in acquiring knowledge being a diſtinguiſhing mark of her benevolence towards you.

you. Mankind are naturally perverſe; but how much more ſo would they be, if they had the misfortune to be alſo born learned!

Theſe reflections are ſufficiently mortifying to the pride of human nature. What! will it be ſaid, is probity the child of ignorance? Is virtue inconſiſtent with ſcience? How fatal are the conſequences that flow from ſuch prepoſſeſſions? But to reconcile theſe apparent contradictions, we need only examine nearly the emptineſs and vanity of thoſe pompous titles which are ſo liberally beſtowed on human knowledge. Let us conſider, therefore, the arts and ſciences in themſelves. Let us trace the reſult of their progreſs, nor ſcruple to admit of thoſe points in which our rational inductions ſhall be found to agree with thoſe deducible from hiſtory.

PART THE SECOND.

AN ancient tradition paſſed out of Egypt into Greece, that ſome god, who was an enemy to the repoſe of mankind, was the inventor of the ſciences *. What muſt have been the opinion of the Egyptians, then, with whom the ſciences firſt took riſe; they who beheld, at a nearer diſtance, the ſource from whence they ſprung? In fact, whether we turn to the annals of

* It is eaſy to diſcover the allegory of the fable of Prometheus: and it does not appear that the Greeks, who chained him to mount Caucaſus, had a better opinion of him than the Egyptians had of their god Teuthos. A certain ſatyr, ſays an ancient fabuliſt, the firſt time he ſaw a fire, was going to kiſs and embrace it; but Promethus cried out to him to forbear, or otherwiſe his beard would rue it: It burns, ſays he, every thing that touches it.

of the world, or ſubſtitute philoſophical inveſtigations inſtead of the uncertain chronicles of hiſtory, we ſhall not find the origin of human knowledge anſwerable to the idea we are fond of entertaining of it at preſent. Aſtronomy was the effect of ſuperſtition; eloquence of ambition, hatred, falſehood, and flattery; geometry of avarice; phyſics of an idle curioſity; and moral philoſophy, like all the reſt, of human pride. Thus the arts and ſciences owe their birth to our vices; we ſhould be leſs doubtful of their advantages, if they had ſprung from our virtues.

The default of their origin is, indeed, but too plainly ſeen in their objects. What would become of the arts, were they not cheriſhed by luxury? If men were not unjuſt, of what uſe were juriſprudence? What would become of hiſtory, if there were no tyrants, wars, nor conſpiracies? In a word, who would paſs his life in barren ſpeculations, if every body, attentive only to the obligations of humanity and the neceſſities of nature, employed themſelves ſolely in ſerving their country, obliging their friends, and relieving the unhappy? Are we then formed, it may be aſked, to live and die on the brink of that well in which truth lies hid at the bottom? This reflection alone is, in my opinion, enough to diſcourage, at firſt ſetting out, every man who ſeriouſly endeavours to inſtruct himſelf by the ſtudy of philoſophy.

What a variety of dangers ſurround us! What a number of wrong paths preſent themſelves in the inveſtigation of the ſciences! Through how many errors, more perilous than the truth itſelf is uſeful, muſt we not paſs to arrive at it! The diſadvantages we lie under are evident; for falſe-

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hood is capable of an infinite variety of combinations; but the truth hath but one ſimple way of being ſuch. Beſides, where is the man who ſincerely deſires to find it? Or even admitting his good will, by what characteriſtic marks is he ſure to know it? Amidſt that infinite diverſity of opinions which prevail in the world, where is the criterion * by which he may certainly judge of it? Again, what is ſtill more difficult, if we ſhould even be fortunate enough to diſcover it, which of us knows how to make a proper uſe of it?

If our ſciences, alſo, are futile in the objects they propoſe, they are no leſs dangerous in the effects they produce. Being themſelves the effect of indolence, they generate idleneſs in turn; and an irreparable loſs of time, is the firſt prejudice they muſt neceſſarily be of to ſociety. To live without doing ſome good, is a great evil as well in the political as in the moral world; and hence an uſeleſs citizen ſhould ever be regarded as a very pernicious member of ſociety. Anſwer me then, ye illuſtrious philoſophers! you, of whom we learn the ratios in which attraction acts in vacuo, and in the revolution of the planets deſcribing equal ſpaces in equal times; you, of whom we are taught how the ſoul and body correſpond like two watches without actual communication with each other; what planets are inhabited, and what inſects are capable of re-

* The leſs we know, the more we think we know. The peripatetics doubted of nothing. Deſcartes conſtructed an univerſe with cubes and vortices. And there is ſcarce a minute philoſopher in Europe, who does not boldly explain the inexplicable myſteries of electricity, which will perhaps be ever deſpaired of by real philoſophers.

reproduction: Anſwer me, I ſay, you from whom we receive all this ſublime information, whether we ſhould have been leſs numerous, worſe governed, leſs formidable, leſs flouriſhing, or more perverſe, ſuppoſing you had taught us none of all theſe fine things?

Recede then from the pretended importance of your productions; and, ſince the labours of the moſt enlightened among the learned and among the moſt virtuous of our citizens, are of ſo little public utility, acknowledge what we ought to think of that numerous herd of obſcure writers and uſeleſs literati who live idly upon the ſubſtance of the ſtate.

Idly, do I ſay? Would to God they were really idle. Society would be more peaceful, and our manners leſs corrupt. But theſe vain and futile declaimers go forth on all ſides, armed with fatal paradoxes, to ſap the foundation of our faith, and eradicate the principles of virtue. They contemptuouſly deride the antiquated names of patriotiſm and religion; conſecrating their talents and philoſophy to the debaſement and abolition of every thing that is held ſacred among mankind. Not that they bear any real hatred to religion or virtue; they are enemies only to the public opinion; and would readily become Chriſtians if they were baniſhed to a country of Atheiſts. What extravagancies will not the rage of ſingularity induce men to commit!

The abuſe of time is certainly a great evil; but ſtill greater evils attend upon literature and the arts. Such is luxury, produced like them by indolence and vanity. Luxury is ſeldom unattended by the arts and ſciences; but theſe are ever attended by luxury. I am not to learn that

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our modern philoſophy, fertile in paradoxes, pretends, in contradiction to the experience of ages, that luxury contributes to the ſplendour of a ſtate. But, without inſiſting on the expediency of ſumptuary laws, can it be denied that rectitude of morals is eſſential to the duration of empires, and that luxury is diametrically oppoſite to ſuch rectitude? Let it be admitted that luxury is a certain indication of wealth; that it even ſerves, if you will, to increaſe ſuch wealth: What concluſion is to be drawn from this paradox, ſo worthy of the times? And what will become of virtue, if riches are to be acquired at any rate! The politicians among the ancients were always talking of morals and virtue; ours ſpeak of nothing elſe but commerce and money. One of them gravely tells us, that in ſuch a country a man is juſt worth as much as he will ſell for at Algiers: another, purſuing the ſame mode of calculation, finds that in ſome countries a man is worth nothing, and in others ſtill leſs than nothing; thus valuing men as they do droves of oxen. According to theſe eſtimators, a man is worth no more to the ſtate, than in proportion to his conſumption; and thus a Sybarite would be worth at leaſt thirty Lacedæmonians. Let theſe writers tell me, however, which of the two republics, Sybaris or Sparta, was ſubdued by an handful of peaſants, and which of them became the terror of Aſia?

The monarchy of Cyrus was conquered by thirty thouſand men, led on by a prince poorer than the meaneſt of the Perſian ſatrapes: in like manner the Scythians, the moſt indigent of all nations, were found capable of reſiſting the moſt powerful monarchs of the univerſe. When two

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famous republics contended for the empire of the world, the one rich and the other poor, the former was ſubdued by the latter. The Roman empire in its turn, after having accumulated to itſelf all the riches of the univerſe, became the ſpoil of a people who knew not even what riches were. The Franks conquered the Gauls, and the Saxons England, without any other treaſures than their bravery and poverty. A band of poor mountaineers, whoſe avidity was confined to the poſſeſſion of a few ſheep-ſkins, having firſt given a check to the arrogance of Auſtria, went on to cruſh the opulent and formidable houſe of Burgundy, which at that time made the potentates of Europe to tremble. In fine, not all the power and wiſdom of the heir to Charles the fifth, ſupported even by the treaſures of the Indies, could ſuppreſs the revolt of a few herring-fiſhers in the Netherlands. Let our ſpeculative politicians condeſcend to lay aſide their calculations for a moment, to reflect on theſe examples: whence they may learn, that money, though it buys every thing elſe, cannot purchaſe good morals and virtuous citizens. What is then the preciſe point in diſpute regarding luxury? It is to know which is moſt advantageous to ſtates, to have a brilliant and momentary exiſtence, or to be virtuous and durable? I ſay to be brilliant, but with what luſtre! A taſte for oſtentation never prevails in thoſe minds which delight in probity. No: it is impoſſible that underſtandings, contracted by a multitude of frivolous occupations, ſhould ever be elevated to what is truly great and noble; nay, even if they had the power, they would want the fortitude to exert it.

Every artiſt is covetous of applauſe. The applauſe

applauſe of his contemporaries conſtitutes a valuable part of his recompenſe. What muſt he do then to obtain it, if he have the misfortune to be born among a people, and at a time, when literature being in vogue, even ſuperficial youth are qualified to lead the faſhion; when men ſacrifice their taſte to the tyrants of their liberty, and one ſex dares not approve any thing but what is agreeable to the puſilanimity of the other *; when the greateſt maſter-pieces of the drama are condemned, and the nobleſt of muſical productions neglected? This, gentlemen, he will do. He will lower his genius to the level of the age, and will rather ſubmit to compoſe ordinary productions that may be admired during his life-time, than labour at ſublime performances which will not be admired till after his death. Tell us, Voltaire, how many nervous and maſculine beauties you have ſacrificed to the falſe delicacy of our times; tell us how many great and noble ſtrokes you have ſuppreſſed, in compliance to that ſpirit of modern gallantry which delights in what is frivolous and little.

It is thus that a relaxation in morals, the ne-

* I am far from thinking that the aſcendant which the women have obtained over the men, is an evil in itſelf. It is a preſent which nature hath made them for the good of mankind. If better directed, it might be productive of as much good, as it is now of evil. We are not ſufficiently ſenſible of what advantage it would be to ſociety to give a better education to that half of our ſpecies which governs the other. The men will always do what is pleaſing to the women. If you require therefore that the former ſhould be noble and virtuous, let the women be taught what greatneſs of ſoul and virtue are. The reflections which this ſubject would furniſh, and which Plato formerly intimated, deſerve to be more fully developed by a pen worthy to write after ſo great a maſter, and to defend ſo great a cauſe.

ceſſary conſequence of luxury, brings with it of courſe a corruption of taſte. If by chance, alſo, there be found among the men of genius, an individual who hath fortitude enough to refuſe to comply with the taſte of the age and to debaſe himſelf by puerile productions; hard will be his lot, to live and die in indigence, and be buried in oblivion. Ah! why is this not rather a mere prediction, than a fact already confirmed by experience? Yes, thou admirable Carle Pierre, the time is already come when that pencil of thine, deſtined to increaſe the majeſty of our temples by ſublime and ſacred repreſentations, muſt be thrown aſide, or be proſtituted to adorn the pannels of our coaches with wanton deſigns and laſcivious paintings. And thou, inimitable Pygal, rival of Phidias and Praxiteles; thou, whoſe chiſſel would have been employed among the ancients to carve them gods, whoſe images would almoſt have excuſed their idolatry; yes, even thy maſterly hand muſt condeſcend to faſhion baubles and monſters, or remain idle.

We cannot reflect on the manners of mankind, without contemplating with pleaſure the picture of that ſimplicity which prevailed in the primitive ages. This picture may be juſtly compared to that of a beautiful coaſt, adorned alone by the hands of nature; towards which our eyes are conſtantly turned, and from which we perceive ourſelves departing with reluctance. While men were innocent and virtuous, they loved to have the gods for witneſſes of their actions, and therefore they dwelt together in the ſame ruſtic habitations; but when they became vicious, they grew tired of ſuch officious ſpectators, and baniſhed them to magnificent temples. At length,

length, therefore, they expelled their deities even from theſe; at leaſt the temples of the gods were no more magnificent than the palaces of the citizens. This was the height of depravation; nor could the vices ever be carried a greater length, than when they were ſeen ſupported, as it were, at the doors of the great, on columns of marble, and engraven on Corinthian capitals.

As the conveniences of life increaſe, the arts are brought to perfection, and luxury of courſe prevails; true courage flags; the virtues diſppear; and all this is the effect of the ſciences, and of thoſe arts which are exerciſed in the obſcutity of the cloſet. When the Goths ravaged Greece, the libraries eſcaped the flames merely from an opinion propagated among them, that it was improper to diveſt the enemy of thoſe means which diverted their attention from military exerciſes, and kept it engaged by indolent and ſedentary occupations.

Charles the eighth made himſelf maſter of Tuſcany and the kingdom of Naples, almoſt without drawing his ſword; this unexpected ſucceſs being imputed, by the whole court, to the Italian nobility's having applied with greater earneſtneſs to the ſtudy of the ſciences than to martial purſuits. In fact, ſays the ſenſible relater of the laſt two remarks, experience plainly evinces, that an application to the ſciences tends rather to make men effeminate and daſtardly than reſolute and vigorous.

The Romans confeſſed that military virtue was extinguiſhed among them, in proportion as they began to grow connoiſſeurs in painting, ſculpture, and the reſt of the fine arts. Nay, as if this celebrated country was to be for ever

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an example to other nations, the revival of letters hath again demoliſhed, and perhaps for ever, the martial reputation which Italy ſeemed a few centuries ago to have recovered.

The ancient republics of Greece, with that wiſdom which was ſo conſpicuous in moſt of their inſtitutions, prohibited all thoſe inactive and ſedentary employments, which by enervating the body diminiſhed alſo the vigour of the mind. With what courage, in fact, can it be thought that hunger and thirſt, fatigues, dangers and death, can be confronted by men who are ſhocked at the ſmalleſt difficulty and depreſſed with the ſlighteſt pain? With what reſolution can ſoldiers ſupport the exceſſive toils of war, when they are entirely unaccuſtomed to them? With what ſpirits can they make forced marches againſt the enemy under the command of officers who have not even the ſtrength to travel on horſeback? To this may be objected many celebrated inſtances of valour in officers artificially trained up in the modern diſcipline of war. But, however juſtly they may boaſt their bravery in the field and on the day of battle, they will prudently be ſilent on their ability to ſupport exceſſive fatigue, the rigor of the ſeaſons, and the inclemency of the weather. A little ſunſhine or ſnow, or the want of a few ſuperfluities, is ſufficient to deſtroy one of our fineſt armies in a few days. Intrepid warriors! permit me for once to tell you the truth, which you ſeldom hear. Of your bravery I am fully ſatisfied. I have no doubt that you would have triumphed with Hannibal at Cannæ, and at Thraſimen; that you would have paſſed the Rubicon with Cæſar, and enabled him to enſlave his country:

country: but you never would have been able to have croſſed the Alps with the former, or to ſubdue the Gauls with the latter.

The ſucceſs of a war does not always depend on the events of battle: but there is in generalſhip an art ſuperior to that of gaining victories. A man may behave with great intrepidity in the field, and yet be a very indifferent officer. Even in the common ſoldier, a little more ſtrength and vigour would perhaps be more uſeful than ſo much courage; which after all cannot ſecure him from death. And what imports it to the ſtate whether its troops periſh by colds and fevers, or by the ſword of the enemy?

Again, if the cultivation of the ſciences be prejudicial to military qualifications, it is ſtill more ſo to moral qualities. Hence an abſurd mode of education ſerves, even from our infancy, to improve our wit and corrupt our underſtanding. We ſee, on every ſide, great inſtitutions, where youth are educated at a great expence, and inſtructed in every thing but their duty. Your children are kept ignorant of their own language, while they are taught to ſpeak others of no manner of uſe. In like manner they learn to make verſes which they can hardly underſtand; and, without being capable to diſtinguiſh truth from error, are taught the art of diſguiſing them to others by argumentative ſophiſtry. But with regard to magnanimity, equity, temperance, humanity, courage, they are words of which they know not the meaning. The pleaſing name of patriot never reaches their ear; and if they ever hear the name of God *, it

* Penſees philoſophiques.

it is to hear him repreſented as an object of terror rather than of reverence. I ſhould as lieve, ſaid a very ſenſible tutor on this occaſion, that my pupil had ſpent his time in the tennis-court as in this manner; as there he would at leaſt have acquired an active diſpoſition of body.

I well know that children ought to be employed, and that idleneſs is to them of dangerous conſequence. But what ſhould they be employed about? What ſhould they be taught? This is undoubtedly an important queſtion. Let them be taught what they are to practiſe when they come to be men †; not what they are

† Such was the education of the Spartans with regard to one of the greateſt of their kings. It is well worth obſervance, ſays Montaigne, that the excellent inſtitutions of Lycurgus, which were in truth miraculouſly perfect, were ſo attentive to the bringing up of youth, as if this were their principal object; yet make no mention of learning: As if their generous-ſpirited youth, diſdaining every other reſtraint, required, inſtead of maſters of the arts and ſcientific pedagogues, liberal inſtructors in valour, prudence, and juſtice.

Let us hear next what the ſame writer ſays of the Perſians. Plato, ſays he, relates that the preſumptive heir to the crown was thus brought up. At his birth he was committed, not to the care of the women, but to thoſe eunuchs who were in higheſt authority and eſteem with the king on account of their virtue. Theſe undertook to render his body beautiful and healthy. At ſeven years of age they taught him to ride and go a-hunting. At fourteen he was placed under the tuition of four the moſt wiſe, juſt, temperate, and brave perſons in the kingdom. The firſt inſtructed him in religion, the ſecond taught him to adhere inviolably to truth, the third to conquer his paſſions, and the fourth to be afraid of nothing. All, I may add, taught him to be a good man; but not one taught him to be learned.

Aſtyages, in Xenophon, deſires Cyrus to give him an account of his laſt leſſon. It was this, anſwered Cyrus: One of the great boys of the ſchool having a little coat, gave it to a little boy and took away from him his coat which was larger. Our preceptor having appointed me arbiter in the diſpute, I ordered that matters ſhould ſtand as they were, as each boy ſeemed

are to forget before they come to man's eſtate.

Our gardens are embelliſhed with ſtatues and our galleries with pictures. What do you imagine theſe maſter-pieces of art, thus exhibited to public admiration, repreſent? The great men who have defended our country, or the ſtill greater men who have enriched it by their virtues? No; they are the extravagant images of looſe deſires and perverted underſtandings, carefully ſelected from the ancient mythology, and preſented to the early curioſity of our children, doubtleſs that they may have in view the repreſentations of vicious actions, before they have learned to read the hiſtory of them.

Whence ariſe all thoſe abuſes, unleſs it be from that fatal inequality introduced among men, by the difference of talents and the depreſſion of virtue. Such is the moſt evident effect of all our ſtudies, and the moſt dangerous of all their conſequences. The queſtion is no longer, Is he a man of probity? but, Is he a man of ingenuity? We aſk not of a book, whether it be uſeful? but whether it be well written? Premiums are laviſhed on wit and ingenuity, while virtue is left to its own reward. Numerous are the prizes offered for fine writings, none for good actions. I ſhould be glad

ed to be better accommodated than before. The maſter remonſtrated, however, againſt my ſentence; alledging that I conſidered only the propriety of things; whereas juſtice ought firſt to have been regarded, by the firſt principle of which we are taught that none ſhould be diveſted of their property by force and violence: Adding, that he was puniſhed for his wrong deciſion, juſt as the boys are puniſhed in our country-ſchools when they forget the firſt aoriſt of τυπτω. My governor muſt make me a fine oration, *in genere demonſtrativo*, before he will perſuade me that his ſchool is as good as this.

glad however to know, whether the honour of obtaining the prize of the academy, is in any degree comparable to the merit of having inſtituted it.

A wiſe man is not eager after the gifts of fortune; but he is by no means inſenſible to glory, and when he ſees it ſo ill diſtributed, his virtue, which might have been animated by a little emulation, and rendered advantageous to ſociety, droops and dies away in obſcurity and indigence. It is from this cauſe, that the agreeable arts muſt in time neceſſarily be preferred to the uſeful; a circumſtance which has been but too much confirmed ſince the revival of the arts and ſciences. We have natural philoſophers, geometricians, chymiſts, aſtronomers, poets, muſicians, and painters in plenty: but we have no longer a true patriot amongſt us; or if there be found a few diſperſed up and down the country, they are left to periſh in their native poverty unnoticed and neglected. Such is the ſituation to which we are reduced: and ſuch are our ſentiments with regard to thoſe, who give us our daily bread, and afford us nouriſhment for our children.

I confeſs, however, that the evil is not ſo great as it might have been. Allwiſe Providence, by placing ſalutary ſimples near noxious plants, and by making poiſonous animals contain their own antidote, hath taught the ſovereigns of the earth, who are his miniſters, to imitate his wiſdom. It is by following this example, that the truly great monarch, to whoſe glory every ſuceeding age will add new luſtre, drew from the very boſom of the arts and ſciences, the very fountains of corruption, thoſe famous

famous ſocieties, which, while they are depoſitaries of that dangerous truſt the ſciences, are yet the ſacred guardians of our morals, by their attention to maintain a purity of manners among themſelves, and requiring it in every candidate as the condition of his admittance into their ſociety.

Theſe wiſe inſtitutions, confirmed by his auguſt ſucceſſor and imitated by all the princes of Europe, will ſerve at leaſt as a reſtraint on men of letters, who all aſpiring to the honour of being admitted into theſe academies, will of courſe have an eye to their moral conduct, and endeavour to merit ſuch honour by uſeful performances and irreproachable manners. Thoſe academies alſo, which, propoſing prizes for literary merit, ſhall make choice of ſuch ſubjects as are adapted to incite their countrymen to virtue, prove that it prevails in themſelves, and muſt give us a ſenſible and ſingular pleaſure to find that ſuch learned ſocieties devote their time to enlighten mankind, not only by ſuch inſtructions as are agreeable, but by thoſe which are uſeful.

Let not an objection be ſtarted, therefore, which is only an additional proof of my argument. So much precaution proves but too evidently the neceſſity of taking it. We never look out for remedies againſt ills that do not exiſt. Wherefore, indeed, do theſe bear all the marks of mere ordinary remedies, on account of their inefficacy? The numerous eſtabliſhments in favour of the learned, are only adapted to make men miſtake the objects of the ſciences, while they engage our attention to the cultivation of them. One would be apt to think, from the

the precautions every where taken, that we are over-ſtocked with huſbandmen, and are afraid of wanting philoſophers. I will not venture here to enter into a compariſon between agriculture and philoſophy, as they would not bear it. I ſhall only aſk, What is philoſophy? What is there contained in the writings of the moſt celebrated philoſophers? What are the inſtructions of theſe great friends of wiſdom. If we pay them any attention, ſhall we not take them for ſo many mountebanks, exhibiting themſelves in public, and crying out, *In here, in here, come to me, I am the only true doctor?* One of them teaches that there is no ſuch thing in the world as matter, but that every thing is merely repreſentative. Another declares that there is no other ſubſtance than matter, and no other God than the world itſelf. A third tells you that there is no ſuch thing in nature as virtue and vice, but that moral good and evil are only chimerical; while a fourth informs you that men are only beaſts of prey, and may conſcientiouſly devour each other. Oh why, ye great philoſophers, do you not reſerve theſe wiſe and profitable leſſons for your friends and children? You would ſoon reap the benefit of them, nor ſhould we be under any apprehenſions of ours becoming your diſciples.

Such are the wonderful men, whom their contemporaries held in the higheſt eſteem during their lives, and to whom immortality hath been attributed ſince their deceaſe. Such are the wiſe maxims we have received from them, and which are tranſmitted from age to age to poſterity. Paganiſm, though polluted with all the extravagancies of human reaſon, hath left nothing e-

qual

qual to the ſhameful monuments which have been erected by the art of printing, during the reign of the goſpel. The impious writings of Leucippus and Diagoras periſhed with their authors. The world, in their days, were ignorant of the art of immortalizing the errors and extravagancies of the human mind. But thanks to the art of printing †, and the uſe we make of it, the pernicious reveries of Hobbes and Spinoſa will laſt for ever. Hence with thoſe celebrated writings, of which the ignorance and ruſticity of our forefathers were incapable! Hence with them to our deſcendants, accompanied by thoſe writings, ſtill more pernicious, which ariſe from the corrupted manners of the preſent age! Let them convey to poſterity a faithful hiſtory of the progreſs and advantages of our arts and ſciences. If they are read, they will leave not a doubt about the queſtion now diſcuſſed: And unleſs mankind

† If we conſider the horrid diſorders which the art of printing hath already cauſed in Europe, and judge of the future by the evils that daily reſult from it, it is eaſy to foreſee that ſovereigns will hereafter take as much pains to ſuppreſs, as they ever took to encourage it. The Sultan Achmet, yielding to the importunities of certain pretenders to taſte, conſented to have a preſs erected at Conſtantinople; but it was hardly ſet to work, before they were obliged to deſtroy it, and throw the preſs and types into a well.

It is related that the Calif Omar, being aſked what ſhould be done with the library at Alexandria, anſwered in theſe words: "If the books in the library contain any thing contrary to the Alcoran, they are naught, and ought to be burnt; if they contain the doctrines of the Alcoran, they are uſeleſs, and ought to be burnt likewiſe." This reaſoning has been cited by our men of letters as the height of abſurdity: but if Gregory the Great had been in the place of Omar, and the Goſpel in the place of the Alcoran, the library would have been in like manner committed to the flames; and it would have been one of the moſt brilliant actions of his life.

mankind ſhould then be ſtill more abſurd than we, they will lift up their eyes to heaven, and exclaim in bitterneſs of heart, "Almighty "God! thou who diſpoſeſt of the underſtand-"ings of men, deliver us not up to the fatal "arts and ſciences of our forefathers; but re-"ſtore us to ignorance, innocence, and indigence, "which alone can make us happy, and are pre-"cious in thy ſight."

But if the progreſs of the arts and ſciences has added nothing to our real happineſs; if, on the other hand, it has corrupted our morals; and if that corruption has vitiated our taſte; what are we to think of the herd of inſtitutionary authors who have removed thoſe impediments which nature purpoſely laid in the way to the temple of the muſes, in order to try the powers of thoſe who might be tempted to ſeek knowledge? What ſhall we think alſo of thoſe compilers who have indiſcreetly opened a door to the ſciences, and have introduced into their ſanctuary a populace unworthy to approach it, when it was greatly to be wiſhed that all who ſhould be found incapable of making a conſiderable progreſs in the ſciences, were repulſed at their firſt ſetting out, and thereby induced to apply themſelves to employments more beneficial to ſociety? A man who ſhould remain all his life-time a poor verſifier, or a ſecond-rate geometrician, might have made nevertheleſs an excellent clothier. Thoſe whom nature intended for ſcholars, have no need of a maſter. Verulam, Deſcartes, and Newton, thoſe preceptors of mankind, had no preceptors themſelves. What guide could indeed have conducted them ſo far as their ſublime genius directed? Ordinary maſters would only

only have cramped their abilities, by confining them within the narrow limits of their own capacity. It was from the obſtacles they met with at firſt, that they learned to exert themſelves, and thence to traverſe the vaſt field they went over. If it be proper for ſome men to apply to the ſtudy of the arts and ſciences, it is only for thoſe who perceive themſelves capable of proceeding on their own ſtrength. It belongs only to theſe happy few, to erect monuments of glory to the human underſtanding. But if we are deſirous that nothing ſhould be above their genius, nothing ſhould be beyond their hopes. This is the only encouragement they require. The ſoul inſenſibly adapts itſelf to the objects on which it is employed, and thus it is that great occaſions always have produced great men. The greateſt orator in the world was Conſul of Rome, and perhaps the greateſt of philoſophers Lord Chancellor of England. Can it be conceived, that if the former had only been a profeſſor at an univerſity, and the latter a penſioner of an academy; can it be conceived, I ſay, that in ſuch caſe their works would not have ſuffered from their ſituation? Let not princes diſdain to admit into their councils thoſe who are the moſt capable of adviſing them. Let them renounce that antiquated prepoſſeſſion, originally ariſing from the ambition of the great, that the art of governing mankind is more difficult than that of inſtructing them; as if it was more eaſy to induce men to do good voluntarily, than to compel them to do it by force. Let the learned of the firſt rank in merit find an honourable aſylum in their courts; let them there enjoy the only recompenſe they deſerve, that of

promoting by their influence the happineſs of a people whom they have enlightened by their wiſdom. It is in this caſe only that we are likely to ſee what virtue, ſcience and power can do, when animated by the nobleſt emulation, and unanimouſly promoting the happineſs of mankind.

But ſo long as power only remains on one ſide, and knowledge and underſtanding on the other, the learned will ſeldom make great objects their ſtudy, princes will ſtill more rarely do great actions, and the common people will continue to be, as they are, mean, corrupt, and miſerable.

As for us, ordinary men, on whom heaven has not been pleaſed to beſtow ſuperior talents; as we are not deſtined to reap ſuch glory, let us be contented to remain in obſcurity. Let us not covet a reputation we ſhall never attain; and which, in the preſent ſtate of things, would never make up to us for the trouble it might coſt, even if we were qualified to obtain it. Why ſhould we build our happineſs on the opinions of others, when we poſſeſs a ſolid foundation for it in our own breaſts? Let us leave to others the taſk of inſtructing mankind in their duty, and confine ourſelves to the diſcharge of our own. We have no occaſion for greater knowledge than this.

Hail, virtue! thou ſublime ſcience of ſimple minds; ſay, if ſo much induſtry and preparation is neceſſary to become acquainted with thee. Are not thy principles engraven on every heart? Need we do more, to learn thy laws, than to examine ourſelves, and liſten to the voice of conſcience when the paſſions are at reſt?

This

This is the true philoſophy, with which we ſhould learn to reſt ſatisfied, without envying the fame of thoſe celebrated men who have immortalized their names in the republic of letters. Let us, inſtead of envying them, endeavour to make that honourable diſtinction between them and us, which was formerly obſerved to ſubſiſt between thoſe two powerful ſtates, Athens and Sparta; viz. that the one knew what was right, and the other practiſed it.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE ANSWER that hath been made to the foregoing DISCOURSE.

I OWE rather thanks than a reply to the anonymous author who hath done me the honour of writing an anſwer to my diſſertation. But a due ſenſe of my acknowledgements muſt not make me forget what I alſo owe to truth. Neither can I ever forget, that, in holding a rational argument, men enter into a ſtate of nature, and reſume their primitive equality.

The tract, which I am about to anſwer, abounds with demonſtrative truths to which I can make no manner of reply. For, however qualified I might be to play the ſophiſt, I ſhould be very ſorry to be one of thoſe who have an anſwer for every thing.

But my defence will not be the leſs eaſy; as it will be confined to a mere compariſon of my

own ſentiments with the truths which are objected to them; for if I prove that the latter do not really attack what I have advanced, I ſhall think the former are ſufficiently defended.

All the propoſitions eſtabliſhed by my adverſary, may be reduced to two principal points; the one containing a commendation of the ſciences, the other treating of their abuſe. I ſhall examine each apart.

It ſeems, by the manner of the anſwer, that my opponent would have been pleaſed if I had ſaid more againſt the ſciences than I have really done. It is ſuppoſed that the eulogium I made on the ſciences at firſt ſetting out muſt have been much againſt my will; it is, ſays my antagoniſt, a confeſſion forced from me by the truth, which I ſpeedily haſtened to retract.

But if this confeſſion be an eulogium which truth hath forced from me, it muſt be granted that I thought the ſciences as good as I repreſented them: ſo that the author's praiſe of them is not contradictory to my opinion.

That confeſſion, it is ſaid, was forced from me: ſo much the better for my cauſe; for that ſhews that truth hath a greater influence over me than my own inclination. But how does that acknowledgement in favour of the ſciences appear to be involuntary? Is it becauſe it is done with an ill grace? It would be terrible to judge of the ſincerity of authors by ſuch new and unprecedented principles. Is it becauſe it is too ſhort? I could very eaſily have ſaid leſs to the purpoſe in a greater number of pages. Will it be ſaid, it is becauſe I have retracted it? I muſt confeſs I am ignorant that I have any where

where done this; and all I can reply to this, is, that I am ſure I did not intend it.

It is evident that knowledge in itſelf is valuable; a man muſt give up all pretenſions to common ſenſe to affirm the contrary. The Author of all things, is the fountain of truth; omniſcience is one of his divine attributes. To acquire knowledge, therefore, is, in ſome degree, to participate of his ſupreme intelligence. It is in this ſenſe that I have commended knowledge, and it is in this ſenſe that I commend my adverſary. But he expatiates farther on the ſeveral modes of utility which the arts and ſciences may be of to mankind, and I ſhould very readily have done the ſame, had it come within my deſign. So that ſo far we are perfectly agreed.

But the queſtion is, How comes it about that the ſciences, whoſe ſource is ſo pure, and whoſe end is ſo laudable, ſhould give riſe to ſo many impieties, hereſies, errors, abſurdities, contradictions and puerilities; to ſo many bitter ſatires, wretched romances, licentious poems, and obſcene books; and in thoſe who cultivate them, to ſo much pride, avarice, malignity, jealouſy, calumny, falſhood, ſervility and flattery? To this I anſwer, that it is becauſe ſcience, ſublime and beautiful as it is, was not made for man: his genius is too confined to make any great progreſs in it, and his paſſions are too ungovernable not to make a bad uſe of it. It is enough for him to ſtudy his duty, for which nature hath furniſhed every man with ſufficient capacity. My antagoniſt allows, on his part, that the ſciences become hurtful when they are abuſed, and that many perſons do really abuſe them. I

imagine that in this particular we ſhall not be thought to differ very widely. I add, it is true, that they are very much abuſed, and that they are always and univerſally ſo; and it does not appear to me that the contrary is made plain in my adverſary's tract.

I can ſafely take upon me to aver, therefore, that our principles, and of courſe all the propoſitions deducible from them, are nothing contrary; which is what I endeavoured to prove. Our concluſions, nevertheleſs, when we come to form our inferences, are quite contradictory. Mine is, that, as the ſciences do more harm to our morals than good to ſociety, it is to be wiſhed that mankind did not ſo ardently proſecute them. That of my opponent is, that, although the ſciences are hurtful, yet they ſhould ſtill be cultivated on account of their being uſeful. I appeal, not to the public, but to the few real philoſophers that are in the world, to determine which of theſe two inferences ſhould be preferred.

I have ſome other ſlight obſervations to make on ſome paſſages in his anſwer; which appear to me to want ſomething of that juſtneſs of reaſoning which I admire in other parts of it, and which may have contributed to the erroneous conſequence the author has deduced.

The work begins with ſome perſonalities, which I ſhall take notice of only when they affect the ſubject in diſpute: the writer does me the honour of many commendations; which doubtleſs opens to me a fine field; but there is too little conſiſtence in theſe things. A reſpectful ſilence with regard to the object of our admiration,

miration, has often much greater propriety than indiſcreet commendation *.

My diſſertation, it is ſaid, hath ſomething in it very ſurpriſing †. This, I think, requires ſome explanation. It is thought very ſurpriſing alſo that it ſhould obtain the prize. It is, however, no prodigy, to ſee very indifferent performances thus honoured. Take the affair in any other light, this ſurpriſe muſt be as favourable to the academy of Dijon, as injurious to the integrity of academies in general; and it is eaſy to perceive how I could turn it to the advantage of my own cauſe.

I am charged, in a very injurious manner, with a contradiction between my conduct and my doctrine; and reproached for having myſelf cultivated the ſciences I condemn ‡. If virtue and

* Sovereigns, good or bad, will be all indiſcriminately and ſervilely commended, ſo long as there are courtiers or men of letters. As to thoſe princes who are great men, their panegyrics are more moderate and refined. Flattery is offenſive to their virtue, and applauſe is injurious to their glory. This I know, at leaſt, that Trajan would have been, in my opinion, a much greater man, if Pliny had never written. Had Alexander been in reality what he affected to appear, he would never have troubled himſelf about his portrait nor his ſtatue: but would have left the Lacedemonians to write his panegyric, or have gone without one. The only eulogium worthy of a king is that which is heard, not from the mercenary lips of an orator, but from the mouth of a free people.

† It is the queſtion itſelf, poſſibly, that ſurpriſes; being one of the moſt noble and intereſting that ever was diſcuſſed, and which may not be ſpeedily repeated. The French academy have propoſed, as the prize of elocution for 1752, a ſubject very ſimilar: This is, That the love of literature inſpires a love to virtue. The academy very prudently thought it expedient, not to leave a propoſition of that kind problematical: on this occaſion alſo they have allotted twice the uſual time hitherto allowed to treat the moſt difficult ſubjects.

‡ I cannot juſtify myſelf here, as many others may, by ſaying,

and ſcience are incompatible, as it is pretended that I endeavour to prove, I am aſked, and that with great earneſtneſs, how I venture to employ the one in declaring for the other.

There is a good deal of addreſs in bringing me thus perſonally into the queſtion; as this perſonality cannot fail to throw ſome little embarraſſment on my anſwers, for unhappily I have more than one to make. In doing this, I ſhall endeavour to make preciſion ſupply the want of entertainment.

In the firſt place, I have ventured to advance, and imagine I have proved, that the cultivation of the ſciences introduces a corruption of morals among a nation in general. But how could I venture to ſay that virtue and ſcience were incompatible in a ſimple individual? I, who have exhorted princes to invite the truly learned to their courts, and to put confidence in them, in order that they might for once ſee how far ſcience and virtue united might contribute to the happineſs of mankind? The truly learned, it is true, are few in number: for to be able to put ſcience to its proper uſe, requires great talents and great virtues. Now, though their union may be hoped for in ſome few privileged minds, it cannot be expected of a whole people: It cannot therefore be concluded from my premiſes that

ſaying, that our education does not depend on ourſelves, and that we are not conſulted before we are corrupted. I very willingly applied to ſtudy, and ſtill more willingly abandoned it when I perceived the diſturbance it gave my mind without being of any advantage to my underſtanding. I would have nothing to do with a fallacious employment, in which one imagines he is doing great things for wiſdom, in doing every thing for vanity.

that a man may not be learned and virtuous at the ſame time.

2. The perſonal objection againſt my inconſiſtency of conduct, ought not be enforced againſt me, even though it really exiſted. I revere the maxims and principles of virtue; of this my heart bears me witneſs: at the ſame time, however, it is but too ſenſible how far the love of virtue is from the practice of it. Beſides, I am very far from being a man of ſcience, and ſtill farther from affecting it. I ſhould have thought the ingenuous confeſſion I made at the beginning of my diſſertation, might have ſecured me from this imputation; being rather apprehenſive that I ſhould be charged with preſumption for pretending to judge of things of which I was ignorant. It is eaſy to perceive I could not be liable to both theſe reproaches at once: not that I am certain they will not be both united, if I do not haſten to paſs condemnation on this, however little I have deſerved it.

3. I might quote, on this ſubject, what the fathers of the Chriſtian church have ſaid with regard to that worldly knowledge which they deſpiſed, and which they employed nevertheleſs in their diſputes with the philoſophical pagans. I might cite the compariſon they make of the veſſels of which the Iſraelites ſpoiled the Egyptians: but I content myſelf with only propoſing one queſtion, as my anſwer. Suppoſe a perſon ſhould come with an intent to kill me, and that I ſhould be ſo luckly as to wreſt his weapon from him; is it not lawful for me, before I throw it away, to uſe it to drive away the aſſaſſin.

Again, if the inconſiſtency with which I am charged

charged hath no exiſtence, it is not neceſſary to ſuppoſe that I intended only to amuſe myſelf with a frivolous paradox; and this appears to me ſtill the leſs neceſſary, as the ſtyle and manner of my writing, however poor or indifferent, were not then employed in works of mere amuſement.

It is time to cloſe what I have to ſay of myſelf; one never gets any thing by egotiſms; which is a ſpecies of indiſcretion that the public hardly ever excuſes, even when we are forced upon them. The truth is ſo independent both of thoſe who attack and thoſe who defend it, that theſe authors ought reciprocally to forget each other; which would be a means of ſparing them a great deal of paper and ink. But this rule, ſo eaſy to practiſe with me, is not ſo with regard to my adverſary; and this is a difference which is not at all to the advantage of my reply.

The author, obſerving that I attack the arts and ſciences on account of their effects on morals, employs, by way of reply, the enumeration of the various uſes of them to different ſtates; juſt as if, in juſtification of a criminal, he had contented himſelf with proving, that he was very well in health, very ingenious, or very rich. Let it be admitted me, that the arts and ſciences tend to make us very diſhoneſt people, and I ſhall not diſpute that they are otherwiſe very convenient and agreeable: this is an additional conformity they have with moſt of our vices.

The author goes farther, and pretends that ſtudy is neceſſary to enable us to admire the beauties of nature; and that thoſe of the univerſe expoſed, as it appears, to the eyes of all, for

for the inſtruction of the ſimple, yet require a good deal of knowledge in the obſervers to be even perceived. I confeſs that this propoſition aſtoniſhes me. Can it be ordained that all mankind ſhould be philoſophers, or is it ordained that philoſophers only can believe in God? The ſcripture exhorts, in many places, to adore the greatneſs and goodneſs of God in his marvellous works; but I do not know that it any where commands us to ſtudy natural philoſophy: nor do I think that the Author of nature is leſs adored by me who know nothing, than by him who knows every tree and plant from the cedar to the hyſſop, and every inſect and animal from the mite to the elephant.

It is ſuppoſed that we impute their real effects to the ſciences, when we only deſcribe what ought to be their effects. Theſe appear to me, however, very different. The ſtudy of nature ought, I know, to elevate the ideas of man to his Creator; but it only ſerves to increaſe his own vanity. The philoſopher, who flatters himſelf that he hath penetrated into the ſecrets of the Creator, is preſumptuous enough to compare his pretended wiſdom to the infinite wiſdom of his Maker. He approves, cenſures, corrects, and preſcribes laws to nature and limits to omnipotence: and thus while a philoſopher, engaged with idle ſyſtems, gives himſelf a world of pains to arrange this machine of the world, the poor huſbandman, who ſees the rain and the ſun contribute in their turns to fertilize his fields, admires and bleſſes the hand whoſe bounties he receives, without troubling himſelf about the manner in which they are beſtowed. He does not ſeek to juſtify his ignorance or his

vices

vices by his infidelity. He does not arrogantly cenſure the works of his Creator, nor attack his divine Maſter, to diſplay his own ſelf-ſufficiency. The impious ſaying of Alphonſo the tenth could never have fallen from the lips of an ordinary man; no, ſuch a blaſphemy was reſerved for the mouth of a ſcholar. The author proceeds, *The curioſity natural to man, excites in him a deſire to learn.* I anſwer, He ought therefore to lay it under a proper reſtraint, as he ought to do all his natural propenſities.

But *his wants dictate to him the neceſſity of inſtruction.* In many reſpects, it is certain, the ſciences are uſeful: yet ſavages are men, and perceive not this neceſſity. *His employments impoſe it on him as a duty.* They more frequently oblige him to avocations from his ſtudies in order to diſcharge his duties †. *The progreſs he makes in ſtudy gives him a taſte for it.* It is for that very reaſon he ſhould diſtruſt it. *His firſt diſcoveries increaſe his curioſity to know ſtill more.* This indeed happens to perſons of genius. *The more he knows, the more he finds there is ſtill to learn.* That is as much as to ſay, that the uſe of all the time he has thrown away, is to induce him to throw away ſtill more. But there are but a ſmall number of thoſe men of genius, who become ſenſible of their ignorance in proportion to the increaſe of their knowledge; and it is for theſe only that ſcience is good and uſeful. The generality of little minds, when they have learned any thing, are apt to think they know every thing;

† It is a bad ſign for community, that ſo much knowledge is requiſite to conduct them. If men were what they ought to be, they would have no occaſion to ſtudy ſo much, to know what they ought to do.

thing; and there is hardly any folly which this perſuaſion doth not make them commit. *The more knowledge we acquire, the more eaſy we find it to act virtuouſly.* It is plain by this, that the author hath conſulted his own heart, rather than made his obſervations on mankind. He advances ſtill farther; That it is good to know evil, in order to learn to avoid it: Affirming that one's virtue cannot be depended on till it hath been put to the proof. Theſe maxims are at leaſt doubtful, and ſubject to many objections. It is by no means certain, that, in order to learn to act well, one is obliged to know in how many ways we may act ill. We have an internal guide much more infallible than books, and which never forſakes us in caſe of need. This is ſufficient to direct us always to act aright, if we will but attend to its dictates. Beſides, how can we be under the neceſſity of making a trial of our ſtrength to aſſure ourſelves of our virtue, when the principal exerciſe of virtue conſiſts in avoiding every occaſion of falling into vice?

A prudent man is continually on his guard, and always diſtruſts his own ſtrength; he reſerves all his fortitude for the time of need, and never unneceſſarily expoſes himſelf to danger. The braggard is he who conſtantly boaſts of more than he can perform, and, after having braved and inſulted all the world, ſubmits to be beaten on the firſt rencounter. Let me aſk which of theſe two portraits reſembles moſt a philoſopher at war with his paſſions.

I am reproached with having affected to deduce all my examples of virtue from the ancients. There is great reaſon to think, I ſhould

have found more eminent ones, could I have gone ſtill farther into antiquity. I have cited alſo one inſtance of modern people, and it is not my fault that I could find but one. Again I am reproached, in a general reflection, with having drawn odious parallels, in which there is leſs juſtice and zeal, than ill-will againſt my compatriots, and diſguſt againſt my contemporaries. And yet perhaps no man living has a greater affection for his country and fellow-countrymen than myſelf. As to the reſt, I have but one word of reply. I have given my reaſons, and thoſe are to be weighed. As to my intentions, thoſe muſt be left to Him alone who is the proper judge of them.

I ought not to paſs over in ſilence one conſiderable objection, which hath been already ſtarted by a certain philoſopher. *Is it not*, ſays this writer, *to the climate, temperament, want of opportunity, default of the object, the adminiſtration of government, cuſtoms, laws, and indeed to any thing rather than to the ſciences, that we ought to attribute the difference which is ſometimes remarkable in the morals of different countries and different ages?*

This queſtion is too extenſive in its deſign, and requires a more particular explanation than is proper for this tract. Beſides, it would require me to enter into an examination of thoſe ſecret, but actual relations, which ſubſiſt between the nature and forms of government, and the genius, manners and knowledge of a people; all which would involve me in ſuch delicate inveſtigations as would lead me too far out of my way. Add to this, that it would be very difficult for me to treat the ſubject of government, without

without laying myſelf too open to my adverſary; and, every thing conſidered, ſuch reſearches were more properly made at Geneva, and in other circumſtances. I proceed now to an accuſation much more ſerious and important than the preceding. This I ſhall tranſcribe therefore in the author's own words; as it is of conſequence that I ſhould lay it faithfully before the reader.

" The more a Chriſtian examines the authen-
" ticity of his title-deeds, the more is he con-
" firmed in the poſſeſſion of his belief: The
" more he ſtudies revelation, the more ſtrongly
" is he fortified in the faith. It is in the holy
" ſcriptures that their excellence and divine o-
" riginal are to be diſcovered; it is in the learn-
" ed writings of the fathers of the church, that
" they have been from age to age illuſtrated and
" explained. It is from books of morality, and
" the lives of the ſaints, that we trace their ex-
" amples, and learn to apply their precepts.
" What! ſhall ignorance be permitted to de-
" prive religion and virtue of ſuch powerful
" ſupports? and is it to learning that a Genevan
" doctor openly and loudly imputes a corrup-
" tion of manners? One would be really more
" aſtoniſhed to hear ſo ſtrange a paradox, were
" it not notorious that the ſingularity of an o-
" pinion is an additional motive for embracing
" it with thoſe who have no other guide than
" a ſpirit of ſingularity."

But let me aſk this author, how he can preſume to put ſuch an interpretation on the principles I have laid down? How can he accuſe me of cenſuring the ſtudy of religion, when I have condemned an application to the frivolous ſci-

ences, becauſe they diverted our attention from the ſtudy of our duty? And what is the ſtudy of of a Chriſtian's duty, if it be not that of his religion?

I ought, without doubt, to have expreſsly condemned thoſe puerile ſubtilties of the ſchools, by which, under the pretext of illuſtrating the principles of religion, its ſpirit hath been extinguiſhed, and ſcientific pride hath been ſubſtituted in the place of Chriſtian humility. I ought to have more ſtrenuouſly blamed thoſe imprudent miniſters of the goſpel, who firſt laid their hands upon the ark, in order to ſupport with their feeble ſcience an edifice ſupported by the hand of God. I ought to have expreſſed my indignation againſt thoſe frivolous ſcholiaſts, who, by their wretched punctilios, have debaſed the ſubiime ſimplicity of the goſpel, and have reduced the doctrine of Jeſus Chriſt into ſyllogiſms. But I am at preſent to defend myſelf, not to attack others.

I ſee that this diſpute is to be decided by appealing to hiſtory and facts. If I could ſhew in few words what our religion and the ſciences had in common at their commencement, perhaps this might ſerve to determine the point in queſtion.

The choſen people of God never cultivated the ſciences, nor was that cultivation ever recommended to them: Yet ſurely, if this ſtudy had been good for any thing, they had more occaſion for it than any other people. On the contrary, their leaders uſed all the means poſſible to prevent their intercourſe or commixture with the idolatrous and learned nations that ſurrounded them. A precaution leſs neceſſary on one account

account than on another; as this rude and ignorant people would have been more likely to be ſeduced by the artifices of the prieſts of Baal, than by the ſophiſtry of the philoſophers.

After their frequent diſperſions among the Egyptians and the Greeks, the ſciences were with ſtill greater difficulty brought to take any place among the Hebrews. Joſephus and Philo, who any where elſe would have been looked upon as ordinary men, were reckoned among the Jews as prodigies of learning. The Sadducees, remarkable for their irreligion, were the philoſophers of Jeruſalem; the Phariſees, notorious hypocrites, were their orthodox teachers †. The latter, although their ſcience was confined almoſt ſolely to the ſtudy of the law, proſecuted it with all the pomp and dogmatical ſelf-ſufficiency imaginable. They obſerved all the ceremonies of religion with great exactneſs; but the goſpel informs us of the ſpirit of that obſervance, and the imagined importance of it. Add to this, that they had but very little knowledge, and a great deal of vanity; in which particular they did not differ moſt from the learned profeſſors of modern times.

† The ſame hatred and contempt ſubſiſted alſo between theſe two parties, as hath been reciprocally kept up between the philoſophers and ſcholars in all ages; that is, between thoſe who make their heads a repoſitory for other people's knowledge, and thoſe who pique themſelves on having knowledge of their own. Set together by the ears the dancing-maſter and muſic-maſter of the *Gentleman Citizen*, [du Bourgeois Gentilhomme,] and you will have the exact picture of the antiquarian and the wit, the chymiſt and the man of letters, the civilian and the phyſician, the mathematician and the verſifier, the divine and the philoſopher. To form a proper judgment of all theſe people, it is ſufficient to hear what they ſay of themſelves; that is, not what each individual, or the individuals of each profeſſion; but what thoſe of each profeſſion ſay of the other.

In the eſtabliſhment of the new law, it was not with the learned that Jeſus Chriſt choſe to intruſt his doctrines and his miniſtry. He followed in his choice that predilection, which he diſplayed on every occaſion for the poor and ſimple. In the inſtructions he gave to his diſciples, alſo, not a ſyllable is mentioned of ſtudy or ſcience, unleſs it be to ſhew the little value he ſet upon them.

After the death of Chriſt, a dozen poor fiſhermen and artificers took upon them to inſtruct and convert the world. Their method was ſimple; they diſplayed no art in their preaching, but an heart penetrated with the ſubject of their diſcourſe. Of all the miracles by which God honoured their faith, the moſt ſtriking was the ſanctity of their lives; their diſciples followed their example, and their ſucceſs was prodigious. The pagan prieſts were alarmed, and complained to their reſpective princes that the ſtate was undone becauſe their offerings and ſacrifices diminiſhed. Perſecutions were ſet on foot, and the perſecutors thereby only accelerated the progreſs of that religion they intended to ſuppreſs. As the martyrs were led to the ſtake, the people flocked to the font; indeed the hiſtory of thoſe primitive times is one continued prodigy.

Yet, notwithſtanding this, the prieſts of the idols, not contented with perſecuting the Chriſtians, began to calumniate them; in which the philoſophers, who did not find their account in a religion which inculcated humility, joined them. Innumerable railleries and reproaches were in conſequence ſhowered down on the new ſect. It became neceſſary to take up the pen in their defence

defence. Juſtin Martyr * accordingly wrote the firſt apology for the faith. The pagans were now attacked in turn; while to attack was in fact to vanquiſh them. The ſucceſs of the firſt writers encouraged others, who, under the pretence of expoſing the turpitude of paganiſm, entered into ſubjects of mythology and erudition *.

* Theſe primitive writers, who ſealed with their blood the teſtimony of their pens, would be thought at this time of day very ſcandalous authors, for they maintain exactly the ſame ſentiments as I do. Juſtin, in his dialogue with Trypho, takes a review of the ſeveral ſects of philoſophy which he had before attacked; and renders them ſo very ridiculous, that you would almoſt think you were reading one of the dialogues of Lucian. In the apology of Tertullian, we ſee alſo, how greatly the primitive Chriſtians were offended at being taken for philoſophers. It would be in fact a very mortifying recapitulation to philoſophy, ſhould we enumerate all the pernicious max ms and impious tenets of their ſeveral ſects. The followers of Epicurus denied a providence: the academics doubted of the exiſtence of a deity, and the ſtoics of the immorality of the ſoul. The ſects leſs famous had no better ſentiments. Witneſs a ſpecimen of thoſe of Theodorus, chief of the two branches of Cyrenaicks, given us by Diogenes Laertius. *Sustulit amicitiam quod ea neque insipientibus neque sapientibus adsit.—Probabili dicebat prudentem virum non seipsum pro patria periculis exponere, neque enim pro insipientium commodis amittendam esse prudentiam. Furto quoque et adulterio et sacrilegio, cum tempestivum erit daturum operam sapientem. Nihil quippe horum turpe natura esse. Sed auferatur de hisce vulgaris opinio, quæ a stultorum imperitorumque plebecula constata est.——Sapientem publice absque ullo pudore ac suspicione scortis congressurum.*

Theſe opinions, I know, are very particular; but is there one of all the ſects which has not fallen into ſome groſs and dangerous error? And what ſhall we ſay of the diſtinction of doctrines ſo readily adopted by all the philoſophers, by which they ſecretly profeſſed ſentiments directly oppoſite to thoſe they taught in public. Pythagoras was the firſt who made uſe of his private doctrine; which he taught his diſciples after long proof, and with the greateſt ſecrecy. In private he taught them leſſons of atheiſm, at the ſame time that he publicly offered hecatombs to Jupiter. The philoſophers in general approved ſo highly of this method, that it ſpread itſelf rapidly through Greece, and from thence to Rome; as is evident

tion *. In theſe, the authors endeavoured to diſplay their learning and ingenuity: thus books multiplied, and a relaxation of morals enſued.

Men were now no longer content with the ſimplicity of the goſpel, and the doctrines of the apoſtles; every new writer muſt needs have more wit than his predeceſſors. Every tenet was rendered more refined; while each of the refiners tenaciouſly maintained his own opinion, in oppoſition to all the reſt. The ambition of being at the head of a ſect univerſally prevailed; and hereſies multiplied abundantly.

Extravagance and violence were ſoon added to diſputation: while the Chriſtians, late ſo mild and gentle as to be led by the pagans like lambs to the ſlaughter, became worſe than the idolaters, the enraged and furious perſecutors of one another. All gave into the ſame exceſs; the cauſe of truth being maintained with as little moderation as that of error.

Another

dent from the works of Cicero, who, when among his ſelect friends, turned thoſe immortal gods into ridicule, which he ſo ſolemnly called to witneſs to the truth of his harangues.

* Clemens Alexandrinus was juſtly reproached for affecting in his writings a profundity of profane erudition, little becoming a Chriſtian. It ſeems, however, that he was at that time of day very excuſable, for acquiring proper information of the doctrines againſt which he was to defend himſelf. But who can behold, without ſmiling, the ridiculous pains which our modern divines take to explain the reveries of the pagan mythology.

The expedience of an internal doctrine was not carried from Europe to China; but it took riſe there together with philoſophy: and it is to this circumſtance the Chineſe are indebted for that multitude of atheiſts or philoſophers which they have among them. The hiſtory of this fatal expedient, written by a man of knowledge and ſincerity, would give a terrible blow to philoſophy, both ancient and modern. But philoſophy will triumph over both reaſon and time; becauſe it has its ſource in human vanity, the ſtrongeſt of all ſublunar influence.

Another evil, ſtill more dangerous, aroſe from the ſame cauſe. This was the introduction of the ancient philoſophy amidſt the doctrines of Chriſtianity. By ſtudying the Greek philoſophers, ſome perſons imagined they diſcovered a relation between their doctrines and thoſe of Chriſtianity: nay, it was even ſuppoſed that religion would be rendered more reſpectable, when clothed with the authority of philoſophy. There was a time when it was held neceſſary to be a Platonic, in order to be ranked among orthodox Chriſtians; who were very nigh ſeeing firſt Plato, and then Ariſtotle, placed on the altar, by the ſide of Jeſus Chriſt.

The church indeed once ſtood up againſt theſe abuſes; which its illuſtrious defenders lament in the moſt pathetic terms; attempting frequently to baniſh altogether that worldly ſcience which corrupted its purity. One of the moſt celebrated popes even carried his zeal ſo far as to maintain, that it was a ſhameful thing to ſubject the word of God to the rules of grammar.

In vain, however, were their remonſtrances; borne down by the torrent, they were themſelves obliged to conform to a cuſtom they condemned, moſt of them declaiming in a very learned manner againſt the progreſs of all ſcience and learning.

After long agitations, things took at length a more ſettled turn. Toward the tenth century, the meteor of ſcience ceaſed to enlighten the earth: the clergy remained plunged in a ſtate of ignorance, which I will by no means juſtify, becauſe it related no leſs to thoſe things which they ought to have known, than to ſuch as were uſeleſs. By this means, nevertheleſs, the church obtained

obtained a little more repoſe than it had before experienced.

On the revival of letters, its diviſions aroſe again, with more violence than ever. It was the learned who began the quarrel, the learned kept it up, and thoſe who poſſeſſed the greateſt abilities poſſeſſed alſo the greateſt ſhare of obſtinacy. It was in vain that conferences were appointed, to adjuſt the differences between the learned of each party; while the partizans had no mind for a reconciliation, nor perhaps any regard for the truth. Each wanted only to diſplay his talents at the expence of his adverſary. All wanted to gain the victory, but none deſired inſtruction: the ſtrongeſt impoſed ſilence on the weaker, while the diſpute conſtantly ended in abuſe and perſecution. God only knows when theſe evils will have an end.

The arts and ſciences are at preſent in a flouriſhing condition; literature is ſtill ſucceſsfully cultivated: but of what advantage are they to religion? Let us aſk this queſtion of thoſe numerous philoſophers who pique themſelves on ſuch cultivation. Our libraries are full of books of divinity, and we are every where over-run by caſuiſts: formerly we had ſaints, but no caſuiſts. Science extends itſelf, and religion decays. All the world are for teaching how to act well, but nobody is willing to learn. We are in fact all become ſcholars, and have ceaſed to be Chriſtians.

No, it was not by means of ſo much artifice and ſtudy that the goſpel ſpread itſelf over the univerſe, and that its captivating beauty penetrated the hearts of mankind. This divine book, the only one neceſſary for Chriſtians, and the moſt

moſt uſeful even to thoſe who are not, need only to be read and reflected on, to inſpire the ſoul with the love of its Author, and a deſire to obey his precepts. Never did virtue ſpeak in ſo pleaſing a ſtyle; never was profound wiſdom expreſſed with ſo much energy and ſimplicity. It is impoſſible to give over reading it, without perceiving ourſelves the better for it. O ye miniſters of that goſpel which it contains, give yourſelves leſs trouble to inſtruct me in ſo many uſeleſs things. Throw aſide all thoſe learned volumes which can neither convince nor affect me. Proſtrate yourſelves at the feet of that God of mercy, whom you undertake to make me know and love; aſk of him for yourſelves that profound humility which you ought to preach to me. Diſplay not to me that variety of ſcience, that indecent pomp of learning, which diſhonours you, and diſguſts me. Be you affected yourſelves, if you would have me ſo; and, above all, give me a proof, in your conduct, of your practiſing that law in which you pretend to inſtruct me. You have no need of any other learning, either for yourſelves, or to inſtruct us. Do this, and your miniſtry is accompliſhed; and that without even the mention of the belles-lettres or of philoſophy. It is thus you ought to practiſe, and to preach the goſpel; and it was thus its firſt defenders cauſed it to triumph over all nations, not *Ariſtotelico more*, as the fathers ſaid, but *piſcatorio more*.

I perceive that I am growing prolix; but I thought it indiſpenſibly neceſſary for me to dwell ſomewhat long upon a point of ſo much importance. Beſides, the impatient reader ſhould conſider that it is very eaſy to play the critic; as a writer

writer may be attacked on account of a ſingle word, from which attack it may require whole pages to defend him.

But to proceed to the ſecond part of the anſwer; in replying to which I ſhall endeavour to be more conciſe, although I do not find that I ſhall have fewer obſervations to make.

I am told that *it is not ſcience, but wealth, that hath in all ages given birth to effeminacy and luxury.* I did not ſay that the ſciences gave birth to luxury, but that they had their birth together, and that they were always inſeparable. I ſettle their genealogy thus: The firſt ſource of evil is inequality: from inequality flow riches; for the terms rich and poor are merely relative, and wherever men are all equal, there are none either rich or poor.

From riches are derived luxury and idleneſs: from luxury ariſe the fine arts, and from idleneſs the ſciences. But *riches never were in any age the portion of the learned.* The evil is for this reaſon ſo much the worſe: for, as it is, the rich and the learned ſerve mutually to corrupt each other. If the rich were more learned, or the learned more rich; the one would be leſs ſervile in their flattery, and the other love leſs to be flattered; ſo that both would be the better for it. This is evident to be ſeen in thoſe few who have the happineſs to be at once both rich and learned.

To go on with my antagoniſt. *For one Plato in opulence, for one Ariſtippus a favourite at court, how many philoſophers have there been reduced to a thread-bare cloak and wallet, or left without any other covering than their own virtue in penury or ſolitude!* I do not pretend to deny

deny that there have been a great number of philoſophers exceedingly poor, and am exceedingly ſorry that they were ſo; nor do I doubt that their philoſophy was for the moſt part owing merely to their poverty: but when I am to ſuppoſe them virtuous, it muſt be from their morals, which as the people were not witneſs of, could they learn by them to improve their own?

The learned have neither leiſure nor inclination to amaſs great wealth. I agree that they have not leiſure; *they love ſtudy.* He who does not take delight in his calling, muſt needs be either very fooliſh or very wretched. *They live in a ſtate of mediocrity.* One muſt be greatly diſpoſed in their favour to make this a merit.

A life of induſtry and temperance, paſſed in the ſilence of ſolitude, and employed in reading and labour, is not moſt aſſuredly a life of luxury and vice. Not indeed in the eyes of the world; this depends on the heart. A man may poſſibly be compelled to live ſuch a life, and yet have a very corrupt heart. Beſides, what ſignifies his being modeſt and virtuous himſelf, if the ſubjects of his employment ſerve to diffuſe idleneſs, and to corrupt his fellow-citizens. *The conveniences of life, notwithſtanding they are often the product of the arts, are not therefore in a greater degree the portion of the artiſts.* The artiſts never appeared to me ſo very ready to refuſe them; eſpecially thoſe who, being employed in arts altogether uſeleſs, and of courſe very lucrative, are in a ſituation to procure what they may deſire. *They labour only for the rich.* As things go on at preſent, I ſhould not be aſtoniſhed to ſee, ſome time or other, the rich working for them. *And it is*

the wealthy who are idle, that profit by and abuſe their induſtry. Again I ſay, I do not ſee that our artiſts are ſuch ſimple modeſt people as they are here deſcribed. Luxury cannot generally prevail among any one rank of citizens, without preſently affecting in ſome degree every other. Luxury is a general corruptor, as well of the wealthy who enjoy it, as of the poor who covet it. I do not pretend that it is any evil in itſelf to wear laced ruffles, an embroidered coat, or carry about one an enamelled ſnuff-box: but it is a very great one to look upon theſe baubles as matters of importance; to eſteem thoſe happy who poſſeſs them; and to devote that time and pains to acquire the like, which ought to be employed on more noble objects. I have no need to be told the profeſſion of a man thus employed, in order to form a proper judgment of him. I paſs over that fine deſcription my antagoniſt hath given us of the learned; in doing which, I think he is not a little indebted to my complaiſance. He is leſs indulgent to me; for he not only allows me nothing that he can poſſibly refuſe me; but rather than condemn the evil which I think of our vain and falſe politeneſs, he chuſes to excuſe the hypocriſy of it. He aſks me, if I would have vice ſhew itſelf openly? Aſſuredly I would. Our confidence and eſteem for the virtuous, would then be revived; we ſhould learn to diſtruſt the vicious, and ſociety would be much more ſecure.

Doubtleſs, I had rather that my enemy ſhould attack me openly and by force, than that he ſhould come treacherouſly to ſtab me in the back. How! you will ſay, ſhall we add ſcandal to vice? I wiſh we did not add deceit. The maxims

maxims lately inculcated about avoiding ſcandal, are certainly very convenient for the vicious; and if we were to follow them very rigorouſly, we might ſuffer them to rob and murder with impunity; for it cannot be doubted, that a thief at the gallows is a very ſcandalous ſight. *But hypocriſy*, it is ſaid, *is the homage which vice pays to virtue.* Yes, juſt as the aſſaſſins of Cæſar, who knelt down that they might ſtab him with greater certainty. It is in vain that the above ingenious ſaying is enforced by the celebrated name of its author, it is not on that account the more juſt. Will it be ſaid of a thief, who ſhould put on the livery of a gentleman in order to rob his houſe more conveniently, that he rendered homage to the maſter of it? No, to clothe villany with the dangerous cloak of hypocriſy, is doing no honour to virtue: it is to inſult her, in profaning her inſignia: it is to add deceit and cowardice to the other vices; and to preclude for ever a return to probity. There are ſome elevated characters, that mix ſomething ſo bold and generous, even with their crimes, as to betray a ſpark of that celeſtial fire which animates great minds. But the mean and ſervile ſoul of an hypocrite is like a dead carcaſs, in which there is neither heat, fire, nor ſpark of life remaining. I appeal to experience, whether there have not been inſtances of many brave and wicked men, who, recovering themſelves, have been reclaimed to virtue, and cloſed their lives in a manner truly exemplary. But nobody ever yet knew an hypocrite become a man of probity. One might not have unreaſonably undertaken the converſion of a Cartouche; but no man in his ſenſes would have attempted that of Cromwell.

I have imputed to the reſtoration of letters and the arts, that elegance and politeneſs which prevail in our manners. This the author of the anſwer diſputes with me, which ſurpriſes me much: for as he ſets ſuch great ſtore both by politeneſs and ſcience, I do not perceive what advantage he will reap, by depriving one of the honour of producing the other. But let us examine his argument; which may be reduced to this.

It is not obſervable that the learned are more polite than other men: on the contrary, they are often much leſs ſo; therefore our politeneſs is not the effect of the ſciences.

In reply to this, I ſhall remark, in the firſt place, that it is not ſo much the ſpeculative ſciences, as literature, the fine arts, and productions of taſte, that are here intended; and I will venture to ſay, that our *beaux eſprits* with as little ſcience as you pleaſe, are ſo polite, ſo brilliant, ſo much the fine gentlemen, that they would not eaſily know themſelves under that pedantic and unpoliſhed air, which the author of the anſwer hath imputed to them. But not to inſiſt on this point: we will agree, for argument's ſake, that the ſcholars, the poets, and the wits, are all equally ridiculous; that the gentlemen of the Academy of Belles-Lettres, the gentlemen of the Academy of Sciences, and the gentlemen of the Academie Francoiſe, are rude, unpoliſhed clowns; that they know neither the cuſtoms nor manners of the world, but are excluded by their profeſſion from all good company: the anſwerer will gain little by this conceſſion, as he would not be any more authorized to deny that the politeneſs and urbanity which prevail among us, are

are the effect of a good taſte, which firſt took place among the ancients, and hath been diffuſed all over Europe by the publication of poliſhed and agreeable writings †. As the beſt dancing-maſters have not always the politeſt method of perſonal addreſs; ſo a man may be very capable of giving leſſons of politeneſs, without having the talent or inclination of putting them in practice. Thoſe heavy commentators, who, we are told, underſtood every thing of the writings of the ancients, except their peculiar grace and beauty, have not failed, however, by their uſeful though ſlighted performances, to teach us to perceive and taſte thoſe beauties they could not taſte themſelves. It is the ſame thing with that agreeableneſs of converſation and elegance of manners, which have been ſubſtituted inſtead of their primitive ſimplicity and purity, and which have taken place among all nations where literature hath been held in eſteem. At Athens, at Rome, in China, every where, have elegance of ſtyle and complacency of manners accompa-

† In treating of ſubjects ſo very general as the morals and manners of a people, great care ſhould be taken not to confine our views to particular examples: as this is the way never to come at the true ſource of things. To know whether I am in the right to impute politeneſs to the cultivation of letters, it muſt not be inquired whether this or that individual among the learned be polite or not; but an examination ſhould be made into the relations and connections of literature and politeneſs; and then inquiry ſhould be made, among what people theſe things have been found united or ſeparated. The ſame may be ſaid of luxury, liberty, and of all other things that affect the morals of a nation, and about which I hear held every day a number of pitiful arguments. To examine the effects of theſe things in miniature, and on individuals, is not to philoſophiſe, but to throw away one's time and reflections: for we may be well acquainted with Jack and Peter, and know very little of mankind in general.

nied, not the ſcholar and the artiſt, but the ſciences and the fine arts.

The author attacks next the commendations I have beſtowed on a ſtate of ignorance; and after accuſing me of ſpeaking more like an orator than a philoſopher, he proceeds to deſcribe it himſelf, which he does moſt aſſuredly in very fine colours. I do not deny that he is in the right; and yet I cannot conceive that I am in the wrong. It requires only for us to make a very juſt and true diſtinction to be reconciled.

There are two kinds of ignorance: the one brutal and ferocious †, which ariſes from a badneſs of heart, and a defect in underſtanding; a criminal ignorance, which extends even to the duties of humanity, which increaſes the number of vices, degrades our reaſon, debaſes the ſoul, and levels mankind with the brutes: it is this kind of ignorance which my antagoniſt has attacked, and of which, it muſt be confeſſed, he hath drawn a very odious and ſtriking deſcription. The other kind of ignorance is by no means irrational, but conſiſts in the limitation of our curioſity to the extent of our faculties; a modeſt ignorance, which ariſes from an ardent love

† I ſhould be much ſurpriſed if any of my critics ſhould object to the eulogium I have made on ſeveral ignorant and virtuous people, by oppoſing to it a liſt of all thoſe bands of robbers that have occaſionally infeſted the earth, and who in general were not compoſed of the moſt learned men in the world. I adviſe them beforehand not to give themſelves ſuch needleſs trouble, unleſs, indeed, they think it neceſſary to diſplay their erudition. Had I ſaid, that, in order to be virtuous, it was ſufficient to be ignorant; it would have coſt little pains to anſwer me; and, for the ſame reaſon, I think myſelf excuſed from anſwering thoſe who throw away their time to maintain the contrary.

love for virtue, and renders us indifferent to all thoſe things, which are not worthy to engage the heart, or do not contribute to make us better. This delightful and valuable kind of ignorance, is a treaſure to an innocent mind, that is contented with itſelf, and places all its happineſs in the conſciouſneſs of its own integrity; never ſeeking that vain and fallacious honour which reſults from the opinion which others entertain of our talents or abilities. Such is the ignorance I commended, and which, I pray heaven, may be my puniſhment for the ſcandal I have brought upon the learned by my declared contempt for human ſciences.

Let us compare, ſays my anſwerer, *with the times of ignorance and barbariſm, thoſe happy ages in which the ſciences have univerſally diffuſed a ſpirit of order and juſtice among men.* Thoſe happy ages, I fear, will be very difficult to be found: but thanks to the ſciences, we may very eaſily find thoſe in which *juſtice and order* are nothing more than unmeaning terms, made uſe of to amuſe the people; in which the appearance of thoſe things is carefully preſerved, only that their reality may be deſtroyed with impunity. *We ſee in our own times, that wars are leſs frequent, but more juſt.* I do not well comprehend that war can at any time be more juſt on the ſide of one of the belligerant parties, than it muſt be unjuſt on that of the other. *We are witneſſes of actions leſs aſtoniſhing but more heroical.* There is nobody poſſibly will diſpute my adverſary's right to judge of heroiſm; but is he certain that things which may not aſtoniſh him, may be aſtoniſhing to us? *Our victories are leſs bloody, but more glorious; our conqueſts leſs rapid, but*

more

more certain; our warriors leſs violent, but more formidable; capable of vanquiſhing with moderation, and of treating the vanquiſhed with humanity: men whoſe honour is their guide, and whoſe glory is their reward.

I do not deny that we have great men among us; it would be eaſy to furniſh proofs of there being ſuch: but this does not prevent the people in general from being corrupt. Beſides, aſſertions of this kind are ſo vague and undeterminate, that they may be made concerning all ages; and it is impoſſible to reply to them without turning over whole libraries, and writing volumes in folio to eſtabliſh the proofs pro & contra.

When Socrates declaimed againſt the ſciences, it appears to me that he could not have in view either the arrogance of the ſtoicks, the effeminacy of the Epicureans, nor the abſurd jargon of the Pyrrhoniſts, becauſe none of thoſe people at that time exiſted. But this ſlight anachroniſm does not ill become my adverſary: he hath employed his life better than in ſtudying chronology; and is no more obliged to have his Diogenes Laertius by heart, than I to have ſeen more particularly what paſſed in the ancient combats.

I admit that Socrates intended only to expoſe the vices of the philoſophers of his time: but I know not what concluſion to draw from this, unleſs it be that the philoſophers of his time abounded in vices. This, it will be ſaid, aroſe from the abuſe of philoſophy; but I do not know that I have ſaid any thing to the contrary. What, then! is every thing to be ſuppreſſed that is ſubject to be abuſed? Undoubtedly, anſwer I without heſitation; every thing that is uſeleſs, and

of

of which the abuſe does more hurt than the uſe does good.

Let us ſtop a moment at this laſt concluſion, leſt any ſhould haſtily infer that we ought at preſent to burn all our libraries, and deſtroy our academies and univerſities. In doing this, Europe would only be plunged again into a ſtate of barbariſm, without any amendment of its morals †. It is with ſorrow I am going to declare a great and fatal truth. There is but one ſtep from knowledge to ignorance, and various nations have taken it alternately from one to the other; but it hath never been known that a people once corrupted ever were reſtored to virtue. It were to no purpoſe to remove the aliments of vanity, idleneſs, and luxury; in vain ſhould we reduce mankind to their primitive equality, the preſerver of innocence and ſource of every virtue. When their hearts are once vitiated, they will always remain ſo: nor is there any remedy, unleſs it be ſome great revolution almoſt as much to be dreaded as the evil it might cure, an event which it is blameable to hope for and impoſſible to foreſee.

Let us leave the arts and ſciences, therefore, to ſoften, as much as may be, the ferocity of men whom they have corrupted; let us make a prudent uſe of them, by way of diverting and amuſing the paſſions. Let us give ſome ſubſiſtence to theſe tygers, that they devour not our offſpring. The learning of the wicked is ſtill leſs to be feared than their brutal ſtupidity; it renders them at leaſt more circumſpect about what

† *Our vices would remain*, ſays the philoſopher I have already cited, *and we ſhould be ignorant into the bargain.*

what evil they commit, from a foreſight of that which may thence happen to themſelves.

I have praiſed the academies with their illuſtrious founders, and am ready to repeat their praiſes. When the evil is incurable, a phyſician ſhould apply palliatives, and adapt his remedies leſs to the condition than to the conſtitution of his patients.

It is the province of prudent legiſlators to imitate this conduct; and as they cannot appropriate to a diſordered people the moſt excellent ſyſtem of policy, let them, like Solon, adopt the beſt they are able to bear.

Europe at preſent boaſts a great prince, and, what is much more, a virtuous citizen, who hath formed ſeveral inſtitutions in favour of literature in the country he hath adopted and rendered happy by his government. In this, he hath done an action worthy of his wiſdom and virtue. In regard to political eſtabliſhments, every thing depends on time and place. Sovereign princes ſhould at all times cultivate the arts and ſciences, for their own intereſt. I have given a reaſon for this. In the preſent ſtate of things, they ſhould encourage them, alſo, for the intereſt of their ſubjects. If there were any ſovereigns in Europe of ſo confined a capacity as to think and act otherwiſe, their ſubjects would become poor and ignorant, without being leſs vicious than other nations. My adverſary has neglected to take advantage of an example ſo ſtriking, and in appearance ſo favourable to his cauſe. He is, however, the only perſon in the world, perhaps, that is ignorant or forgetful of it. Let him permit me then to put him in mind of it; let him not refuſe to grant

grant things the praiſes that are due to them; let him admire them as well as we, without being rendered thereby more poſitive againſt the truths he hath attacked.

A LETTER From Mr ROUSSEAU to Mr GRIMM.

Occaſioned by the Refutation of his Diſcourſe by Mr GAUTIER, Profeſſor of the Mathematics and of Hiſtory, and Member of the Academy of Belles-Lettres at Nancy.

I RETURN you, Sir, the Mercury for October, which you was ſo kind as to lend me. I have peruſed, with a good deal of pleaſure, the refutation which Mr Gautier has taken the trouble to write againſt me. But I am not of your opinion that I am under any kind of neceſſity to reply to it. And theſe are my objections:

1. I cannot perſuade myſelf that, in order to be in the right, it is indiſpenſably neceſſary to have always the laſt word.

2 The more I peruſe the Refutation, the more I am convinced that I ought to give Mr Gautier no other reply than the Diſſertation he has anſwered. Read over what is advanced in both, on the ſubject of luxury, war, academies, and education; read the proſopopœia of Louis le Grand,

Grand, and that of Fabricius; in ſhort, compare Mr Gautier's concluſion with mine, and you will comprehend what I ſay.

3. My manner of thinking is ſo entirely different from that of Mr Gautier, that, if I were to take notice of all the paſſages where we diſagree, I ſhould be obliged to contradict hime ven with regard to things that I ſhould have advanced as well as he; and this will give me ſuch an air of inconſiſtency, that I ſhould rather if poſſible avoid it. Thus, for inſtance, in ſpeaking of politeneſs, he very explicitly declares, that, in order to become a man of probity, it is proper to begin by being firſt an hypocrite, and that falſehood is the means of arriving at virtue. He ſays farther, that the vices, ſet off by politeneſs, are not contagious, as they would be if they preſented themſelves in the garb of ruſticity; that the art of penetrating the ſentiments of mankind, hath made as great a progreſs as that of diſguiſing them; that men are convinced they muſt place no confidence in thoſe to whom they do not give pleaſure or are not of uſe; that every one knows what value to ſet upon the ſpecious offers of politeneſs: all which is doubtleſs as much as to ſay, that, when two men are complimenting each other, and the one ſays from the bottom of his heart, *I treat you like an aſs, and only laugh at you*; the other anſwers from the bottom of his, *I know that you are an impudent liar, but I will be even with you if I can.* Had I been inclined to employ the moſt bitter irony, I ſhould have ſaid very nearly as much.

4. It is evident from every page of the refutation, that the author does not, or will not, underſtand

derſtand the performance he hath undertaken to refute. A great conveniency indeed reſults to him from this; which is, that, by always replying to his own ſentiment, and never to mine, he has the fineſt opportunity in the world of ſaying juſt what he pleaſes. On the other hand, as my reply is hence more difficult, it is become alſo leſs neceſſary; for who ever heard of a painter, that, when he exhibited a performance in public, was obliged to examine the eyes of the ſpectators, and to furniſh the dim-ſighted with ſpectacles! Add to this, it is not very certain that I myſelf ſhould be underſtood in my reply: As for example, ſhould I ſay to Mr Gautier, "I know that our ſoldiers are not Reaumurs nor Fontenelles; and that it is ſo much the worſe for them, for us, and particularly for the enemy: I know that they know nothing; that they are groſs and brutal; and yet I have ſaid, and I ſay again, that they are enervated by the ſciences which they deſpiſe, and by the polite arts of which they are ignorant. It is one of the greateſt inconveniences attending the cultivation of letters, that in return for the few men they enlighten, they corrupt a whole nation." Now, you ſee plainly, Sir, that all this would only be another inexplicable paradox to Mr Gautier; who aſks me, What have troops to do with academies? Whether ſoldiers have more bravery for being badly clothed and poorly fed? What I mean by advancing, that, in doing honour to the talents of men, we neglect their virtues? with other queſtions of the like nature, that ſhew it to be impoſſible to give an intelligible and ſatisfactory reply to the perſon who aſks them. And I believe you will agree with

me, that is not worth while to explain myſelf a ſecond time, to be underſtood no better than I was the firſt.

5. If I had a mind to anſwer the firſt part of the refutation, it would be the way never to have done. Mr Gautier has thought proper to preſcribe to me the authors I am to quote, and thoſe whoſe authority I am to reject. His choice is natural enough; as he objects to all thoſe who depoſe in my favour, and is deſirous that I ſhould reſt my cauſe on thoſe which, he thinks, make againſt it. It would be to no purpoſe I ſhould tell him that one good evidence in my favour is deciſive, while an hundred evidences are of no avail againſt me ſo long as they are parties in the cauſe. In vain ſhould I deſire him to diſtinguiſh between the examples he cites; in vain repreſent to him, that to be uncivilized, and to be criminal, are very diſtinct and different; or that a people really corrupted are not ſo much thoſe who have bad laws, as thoſe who deſpiſe all law. His anſwer, I foreſee, is ready and eaſy. "What credit, will he ſay, can be given to a pack of ſcandalous writers, who have ventured to praiſe the morals of Barbarians that could neither write nor read! How can we ever imagine a people could be modeſt who uſed to go naked? or be virtuous and eat raw fleſh?"

Thus we ſhould go to diſputing; and Herodotus, Strabo, and Pomponius Mela, would be drawn up againſt Xenophon, Juſtin, Quintus Curtius, and Tacitus. Thus engaged in reſearches of criticiſm, antiquity and erudition, pamphlets would ſwell into volumes; books would multiply, and the queſtion would be forgotten.

gotten. Such is the fate of literary diſputes, which always end with our not knowing where we are, nor where we ſet out from.

If I were inclined indeed to anſwer the ſecond part, it would be ſoon done; but nobody would be at all inſtructed by it. Mr Gautier contents himſelf with refuting me by ſaying *yes* wherever I have ſaid *no*, and by ſaying *no* wherever I have ſaid *yes*. I have nothing more to do, therefore, than to repeat *yes* and *no* in the proper places, and he is fully anſwered. Thus, in following Mr Gautier's method, I cannot anſwer both parts of his refutation, without ſaying too much or too little. I am therefore reſolved to do neither the one nor the other.

6. I might purſue another method, and examine ſeparately the arguments and the ſtyle of Mr Gautier's refutation. If I examine his arguments, it is eaſy for me to ſhew that they are all fallacious; that the author does not enter into the ſtate of the queſtion, and that he does not underſtand me.

For example, Mr Gautier takes the pains to imform me, that there are vicious people in the world who are not learned; and, to be ſure, I muſt have been in ſome doubt whether the Calmucks, the Bedouins, and the Hottentots, were not prodigies of virtue and erudition. Had this writer taken the pains to ſhew me a learned people who were not vicious, he would have ſurpriſed me much more. He has repreſented me always as arguing to prove that ſcience is the only ſource of corruption among mankind. If he really thought ſo, I wonder at his complacency in anſwering me at all.

He ſays that a commerce with the world, is

ſufficient to enable any one to acquire that politeneſs which qualifies the fine gentleman; from whence he concludes, that it is without grounds the honour of it is imputed to the ſciences. But to what, then, muſt we attribute this honour? Ever ſince men have lived together in a ſtate of ſociety, ſome people have been polite, and others not ſo. This author has forgotten to account for that difference.

Mr Gautier every where expreſſes his admiration of the purity of modern manners. The good opinion he entertains of them, may poſſibly do ſome honour to his own; but it does not ſhew much knowledge and experience of the world.

One would imagine, by his manner of writing, that he had ſtudied mankind, as the eripatetics did natural philoſophy, without ever ſtirring out of their cloſets. For my part, I locked up my books, and having heard men talk, examined their actions. It is not at all ſurpriſing that, having taken ſuch different methods of acquiring our knowledge, we ſhould differ ſo much in opinion. I am ſenſible, that the language of the preſent age is unexceptionable; and this is what ſtrikes Mr Gautier. But at the ſame time, I am ſenſible, that its manners are extremely corrupt; and this is what diſguſts me. For, are we to think that we are become men of probity, becauſe, by means of giving decent names to our vices, we have learned no longer to bluſh at them?

He ſays farther, that, even could it be proved by facts that a corruption of morals hath always prevailed with the ſciences, it will not thence follow that the fate of virtue depends on their

their progreſs. But having employed the firſt part of my diſſertation to ſhew that theſe things always accompanied each other, I endeavoured in the ſecond to ſhew that one actually did depend on the other. To which part of my piece would Mr Gautier make anſwer by the above reflection?

This gentleman ſeems to take particular offence at what I have ſaid reſpecting the mode of education at our univerſities. He informs me that our young people are there taught a number of fine things, which may poſſibly ſerve for their amuſement when they are grown up; but of which I muſt confeſs I do not ſee the utility, nor any connection they have with their duty as citizens, which I think ought firſt to be taught them. "We readily aſk, Doth he underſtand Latin and Greek? doth he write in verſe or proſe?" But, Is he become better or more prudent? this, though the principal thing to be thought on, is the laſt to be inquired after. "Should one ſay of a perſon paſſing along the "ſtreet, *There goes a learned man*; and of ano-"ther, *There goes a good man*; the looks and "reſpect of the people would give ſuch prefer-"ence to the former, that a third perſon would "have great reaſon to call them a *parcel of block-"heads.*"

I have ſaid, that nature ſought to preſerve us from ſcience, as a mother ſnatches a dangerous weapon out of the hands of her children; and that the trouble we find in acquiring learning, is not the ſmalleſt of her favours. Mr Gautier had rather I ſhould have ſaid thus: "Know, ye "people, that nature never intended you ſhould "be nouriſhed by the fruits of the earth, the

" pains and trouble annexed to the culture of it " being a ſufficient warning to leave it uncul- " tivated." He does not conſider, that, with a very ſmall degree of labour, men are certain to provide themſelves food; but that, after a great deal of ſtudy, it is very doubtful whether a man may acquire underſtanding. He does not reflect alſo that this is a farther obſervation in my favour: for why hath nature impoſed on us uſeful and neceſſary labours, unleſs to divert our attention from occupations that are frivolous and uſeleſs? But it appears by the contempt which this writer affects for agriculture, that, if it depended on him, our huſbandmen would ſoon deſert our fields, in order to fill the ſchools; an employment, according to Mr Gautier, and I believe many other profeſſors, more important to the ſtate.

In reaſoning upon a paſſage in Plato, I preſumed that perhaps the ancient Egyptians did not hold the ſciences in ſuch high eſteem as hath been imagined. The author of the refutation aſks me, how I reconcile that opinion with the inſcription which Oſymandias had placed in his library. This difficulty had been ſtarted with propriety enough in the life-time of that prince; but now he is dead, I aſk, in my turn, Where is the neceſſity of our reconciling the opinion of king Oſymandias with that of the Egyptian philoſophers? and whether he had counted, and particularly if he had eſtimated, the votes of ſuch as might anſwer that the word *poiſons* was not ſubſtituted in the place of *remedies*. But to paſs over that faſtidious inſcription; theſe remedies I confeſs are excellent, and I have frequently repeated that conceſſion.

But

But is this a reaſon why they ſhould be adminiſtered inconſiderately, and without regard to the conſtitutions of the ſick? An aliment may be very good in itſelf, which in a weak ſtomach may only breed ill humours and indigeſtions. What ſhould we ſay of a phyſician, who, after having made a juſt elogium on certain nutritive viands, ſhould conclude that all the ſick ought indiſcriminately to feed upon them!

I have ſhewn that the ſciences and the arts enervate our courage. Mr Gautier calls this a very ſingular method of reaſoning, and ſees no connection between courage and virtue. This is not ſo very difficult, howevever, in my opinion, to be comprehended. The man who is once accuſtomed to prefer life to his duty, will not be long before he prefers alſo thoſe things which render life eaſy and agreeable.

I have ſaid, that ſcience is proper enough for great geniuſes, but that it is hurtful to the people in general. Mr Gautier ſays that Socrates and Cato, both of whom cenſured the ſciences, were nevertheleſs very learned men; and this he calls refuting my aſſertion.

I ſaid that Socrates was the moſt learned of all the Athenians, and that for this reaſon I appealed to his authority: but all this does not hinder Mr Gautier from thinking it neceſſary to inform me that Socrates was learned.

He blames me for having advanced that Cato deſpiſed the Greek philoſophers; and grounds his cenſure on the relation that Carneades took a delight in eſtabliſhing and controverting the ſame propoſitions; a circumſtance that very unjuſtly prejudiced Cato againſt the Grecian literature. Mr Gautier, however, ought to inform

form us what was the country and profeſſion of this Carneades. To be ſure, he was the only philoſopher who hath piqued himſelf on his being able to maintain the pro & contra of an argument; otherwiſe what the refuter advances on this head is nothing at all to the purpoſe. I appeal, on this ſubject, to Mr Gautier's erudition.

If the refutation doth not abound with ſolid reaſoning, it is made up for by very curious declamations. Indeed, the author ſubſtitutes throughout the artificial ornaments of ſtyle, inſtead of that ſolidity of proof which he promiſed at firſt ſetting out: and thus, while he is laviſhing his oratory on a refutation, he reproaches me for having employed it in an academical diſcourſe.

To what purpoſe then, ſays Mr Gautier, *are all the eloquent declamations of Mr Rouſſeau?* To aboliſh, if poſſible, the vain declamations of the colleges. *Who is there, that doth not feel ſome indignation at being told that we have the appearances of all the virtues without poſſeſſing one?* I confeſs there is a little flattery in ſaying that we have even all the appearances of virtue; but Mr Gautier ought, ſooner than any body, to excuſe this. *And why have we no longer any virtue? Becauſe truly we cultivate the arts and ſciences.* Even ſo; for that very reaſon preciſely. *If we were ſtill uncivilized, rude, ignorant, Goths, Huns and Vandals, we ſhould be worthy of Mr Rouſſeau's commendation.* Why not? Is there any of thoſe appellations incompatible with virtue? *Will he never ceaſe caſting invectives on mankind?* Will mankind never ceaſe to be wicked? *Does he think he will ever make*

them

them virtuous, by tellingthem they are deſtitute of virtue? Can he think they will ever be made better by telling them they are already good enough? *Under the pretence of correcting their morals, ought he to ſubvert the ſupport of them?* Under the pretence of enlightening the minds of men, ought we to corrupt their hearts? *O, ye pleaſing bonds of ſociety, the delight of true philoſophers! Ye amiable virtues! it is by your own native charms that you captivate our hearts: you owe not your empire either to ſtoical affectation, to the clamours of barbariſm, or to the counſels of haughty ruſticity.*

I muſt here make one pleaſant remark; and this is, that of all the ſects of ancient philoſophers which I have attacked as uſeleſs to virtue, the ſtoics are thoſe only which Mr Gautier has given up to me; and theſe he ſeems to rank on my ſide of the queſtion. He is in the right, I ſhall not be the more proud for ſuch auxiliaries.

But let us ſee if I cannot render exactly the ſenſe of this exclamation in other words. "Ye "amiable virtues! it is by your own native "charms that you captivate our hearts. You "do not ſtand in need of all the vaſt apparatus "of ignorance and ruſticity. You know how "to penetrate the heart by more ſimple and na-"tural methods. It is ſufficient only to know "rhetoric, logic, phyſics, metaphyſics, and "the mathematics, to acquire the right of poſ-"ſeſſing you."

Another example of the ſtyle of Mr Gautier: *You know that the ſciences, on which our young philoſophers are employed at the univerſity, are logic, the metaphyſics, phyſics, and the elementary parts*

parts of mathematics. If I once did know it, I have forgot it, as we all do, when we come to years of diſcretion. *Theſe are, according to you, barren ſpeculations.* They are barren ſpeculations, in the common opinion of mankind; in mine, they are very fertile, and pregnant with many evils. *The univerſities are much obliged to you for informing them that the truth of the ſciences is retired to the bottom of a well.* I do not know that I have informed any body of ſuch a thing. That ſaying is not of my invention, but is as old as philoſophy itſelf. As for the reſt, I know that the univerſities owe me no obligation; and I am not to learn, that, when I took up my pen, it was impoſſible for me to make my court to men, and at the ſame time do homage to truth. *The great philoſophers, who poſſeſs the ſciences to an eminent degree, are doubtleſs ſurpriſed to learn that they know nothing.* I do believe in fact, that theſe great philoſophers, who poſſeſs all theſe great ſciences to ſuch an eminent degree, will be very much ſurpriſed to learn that they know nothing: but I ſhould be much more ſurpriſed myſelf, if theſe learned men, who know ſo many things, ſhould ever know this.

I remark that Mr Gautier, who treats me throughout with the utmoſt politeneſs, lets ſlip no occaſion, however, to create me enemies; he extends his regard for me this way even from the heads of colleges to thoſe of kingdoms. He does well to juſtify the practices of the world, to which he is evidently no ſtranger.

Indeed Mr Gautier's manner of writing and reaſoning in general, ſo ill agrees with a man of his apparent ingenuity, that it has ſuggeſted a conjecture; which poſſibly to you may ſeem a bold

bold one, but to me appears reaſonable. He accuſes me, aſſuredly without believing it, that I am not myſelf perſuaded of the truth of the ſentiments I have advanced. Now, I ſuſpect, and that with much more reaſon, that he is after all really of my opinion. His profeſſion and ſituation in life laid him under a kind of neceſſity of taking part againſt me. The modern decorum of keeping up appearances has certainly its uſe in many reſpects. Thus he will have refuted me out of decorum; but have taken every precaution, and employed all poſſible art, to do it in ſuch a manner as not to convince the reader.

It ſeems to be with this view that he ſets out with declaring, that the cauſe he defends is intereſting to the happineſs of the aſſembly he is addreſſing, and to the glory of that great prince under whoſe government they are ſo fortunate as to live. All which is juſt as much as if he had ſaid, You cannot, gentlemen, without being guilty of ingratitude toward your reſpectable protector, refuſe to acknowledge I am in the right. It is, beſides, your own cauſe that I am pleading before you; ſo that in whatever light you regard my arguments, I have a right to expect you will not be very ſcrupulous in admitting their ſolidity. Now I ſay, that every man, who delivers himſelf in this manner, ſeems more intent to cloſe the lips of the judges than deſirous of convincing them. If you give the refutation an attentive peruſal, you will hardly find a line which does not ſeem to indicate my anſwer. A ſingle example will ſuffice to make me underſtood. *The victories which the Athenians gained over the Perſians, and even over the*

the Lacedemonians themſelves, ſhew that the arts may accompany military virtue. I aſk whether this reflection is not artfully made, to recall to mind what I have ſaid of the defeat of Xerxes, and to make me refer to the cloſe of the Peloponneſian war. *Their government, become venal under Pericles, aſſumed a new form; the love of pleaſure extinguiſhed their bravery; their moſt honourable employments became cheap; impunity multiplied the number of bad citizens; the treaſures, ſet apart for the ſupport of war, were converted to nouriſh effeminacy and idleneſs: but what have all theſe cauſes of corruption to do with the ſciences?* Mr Gautier hath here only recapitulated the heads of a ſecond part of my diſſertation, wherein I have demonſtrated the connection between them. You will remark here, how artfully he hath ſubſtituted the effects of corruption for the cauſes of it; in order to engage every man of ſenſe to recur himſelf to the firſt cauſe of theſe pretended cauſes. Obſerve alſo, how, in order to engage the reader to make his own reflections, he pretends to be ignorant of what he certainly muſt know, and what all hiſtorians have unanimouſly agreed on, that the depravation of the government and manners of the Athenians were the effect of the fine ſpeeches of their orators. It is therefore certain that, by attacking me in this manner, he hath plainly indicated the anſwers I might make to them.

This is, however, no more than a conjecture; which I will not undertake to warrant. Mr Gautier himſelf probably would not be willing that I ſhould juſtify his erudition at the expence of his probity: but if he hath really been ſincere in his refutation of my diſcourſe, I cannot ſee how

how he can conſcientiouſly aſſume all the titles he is inveſted with, as profeſſor of hiſtory, profeſſor of the mathematics, and member of the academy of Nancy.

I am reſolved therefore to make no anſwer to Mr Gautier. I have given you a reaſon why I cannot give it a regular and ſerious reply: and it might be thought an ungrateful return for all the commendations Mr Gautier hath honoured me with, to employ againſt him the *ridiculum acri*, the bitter pleaſantry of irony. I am afraid, indeed, he hath but too much reaſon to complain of me in this reſpect already: at leaſt he could not be ignorant, in writing his refutation, that he attacked a man who ſet too little value on politeneſs to diſguiſe his real ſentiments.

With regard to any thing elſe, I am ready to do Mr Gautier that juſtice which is his due. His performance appears to me to be that of a man of genius and learning. Others may perhaps think there is philoſophy in it; for my part I find in it a good deal of erudition.

I am, Sir, yours ſincerely, &c.

P. S. I have juſt read, in the Utrecht Gazette of the 22d of October, a pompous expoſition of Mr Gautier's performance; which ſeems calculated expreſsly to confirm my ſuſpicions. An author, who hath any confidence in the merits of his own work, would leave others to write encomiums on it, and confine himſelf to the making only a good extract. That from Mr Gautier's refutation is managed with ſo much art, that, though it touches only upon ſome trifling objects that I employed only by way of tranſition, yet there is not a ſingle one

concerning which a judicious reader can ſubſcribe to the refuter's opinion.

It is not true, according to Mr Gautier, that the vices of man have contributed to make hiſtory intereſting. I may ſet aſide the proofs of the argument, and in favour of my adverſary only repeat the authorities.

Happy are the people whoſe kings have not been renowned in hiſtory.

When mankind grow wiſe, their hiſtory will be no longer entertaining.

Mr Gautier very juſtly obſerves, that a ſociety, though compoſed of men truly virtuous, could not ſubſiſt without laws: and hence he concludes it is not true, that, "*if mankind were not unjuſt*, "*the ſtudy of juriſprudence would be uſeleſs.*" It is ſtrange that ſo learned a writer ſhould confound juriſprudence with law, the ſtudy of the laws with the laws themſelves.

I may again do the ſame with regard to facts. The Lacedemonians had neither counſellors nor pleaders; their laws were not even committed to writing. And yet they certainly had laws. I appeal to Mr Gautier's erudition, to determine whether the laws were leſs obſerved at Sparta than in thoſe countries which abound with lawyers. I ſhall not dwell upon all thoſe minutiæ, which form Mr Gautier' text, and are ſo formally diſplayed in the Gazette; but cloſe with the following obſervation, which I ſubmit to your examination:

Allow Mr Gautier to be in the right as to every thing he has ſaid, and take every thing he has attacked out of my diſſertation; and my arguments will loſe nothing of their force. Whereas, take from Gautier's refutation all that does not

not really affect the queſtion, and you will leave him nothing at all. I therefore ſay again, it is not neceſſary to make him any reply.

Paris, Nov^r. 1. 1751.

THE FINAL ANSWER,

OF J. J. ROUSSEAU,

To thoſe who have made objections to his preceding diſcourſe.

Ne dum tacemus, non verecundiæ, ſed diffidentiæ cauſa, tacere videamur.

CYPRIAN. *contra* DEMET.

IT is with extreme reluctance that I contribute, by my diſputes, to the entertainment of idle readers, who care but little about the truth: but the manner in which it has been attacked, obliges me to engage again in its defence, that my ſilence may not be miſconſtrued by the multitude as a defeat, nor by the philoſophers as want of reſpect.

I perceive that I ſhall be guilty of frequent repetitions, and that the public in general will

not excuſe it. The ſenſible few, indeed, will ſay; This man has no need to be perpetually ſearching after new arguments, and this is a proof of the validity of thoſe he hath already advanced †.

As every one of thoſe who have attacked me, hath not failed to wander from the point in diſpute, and to ſuppreſs thoſe eſſential diſtinctions I had made; it is conſtantly neceſſary to bring them back to the premiſes. I have drawn up, therefore, a ſummary of the propoſitions I have maintained, and which I ſhall maintain as long as I conſult no other intereſt than that of the truth.

The ſciences are the maſter-piece of human genius and reaſon. The ſpirit of imitation gave riſe to the fine arts, and experience hath brought them to perfection. We are indebted to the mechanic arts for a great number of uſeful inventions, which have added to the conveniences and pleaſure of life. Theſe are truths to which

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† There are ſome indiſputable truths, which at firſt ſight appear to be ſtrange abſurdities, and which always paſs for ſuch among the generality of people. Thus, if we ſhould tell an ignorant perſon that the ſun is nearer us in winter than in ſummer, or that it is really ſet before we loſe ſight of it; he would undoubtedly laugh at us. It is the ſame with the opinion I maintain. The moſt ſuperficial readers are the firſt to take part againſt me; the philoſophers are not ſo haſty; and, if I have the honour to have made any converts, it has been among the latter. Before I ventured to give my thoughts on this ſubject, I had long and maturely weighed it; endeavouring to conſider it in every point of view. I doubt much whether any one of my adverſaries can ſay as much. At leaſt I do not perceive, in their writings, any of thoſe ſtriking truths which affect us not leſs with their force than their novelty, and which are the conſtant effects and proofs of ſufficient meditation. I may venture to ſay they have not ſtarted one reaſonable objection which I did not foreſee, and to which I had not prepared a ſatisfactory anſwer. Hence it is that I am reduced to the neceſſity of conſtantly repeating the ſame things.

I very readily and ſincerely ſubſcribe. But now let us conſider the relation which all theſe ſciences have to morals †.

If celeſtial beings were to cultivate theſe ſciences, nothing but good would reſult from them: I ſay the ſame alſo of thoſe ſuperior geniuſes which are formed to guide the reſt of mankind. The learned, the virtuous Socrates did honour to humanity. But the vices of the generality of mankind have poiſoned the moſt ſublime ſciences, and rendered them pernicious to ſociety. The vicious deduce from them a number of hurtful things, and the virtuous little elſe. If none but Socrates had piqued himſelf on the ſtudy of philoſophy at Athens, the innocent blood of the juſt had not cried out for vengeance againſt that nation of arts and ſciences *.

† *The ſciences made men gentle*, ſaid a celebrated philoſopher, whoſe works are ſometimes ſublime, but always profound, and breathe throughout a love for humanity. He hath ſaid in theſe few words, and what is ſingular, without declamation, all that hath been advanced to the purpoſe in favour of literature. It is true the ſciences do make men gentle; but gentleneſs, which is the moſt amiable of the virtues, is alſo ſometimes a weakneſs. Virtue is not always gentle, but is capable of arming itſelf with proper ſeverity againſt vice; it is inflamed with indignation againſt improbity.

Et le juſte au mechant ne ſçait point pardonner.

It was a very wiſe and prudent anſwer which a certain king of Lacedæmon made to thoſe who commended, in his preſence, the goodneſs of his colleague Charillus. *Good!* ſaid he, *How can he be good, when he knows not how to be terrible to the wicked?* Brutus was none of theſe meek or gentle men; and who will preſume to ſay, Brutus was not virtuous? On the other hand, we meet with many cowardly and puſillanimous ſouls, who have neither fire nor ſpirit, and are gentle only from their indifference both to good and evil. Such is that gentleneſs which a taſte for literature at preſent inſpires.

* Socrates loſt his life for having ſaid exactly the ſame things as I do. In the proſecution carried on againſt him, one

It is a queſtion that will bear examination, whether the ſciences are advantageous to mankind? even ſuppoſing that what paſs under that appellation really merit it. But it would be a folly to pretend that the chimeras, errors and falſehoods of pretended philoſophers can be good for any thing. Shall we for ever continue to be impoſed on by mere words? Shall we never learn that our ſtudies, ſciences, learning, and philoſophy, are only empty monuments erected to human pride, and very unworthy of thoſe pompous titles given them?

In proportion as a taſte for theſe puerilities diffuſes itſelf over a nation, it loſes that of the ſolid virtues: for it is leſs trouble for men to diſtinguiſh themſelves by prattling and declamation than by virtuous manners, when virtue is diſpenſed with, if a man has but the art to make himſelf agreeable.

The more we are internally corrupt, the more we are externally delicate †; and thus it is that the cultivation of letters inſenſibly gives birth to politeneſs.

one of his accuſers pleaded in favour of the artiſts, another for the orators, and the third for the poets, and all in the pretended cauſe of the gods. The poets, the artiſts, the fanatics, the rhetoricians, triumphed, and Socrates periſhed. I am afraid I did the preſent age too much honour, when I ſaid that Socrates, had he lived in it, would not have been compelled to drink poiſon.

† I never am preſent at the repreſentation of any of Moliere's comedies, but I admire the extraordinary delicacy of the audience. Every word that is a little free, or expreſſion tho' rather coarſe than obſcene, offends their chaſte ears: and I doubt not but the moſt corrupt are generally the moſt offended. Yet, if we make a compariſon between the manners of the age of Moliere and thoſe of the preſent, the reſult will not be to the advantage of the latter. When the imagination is once ſullied, every thing becomes an object of ſcandal. When all the good we have left is in external ſhew, we take more than ordinary pains to preſerve appearances.

politeneſs. Taſte riſes from the ſame ſource. The public approbation being the principal reward of literary labours, it is natural for thoſe who engage in them, to ſtudy the means of pleaſing. And to this ſtudy it is that elegance of ſtyle, purity of taſte, the graces of expreſſion, and urbanity of ſentiment, are owing.

You may call theſe things, if you will, a ſupplement to virtue; but you never can call it virtue itſelf; nay, they can even rarely be ſaid to accompany it. There always ſubſiſted this difference, that he who rendered himſelf uſeful laboured for others, and he who ſtrove merely to make himſelf agreeable laboured only for himſelf. The flatterer, for example, ſpares no pains to pleaſe, and yet he is productive of nothing but evil.

Idleneſs and vanity, which gave birth to our ſciences, gave birth alſo to luxury. A taſte for luxury always accompanies that for letters; and a taſte for letters often that for luxury †. All theſe things are faithful companions, becauſe they are the product of the ſame vices. If experience did not agree with theſe demonſtrative propoſitions, it would be neceſſary to inquire into the particular cauſes of that diſagreement. But the firſt idea of theſe propoſitions, is itſelf the effect of long meditation on known experience: and

† Some have objected to me the luxury of the Aſiatics, by a parity of reaſoning with thoſe who have objected the vices of ſome ignorant nations. But my adverſaries are all ſo unlucky as to miſtake even their facts, which make nothing againſt me. I know very well that the people of the eaſt are no more ignorant than we are: but this does not hinder them alſo from being equally vain, or of writing nearly as many books. The Turks, who cultivate learning leaſt of any, reckoned among them no leſs than five hundred and eighty claſſical poets about the middle of the laſt century.

and we have only to turn over the annals of the world to see how fully it is confirmed.

In the primitive ages mankind were very ignorant. How shall we venture to say they were corrupt, before the sources of corruption were opened? It is to be perceived, through the veils of obscurity and rusticity that are thrown over ancient times and ancient people, that many of them possessed great virtues; and particularly a severity of manners, which is an infallible token of their purity; as also sincerity, hospitality, justice, and, what is very important, a detestation of debauchery †, the fruitful mother of all other vices. Virtue, therefore, is not incompatible

† I have no design here to pay my court to the women; I freely consent that they should honour me with the epithet of pedant, so formidable to our philosophical gallants. I am more coarse, slovenly, unpolished in my principles, and have an utter aversion to great talkers; so that I shall proceed to speak the truth, perfectly at my ease.

Man and woman are formed to love, and be united to each other: but if we except the lawful union subsisting between them, all commerce of love is a frightful source of disorders to society and to morals. It is certain that the women alone can bring us back to a state of honour and probity. But they disdain to receive from virtue that power and prerogative they would owe solely to their charms. Thus they act always wrong, and often suffer in themselves the punishment due to this unjust preference. It is hardly to be conceived how, under so pure a religion, chastity is become a mean and monkish virtue, capable of rendering every man, and I had almost said every woman, ridiculous that pretends to it; whereas, among the pagans, this virtue was held in universal esteem, regarded as becoming in great men, and admired in their most illustrious heroes. I might name three, inferior to none, and who, setting religion out of the question, have set memorable examples of continence; these are Cyrus, Alexander, and the younger Scipio. Of all the rarities in the French king's cabinet, I would not give a farthing to see any but the silver target which was given to the latter by the people of Spain, and on which they had engraved the triumph of his virtue. It was thus peculiar to the Romans to subdue other nations as much

patible with ignorance. Nor is it any more its conſtant companion; for there are many nations very ignorant and very vicious. Ignorance is no impediment either to good or evil; but is only the natural ſtate of man †.

Now we cannot ſay ſo much in favour of ſcience. Every learned nation hath been corrupted, and this is alone a terrible argument againſt it. But, as it is difficult to draw compariſons between different nations, on account of the great variety of objects that muſt enter into and render them defective in point of exactitude, we ſhall be more certain of our facts, in purſuing the hiſtory of ſome one particular people, and comparing the progreſs of its knowledge with the revolutions of its manners. Now the reſult of this examination is, that the virtuous age of a people hath been always that of their ignorance; and that, in proportion as they became ſcholars, artiſts, and philoſophers, they loſt their morals and

much by the veneration due to their morals, as by the efforts of their arms. It was thus the town of the Faliſci was conquered, and Pyrrhus the conqueror driven out of Italy.

I remember to have ſomewhere read a pertinent reply enough, which the Engliſh poet, Dryden, made to a young nobleman, who reproached him that in one of his tragedies Cleomenes amuſes himſelf with mere idle talk in a private converſation with his miſtreſs, inſtead of forming ſome enterpriſe more worthy of his paſſion. Now, when I am tete a tete with a fair lady, continues his lordſhip, I always employ my time much better. I do not doubt it, my lord, replied Dryden, but then you muſt confeſs that you are no hero.

† I cannot forbear ſmiling to ſee ſo many learned men as have honoured me with their criticiſms, conſtantly objecting to me the vices of a multitude of ignorant nations; as if this were any thing at all to the purpoſe. Becauſe the ſciences have given birth to vice, doth it thence follow that ignorance muſt neceſſarily give birth to virtue! This may be a good argument enough among rhetoricians, or among the children which they ſet to refute me in my own country; but philoſophers ſhould reaſon in a different manner.

and their probity; nay, have in this reſpect debaſed themſelves to a level with thoſe ignorant and vicious nations which are a ſcandal to humanity.

If it be ſtill inſiſted that there is a diſtinction to be made between them, I acknowledge it; there is one, and this it is: The barbarous nations, even thoſe without virtue, have yet always held it in veneration; whereas the learned and philoſophical have by degrees arrived at the pitch of turning it into ridicule, and treating it with contempt. When once a nation hath reached this point, it may well be ſaid to be at its higheſt criſis of corruption, and is, paſt all remedy, incurable.

Such is the ſummary of what I have advanced, and which, I conceive, I have proved. Take now a ſhort abſtract of the doctrines advanced by my opponents.

"Mankind are naturally wicked: they were "ſo before the formation of ſocieties; and "wherever they are not enlightened by ſcience, "but are abandoned to the faculties ſolely of "inſtinct, leading a mere animal life with the "lions and bears, remain plunged in barbariſm "and miſery.

"In ancient times, Greece alone raiſed it-"ſelf, by its genius, to every thing that could "render a people reſpectable. The philoſo-"phers formed its manners, and gave it laws.

"Sparta, it is true, was poor and ignorant, "by inſtitution and choice; but its laws were "very defective; its citizens had a great incli-"nation to ſuffer themſelves to be corrupted; "its glory was not built upon a ſolid foundation;

"it

" it therefore ſoon loſt its primitive inſtitutions,
" its laws and its morals.

" Athens and Rome degenerated in like man-
" ner. The one yielded to the fortune of Ma-
" cedon; the other ſunk under its own grandeur,
" becauſe the laws calculated for the govern-
" ment of a ſmall city, were not formed to go-
" vern the whole world. If it hath ſometimes
" happened that the glory of great empires hath
" not laſted long after letters have flouriſhed in
" them, it is becauſe they were arrived at the
" criſis of diſſolution when literature began to
" be cultivated; it is beſides the fate of all hu-
" man inſtitutions not to remain long in the
" ſame ſtate. Admitting then, that a revolu-
" tion in a people's laws and morals have had
" an influence on ſuch great events; it does not
" thence follow that the arts and ſciences have
" contributed to them. On the contrary, it is
" obſervable that the progreſs and decay of li-
" terature, hath always been proportionable to
" the riſe and fall of the ſtate.

" This truth is confirmed by the experience
" of modern times; having before our eyes an
" inſtance of a vaſt and powerful monarchy in
" which the proſperity of the ſtate, the cultiva-
" tion of the arts and ſciences, and military vir-
" tue, have unitedly contributed to the glory and
" grandeur of its empire.

" Our morals are the beſt that can be ima-
" gined: many vices are baniſhed from among
" us; and thoſe which remain are inſeparable
" from humanity, and are by no means the ef-
" fect of the ſciences. Luxury hath nothing
" alſo in common with the arts; ſo that the
" diſorders they may occaſion ought not to be

" im-

" imputed to them. Beſides, luxury is neceſſary " in great ſtates; and is of more utility than " diſadvantage, by employing the idle and giving " bread to the poor.

" Politeneſs ought to be rather numbered a- " mong the virtues than the vices: it prevents " men from appearing what they are; a neceſ- " ſary caution to render them ſupportable to " each other. The ſciences have indeed ſel- " dom attained the end propoſed by them; " but they have at leaſt advanced, and ſtill " tend that way. Slow as our progreſs is alſo " towards the truth, it is nevertheleſs ſure and " certain.

" In fine, tho' it ſhould be true that the arts " and ſciences enervate and diminiſh our courage; " yet on account of the infinite advantages they " procure us, they are ſtill preferable to that " ſavage and barbarous virtue, which is ſhocking " to humanity."

I paſs over the uſeleſs and pompous review of theſe advantages; and to begin with the laſt point, by a conceſſion that may prevent a great many words, I declare once for all, that, if any thing can compenſate for a total corruption of manners, I am ready to own that the ſciences have done more good in the world than harm. Now let us proceed to the reſt.

I may, without running any great riſque, take it for granted that every thing which is aſ- ſerted above is proved; ſince, of all thoſe aſſer- tions ſo boldly advanced, there are very few that materially affect the queſtion, and ſtill fewer from which any valid concluſion can be drawn againſt my opinion. Nay, the greater part of them

them would even furniſh new arguments in my favour, if my cauſe ſtood in need of it.

In fact, with regard to the 1ſt, If mankind be wicked by nature, it is poſſible, if you will, that the ſciences may do ſome good in their hands; but it is very certain that they will do a great deal of harm. We ought not to put a ſword into the hands of a madman.

2. If the ſciences ſeldom anſwered the end propoſed by them, there will be always more time thrown away, than uſefully employed in their cultivation. And tho' it were true that we had diſcovered the beſt methods to effect the purpoſe intended, the greater part of our attempts would be as ridiculous as that of a man who, becauſe he was certain of being able to work exactly to a plumb-line, ſhould therefore undertake to dig a well to the centre.

3. We ought not to be ſo much terrified at the thoughts of a life merely animal, nor to conſider it as the worſt ſtate into which we can fall; for it would certainly be better to reſemble a ſheep than an evil angel.

4. Greece owed its manners, and its laws, to philoſophers and legiſlators. Granted. I have ſaid an hundred times, It is good to have philoſophers, provided the people in general did not trouble themſelves about philoſophy.

5. Not daring to advance that Sparta had not good laws, my adverſaries cenſure thoſe laws as being defective; thus, in order to retort the reproaches I have caſt on the learned nations for being always corrupt, they reproach thoſe ignorant people for not having reached a ſtate of perfection.

6. The progreſs of literature is always pro-

portionate to the flouriſhing ſtate of a nation. Be it ſo. At the ſame time be it remarked, that my opponents always talk to me of riches and grandeur; and I to them of morals and virtue.

7. Our morals are the beſt that men, vicious by nature like us, can be poſſeſſed of.——This may be. We have baniſhed many vices; I do not deny it. I did not accuſe my contemporaries of practiſing all the vices. They practiſe none but thoſe of mean ſouls: they are only hypocrites and knaves. As to thoſe vices which require fortitude and perſeverance, I believe them to be incapable of them.

8. Luxury may be neceſſary to furniſh bread to the poor; but if there were no ſuch thing as luxury, there would be no poor †.—It employs the idle.——True; but when agriculture was reſpectable, none were either poor or idle; and the world was not ſo full of vice.

9. I ſee that my antagoniſts have the cauſe of luxury much at heart; which they affect, nevertheleſs,

† For an hundred poor people that luxury nouriſhes in our cities, an hundred thouſand periſh by it in the country. The money which circulates in plenty among the artiſts and the rich, in order to furniſh them with ſuperfluities, prevents the circulation of any for the ſubſiſtence of the huſbandman: and the latter has not a coat to his back, merely becauſe theirs muſt be laced. The daily waſte of thoſe aliments which ſerve for the ſubſiſtence of mankind, is alone ſufficient to render luxury hateful. My adverſaries are lucky that the falſe delicacy of our language prevents my entering into thoſe particulars which would make them bluſh for the cauſe they have eſpouſed. We muſt have rich ſauces in our kitchens truly, and therefore the ſick want broth. We muſt have ſtore of rich liquors at our tables, and therefore the poor peaſant drinks nothing but water. We muſt have our periwigs loaded with powder, and therefore the poor want bread.

theleſs, to ſeparate from that of the arts and ſciences. I will admit, then, ſince they will have it ſo, that luxury ſerves to the ſupport of ſtates, juſt as the cariatides ſerve to ſupport the palace they embelliſh; or rather juſt as the beams made uſe of to prop decayed houſes, which frequently complete their downfal. Learn, ye that are wiſe and prudent, to forſake every houſe that is thus ſupported by props. This may ſerve to ſhew how eaſy it would be for me to convert moſt of thoſe things which are brought againſt me, to my own favour. But to deal frankly, I do not think them ſufficiently well eſtabliſhed, to venture to take any advantage of them.

It is ſaid that mankind were originally wicked; whence it follows, that man is wicked by nature †. This is an aſſertion of no ſmall importance; and in my opinion ought, if it could, to have been proved. The hiſtory of every people that one might venture to quote on this occaſion, is more in favour of the contrary opinion; and it requires conſiderable evidence to make me believe an abſurdity. Before thoſe horrid terms, *meum* & *tuum*, *mine* and *thine*,

† The following note is written purely for the philoſophers. The reader who is not a philoſopher is deſired therefore to paſs it over.

If mankind are naturally bad, it is clear that the ſciences will only make him worſe: ſo that their cauſe is loſt by this ſuppoſition. But it muſt be carefully obſerved, that, although man be naturally good, as I believe, and have the happineſs to feel, it does not thence follow that the ſciences muſt be good for him: for every ſituation, in which a people may be diſpoſed to cultivate them, neceſſarily indicates the beginning of corruption, which is haſtily accelerated. So that a defect in the political conſtitution of a people effects that evil which might have flowed from nature; and falſe prejudices may have the effect of bad inclinations.

were invented; before there exiſted in the world that ſpecies of cruel and brutal men whom we call *maſters*, and that other ſpecies of knaviſh lying men we call *ſlaves*; before there were men abominable enough to enjoy ſuperfluities, while their fellow-creatures were periſhing with hunger; before a reciprocal dependence on each other obliged them all to become roguiſh, ſuſpicious, and deceitful; I ſhould be glad to know wherein conſiſted thoſe vices and crimes with which they are ſo earneſtly reproached. I am aſſured that the world have long been convinced that the golden age was chimerical. Why do not they aſſure me alſo that the world hath been long convinced that virtue alſo is chimerical?

I have ſaid that the Greeks were virtuous before they were corrupted by ſcience; nor will I retract what I have advanced on that head; although, in conſidering the matter more nearly, I am in ſome doubt of the reality of the virtues of ſuch a talkative ſet of people, as well as about the juſtice of the encomiums they were ſo fond of beſtowing on themſelves, and which I do not find confirmed by other teſtimony.——What ſay my antagoniſts to this?

They ſay, that the early Greeks, whoſe virtue I have commended, muſt have been knowing and learned, ſince philoſophers formed their manners, and gave them laws. But after this mode of reaſoning, I might ſay as much of all other nations. Had not the Perſians their Magi? the Aſſyrians their Chaldeans? the Indians their Gymnoſophiſts? the Celti their druids? Was not Ochus famous among the Phenicians; Atlas among the Perſians; and Zamolxis among the

the people of Thrace? Nay, have not many writers pretended that philoſophy itſelf took riſe among the Barbarians?

According to the reaſoning of my adverſaries, all theſe muſt have been learned people. *By the ſide of Miltiades and Themiſtocles we find*, I am told, *an Ariſtides and a Socrates.* Well, by the ſide, if you will, for what is that to me? However it is certain, that Miltiades, Ariſtides and Themiſtocles, who were heroes, lived in one age; and Socrates and Plato, who were philoſophers, lived in another: indeed the public ſchools of philoſopy were no ſooner opened, than Greece, already debaſed and degenerated, had renounced its virtue, and ſold its liberty.

Proud Aſia ſaw its immenſe forces broken to pieces by a handful of men, whom philoſophy conducted to glory. It is true: the philoſophy of the ſoul conducts to true glory; but this is not learned from books. *Such is the infallible effect of intellectual improvements.* I beg the reader will be attentive to this concluſion. *The morals and laws of a people are the only ſource of true heroiſm.* So then, we find the ſciences have nothing to do with it. *In a word, Greece owed every thing to the ſciences, and the reſt of the world every thing to Greece.* Neither Greece nor the world owed any thing then to the wiſdom of their laws or the purity of their manners. I beg my adverſaries pardon, but it is impoſſible to overlook ſuch palpable ſophiſtry.

Let us examine, for a moment, that preference which is affected to be given to Greece above all other nations; and which ſeems to be made a very capital point. *I will admire, if you pleaſe, a people who ſpend their lives in war or*

in the woods, who live on pulſe, and dwell in caverns. This admiration is, in fact, very worthy of a true philoſopher: it belongs only to a blind and ſtupid people to admire thoſe who paſs their days, not in defending their own liberty, but in reciprocally cheating and betraying one another, in order to gratify their effeminacy or ambition; thoſe who have the preſumption to live in idleneſs on the labour, on the blood of thouſands of unhappy wretches, their fellow-creatures. *But is it among theſe barbarous people, we are to look for happineſs?* It would be much more reaſonable to look for happineſs among them, than to look for virtue among others.

What a ſpectacle is preſented us by a world compoſed only of huſbandmen, ſoldiers, hunters, and herdſmen! A ſpectacle infinitely finer than that of a world compoſed of cooks, poets, printers, artificers, painters, and fiddlers. The word *ſoldier*, indeed, ſhould be left out of the former liſt; for war is ſometimes a duty, and was not intended to be made a trade of. Every man ſhould be a ſoldier in defence of his liberty; but none to take away the liberty of others. To die for the good of one's country, is an employment too noble to be entruſted with mercenaries. *What, muſt we then live like bears and lions, in order to be worthy the name of men?* If I have the honour to have one impartial reader, who is at the ſame time a friend to truth, I beg of him juſt to caſt an eye on the preſent ſtate of ſociety, and to remark who thoſe are that live in it like tygers and crocodiles. *Shall we magnify the mere faculties of inſtinct, tending ſolely to the preſervation of our ſpecies, into virtues?* They are undoubted

undoubted virtues, when they are under the guidance of reaſon and prudence; and more particularly ſo when they are engaged in the ſervice of our fellow-creatures. *I ſee in them only animal virtues, little conformable to the dignity of our nature. The body is exerciſed, but the ſoul is depreſſed and enſlaved.* I may ſay with equal juſtice, in taking a ſurvey of the pompous reſearches of our academics, "*I ſee in them no-*"*thing but ingenious ſubtilties, little conformable*"*to our nature. The wit indeed is exerciſed,*"*but the ſoul is depreſſed and enſlaved.*" It is ſaid by ſome, "*Take away the arts, and what re-*"*mains but the exerciſe of the body and the paſ-*"*ſions?*" Pray, obſerve how reaſon and virtue are conſtantly left out of the queſtion. *The arts afford thoſe pleaſures to the mind which are only worthy of it.* That is to ſay, they have ſubſtituted others in the place of virtue, ſtill more worthy of it.

In tracing the ſpirit of this reaſoning among my antagoniſts, we may obſerve, how a palpable enthuſiaſm for the marvellous powers of the underſtanding, hath reduced that other faculty, infinitely more ſublime and more capable to elevate the mind, even to nothing. Such is the conſtant effect of the cultivation of literature. I am pretty certain there is hardly a man of letters now living, who does not more admire the eloquence of Cicero than his patriotiſm; and hold him in greater veneration for his pleadings againſt Catiline, than for having ſaved his country.

My opponents are viſibly embarraſſed, whenever they are led to ſpeak of Sparta. What would they not give that ſuch a fatal place had never

never exiſted! They who pretend that great actions are good for nothing but to be celebrated, what would they not give that thoſe of the Spartans had been forgotten! It is really a terrible thing for them, that in the very centre of Greece, ſo famous for owing all its virtue to its philoſophy, the ſtate whoſe morals were moſt pure, and whoſe government was of longeſt duration, ſhould be one in which there were no philoſophers. The Spartan manners were always propoſed as an example to the other ſtates of Greece: all which were corrupted, while virtue exiſted only in Sparta. All the reſt of Greece was enſlaved, while Sparta remained free. This is provoking. At length, however, proud Sparta itſelf loſt its morals and its liberty, as well as learned Athens. Sparta was no more. What reply can I make to that?

To conſider two obſervations more, regarding Sparta; when I ſhall proceed to another ſubject. The firſt is: *After being many times on the point of becoming conqueror, Athens, it is true, was at length vanquiſhed: and indeed it is ſurpriſing it was not conquered ſooner, as Attica is on the whole an open country, incapable of its own defence except by ſuperior ſucceſs.* Athens ought to have been the victor for various reaſons. It was, in the firſt place, more extenſive and more populous than Lacedemon. Its revenues were conſiderable, and it had many tributaries. Sparta enjoyed none of theſe advantages. Athens had, in particular, by its ſituation, an advantage of which Sparta was deſtitute; and which, enabling it frequently to deſolate the Peloponeſe, ought alone to have conferred on it the empire of all Greece. It had a large and con-

convenient harbour; and a formidable fleet, which it owed to the care of that clown Themiſtocles, who did not even know how to play upon a flute. It is ſurpriſing therefore that Athens, with all theſe advantages, ſhould nevertheleſs be vanquiſhed. But although the war of the Peloponeſus, which ruined Greece, did no honour to either of theſe republics, but, with regard to the Lacedemonians, was a direct breach of the maxim of their ſagacious founder, it was not to be wondered at that, in the end, true courage ſhould prevail over all other reſources, or that the reputation of the Spartans afforded them ſuch as facilitated their victory. In truth, I am aſhamed to know theſe things and to be under the neceſſity of mentioning them.

The other obſervation is no leſs remarkable: I ſhall therefore lay it *verbatim* before my readers.

" Let us ſuppoſe, that all the ſtates of which " Greece was compoſed, had followed the ſame " maxims as that of Sparta, what remains " ſhould we have now had of this celebrated " country? The very name of it would hardly " have been known to us. They would have " diſdained to form hiſtorians, who might have " tranſmitted their glory to poſterity. We " ſhould have been ſtrangers to their ſavage vir- " tues; and it would of courſe have been in- " different to us whether they had ever exiſted or " not. The numerous ſyſtems of philoſophy " that have exhauſted all the poſſible combina- " tions of our ideas; and which, if they have " not much extended the limits of the human " mind, have taught us at leaſt where thoſe li- " mits are fixed: Thoſe maſter-pieces of elo-

" quence

" quence and poeſy, which have pointed out " all the inlets to the human heart; thoſe uſe- " full or agreeable arts, which ſerve to the em- " belliſhment of life, in fine, the ineſtimable " tradition of the ſentiments and actions of all " thoſe great men, who have contributed to the " glory or happineſs of their fellow-creatures: " All theſe intellectual treaſures had been for " ever loſt *. Ages would have been heaped " upon ages, and the ſeveral generations of man- " kind have ſucceeded each other like thoſe of " mere animals; without being of any advan- " vantage to poſterity; leaving behind them " only a confuſed remembrance of their exiſt- " ence: the world would have grown old, and " mankind have ſtill remained in a ſtate of in- " fancy." In anſwer to this, let us ſuppoſe, in our turn, that a Spartan, influenced by the force of the above reaſons, had a mind to repreſent them to his compatriots: let us thus conceive the

* Pericles poſſeſſed conſiderable talents, great eloquence, magnificence and taſte. He embelliſhed Athens with excellent ſculptures, ſumptuous edifices, and maſter-pieces in all the arts. Hence, God knows how he has been flattered by the herd of writers. It ſtill remains a doubt, however, whether Pericles was a good magiſtrate; for in the government of ſtates, a proper regulation of manners is of more conſequence than the erecting of ſtatues. I ſhall not amuſe myſelf, to inveſtigate the ſecret motives for the war of Peloponeſus, which was the ruin of the republic: I inquire not whether the advice of Alcibiades was well or ill founded, nor whether Pericles was juſtly or unjuſtly accuſed of malverſation. I will aſk only whether the Athenians became worſe or better under his government. I ſhould be glad to know he name of a ſingle individual among the citizens, among the ſlaves, or even among his own children, that he made an honeſt man. Yet this appears to me the chief duty of a magiſtrate and a ſovereign. For the ſureſt way of making men happy, is not to adorn their towns, nor to make them rich; but to make them good and virtuous.

the terms of his diſcourſe he might addreſs to them in the public place of Sparta.

"Reflect, my fellow-citizens, on your blind-
"neſs and infatuation. I behold, with ſorrow,
"that you trouble yourſelves only to acquire
"virtue; to exert your courage, and maintain
"your liberty; forgetting that moſt important
"duty of providing for the amuſement of the
"idle in future ages. Say, of what uſe is
"your virtue, unleſs to make a noiſe in the
"world? To what purpoſe is it that you are
"virtuous, if nobody talks of you? What will
"it ſignify to poſterity that you devoted your-
"ſelves to death in the fields of Thermopile,
"for the ſafety of the Athenians, if you leave
"not behind you, like them, ſyſtems of philo-
"ſophy, poems, comedies, and ſtatues? Aban-
"don, therefore, thoſe laws that are good for
"nothing but to make us happy. Employ
"your endeavours to make yourſelves talked
"on when you are no more; and forget not,
"that, if great men are not celebrated, their lives
"and exploits are uſeleſs."

Such, I imagine, would be in ſubſtance the oration of our Spartan, if the Ephori would but give him leave to finiſh his harangue. The above-quoted paſſage is not the only one in which we are informed by my opponents that virtue is of no other uſe than to make the world talk of us. To this I may add their boaſt of the ſyſtems of the philoſophers, becauſe they are immortal, and are conſecrated to the admiration of all ages. *While the notions of other men are obliterated with the time and circumſtance that produced them. With three-fourths of mankind, the one day is effaced by the morrow, leaving not the*

ſlighteſt

ſlighteſt trace behind. May we not ſay, however, that there remain ſome traces in the teſtimony of a good conſcience, in the remembrance of the unhappy whom we have relieved, in the goood actions we may have done, and in the eye of that beneficent and almighty Being whom we have ſilently ſerved? *Dead or living*, ſaid Socrates, *the virtuous man is never forgotten by the Gods.* It may be anſwered, perhaps, that it is not on this kind of reflections my adverſaries meant to inſiſt: but, for my part, I ſay that no other kind of reflections are worth inſiſting on *.

It is eaſy to conceive, that, as they ſet little ſtore by Sparta, they do not ſet much more on the ancient Romans. *It is admitted, that they were great men, although they were capable of doing but little actions.* Upon this footing, I muſt confeſs, it is long ſince there were any great men in the world. Their courage and temperance are reproached with not being real virtues, but forced and affected qualifications. And yet the writer who charges them with this defect, confeſſes, a few pages after, that Fabricius

* The greater part of our modern wits are fond of diſplaying their ingenuity in obſcuring the glory and generous actions of the ancients; giving them ſome baſe and invidious turn, and imputing them to different and vain motives. Prodigious ſubtilty this! to take the moſt excellent and ſimply virtuous action, and account for it from a number of probably vicious intentions. But in this our wits rather act abſurdly than maliciouſly. For my part, I would readily take as much pains to enhance the reputation of thoſe great men, as they take to detract from it. Nor would it be any forgery to beſtow honours on ſuch illuſtrious characters to the height of our invention; the greateſt efforts of which muſt be ſtill inferior to their merit. It is the province of virtuous men to deſcribe virtue in its moſt captivating colours. Theſe are not the words of Rouſſeau, but of *Montaigne.*

bricius deſpiſed the gold of Pyrrhus; and it is well known that the Roman hiſtory is full of examples of the facility with which thoſe venerable warriors, their magiſtrates, might have enriched themſelves; who nevertheleſs conſtantly piqued themſelves on their poverty *.

With regard to courage; is it not well known that cowardice never hears reaſon, and that a poltroon never fails to fly, although ſure to be killed in his flight? *We may as well*, it is ſaid, *confine a ſtrong and robuſt man to be rocked in a cradle, as to reduce great ſtates to practiſe the petty virtues of petty republics.* This is a mode of expreſſion not unfamiliar in modern courts. It had been well worthy a Siberias or a Catherine de Medicis; and I doubt not that it frequently ſuggeſted itſelf to both.

It is not eaſily to be conceived that the moral world can be meaſured by a ſurveyor's theodolite. It cannot, however, be affirmed that the extent of a ſtate is altogether indifferent to the morals of its people. There is certainly ſome proportion between theſe things; I know not whether this proportion be inverſe †. Here is another queſtion well worthy of diſcuſſion; and which I believe may be juſtly looked upon as at preſent undecided, notwithſtanding the very po-

* When Curius rejected the preſents of the Samnites, he told them he had much rather command thoſe who poſſeſſed gold, than be in poſſeſſion of it himſelf. Curius was in the right. Thoſe who love riches are born to be ſlaves, and thoſe who deſpiſe them to be their maſters. It is not the power of gold that binds the poor to the rich, but the deſire of becoming rich in their turn; for otherwiſe the poor would neceſſarily have the power over the wealthy.

† My adverſaries think to impoſe on me with their contempt for little ſtates. Are they not afraid that I ſhall aſk them, whether there ought to be great ones?

ſitive air, more contemptuous than philoſophical, with which it is here decided in a few words.

This, continues the author, *was the phrenzy of Cato. Biaſſed by the hereditary prepoſſeſſions of his family, he declaimed all his life-time againſt the practices of the world, and fought and died without effecting any thing uſeful to his country.* I know not whether Cato did any thing or not for his country; but I know that he did a great deal for mankind in general, affording it an example of virtue, perhaps the moſt pure that ever exiſted. He hath given a leſſon for thoſe, who ſincerely love true honour, to reſiſt the vices of their age, and to deteſt that horrid maxim which prevails in the world, and inculcates the neceſſity of following the general example of others, *At Rome we muſt do as Rome does*; a maxim that would lead thoſe who adopt it great lengths, if they had the misfortune to fall into a company of a gang of highwaymen. Poſterity will one day read with aſtoniſhment, that in this age of ſcholars and philoſophers the moſt virtuous of mankind was turned into ridicule, and treated as a madman, becauſe he refuſed to ſtain his great ſoul with the crimes of his contemporaries; becauſe he would not villanouſly join with Cæſar, and the other public robbers of his time.

We have juſt ſeen in what manner our modern philoſophers ſpeak of Cato. Let us compare what was ſaid of him by the ancients. *Ecce ſpectaculum dignum ad quod reſpiciet, intentus opere ſuo, deus. Ecce par deo dignum: vir fortis cum mala fortuna compoſitum. Non video, inquam, quod habeat in terris Jupiter pulchrius ſi convertere animum velit, quam ut ſpectat Catonem*

todem, jam partibus non ſemel fractis, nihilominus inter ruinas publicas erectum.

Of other primitive Romans it hath been elſewhere ſaid, *We admire the characters of Brutus, Lucretia, Virginius, and Scevola.* It muſt be confeſſed this is ſomething in the preſent degenerate age. *But we admire more, a powerful and well-governed ſtate.* A powerful and well-governed ſtate! Doubtleſs, and ſo do I too. *In which the citizens are not condemned to the exerciſe of ſuch cruel virtues.* I underſtand you. It would certainly be more commodious to live under a government whoſe conſtitutions would diſpenſe with our being rigidly virtuous. But if the citizens of ſuch an admired ſtate ſhould be reduced by ſome misfortune, either to renounce virtue entirely, or to put ſuch cruel virtues in practice, and ſhould have the fortitude to do their duty, would this be a reaſon for admiring them leſs? Let us take a ſurvey of the example which is moſt offenſive to the delicacy of the preſent age; I mean the conduct of Junius Brutus, who ſentenced his own ſons to death for having conſpired againſt the ſtate at a criſis when the ſlighteſt ſiniſter accident threatened its ruin. It is certain that, if he had pardoned them, his colleague would have pardoned all their accomplices, and the republic would have been undone. But it may be aſked, Of what conſequence was that? We will ſuppoſe it then a matter of indifference; that the ſtate had ſtill ſubſiſted; and that Brutus, in the courſe of his office, was about to condemn another criminal; might not the culprit with great juſtice addreſs him as follows: "Wherefore, conſul, do you "condemn me? Am I guilty of a greater crime

" than betraying my country! And am not I " alſo your child?" I ſhould be glad to know what reply Brutus could make to ſuch a remonſtrance.

Will it be ſaid that Brutus ought to have abdicated the conſulſhip, rather than have condemned his own children! I anſwer, No. On the countrary, I affirm that every magiſtrate or governor, who ſhould leave his poſt at ſuch a criſis, and abandon his country in ſuch a perilous ſituation, would be a traitor and worthy of death. There is no medium in theſe things: Brutus muſt have been infamous, or Titus and Tiberinus have fallen by his order under the axe of the lictors. Not that I preſume there are many perſons who would have had the reſolution to have acted like Brutus. My antagoniſts do not indeed openly declare in favour of the latter ages of the Roman republic: they evidently betray that preference, however, which they give to the former; and ſeem to be as much at a loſs to diſcover the character of the hero through the rude ſimplicity of the firſt, as I have to diſcover that of men of probity through the pomp and ſplendour of the latter.

To Fabricius, indeed, they oppoſe Titus: but they leave out a neceſſary diſtinction; which is; that, in the time of Pyrrhus, every Roman was a Fabricius; whereas, in the reign of Titus, he was the only honeſt man among them *. I will not

* If Titus had not been emperor, we ſhould never have heard a word about him or his virtue: for he would have continued to follow the general example. He became indeed a man of probity only, by riſing to a ſtation which authorized him to ſet a better. " Privatus atque etiam ſub patre principe, " ne odio quidem, ne dum vituperatione publica caruit. At illi " ea fama pro bono ceſſit, converſaque eſt in maximas laudes."

not inſiſt on the heroic actions of the primitive Romans, nor the criminal ones of their ſucceſſors; but I cannot forbear mentioning, that virtue was honoured by the former, and deſpiſed by the latter. For it is to be obſerved, that when honorary crowns were beſtowed on the conquerors in the games at the circus, they no longer adjudged the civic crown to him who ſhould ſave the life of a citizen.

Not that this degeneracy was confined to the Romans. There was a time when the republic of Athens was rich enough to defray the immenſe expenſe of its public ſhews and entertainments; to reward, at a very conſiderable rate, authors, comedians, and even the ſpectators: this was the very time, nevertheleſs, at which the ſtate was diſtreſſed for money to defend itſelf againſt the enterprizes of Philip.

To come, at length, to modern examples; in adducing which, however, I ſhall not adopt the mode of argumentation made uſe of by my antagoniſts. I muſt yet obſerve, that they procure to themſelves no very honourable advantage, in preventing their adverſary from bringing his reaſons, inſtead of refuting them when brought.

I ſhall not enter into a particular examination, alſo, of all the reflections which my opponents have been at the trouble of making, on luxury, on politeneſs, on the admirable methods of educating our children *, on thoſe of improving

* It muſt not be aſked if parents and tutors are not very careful to keep ſuch dangerous writings as mine out of the hand of their children and pupils. In fact, what terrible diſorders might not follow, if theſe pupils, ſo admirably educated, ſhould come to diſdain all the fine things they have been taught, and prefer in good earneſt virtue to knowledge? Thus puts me in mind of

our knowledge, on the utility of the ſciences, on the agreeableneſs of the fine arts, and on other points; of which the greater part do not affect my arguments; while others either refute themſelves, or have been long ſince refuted. I ſhall content myſelf with the citation of a few paſſages, picked up in different places, and which appear to want ſome explanation. At the ſame time, I ſhall be under the neceſſity of contenting myſelf with paraphraſes, from the impoſſibility of purſuing accurately thoſe arguments of which I cannot diſcover the thread.

It is pretended that thoſe ignorant nations, which have had *ſome ideas of glory and virtue, are very ſingular exceptions that afford no preſumption in diſcredit of the ſciences.* Very well! But it is certain that all the learned nations, with their fine ideas of glory and of virtue, have ever loſt both the love and the practice of it. That is without exception; let us proceed to the proof. *To be convinced of this, let us caſt our eyes over the immenſe continent of Africa, which no mortal hath been daring enough to penetrate, nor lucky enough to attempt it with impunity.* That is as much as to ſay, Becauſe we cannot penetrate the continent of Africa, and are therefore ignorant of what paſſes there, we muſt conclude the people to be over-run with vices. Had we found out the means of conveying our own thither, we might indeed have juſtly drawn ſuch a con-

of a Lacedemonian preceptor, who, being aſked raillery what he would teach his pupil, anſwered, *I will teach him to love what is virtuous.* If I ſhould meet with ſuch a tutor among us, I ſhould whiſper in his ear to take care of what he ſaid; for otherwiſe he would have no diſciples. I ſhould bid him ſay, he would teach them to prattle agreeably, and I would anſwer for it he'd make his fortune.

conclusion. If I were a chief of any of the people of Negroe-land, I declare I would erect a gallows on the frontiers of my country; on which I would hang up the first European that should attempt to enter it, and the first native that should dare to leave it *. *America presents us with spectacles no less disgraceful to human nature.* Particularly since the Europeans have been there. *There may be counted an hundred barbarous or savage people in ignorance, for one that is virtuous.* Be it so. Let us suppose we can count one. But of people that have cultivated the sciences, and have been at the same time virtuous, the world hath never seen even a single one. *The earth abandoned and without culture, is not therefore totally barren and idle; it produces poisonous plants, and nourishes monsters.* This it always begins to do in those places where a taste for the frivolous arts occasions that of agriculture to be neglected. *The soul,* it may in like manner be said, *is not barren and idle when abandoned by virtue. It produces fictions, romances, satires, verses, and nourishes the vices.*

If the barbarians have ever made conquests, they have been always such as were unjust. Pray, what were the Europeans when they first made the admired conquest of America? But, how is it possible that a people, possessed and knowing the use of cannon, charts, and compasses, should com-

* It may be asked perhaps, what evil a citizen is guilty of who leaves it with a design never to return? In the first place, he sets a bad example to others; and he hurts himself by the vices he goes in search of. It is therefore the business of the law to prevent both; for it is certainly better for people to be hanged than to be wicked.

commit injuſtice! Will it be ſaid that the event diſplayed the ſuperior valour of the conquerors? No, it only diſplayed their art and ingenuity; it ſhewed that an artful and cunning man might deduce that ſucceſs from his induſtry, which a brave one deduces only from his valour. To ſpeak without partiality; which are we to conclude the moſt courageous, the odious Cortez, ſubduing Mexico, by the help of gun-powder, artifice, and perfidy; or the unfortunate Guatimozin, ſtretched out, by the honeſt Europeans, over burning coals, and ſaying in raillery to one of his officers who complained at being treated in the ſame manner, "How, Sir, am I upon a "bed of roſes?"

To ſay that the ſciences take riſe from idleneſs, is a palpable abuſe of terms; they ariſe indeed from leiſure, but they ſecure us from being idle. For my part, I do not comprehend this diſtinction between leiſure and idleneſs. But this I know very well, that no honeſt man can pretend to have leiſure, while there is any good for him to do; while he hath a country to ſerve; while there are unhappy perſons to relieve; and I defy my antagoniſt to find any honeſt ſenſe, which can, agreeable to my principles, be given to the word leiſure.

The huſbandman, whoſe neceſſities attach him to the plough, is not more buſy than the geometer or the anatomiſt. No, nor the child who is employed in building himſelf a houſe of cards, but much more uſefully. *Under the pretence that bread is neceſſary to life, ought the whole world to apply to agriculture?* Why ſhould they not? let them live on paſturage, if it be proper for them; I had much rather ſee men quietly brow-

zing on the herbage of the fields, than devouring one another in towns and cities. It is certain that, were they ſuch as I require, they would reſemble the brutes more than they do; and as they are, they more reſemble mankind.

A ſtate of ignorance is a ſtate of fear and want. We are ſo weak, that in ſuch a ſtate every thing ſeems dangerous; death thunders over our heads, and lurks in the graſs that we tread under feet. When we fear every thing, and want every thing, what diſpoſition can be more natural than a deſire to know every thing? We need only reflect on the continual apprehenſions and inquietudes of phyſicians and anatomiſts about their health, to know whether our knowledge ſerves us as a ſecurity againſt the fear of danger. On the contrary, as ſcience always diſcovers to us more dangers than it teaches us how to avoid, it is no wonder that its cultivation ſhould only increaſe our apprehenſions, and make us puſillanimous. The animals live in a perfect ſecurity in this reſpect, and are not at all the worſe for it. A heifer hath no need to ſtudy botany, to enable her to chuſe her proper food; and the wolf devours his prey without any apprehenſions of indigeſtion. In anſwer to all this, ſhall we venture to take the part of inſtinct againſt reaſon? This is exactly the queſtion I would myſelf aſk.

It ſeems, we are told this, as if there were too many labourers, and that we were afraid of being in want of philoſophers. I will aſk, in my turn, whether there be any fear that the lucrative profeſſions ſhould want profeſſors? It is bad to know the influence of avarice. Every thing, from our very infancy, induces us to the uſeful

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profeſſions; and what prepoſſeſſions have we not to overcome, what fortitude doth it not require, to dare to be only a Deſcartes, a Newton, or a Locke?

Leibnitz and Newton died in poſſeſſion of wealth and honours; of which they merited ſtill more. Shall we ſay that it was from their moderation they were not elevated to the rank of ploughmen? I am well enough aware of the influence of avarice, to know that every thing induces us to the lucrative profeſſions; and therefore, I ſay, draws us off from the uſeful ones. An Hebert, a Lafrenaye, a Dulac, and a Martin, get more money by their frivolous arts in one day, than the huſbandmen of a whole province can earn in a month. I might propoſe a very ſingular problem with regard to the paſſage I am now conſidering; this is, to take away the three firſt lines, which are quoted from me, and then to leave any one to gueſs whether it is cited from my writings or thoſe of my antagoniſts.

Good books are the only ſecurity of weak minds, that is to ſay, of three fourths of mankind, againſt the contagion of bad example. In the firſt place, the learned ſet many more bad examples than they write good books; ſecondly, there will be always more bad books than good; and thirdly, the beſt directors which ſimple honeſt people can follow, are reaſon and conſcience. *Paucis eſt opus litteris ad mentem bonam.* As to thoſe whoſe intellects are dull and whoſe conſcience is hard, reading will never be of any uſe to them. In ſhort, there are no books in the world but thoſe of religion that are good for

any

any thing to any body and theſe are thoſe only which I have not condemned.

It is attempted to make us regret the want of the education of the Perſians. Pleaſe to obſerve that it is Plato who attempts this. I thought it neceſſary to ſkreen myſelf behind the authority of that philoſopher, but I ſee that nothing can ſkreen me from the animoſity of my adverſaries. *Tros Rutuſulve fuat:* they had rather wound one another, than give me the leaſt quarter; and thus do themſelves more miſchief than me†.

This education was founded, it is ſaid, on ignorance and barbarous principles, becauſe it preſcribed peculiar maſters for the exerciſe of every virtue: whereas virtue is indiviſible; becauſe it is to be inſtilled, not to be taught; the buſineſs of education being to excite our love to the practice of it, and not merely to demonſtrate its theory. How many things ſuggeſt themſelves, in anſwer to this paſſage! but we muſt not do the reader ſo much injury as to ſay here every thing that is to be ſaid. I ſhall confine myſelf to two remarks. The firſt is, that, whoever would bring up a child, does not begin with telling him it is neceſſary to practiſe virtue. He teaches him firſt to be true, to be temperate, to be courageous, *&c.* telling him, that in the union of all theſe conſiſts virtue. Secondly, that it is we who content ourſelves with demonſtrating the theory

† I have had in my head a new ſcheme of defence; and I will not anſwer for it, that I ſhall not be, ſome time or other, weak enough to execute it. This defence will be compoſed only of arguments taken from the philoſophers: whence it will follow, that if their reaſons are bad, they are all mere babblers, as I affirm; and, on the contrary, if they are good, I ſhall have gained my cauſe.

theory of virtue; but the Perſians taught the practice.

All the reproaches, which have been caſt on philoſophy, are ſo many attacks on the human underſtanding: I confeſs it. *Or rather on the Author of nature, who made us ſuch as we are.* If he hath made us philoſophers, why ſhould we take ſuch a deal of pains to make ourſelves ſo? *Philoſophers are but men; and if they are miſtaken, where is the wonder?* No wonder at all: the wonder will be when they are not miſtaken. *Let us pity them, profit by their errors, and correct ourſelves.* Yes, let us correct ourſelves, and philoſophiſe no longer. *There are a thouſand ways to error, and but one that leads to the truth.* This is exactly what I myſelf have ſaid. *Ought we to be ſurpriſed that ſo many miſtakes have been committed in ſearch of this, and that it hath been diſcovered ſo late.* Is it then true that we have found it out at laſt?

An opinion of Socrates is produced againſt us, which affects the ſophiſts, not the learned; not the ſciences, but the abuſe which may be made of them. What could be required more by one who maintains, that all our ſciences are mere abuſes, and all our ſages in reality ſophiſts? *Socrates was the chief of a ſect, who taught the art of doubting.* My veneration for Socrates would be greatly diminiſhed, if I could imagine he had the ridiculous vanity of ſetting himſelf up for the chief of a ſect. *And he juſtly cenſured the pride of thoſe who pretended to know every thing.* That is to ſay, the pride of all the learned. *True ſcience is very far from any ſuch affectation.* That is true; but it is of our ſcience that I am ſpeaking. *Socrates is here a witneſs againſt himſelf.*

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This ſeems difficult to comprehend. *The moſt learned of the Greeks did not bluſh for his ignorance.* The moſt learned of the Greeks knew nothing by his own confeſſion. Draw what concluſion, therefore, you pleaſe concerning the reſt. *The ſciences have not, therefore, their ſource in our vices.* Our ſciences have, therefore, their ſource in our vices. *They do not, therefore, all take their riſe in human pride.* I have already explained myſelf on this head. *Vain declamation, which can only deceive prejudiced minds!* I know not what anſwer to make to this.

In ſpeaking of the bounds of luxury, it is pretended that no inferences ſhould be drawn from paſt times to the preſent. *When men univerſally went naked, he who firſt put on wooden ſhoes was deemed a voluptuary. The outcry againſt corruption hath been conſtantly tranſmitted from age to age, without any idea being fixed to the term.* It is very true that, till the preſent age, luxury, though frequently prevalent, hath been looked upon at leaſt as the fatal ſource of numerous evils. It was reſerved for M. Melon to be the firſt publiſher of the contrary obnoxious doctrine; the novelty of which acquired him more followers than the ſolidity of his reaſons. But I am not afraid to ſtand up alone, to combat theſe odious maxims, which tend but to the debaſement and deſtruction of virtue, and to add to the number of the rich and the miſerable, that is to ſay, to that of the vicious.

It was thought I ſhould be greatly embarraſſed, by being aſked, "To what limits I would "have luxury confined?" My opinion is, that it is altogether unneceſſary. Every thing is the ſource of evil beyond what is phyſically neceſſary.

Nature itſelf hath given us but too many wants; and it is, at beſt, a very great imprudence to multiply them without an abſolute neceſſity, and by ſuch means to lay the ſoul under ſtill greater dependence. It was not without reaſon that Socrates, looking over a variety of merchandiſe and manufactures, congratulated himſelf on his having no need of any of thoſe things. It is indeed an hundred to one, that the firſt man who wore wooden ſhoes was culpable in ſo doing, except he had got ſore feet. As for us, we are too much obliged to wear ſhoes, not to be excuſed from practiſing virtue.

I have elſewhere ſaid, that I do not propoſe to ſubvert the actual ſtate of ſociety, to burn libraries, or deſtroy colleges and academies. To this I add here, that I as little propoſe to force mankind to content themſelves with ſimple neceſſaries. I am very ſenſible I ought not to form the chimerical project of making people honeſt: but I thought it my duty to ſay, without diſguiſe, what the truth demanded of me. I have ſeen the evil, and have endeavoured to trace the cauſes. Others more bold, or leſs prudent, may attempt to preſcribe the remedy.

But I am weary; and lay down my pen, to be taken up no more in this tedious diſpute. I underſtand that a great number of authors * have employed themſelves in endeavouring to refute me. I am very ſorry that I cannot anſwer them all; but I conceive that I have here ſhewn, by the

* There has been hardly a critical pamphlet, publiſhed for the amuſement of youth, in which the writers have not done me the honour to mention me. I have not read them, indeed, and certainly never ſhall: but nothing ſhall hinder me from ſetting all the ſtore by them which they deſerve; and I doubt not the whole is mighty pleaſant.

the choice of thoſe I have ſelected for this purpoſe †, that it is not fear which prevents my replying to the reſt.

I endeavoured to erect a monument, which owes not either its force or ſolidity to art. Truth alone, to which I have conſecrated it, ought to render it immoveable. And if I have once again repulſed the attacks which have been made on it, it hath been more with a view to do myſelf honour in defending it, than to afford it a ſupport, of which it ſtood in no need.

Be it permitted me, in taking leave of the reader, to proteſt to him, that nothing but the love of humanity and virtue gave riſe to this reply; and that the bitterneſs of my invectives againſt vices to which I have been a witneſs, hath ariſen only from the grief with which they affected me, and my ardent deſire to ſee mankind happy, and, above all, more worthy of being ſo.

† I am informed that Mr Gautier has done me the honour of a reply, though I did not anſwer him, but publiſhed my reaſons for not doing it. Probably Mr Gautier did not think thoſe reaſons valid, as he hath taken the pains to refute them. I ſee that I muſt give up the point to Mr Gautier, and readily confeſs I was in the wrong in not anſwering him. So that in this we are agreed. I regret indeed that I cannot repair that neglect; as it is unhappily now too late, and nobody would know what I was diſputing about.

ON THE ORIGIN and FOUNDATION OF THE Inequality of Mankind.

A DISCUSSION of the QUESTION Propoſed by the ACADEMY of DIJON,

"*What is the Origin of the Inequality among "Men, and whether it be authoriſed by the "law of Nature?*"

Non in depravatis, ſed in his quæ bene ſecundum naturam ſe habent, conſiderandum eſt quid ſit naturale.
ARISTOT. Polit. *l.* 2.

DEDICATION To the Republic of GENEVA.

MOST HONOURABLE, MAGNIFICENT, AND SOVEREIGN LORDS,

CONVINCED that it belongs only to a virtuous citizen to preſent his country thoſe acknowledgments it may become her to receive, I have been for thirty years paſt endeavouring to render myſelf worthy to offer it ſome public homage. In the mean time, a fortunate occaſion ſupplying in ſome degree the inſufficiency of my efforts, I have preſumed rather to follow the dictates

tates of zeal in embracing it, than to wait till I ſhould be authoriſed by merit. Having had the happineſs to be born a ſubject of Geneva, how could I reflect on the natural equality of mankind, and that inequality which ſociety hath introduced among them, without admiring the profound wiſdom by which both the one and the other are happily combined in this ſtate, and contribute, in a manner the moſt conformable to the law of nature, and the moſt favourable to community, to the ſecurity of public order and the happineſs of individuals? In my reſearches after the beſt and moſt ſenſible maxims which might be laid down for the conſtitution of government, I was ſurpriſed to find them all united in the compoſition of yours; ſo that had I not been a fellow-citizen, I ſhould have thought it indiſpenſible in me to preſent ſuch a picture of human ſociety to that people, who of all others ſeem to be poſſeſſed of its greateſt advantages, and to have beſt guarded againſt its abuſes.

Had I been to make choice of the place of my birth, I ſhould have preferred a community proportioned in its extent to the limits of the human faculties; that is, to the poſſibility of being well governed: in which, every perſon being capable of his employments, no one ſhould be obliged to commit to others the truſt he ought to diſcharge himſelf: a ſtate in which its individuals might be ſo well known to each other, that neither the ſecret machinations of vice, nor the modeſty of virtue, ſhould be able to eſcape the notice and judgment of the public; and in which the agreeable cuſtom of ſeeing and knowing each other, ſhould occaſion the love of their

country to be rather an affection for its inhabitants than for its ſoil.

I ſhould have choſen for my birth-place a country, in which the intereſt of the ſovereign could not be ſeparated from that of the ſubject; to the end that all the motions of the machine of government might ever tend to the general happineſs. And as this could not be the caſe, unleſs where the ſovereignty is lodged in the people, it follows that I ſhould have preferred a prudently-tempered democracy.

I ſhould have been deſirous to live and die free: that is, ſo far ſubject to the laws, that neither I, nor any body elſe, ſhould have it in our power to caſt off their honourable yoke; that agreeable and ſalutary yoke to which the haughtieſt necks bend the more tractably, as they are not formed to bear any other.

I ſhould have deſired, therefore, that no perſon within the ſtate ſhould be able to ſay he was above the laws; nor that any perſon without, ſhould be able to dictate ſuch as the ſtate ſhould be obliged to obey. For, be the conſtitution of a government what it may, if there be a ſingle member of it, who is not ſubject to the laws, all the reſt are neceſſarily at his diſcretion (1). And if there be a national chief within, and a foreign chief without, however they may divide their authority, it is impoſſible that both ſhould be duly obeyed and the ſtate well governed.

I ſhould not have choſen to live in a republic of recent inſtitution, however excellent its laws; for fear the government being otherwiſe framed than circumſtances might require, it might either diſagree with the new ſubjects, or the ſubjects diſagree with the new government; in which caſe

caſe the ſtate might be ſhaken to pieces, and deſtroyed almoſt as ſoon as founded.

For it is with liberty as it is with ſolid and ſucculent aliments, or with generous wines, proper to nouriſh and fortify robuſt conſtitutions accuſtomed to them, but pernicious, deſtructive, and intoxicating to weak and delicate temperaments, to which they are not adapted. A people once accuſtomed to maſters, are not in a ſituation to live without them. If they attempt at any time to ſhake off their fetters, they ſeldom gain any thing in point of freedom; for, by miſtaking licentiouſneſs for liberty, to which it is diametrically oppoſed, they generally become greater ſlaves to ſome impoſtor, who loads them with freſh chains. The Romans themſelves, an example for every ſucceeding free people, were incapable of governing themſelves on their expulſion of the Tarquins. Debaſed by ſlavery, and the ignominious taſk impoſed on them, they were at firſt no better than a headſtrong mob, which it was requiſite to manage and govern with the greateſt wiſdom; ſo that, being accuſtomed by degrees to breathe the ſalutary air of liberty, their minds, which had been enervated, or rather brutalized, under the burden of ſlavery, might gradually acquire that ſeverity of manners and ſpirit of fortitude, which rendered them at length the moſt reſpectable nation upon earth.

I ſhould have ſearched out for my country, therefore, ſome peaceful and happy republic, whoſe antiquity loſt itſelf, as it were, in the obſcurity of time: one that had experienced only ſuch ſalutary ſhocks as ſerved to diſplay and confirm the courage and patriotiſm of its ſubjects; and

and whoſe citizens, long accuſtomed to a prudent independence, were not only actually free, but worthy of their freedom.

I ſhould have made choice of a country, diverted, by a fortunate impotence, from the brutal love of conqueſt; and ſecured, by a ſtill more fortunate ſituation, from becoming itſelf the conqueſt of other ſtates: a free city ſituated between ſeveral nations, none of which ſhould find it their intereſt to attack it, yet all think themſelves intereſted in preventing its being attacked by others: a republick, in ſhort, which ſhould preſent nothing to tempt the ambition of its neighbours, but might reaſonably depend on their aſſiſtance in caſe of need. It would follow, that a republican ſtate ſo happily ſituated as I have ſuppoſed, could have nothing to fear but from itſelf; and that, if its members accuſtomed themſelves to the exerciſe of arms, it muſt be to keep alive that military ardour and courage, which is ſo becoming among free men, and tends to keep up their taſte for liberty, rather than through the neceſſity of providing for their own defence.

I ſhould have ſought a country, in which the legiſlative power ſhould be veſted in all its citizens: for who can better judge than themſelves of the propriety of the terms on which they mutually agree to live together in the ſame community? Not that I ſhould have approved of Plebiſcita, like thoſe among the Romans; in which the principal perſons in the ſtate, and thoſe moſt intereſted in its preſervation, were excluded thoſe deliberations on which its ſecurity frequently depended; and in which, by the moſt abſurd inconſiſtency, the magiſtrates were deprived

ved of privileges enjoyed in common by the loweſt citizens.

On the contrary, I ſhould have deſired, that, in order to prevent ſelf-intereſted and ill deſigned projects, with any of thoſe dangerous innovations which at length ruined the Athenians, no perſon ſhould be at liberty to propoſe new laws at pleaſure: but that this ſhould be the excluſive privilege of the magiſtrates; and that even theſe ſhould uſe it with ſo much caution, that the people on their part ſhould be ſo reſerved in giving their conſent to ſuch laws, and that the promulgation of theirs ſhould be attended with ſo much ſolemnity, that before the conſtitution could be affected by them, there might be time enough given for all to be convinced, That it is the great antiquity of the laws which principally contributes to render them ſacred and venerable; that the people ſoon learn to deſpiſe thoſe which they ſee daily altered; and that ſtates, by accuſtoming themſelves to neglect their ancient cuſtoms under pretence of improvement, frequently introduce greater evils than thoſe they endeavour to remove.

I ſhould have particularly avoided a republic, as one that muſt of courſe be ill-governed, in which the people, imagining themſelves capable of ſubſiſting without magiſtrates, or at leaſt without inveſting them with any thing more than a precarious authority, ſhould imprudently reſerve to themſelves the adminiſtration of civil affairs and the execution of their own laws. Such muſt have been the rude conſtitution of the primitive governments, directly emerging from a ſtate of nature; and this was another of the vices

that

that contributed to the diſſolution of the republic of Athens.

But I ſhould have choſen a community, the individuals of which, contented with the privileges of giving ſanction to their laws, and of unitedly deciding, from the repreſentations of the magiſtrates, the moſt important public affairs, ſhould have eſtabliſhed reſpectable tribunals; carefully diſtinguiſhed their ſeveral departments; and elected annually ſome of their fellow citizens, of the greateſt capacity and integrity, to adminiſter juſtice and govern the ſtate; a community, in ſhort, in which the virtue of the magiſtrates thus bearing teſtimony to the wiſdom of the people, they would mutually confer honour upon each other; in ſo much, that if ever any fatal miſunderſtandings ſhould ariſe to diſturb the public peace, even theſe intervals of confuſion and error ſhould bear the marks of moderation, reciprocal eſteem, and of a mutual reſpect for the laws; certain ſigns and pledges of a reconciliation as laſting as ſincere. Such are the advantages, moſt honourable, magnificent and ſovereign Lords, which I ſhould have ſought in the country I had choſen for the place of my nativity.

And if Providence had added to all theſe a delightful ſituation, a temperate clime, a fertile ſoil, and the moſt charming views that preſent themſelves under heaven, I ſhould deſire only, to complete my felicity, the peaceful enjoyment of all theſe bleſſings in the boſom of this happy country; living in an agreeable ſociety with my fellow-citizens, and exerciſing towards them, from their own example, the duties of friendſhip, humanity, and every other virtue, that I might

might leave behind me the honourable memory of a worthy man and an incorruptible and virtuous patriot.

But if, leſs fortunate, or too late grown wiſe, I ſaw myſelf reduced to end an infirm and languiſhing life in other climates, vainly regreting that peaceful repoſe which I forfeited in the imprudence of my youth, I would at leaſt have entertained the ſame ſentiments within myſelf, though denied the opportunity of avowing and indulging them in my native country. Affected with a tender and diſintereſted love for my diſtant fellow-citizens, I ſhould have addreſſed them, from my heart, nearly in the following-terms.

My dear countrymen, or rather my brethren, ſince the ties of blood unite moſt of us, as well as the laws, it gives me pleaſure that I cannot think of you, without thinking at the ſame time of all the bleſſings you enjoy, and of which none of you, perhaps, are ſo ſenſible of the value as I to whom they are loſt. The more I reflect on your ſituation both civil and political, the leſs can I conceive that the preſent ſtate of human nature will admit of a better. In all other governments, even when they deliberate on ſubjects the moſt intereſting to the ſtate, they are always confined to ideal projects, or at leaſt to bare poſſibilities. But as to you, your happineſs is complete. You have nothing to do but to enjoy it; you require nothing more to be made perfectly happy, than to know how to be ſatisfied with being ſo. Your ſovereignty, acquired or recovered by the ſword, and maintained for two centuries paſt by your valour and wiſdom, is at length fully and univerſally acknowledged. Your boundaries are fixed, your

rights

rights confirmed, and your repoſe ſecured, by honourable treaties. Your conſtitution is excellent, being not only dictated by the profoundeſt wiſdom, but guaranteed by friendly and reſpectable powers. Your ſtate enjoys perfect tranquillity; you have nothing to fear either from wars or conquerors; you have no other maſter than the wiſe laws you have yourſelves made, and which are adminiſtred by upright magiſtrates of your own chuſing. You are neither ſo wealthy as to be enervated by effeminacy, and thence to loſe, in the purſuit of frivolous pleaſures, a taſte for real happineſs and ſolid virtue; nor yet are ye ſo poor as to require more aſſiſtance from ſtrangers than your own induſtry is ſufficient to procure you. In the mean time, that darling liberty, which is not to be maintained in great ſtates but by ſubmitting to the moſt exorbitant impoſitions, coſts you hardly any thing for its preſervation.

May a republic, ſo wiſely and happily conſtituted, laſt for ever, as well for an example to other nations, as for the felicity of its own ſubjects? This is the only wiſh you have left to make; the only ſubject of your ſolicitude. It depends, for the future, on yourſelves alone, not to make you happy, (your anceſtors have ſaved you that trouble,) but to render that happineſs laſting, by your prudence in its enjoyment. It is on your conſtant unanimity, your obedience to the laws, and your reſpect to the magiſtrates, your preſervation depends. If there remain among you the ſmalleſt ſeeds of enmity or diſtruſt, haſten to root them up, as an accurſed leaven from which, ſooner or later, will reſult ſuch misfortunes as muſt be the deſtruc-

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tion of the ſtate. I conjure you all to examine the bottom of your hearts, and to hearken to the ſecret voice of your own conſciences. Is there any among you who can find, throughout the univerſe, a more upright, more enlightened, and more reſpectable body than that of your own magiſtracy? Do not all its members ſet you an example of moderation, of ſimplicity of manners, of reſpect for the laws, and of the moſt ſincere reconciliation? Place, therefore, without reſerve, that ſalutary confidence on ſuch wiſe ſuperiors, which reaſon ever owes to virtue. Conſider they are the objects of your own choice; that they juſtify that choice; and that the honours, due to thoſe whom you have exalted to dignity, are neceſſarily reflected back on yourſelves. Is there any among you ſo ignorant or inattentive, as not to know, that, when the laws loſe their force, and the magiſtrates their authority, neither the perſons nor properties of individuals are any longer ſecure? Why, therefore, ſhould you heſitate to do that cheerfully and confidently, which your true intereſt, your duty, and even common prudence, will ever require?

Let not a culpable and pernicious indifference for the ſupport of the conſtitution, ever induce you to neglect, in caſe of need, the prudent advice of the moſt enlightened and zealous of your fellow-citizens: but let equity, moderation, and firmneſs of reſolution, continue to regulate all your proceedings; exhibiting you to the whole univerſe, as an example of a valiant and modeſt people, equally tenacious of their honour and their liberty. Beware particularly, as the laſt advice I ſhall give you, of ſiniſter conſtruc-

tion and calumniating reports, the ſecret motives of which are often more dangerous than the actions at which they are levelled. The whole houſe will be awake and take the firſt alarm, given by a truſty and watchful maſtiff, who barks only at the approach of thieves; but we ever abominate the impertinent yelping of thoſe noiſy curs, who are perpetually diſturbing the public repoſe, and whoſe continual and ill-timed reports prevent our attending to them when they perhaps may be neceſſary.

And you, moſt honourable and magnificent Lords, you, the worthy and reſpectable magiſtrates of a free people, permit me to offer you in particular my duty and homage. If there be in the world a ſtation capable of conferring honour on the perſons who fill it, it is undoubtedly that which virtue and talents combine to beſtow; that of which you have rendered yourſelves worthy, and to which you have been promoted by your fellow-citizens. Their worth adds a new luſtre to yours; while being choſen by men, capable of governing others, to govern themſelves, I cannot help eſteeming you as much ſuperior to all other magiſtrates, as a free people, and particularly that over which you have the honour to preſide, is by its wiſdom and knowledge ſuperior to the populace of other ſtates.

Be it permitted me to cite an example; of which there ought to have exiſted better remains; an example which will be ever near and dear to my heart. I cannot recall to mind, without the moſt agreeable emotions, the perſon and manners of that virtuous citizen, to whom I owe my being, and by whom I was inſtructed

ſtructed in my infancy in the reſpect which is due to you. I can imagine that I ſee him ſtill ſubſiſting on his manual labour, and improving his mind by the ſtudy of the ſublimeſt truths. I ſee, lying before him, the works of Tacitus, Plutarch, and Grotius, intermixed with the tools of his trade. At his ſide ſtands his darling ſon, receiving, alas with too little profit, the tender inſtructions of the beſt of fathers. But, though the ſallies of youth occaſioned me a while to forget his prudent leſſons, I have at length the happineſs to experience, that, whatever propenſity one may have to vice, it is not eaſy for an education thus affectionately beſtowed to be ever entirely thrown away.

Such, my moſt honourable and magnificent Lords, are the citizens, and even the common inhabitants, of the country under your government; ſuch are thoſe intelligent and ſenſible men, of which, under the name of mechanics and trades-people, it is uſual in other nations to entertain a falſe and contemptible idea. My father, I own it with pleaſure, was in no wiſe diſtinguiſhed from his fellow-citizens. He was only ſuch as they are all: and yet, ſuch as he was, there is no country in which his acquaintance would not have been coveted, and cultivated even with advantage, by men of the firſt diſtinction. It would not become me, nor is it, thank heaven, at all neceſſary for me, to remind you of the regard which ſuch men have a right to expect of their magiſtrates, to whom they are equal both by birth and education; and inferior only by that preference which they voluntarily pay to your merit, and in ſo doing lay claim on their part to *ſome* ſort of acknowledgement.

It is with a lively ſatisfaction I underſtand, that the greateſt candour and condeſcenſion attend, in all your behaviour towards them, on that gravity which becomes the ſagacious miniſters of the law; and that you ſo well repay them, by your eſteem and attention to the general welfare, that reſpect and obedience which they juſtly pay to you. This conduct is not only juſt, but prudent; as it wiſely tends to obliterate many unhappy events, which ought to be buried in eternal oblivion. It is alſo by ſo much the more prudential, as it tends to make a generous and equitable people find a pleaſure in their duty; whilſt, naturally fond of doing you honour, thoſe who are the moſt zealous to maintain their own rights and privileges, are at the ſame time the beſt diſpoſed to reſpect yours.

It ought not to be thought ſurpriſing that the governors of civil ſociety ſhould have the welfare and glory of their peculiar communities at heart: but it is uncommonly unfortunate for them, when thoſe perſons who look upon themſelves as the magiſtrates, or rather the maſters of a more holy and ſublime country, demonſtrate their affection for the earthly ſpot which maintains them. I am happy in having it in my power to make ſo ſingular an exception in favour of my own country; and to rank, in the number of its beſt citizens, thoſe zealous depoſitaries of the ſacred articles of our eſtabliſhed faith; thoſe venerable paſtors, whoſe powerful and captivating eloquence are ſo much the better calculated to enforce the maxims of the goſpel, as they are themſelves the firſt to put them in practice.

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The whole world is informed of the great ſucceſs with which the oratory of the pulpit is cultivated at Geneva; but, being too much uſed to hear divines preach one thing and ſee them practiſe another, few people have an opportunity to know how far the true ſpirit of Chriſtianity, holineſs of manners, ſeverity with regard to themſelves, and indulgence to their neighbours, prevail throughout the whole body of our miniſters. It is, perhaps, in the power of the city of Geneva alone, to produce an edifying example of ſo perfect an union ſubſiſting between its clergy and men of letters. And it is in a great degree, on their wiſdom, their known moderation, and on their zeal for the proſperity of the ſtate, that I build my hopes of its conſtant and perpetual tranquillity.

At the ſame time, I remark, with a pleaſure mixed with ſurpriſe and veneration, how much they deteſt the horrid maxims of thoſe holy and barbarous men, of whom hiſtory furniſhes us with more than one example; who, in order to ſupport the pretended prerogative of the Deity, that is to ſay their own intereſt, have been ſo much the leſs ſparing of human blood, as they were more flattered their own in particular ſhould be always reſpected. I muſt not here forget that precious half of the republic, which makes the happineſs of the other, and whoſe tenderneſs and prudence preſerve its tranquillity and virtue. Amiable and virtuous daughters of Geneva! it will be always the lot of your ſex to govern ours. Happy, ſo long as your chaſte influence, ſolely exerciſed within the limits of conjugal union, is exerted only for the glory of the ſtate and the happineſs of the public. It it

thus the female ſex commanded at Sparta; and thus that you deſerve to command at Geneva.

What man can be ſuch a barbarian, as to reſiſt the voice of honour and reaſon, breathing from the lips of an affectionate wife? Who would not deſpiſe the tawdry charms of luxury, on beholding the ſimplicity and modeſty of an attire, which, from the luſtre it derives from you, ſeems to be the moſt favourable to beauty? It is your taſk to perpetuate, by the inſinuating ſpirit of your manners, by the innocent and amiable influence of your converſation, a reſpect for the laws of the ſtate, and harmony among individuals. It is yours to reunite divided families by happy marriages; and, above all things, to correct, by the perſuaſive mildneſs of your leſſons and the modeſt graces of your diſcourſe, thoſe extravagancies which our young people pick up in other countries; from whence, inſtead of many uſeful things that come within the reach of their obſervation and practice, they bring home hardly any thing, beſide a puerile and ridiculous manner acquired among looſe women, except the admiration of I know not what pretended grandeur, a paultry indemnification for ſlavery, and unworthy of the real greatneſs of true liberty.

Continue, therefore, always to be what you are, the chaſte guardians of our manners, and the gentle ſecurity for our peace; exerting on every occaſion the privileges of the heart and of nature, to the advantage of moral obligation and the intereſts of virtue.

I flatter myſelf no ſiniſter event will ever prove me to have been miſtaken, in building on ſuch a foundation my hopes of the felicity of my fellow-

low-citizens and the glory of the republic. It muſt be confeſſed, however, that with all theſe advantages, it does not ſhine with that exterior luſtre, by which the eyes of the generality of mankind are affected; a puerile and fatal taſte for which, is the moſt mortal enemy to the happineſs and liberty of a ſtate.

Let our diſſolute youth ſeek elſewhere thoſe tranſient pleaſures which are followed by long repentance. Let our pretenders to taſte, elſewhere admire the grandeur of palaces, the beauty of equipages, the ſumptuouſneſs of furniture, the pomp of public entertainments, with all the refinements of luxury and effeminacy. Geneva boaſts nothing but men: ſuch a ſight has nevertheleſs its value; and thoſe who have a taſte for it, are by no means inferior to the admirers of any other merit.

Deign, moſt honourable, magnificent and ſovereign Lords, all and each, to receive, and with equal goodneſs, this reſpectful teſtimony of the intereſt I take in your common proſperity. And, if I have been ſo unhappy as to be guilty of any indiſcreet tranſport in this glowing effuſion of my heart; I beſeech you to pardon, and impute it to the tender affection of a real patriot, and to the ardent and lawful zeal of a man who places his own and his greateſt felicity in the proſpect of ſeeing you happy.

I am, with the moſt profound reſpect, moſt honourable, magnificent and ſovereign Lords,

Chamberi, June 12, 1754.

Your moſt humble
and moſt obedient ſervant
and fellow-citizen.

JOHN-JAMES ROUSSEAU.

PRE-

PREFACE.

OF all human ſciences, the moſt uſeful and moſt imperfect appears to me that of mankind: and I will venture to ſay, the ſimple inſcription on the temple of Delphos contained a precept more difficult and important than is to be found in all the huge volumes of morality that have been written. I conſider the ſubject of the following diſcourſe, as one of the moſt intereſting queſtions philoſophy can propoſe, and, unhappily for us, one of the moſt perplexing for philoſophers to ſolve. For how ſhall we know the ſource of the inequality ſubſiſting among men, if we do not begin with the knowledge of mankind? And how ſhall man arrive at the proſpect of himſelf, ſuch as he was formed by nature, through all thoſe changes which the ſucceſſion of place and time muſt have produced in his original conſtitution? How ſhall he be able to ſeparate and diſtinguiſh that which is eſſential to his nature, from what accident and improvement may have added to, or diverſified in, his primitive ſtate.

As the ſtatue of Glaucus, which was ſo diſfigured by time, by the ſeas and tempeſts, that it bore the reſemblance rather of a wild beaſt than a God; ſo the human ſoul, altered in the midſt of ſociety by a thouſand cauſes perpetually recurring, by the acquiſition of a multiplicity of truths and errors, by the changes happening to the conſtitution of the body, and by the continual jarring of the paſſions, hath, if I may ſo ſpeak, loſt its original appearance, ſo as to be hardly known for the ſame. Inſtead of a being,

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acting conſtantly from fixed and invariable principles; inſtead of that celeſtial and majeſtic ſimplicity, impreſſed on it by its divine Author; we find in it only the frightful contraſt of paſſion miſtaking itſelf for reaſon, and of underſtanding totally perverted.

It is ſtill more cruel, that, every improvement made by the human ſpecies removing it ſtill farther from its primitive ſtate, the more diſcoveries we make, the more we deprive ourſelves of the means of making the moſt important of all. Thus it is, in one ſenſe, from our very application to the ſtudy of man, that the knowledge of him is put out of our power.

It is eaſy to perceive, that it is in theſe ſucceſſive changes, which have happened to the conſtitution of man, we are to look for the origin of thoſe differences which now ſubſiſt among the ſeveral parts of our ſpecies; all which, it is allowed, are as equal among themſelves as were the animals of every kind before phyſical cauſes had introduced thoſe varieties which are now obſervable among ſome of them.

It is, in fact, not to be conceived that theſe primary changes, to whatever cauſes they may be imputed, could have altered, all at once and in the ſame manner, every individual of the ſpecies. It is natural to think, that, while the condition of ſome of them grew better or worſe, and they were acquiring various good or bad qualities not inherent in their nature, there were others who continued a longer time in their firſt ſituation. Such was doubtleſs the firſt ſource of the inequality of makind; which it is much eaſier to point out thus in general terms,

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than to aſſign with preciſion the true cauſes of particular diſtinctions.

Let not my readers, therefore, imagine that I flatter myſelf with having ſeen what it appears to me ſo difficult to diſcover. I have here opened ſome arguments, and riſked a few conjectures; but leſs from the hope of being able to ſolve the difficulty, than with a view to throw ſome light upon it, and of giving a true ſtate of the queſtion. Others may eaſily proceed farther in the ſame route, without finding it very eaſy to reach the end of their career. For it is by no means a ſlight undertaking to diſtinguiſh properly between what is originally natural, and what is artificial, in the actual conſtitution of man; to form a juſt notion of a ſtate, which exiſts no longer, perhaps never did exiſt, and probably never will; and of which it is nevertheleſs neceſſary to have juſt ideas, in order to form a proper judgment of our preſent ſtate. It requires, indeed, more philoſophy than may poſſibly be imagined, to enable any one to determine exactly what precautions he ought to take in order to make ſolid obſervations on this ſubject; it appearing to me, that a good ſolution of the following problem is not unworthy of the Ariſtotles and Plinys of the preſent age. *What are the experiments neceſſary to be made, in order to diſcover the natural ſtate of man? And how are thoſe experiments to be made in a ſtate of ſociety?*

So far am I from undertaking to ſolve this problem, that I think I have ſufficiently conſidered the ſubject, to venture to declare beforehand, that it would require all the ſagacity of our greateſt philoſophers to direct how ſuch experiments

periments are to be made, and the influence of our moſt powerful ſovereigns to make them. A concurrence of which we have very little reaſon to expect, eſpecially attended with that perſeverance, or rather ſucceſſion, of ſcience and zeal, neceſſary on both ſides to reach the end propoſed.

Theſe reſearches, ſo difficult to make, and which have been hitherto ſo little thought of, are, nevertheleſs, the only means which remain to obviate a multitude of difficulties, which deprive us of the knowledge of the real foundations of human ſociety.

It is this ignorance of the nature of man, which caſts ſo much uncertainty and obſcurity on the true definition of natural juſtice: for the idea of juſtice, ſays Burlamaqui, and more particularly that of natural juſtice, are ideas manifeſtly relative to the nature of man. It is therefore from this very nature itſelf, continues he, from the conſtitution and ſtate of man, that we are to deduce the firſt principles of natural law.

We cannot without ſurpriſe and diſguſt remark how little the different authors agree who have treated this important ſubject. There can hardly be found any two, among the moſt ſerious writers, that are of the ſame opinion concerning it. I ſhall not inſiſt upon what the ancient philoſophers have advanced on this head; as one would imagine they had purpoſely engaged to contradict one another, in reſpect to the moſt fundamental principles. The Roman civilians ſubjected man and all other animals indiſcriminately to the ſame natural law, becauſe they conſidered, under that appellation, rather

rather that law which nature impoſes on herſelf, than what ſhe hath preſcribed to others; or perhaps becauſe of the particular acceptation of the term *law* among thoſe Civilians, who ſeem on this occaſion to have underſtood nothing more by it than the general relations eſtabliſhed by nature between all animated beings for their common preſervation. The moderns, underſtanding only by the term *law* a rule preſcribed to a moral being, that is to ſay intelligent, free, and conſidered as to the relations in which he ſtands to other beings, have conſequently confined the juriſdiction of natural law to man as the only animal endowed with reaſon. But as, in defining this law, almoſt every one hath taken a different method, they have eſtabliſhed it on ſuch metaphyſical principles, that there are very few perſons among us capable of comprehending them, much leſs of originally diſcovering them themſelves. So that the definitions of theſe learned men, all differing in every thing elſe, agree only in this, that it is impoſſible to comprehend the law of nature, and of courſe to obey it, without being a very ſubtil caſuiſt, and a profound metaphyſician. All which is exactly the ſame as to ſay, that mankind muſt have employed, in the eſtabliſhment of ſociety, that knowledge which is with great difficulty, and by very few perſons, to be acquired even in a ſtate of ſociety.

Knowing ſo little, therefore, of nature, and ſo ill agreeing about the meaning of the word *law*, it would be difficult for us to fix upon a good definition of the law of nature. Thus all the definitions we meet with in books, ſetting aſide their defect in point of uniformity, have yet

yet another, in that they are derived from many kinds of knowledge which men by nature do not poſſeſs, and from advantages of which they can have no idea when they have once departed from that ſtate. Our modern civilians begin by inquiring what rules it would be expedient for men to agree to for their common intereſt; and then give the name of *natural law* to a ſyſtem compoſed of theſe rules, without any other proof of their originality, than the utility which would reſult from their being univerſally practiſed. This is undoubtedly a commodious way of making definitions, and of explaining the origin and natural fitneſs of things, by the accidental and almoſt arbitrary convenience of them.

But ſo long as we are ignorant of the natural ſtate of man, it is in vain for us to attempt to determine either the law originally preſcribed to him, or that which is beſt adapted to his conſtitution. All we can know with any certainty reſpecting this law, is, that, in order to its being a law, not only the will of thoſe it obliges muſt be ſenſible of its obligation in their ſubmitting to it; but alſo that, in order to its being natural, it muſt come directly from the voice of nature.

Throwing aſide, therefore, all thoſe ſcientific books, which teach us only to look upon men in the light wherein they have placed themſelves, and contemplating the firſt and moſt ſimple operations of the human ſoul, I think I can perceive in it two diſtinct principles of action prior to reaſon; one of them deeply intereſting us in our own welfare and preſervation; and the other exciting a natural averſion to ſee any other ſenſible being, and particularly any of

our own ſpecies, ſuffer pain or death. It is from the concurrence and combination which the underſtanding is capable of forming between theſe two principles, without its being at all neceſſary to annex that of ſociability, that all the rules of natural equity appear to me readily deducible; rules which our reaſon is afterwards obliged to re-eſtabliſh on other foundations, when, by its ſucceſſive efforts to the improvements of ſcience, it hath ſuppreſſed the voice of nature.

In proceeding thus, we ſhall not be obliged to make man a philoſopher before he is made a man. His obligations toward other beings are not only dictated to him by the late and tedious leſſons of wiſdom; but, ſo long as he does not reſiſt the internal impulſe of compaſſion, he will never hurt any other man, nor even any animate creature, except on thoſe lawful occaſions in which his own preſervation is concerned, and he is obliged to give himſelf the preference.

By this method, alſo, we may terminate the ancient diſputes concerning the participation of other animals in the law of nature: for it is clear, that, being deſtitute of knowledge and free-will, they are not recognizable to that law: as they partake, however, in ſome meaſure of our nature, in conſequence of the ſenſibility with which they are endowed, they ought to partake equally of a right to natural juſtice; ſo that mankind are ſubjected to a kind of moral obligation even toward the brutes. It appears, in fact, that my natural obligation to do no injury to my fellow-creatures is founded leſs on their being rational than ſenſible creatures: and this

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quality of ſenſibility, being common both to men and beaſts, ought to entitle the latter at leaſt to the privilege of not being wantonly abuſed by the former.

The very ſtudy of the origin of man, of his real wants, and the fundamental principles of his duty, is beſides the only proper method we can take to obviate a number of difficulties which preſent themſelves on the origin of moral inequality, on the true foundations of the body-politic, on the reciprocal rights of its members, and many other ſimilar topics equally important and obſcure.

In taking a view of human ſociety with a calm and diſintereſted eye, it ſeems, at firſt, to preſent us only with a proſpect of the violence of the powerful and the oppreſſion of the weak. The mind is ſhocked at the cruelty of the one, or is induced to lament the blindneſs of the other; and as nothing is leſs permanent in life than thoſe external relations which are more frequently produced by accident than wiſdom, and which are called weakneſs or power, riches or poverty, all human eſtabliſhments appear at firſt glance to be founded merely on moving banks of quick-ſand. By taking a nearer ſurvey of them, indeed, and removing the duſt which ſurrounds the ediſice, we may perceive the immoveable baſis on which it is raiſed, and thence learn to reſpect their foundation.

Now, without a ſerious application to the ſtudy of man, his natural faculties, and their ſucceſſive developement, we ſhall never be able to make theſe neceſſary diſtinctions; or to ſeparate, in the actual ſituation of things, that which is the effect of the divine will, from the im-

provements attempted by human art. The political and moral reſearches, therefore, to which the examination of the important queſtion before me leads us, are in every reſpect uſeful; while the hypothetical hiſtory of governments affords a leſſon equally inſtructive to mankind.

In conſidering what we ſhould have been if left to ourſelves, we ſhould learn to bleſs that Being whoſe gracious hand, correcting our inſtitutions, and giving them an immoveable baſis, hath prevented thoſe diſorders which otherwiſe would have ariſen from them, and cauſed our happineſs to proceed from thoſe means which ſeemed calculated to involve us in miſery.

——*Quem te deus eſſe*
Juſſit, et humana qua parte locatus es in re,
Diſce.

ADVERTISEMENT

Reſpecting the NOTES annexed to the following DISSERTATION.

I HAVE added ſome annotations to this work, according to my indolent cuſtom of writing by fits and ſtarts. Theſe I have thrown together at the end of the diſſertation; as in this I have endeavoured to take the ſhorteſt way; and the ſubject of my notes ſometimes rambled too far from that of the text to be read conveniently with it.

Thoſe who may have the courage to venture on a ſecond peruſal of the diſcourſe, may amuſe themſelves by beating the buſhes, and try to run over the notes. As to others, it is no great matter if they do not read them at all.

IN-

INTRODUCTION.

MAN is the ſubject of the preſent inquiry; from the nature of which, it is evident I am going to addreſs myſelf to thoſe who are worthy of that appellation: for it belongs to men only, to thoſe who are not afraid to honour the truth, to propoſe queſtions of this kind. I ſhall with confidence, therefore, engage in the cauſe of humanity, before the ſages who invite me to it; and ſhall have no reaſon to be diſſatisfied if I acquit myſelf in a manner worthy of my ſubject and of my judges.

I conceive there are two kinds of inequality among the human ſpecies; one, which I call natural or phyſical, becauſe it is eſtabliſhed by nature, and conſiſts in a difference of age, health, corporeal ſtrength, and the qualities of the mind or of the ſoul; and another, which may be called a moral or political inequality, becauſe it depends on a kind of convention, and is eſtabliſhed, or at leaſt authoriſed, by the common conſent of mankind. This latter conſiſts of the different privileges which ſome men enjoy to the prejudice of others; ſuch as that of being more rich, more honoured, more powerful, and more privileged to exact obedience.

It were ſuperfluous to aſk what is the ſource of their natural inequality, becauſe that queſtion is anſwered by the ſimple definition of the word. Again it would be ſtill more ſuperfluous to inquire, whether there be any eſſential relation or connection between the two inequalities; for this would be only aſking, in other words, whether thoſe who command are neceſſarily better

than thoſe who obey; and if ſtrength of body or mind, wiſdom, or virtue, are to be always found in particular individuals, in the ſame proportion with power or wealth: a queſtion proper enough perhaps to be diſcuſſed by ſlaves in the hearing of their maſters, but highly unbecoming reaſonable men at liberty and in ſearch of the truth.

The ſubject of the preſent diſcourſe, therefore, is more preciſely this: To mark, in the progreſs of things, that critical moment, in which, right ſucceeding to violence, nature became ſubject to law; and to explain by what chain of ſurpriſing events the ſtrong ſubmitted to ſerve the weak, and the people to purchaſe imaginary repoſe at the expence of real felicity.

The philoſophers, who have inquired into the foundations of civil ſociety, have, all of them, perceived the neceſſity of recurring to a ſtate of nature; but not one of them have reached it. Some of them have not heſitated to aſcribe to man, in ſuch a ſtate, a notion of juſtice and injuſtice, without troubling themſelves to ſhew that he muſt be poſſeſſed of ſuch a notion, or that it could be of any uſe to him. Others have ſpoken of the natural right of every man to keep what belonged to him, without explaining what they meant by the term *belong*. Others again, having at firſt inveſted the ſtrong with an authority over the weak, proceeded directly to form a government, without regarding the time that muſt have elapſed before the ſenſe of the words *authority* and *government* could have entered into the minds of men. Every one of them, in ſhort, conſtantly dwelling on the ſubjects of wants, avidity, oppreſſion, deſires, and pride, have transferred to a ſtate of nature,

ture, thoſe ideas which they acquired, and could only acquire, in a ſtate of ſociety; ſo that, although they ſpoke only of ſavages, they deſcribed them as if they were civilized. It hath even never entered into the head of moſt of our writers, to entertain a ſuſpicion that a ſtate of nature exiſted; in the mean while it appears evident, from the holy ſcriptures, that the firſt man, having received his knowledge and commandments immediately from God, was not himſelf in ſuch a ſtate; and that, if we give ſuch credit to the writings of Moſes as every Chriſtian philoſopher ought to do, it muſt be denied that, even before the deluge, men were found in a pure ſtate of nature; unleſs, indeed, they fell into it by ſome very extraordinary circumſtance; a paradox very perplexing to defend, and altogether impoſſible to prove.

Let us begin, therefore, by laying facts aſide, as they do not affect the queſtion. The reſearches we may enter into, in treating this ſubject, muſt not be conſidered as hiſtorical truths, but only as mere conditional and ſyſtematical reaſonings, rather calculated to explain the nature of things, than to aſcertain their real origin; juſt like thoſe hypotheſes with which our naturaliſts daily amuſe themſelves reſpecting the formation of the world. Religion commands us to believe, that God himſelf having taken men out of a ſtate of nature, they are unequal only becauſe it is his will they ſhould be ſo: but it does not forbid us to form conjectures from the mere natural ſtate of man, and the beings around him, concerning what might have been the ſtate of the human race if it had been abandoned and left to itſelf. This then is the queſtion aſk-

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ed me, and that which I propoſe to diſcuſs in the following diſſertation.

As my ſubject is intereſting to mankind in general, I ſhall endeavour to make uſe of a ſtyle adapted to all nations: or rather, forgetting the accidents of time and place, to attend only to mankind, to whom I am ſpeaking, I ſhall ſuppoſe myſelf in the Lyceum of Athens, repeating the leſſons of my maſters; having Plato and Xenocrates for my judges, and the whole human race for my audience.

Attend, O man, of whatever country thou art, and whatever be thy opinions. Behold your hiſtory, ſuch as I conceive I have read it, not in books written by your fellow-creatures, who are liars; but in that of nature, who never lies. All that I ſhall tranſcribe from her, will be true; nor will you meet with any thing falſe, unleſs I ſhould involuntarily mix ſomething of my own. The times I am going to ſpeak of, are very remote: alas! how much are you changed from what you once was! It is, if I may ſo call it, the life of your ſpecies which I am going to write, after the qualities which you have received, and which your education and habits have been able to deprave, but could not entirely deſtroy. I am ſenſible, there is an age at which the individual man would wiſh to ſtop: you are about to inquire for that age, at which you will poſſibly wiſh your whole ſpecies had made a ſtand. Diſcontented with your preſent ſtate, for reaſons which threaten your unfortunate deſcendents with ſtill greater diſcontent, you will wiſh it perhaps in your power to go back; and this ſentiment ought to be a panegyric

ric on your anceſtors, a ſatire on your contemporaries, and a terror to your poſterity.

PART THE FIRST.

IMPORTANT as it may be, in order to judge rightly of the natural ſtate of man, to take a view of his origin; and to examine him, as it were, in the embryo-ſtate of his ſpecies; I ſhall not preſume to trace the ſucceſſive improvements of his organization. I ſhall not ſtay to inquire alſo of the animal ſyſtem; what he might have been in the beginning, in order to become at length what he actually is; whether his long nails were at firſt, as Ariſtotle ſuppoſes, only crooked talons; his whole body, like that of bears, covered with hair; or whether he walked upon all fours (3), with his looks directed toward the earth, and confined to an horizon of a few paces extent, at once pointing out the nature and limits of his ideas. On this ſubject I could form none but vague and perhaps merely chimerical conjectures. Comparative anatomy hath as yet made too little progreſs, and the obſervations of the naturaliſts are too uncertain, to afford a baſis ſufficiently ſolid for any rational ſyſtem. So that, without having recourſe to the ſupernatural informations given us on this head, or paying any regard to the changes which muſt have taken place both in the external and internal conformation of the human frame, in proportion as mankind applied their limbs to new purpoſes and labours, and was nouriſhed with new aliments, I ſhall ſuppoſe his conformation to have been at all times what it appears to us

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at this day; that he always walked on two feet; made uſe of his hands as we do; directed his looks over all nature, and meaſured with his eyes the vaſt expanſe of heaven.

To ſtrip this being, now thus conſtituted, of all the ſupernatural gifts which he may have received, and of all the artificial faculties which he muſt have by ſlow degrees acquired; to conſider him, in a word, ſuch as he muſt have come from the hands of nature, I behold in him an animal weaker than ſome, and leſs active than others, but, taking all things together, the moſt advantageouſly organized of any. I ſee him ſatisfying his hunger at the firſt oak, and ſlaking his thirſt at the firſt brook, in his way, finding his bed at the foot of the ſame tree which afford him a repaſt, and behold all his wants are ſupplied.

While the earth was left to its natural fertility (4), it was covered with immenſe foreſts, whoſe trees were never mutilated by the axe, but preſented on every ſide both ſuſtenance and ſhelter for every ſpecies of animals. Mankind, diſperſed up and down among the reſt, would of courſe obſerve and imitate their induſtry; thus attaining even the inſtinct of the beaſts, with this advantage, that, as every ſpecies of brutes was confined to one particular inſtinct, man, who perhaps has not any one peculiar to himſelf, would appropriate thoſe of all others, and live upon moſt of thoſe different aliments which other animals divide among them (5), and hence would find his ſubſiſtence much eaſier than any other.

Accuſtomed from their infancy to the inclemencies of the weather and the rigour of the

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ſeaſons; inured to fatigue, and forced, naked and unarmed, to defend themſelves and their prey from other ferocious animals, or to eſcape them by flight; mankind would acquire a robuſt and almoſt unalterable temperament of body. In the mean while, the children, bringing with them into the world the excellent conſtitution of their parents, and then confirming it by the ſame exerciſes which firſt produced it, would thus acquire all that ſtrength and vigour of which the human frame is capable. Nature, in this caſe, treats them exactly as Sparta treated the children of her citizens: thoſe of them who came well formed into the world ſhe renders ſtrong and robuſt, and deſtroys all the reſt; differing totally in this reſpect from our modern communities, in which the ſtate, by permitting children to become burdenſome to their parents, murders them all without diſtinction even in the mother's womb.

The body of a ſavage man being the only inſtrument he knows how to make uſe of, he employs it to ſeveral purpoſes; of which ours, for want of practice, are incapable; our induſtry depriving us of that force and agility which neceſſity obliges him to acquire. If he had an axe, would he be able with his naked arm to break ſo large a branch from a tree? If he had a ſling, would he be able to throw a ſtone with ſo great a velocity? If he had a ladder, would he be ſo nimble in climbing a tree? If he had a horſe, would he be himſelf ſo ſwift at the race? Allow civilized man the time to gather all his machines about him, and he will undoubtedly be an overmatch for the ſavage: but if you would ſee a conteſt ſtill more unequal, ſet them together

ther naked and unarmed; and you will preſently ſee the advantage of having all our forces conſtantly at our diſpoſal; of being alway prepared for every event; and in carrying one's ſelf, as it were, perpetually whole and entire about one (6.)

Hobbes pretends, that man is naturally intrepid, and is intent only upon attacking and fighting with other animals. This opinion hath been controverted by a certain illuſtrious philoſopher. Cumberland and Puffendorf alſo affirm that nothing is more timid and fearful than man in a ſtate of nature; that he is always in a tremor, and ready to fly from the leaſt noiſe he hears or motion he perceives. This may poſſibly be true, with reſpect to ſuch objects as he is unacquainted with; and I doubt not of his being terrified by every novelty that preſents itſelf, when he neither knows the phyſical good or evil he ought to expect from it, nor can make a compariſon between his own ſtrength and the dangers he is about to encounter. Theſe circumſtances, however, rarely occur in a ſtate of nature; in which all things proceed in an uniform manner, and the face of the earth is not ſubject to thoſe ſudden and continual changes, which ariſe from the paſſions and caprices of collected bodies. But ſavage man, diſperſed up and down among other animals, and finding himſelf betimes in a ſituation to meaſure his ſtrength with theirs, he ſoon makes a compariſon between them; and, perceiving that he ſurpaſſes them more in addreſs than they ſurpaſs him in ſtrength, he is taught to be no longer afraid of them. Set a bear, or a wolf, againſt a robuſt, active, and reſolute ſavage, as they all are, armed with ſtones and a good

good cudgel, and you will ſee the danger to be reciprocally equal. Hence it is to be preſumed, that, after a few trials of this nature, wild beaſts, who are not fond of attacking each other, will not be very ready to make an attack on man, whom they find as wild and ferocious as themſelves.

With regard to ſuch animals as have really more ſtrength than man hath addreſs, he is, in reſpect to them, in the ſame ſituation with all other weaker animals, who notwithſtanding ſtill had means of ſubſiſtence; except indeed he hath this advantage, that being equally ſwift of foot, and finding an almoſt certain place of refuge in every tree, he is ever at liberty to take or leave it, and thus to fight or fly, as he judges it moſt convenient.

Add to this, it does not appear that any animal naturally makes war on man, except in caſes of ſelf-defence or exceſſive hunger; or betrays any of thoſe violent antipathies, which ſeem to indicate that one ſpecies is intended by nature for the food of others.

But man hath other enemies more formidable; againſt which he is not provided with the like means of defence: theſe are natural infirmities, infancy, ſeneſcence, and maladies of every kind; melancholy proofs of our imbecillity; of which the two former are common to all animals, and the laſt belongs chiefly to man in a ſtate of ſociety.

With regard to infancy, it is obſervable, that the mother carrying her child always with her, can nurſe it with much greater eaſe, than the females of many other animals, who are forced to be perpetually going backwards and forwards,

one way to find ſubſiſtence, and another to ſuckle or feed their young. It is true, that if the woman happens in ſuch a caſe to periſh, the infant is in danger of periſhing with her; but this riſk is common to many other ſpecies of animals, whoſe young require a long time to be able to provide for themſelves. And if our infancy be longer than theirs, our lives are likewiſe longer in proportion; ſo that all things are in this reſpect pretty equal (7); though there are other particulars to be conſidered regarding the duration of the firſt period of life, and of the multiplication of the ſpecies, which do not affect the preſent ſubject (8).

In old age, men are leſs active, and perſpire little; the want of food therefore diminiſhes with their abilities to provide it. As in a ſavage ſtate, alſo, they would be exempted from the gout and rheumatiſm, whilſt old age is, of all ills, that which human aſſiſtance is leaſt capable to alleviate, they would, in ſuch a ſtate, go off the ſtage, without others perceiving that they ceaſed to exiſt, and almoſt without perceiving it themſelves.

With reſpect to ſickneſs, I ſhall not repeat the vain and falſe declamations of moſt people in health againſt phyſic; but I ſhall aſk if any ſolid obſervations have been made, from which it may be juſtly concluded, that the duration of man's life, taken at a medium, is ſhorter in thoſe countries where the art of medicine is moſt neglected, than in thoſe where it is moſt cultivated? How is it poſſible, indeed, that this ſhould be the caſe, if we bring on ourſelves more diſeaſes than phyſic can furniſh us with remedies?

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The great difference in the manner of living of the ſeveral claſſes of mankind, the extreme idleneſs of ſome, and exceſſive labour of others, the facility of exciting and gratifying our ſenſual appetites, the too exquiſite aliments of the wealthy which overheat and fill them with indigeſtions; and, on the other hand, the unwholeſome food of the poor, of which, bad as it is, they are often in want, which induces them, when opportunity offers, to eat voraciouſly and overcharge their ſtomachs; all theſe, together with our watchings, and exceſſes of every kind, immoderate ſallies of paſſion, fatigues, waſte of ſpirits, the innumerable pains and anxieties inſeparable from every condition of life, and by which the mind of man is inceſſantly tormented; theſe, I ſay, are too fatal proofs, that the greater part of our ills are of our own making, and that we might have avoided them all by adhering to that ſimple, uniform and ſolitary manner of life which nature originally preſcribed. Had ſhe deſtined man to be healthy, I could almoſt venture to declare that a ſtate of reflection is a ſtate contrary to nature, and that a thinking man is a depraved animal. When we think on the good conſtitution of the ſavages, at leaſt of thoſe whom we have not ruined by our ſpirituous liquors; and reflect that they are troubled with hardly any diſorders but ſuch as are cauſed by wounds or old age; we muſt be in a manner convinced that the hiſtory of human diſeaſes muſt be confined to that of civil ſociety.

Such, at leaſt, was the opinion of Plato, who inferred from ſome certain remedies preſcribed, or approved, by Podolyrus and Machaon at the ſiege of Troy, that ſeveral maladies which theſe re-

remedies gave riſe to in his time, were not then known to mankind.

Man, being ſubject therefore to ſo few cauſes of ſickneſs in a ſtate of nature, can have no need of phyſic, and ſtill leſs of phyſicians: neither is he in this reſpect worſe off than other animals; and yet it is eaſy to know of hunters, whether they meet with many infirm animals in the courſe of the chaſe. It is certain they frequently meet with ſuch as carry the marks of having been conſiderably wounded; with many that have had their bones broken, or their limbs torn off; whoſe wounds have yet healed up, and whoſe bones have knit together, without any other chirurgical aſſiſtance than that afforded by the hand of time, or any other regimen than that of their ordinary courſe of life. At the ſame time their cures ſeem not to have been leſs perfect, for want of their having been tortured by inciſions, poiſoned with drugs, or waſted by abſtinence. In fine, however uſeful phyſic, properly adminiſtered, may be to us, it is certain, that, if the ſavage, when he is ſick and deſtitute, has nothing to hope for but from nature, he has, on the other hand, nothing to fear but from his diſeaſe; which renders his ſituation frequently preferable to ours.

We ſhould beware, therefore, of confounding ſavage man, with the men we have daily before our eyes. Nature treats all the animals abandoned to her care, with a predilection that ſeems to ſhew how very jealous ſhe is of that prerogative. The horſe, the cat, the bull, and even the aſs itſelf, are generally of an higher ſtature, are always more robuſt, have more vigour, ſtrength, and courage, when they run wild in the

the foreſts than when bred in the ſtall. By becoming domeſtics, they loſe half their advantages; while it ſeems as if all our attention to feed them well, and treat them kindly, ſerved only to deprave their ſpecies. It is thus with man: in proportion as he becomes ſocial and obſequious to others, he becomes himſelf weak, timid, and ſervile; his effeminate way of life totally enervating both his ſtrength and his courage. To this it may be added, that there is ſtill a greater difference between ſavage and civilized man, than between wild and tame beaſts: for men and brutes having been treated alike by nature, the ſeveral conveniences in which men indulge themſelves ſtill more than they do their beaſts, occaſion them of courſe to be more palpably degenerate.

It is not therefore ſo great a misfortune to theſe primitive men, nor ſo great an obſtacle to to their preſervation, that they go naked, are deſtitute of habitations, and of all thoſe ſuperfluities which we miſtake for neceſſaries. If their ſkins are not covered with hair, they have no need of ſuch covering in warm climates, and in the cold they preſently learn to keep themſelves warm with the ſkins of other animals. If they have but two legs to run with, they have two arms to defend themſelves with and provide their ſuſtenance. Their children are ſlowly and with difficulty taught to walk; but their mothers are able to carry them with eaſe; an advantage which other animals are not poſſeſſed of; as the mother, if purſued, is either forced to abandon her young, or to riſk her own ſafety by keeping pace with them.

Unleſs, in ſhort, we ſuppoſe a ſingular and

fortuitous concurrence of circumſtances, of which I ſhall ſpeak hereafter, and which it is probable never exiſted, it is plain, in every ſtate of the caſe, that the man who firſt made himſelf clothes, and built himſelf a hut, furniſhed himſelf with things little neceſſary; for he had till then done without them, and wherefore ſhould he not have been able to ſupport in manhood the ſame kind of life in which he had ſpent his infancy?

Solitary, indolent, and perpetually accompanied by danger, the ſavage muſt of courſe be fond of ſleep; his ſleep alſo muſt be light, like that of other animals, who think but little, and may be ſaid to ſlumber all the time they do not think. Self-preſervation being his chief and almoſt only concern, he muſt exerciſe thoſe faculties moſt which are moſt ſerviceable to attack or defence, either in order to overcome his prey, or to prevent his becoming the prey of other animals.

On the other hand, thoſe organs which are to be improved only by ſenſibility and ſenſuality, will remain in a groſs and imperfect ſtate, incompatible with every ſpecies of delicacy; ſo that, his ſenſes being divided on this head, his touch and taſte will be extremely coarſe and dull; while his ſight, his hearing, and ſmell, will be exceſſively fine and ſubtile. Such is the animal-ſtate in general; and ſuch, according to the relations of travellers, is that of moſt ſavage nations. It is therefore no matter of ſurpriſe that the Hottentots of the Cape of Good Hope, diſtinguiſh ſhips at ſea with the naked eye, at as great a diſtance as the Dutch can do with their teleſcopes; or that the ſavages of America

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ſhould trace the Spaniards by their ſmell, as well as the beſt dogs might have done; or that none of theſe barbarous people feel pain in going naked; or that they uſe large quantities of piemento with their food, and drink the ſtrongeſt European liquors like water.

Hitherto I have conſidered man merely in his phyſical capacity; let us now take a view of him in a metaphyſical and moral light.

I ſee nothing in any animal but an ingenious machine, to which nature hath given ſenſes to wind itſelf up, and to guard itſelf, to a certain degree, againſt any thing that might tend to diſorder or deſtroy it. I perceive exactly the ſame things in the human machine; with this difference, that, in the operations of the brute, nature is the ſole agent; whereas man hath ſome ſhare in his, by virtue of his qualities as a free agent. The one chuſes and refuſes from inſtinct, the other from an act of free-will: hence the brute cannot deviate from the rules preſcribed to it, even when it would be advantageous for him to do it; and, on the contrary, man frequently deviates from ſuch rules, to his own prejudice. Thus a pigeon muſt be ſtarved to death, by the ſide of a diſh of the fineſt fleſh-meat, and a cat by a heap of fruit or grain; though it is certain both might find nouriſhment in the food which they thus reject with diſdain, were they to make trial of it. Hence it is that mankind, grown diſſolute, run into thoſe exceſſes which bring on fevers and death; becauſe the imagination depraves the ſenſes, and the will continues to ſpeak when nature is ſilent.

Every animal hath ideas, for every animal hath ſenſes; he combines thoſe ideas alſo to a certain

certain degree; and it is only in the difference of the degree, that man differs, in this reſpect, from the brute: ſome philoſophers indeed have advanced, that there is a greater difference between ſome men and others, than there is between ſome men and beaſts. It is not, therefore, ſo much the faculty of underſtanding that conſtitutes the ſpecific difference between the man and the brute, as it is his quality of free-agency. Nature lays her commands indiſcriminately on all animals, and the brute obeys her voice. Man is ſenſible of the ſame impulſe; but at the ſame time alſo is ſenſible that he is at liberty to acquieſce or reſiſt: and it is particularly in his conſciouſneſs of this liberty, that the ſpirituality of his ſoul is diſplayed. For phyſics may explain, in ſome meaſure, the mechaniſm of the ſenſes and the formation of ideas; but in the power of willing or rather of chuſing, and in the ſenſe of this power, nothing is to be found but an agency purely ſpiritual, and inexplicable by the laws of mechaniſm.

Suppoſing, however, that the difficulties attending all theſe queſtions ſhould ſtill leave room for diſputing this difference between men and brutes, there is another very ſpecific quality which diſtinguiſhes them, and which will admit of no diſputation; this is the faculty of improvement; a faculty which, by the help of circumſtances, gradually unfolds all the reſt, and is inherent not only in the ſpecies but the individual: whereas a brute is, at the end of a few months, all he ever will be during the reſt of his life; and his ſpecies, at the end of a thouſand years, are exactly what it was the firſt year of that thouſand. Wherefore is man alone ſubject

ject to imbecillity and dotage? Is it not becauſe he returns, in this, to his primitive ſtate; and that, while the brute which has acquired nothing, and has therefore nothing to loſe, ſtill retains the force of inſtinct; man, who loſes by age or accident the acquiſitions he had made by his *perfectibility*, falls by this means lower than even the brutes themſelves?

It would be a melancholy circumſtance, were we forced to admit, that this diſtinguiſhing and almoſt boundleſs faculty is the ſource of all human misfortunes; that this it is, which in time draws man out of his original ſtate, in which his days would inſenſibly paſs away in peace and innocence: that it is this faculty, which ſucceſſively producing in different ages his diſcoveries and his errors, and his vices and his virtues, renders him at length both a tyrant over himſelf and over nature (9.) It would be as ſhocking alſo to be obliged to call the man a beneficent being, who firſt ſuggeſted to the Oroonoko Indians the uſe of the boards they apply to the temples of their children, and which ſecure to them ſome part at leaſt of their imbecillity and original happineſs.

Savage man, left by nature to the direction of inſtinct, or rather indemnified for that which perhaps he wants, by faculties, capable at firſt of ſupplying its place, and afterwards of raiſing him much above it, muſt of courſe begin with functions merely animal (10): thus to ſee and to feel muſt be the exertions of his firſt ſtate, and this would be common alike to him and other animals. To will, and not to will, to deſire and to fear, muſt be the firſt and almoſt the only operations of his ſoul, till new circumſtances

ſtances ſhould ſucceſſively occaſion new developements of its faculties.

Whatever the moraliſts pretend, the human underſtanding is greatly indebted to the paſſions; which, it is univerſally allowed, are much indebted alſo to the underſtanding. It is by the activity of the paſſions that our judgment is improved: for we deſire knowledge only becauſe we covet enjoyment; it being impoſſible to conceive why a perſon who hath neither fears nor deſires ſhould give himſelf the trouble to reaſon. The paſſions again, in their turn, take their riſe from our wants; as their progreſs is owing to that of our knowledge; for we cannot deſire or fear any thing, but from the ideas we have of it, or from the ſimple impulſe of nature. Now ſavage man, being deſtitute of every ſpecies of knowledge, can have no paſſions but thoſe of the latter kind: his deſires never extend beyond his phyſical neceſſities (11.) The only good things in the univerſe that he covets are food, a female, and ſleep; the only evils that he fears are pain and hunger. I ſay pain, and not death: for no animal can ever know what it is to die; the knowledge of death and its terrors being one of the firſt acquiſitions made by man when he departs from an animal ſtate.

It would be eaſy, were it neceſſary, to ſupport this opinion by facts; and to ſhow, that, in all the nations of the world, the progreſs of the underſtanding hath been exactly proportionate to the neceſſities which the people have been expoſed to by nature, or ſubjected to by adventitious circumſtances, and of conſequence to the paſſions that induced them to provide againſt thoſe neceſſities. I might exhibit the

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arts riſing up in Egypt and expanding themſelves with the inundation of the Nile. I might purſue them in their progreſs into Greece; where they took root afreſh, grew up and towered with their lofty heads into the ſkies, amidſt the rocks and ſands of Attica, without being able to germinate in the fertile ſoil of the banks of Eurotas: I might obſerve, that, in general, the people of the North are more induſtrious than thoſe of the South; becauſe they could not ſo well ſubſiſt without induſtry; as if nature was reſolved to reduce every thing to an equality, by giving that fertility to the genius of a people which ſhe had refuſed to their ſoil. But who does not ſee, without recurring to the uncertain teſtimony of hiſtory, that every thing in nature ſeems to remove from uncivilized man both the temptation and means of changing his condition? His imagination deſcribes nothing to excite wiſhes, which his heart does not ſuggeſt. His wants are ſo moderate, that they are readily ſupplied with what he finds at hand; and he is ſo far from having that knowledge which is requiſite to make him covet more, that he is altogether deſtitute both of foreſight and curioſity.

The face of nature becomes indifferent to him as it grows familiar. He obſerves nothing in it but the ſame order, the ſame revolution: he has not underſtanding enough to be ſurpriſed at the greateſt miracles; nor is it in his vacant mind we are to look for that philoſophy, which man ſtands in need of, to know how to obſerve once, what he ſees every day. His ſoul, which is totally undiſturbed, indulges itſelf ſolely in the conſciouſneſs of its preſent exiſtence, without

out any idea of futurity, even of its neareſt period; while his projects, equally limited with his views, hardly reach to the cloſe of the day. Such, even at preſent, is the want of foreſight in the native Caribbean, who will improvidently ſell you his cotton bed in the morning, and come crying in the evening to buy it again, not having foreſeen he ſhould want it at night.

The more we reflect on this ſubject, the greater appears the diſtance between mere ſenſation and the moſt ſimple ſcience: it is impoſſible indeed to conceive how man, by his own powers alone, without the aid of communication and the ſpur of neceſſity, could have got over ſo great an interval. It is not improbable that many ages elapſed before mankind beheld any other fire than that of the heavens. What a multiplicity of accidents muſt have concurred to bring them acquainted with the moſt common uſes of that element? How often muſt they not have ſuffered it to expire or be extinguiſhed, without knowing the art or means of reproduing it? and how often may not ſuch ſecrets have died with the diſcoverer?

What ſhall we ſay, in particular, of agriculture; an art which requires ſo much labour and foreſight; an art ſo dependent on many others, that it is plain, it could not be practiſed but in a ſociety at leaſt begun; an art which does not ſerve ſo much to draw the means of ſubſiſtence from the earth, for theſe the earth would produce voluntarily, and to compel the earth to produce what is moſt agreeable to our taſte? But let us ſuppoſe that mankind, in a ſtate of nature, had multiplied ſo faſt, that the ſponta-

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neous produce of the earth was no longer ſufficient for their ſupport; a ſuppoſition, by the way, which would prove that ſuch a kind of life muſt be very advantageous to the human race; let us ſuppoſe, that, without forges or ſmitheries, the inſtruments of huſbandry had dropt from the ſkies into the hands of ſavages; that they had overcome their natural averſion to continual labour; that they had acquired conſiderable foreſight of their wants; that they had divined the methods of cultivating the earth, of ſowing and planting; that they had diſcovered the arts of grinding corn, and of converting the juice of the grape by fermentation into wine; all of them ſuch things as muſt have been taught them by the gods, ſince it is not to be conceived how they could diſcover them of themſelves: yet after all this, what individual among them would be ſo abſurd as to take the trouble of cultivating a field, which might be ſtript of its crop by the firſt comer, whether man or beaſt, that might take a liking to it; and how ſhould each of them reſolve to paſs his life in laborious fatigue, the reward of which he is by ſo much the more certain of not receiving, as he is ſure of wanting it? In a word, how could ſuch a ſituation induce men to cultivate the earth, till it was regularly parcelled out and divided among them; that is to ſay, till the ſtate of nature in which they ſubſiſted was annihilated.

Were we to ſuppoſe uncivilized man as well verſed in the art of thinking, as philoſophers pretend; ſhould we even follow their example, and ſuppoſe him to be a very philoſopher himſelf, capable of inveſtigating the ſublimeſt truths, and of forming, by abſtract reaſoning, maxims

of reaſon and juſtice, deduced from a love of order in general, or the known will of his Creator; in a word, though we were to ſuppoſe his underſtanding as intelligent and enlightened, as it muſt, and in fact is found to be dull and ſtupid, what advantage would accrue to the ſpecies from all theſe metaphyſical diſcoveries, which could not be communicated from one to another, but muſt end with the individual that might make them? What progreſs could be made by mankind, while diſperſed up and down among other animals? and how far could men reciprocally improve, or mutually enlighten each other, when, having no fixed habitation, nor any need of each other's aſſiſtance, the ſame perſons hardly met twice in their lives, and perhaps then without knowing or ſpeaking together.

Let it be conſidered how many ideas we owe to the uſe and practice of ſpeech; how far grammar exerciſes the underſtanding, and facilitates its operations. Let us reflect on the inconceivable pains and infinite ſpace of time beſtowed on the firſt invention of languages. To theſe reflections join the preceding, and then judge how many millions of ages muſt elapſe in the ſucceſſive developement of thoſe intellectual operations of which the human mind is capable.

I ſhall here take the liberty for a moment to conſider the embarraſſments attending the original formation of languages: on which ſubject I might content myſelf with a ſimple repetition of what has been advanced by the Abbe Condillac; as it ſerves fully to confirm my ſyſtem, and perhaps even firſt ſuggeſted it. But it is plain,

plain, by the manner in which this philoſopher reſolves the difficulties he himſelf raiſes concerning the origin of arbitrary ſigns, that he conceives, what I doubt to have been true, *viz.* that a kind of ſociety muſt have ſubſiſted among the firſt inventors of languages. While I refer, however, to his obſervations on this head, I think it expedient for me to give my own, in order to exhibit the ſame difficulties in a light adapted to my ſubject. The firſt which preſents itſelf is, to conceive how language originally became neceſſary; for as there was no commerce or communication kept up among men, nor the leaſt occaſion for any, we can neither conceive the neceſſity of this invention, nor yet the poſſibility of it if it was not ſome how indiſpenſable. I might affirm, with many others, that languages took their riſe in the domeſtic intercourſe that muſt neceſſarily ſubſiſt between parents and their children. But this expedient would not obviate the difficulty, and would beſides be making the ſame blunder as thoſe who always make uſe of ideas collected in a ſtate of ſociety, in their reaſonings on a ſtate of nature. Thus they conſtantly conſider families as living together under one roof, and the individuals of each obſerving among themſelves as intimate and permanent an union as that which exiſts in a ſtate of civil ſociety, where their common intereſts variouſly conſpire to unite them: whereas in the primitive ſtate, of which we are ſpeaking, men had neither houſes, cabins, nor any kind of property whatever; ſo that every one took up his lodging where he could find it, ſeldom reſting above a ſinge night in a place; the ſexes united without any premeditated

deſign, as accident, opportunity, or inclination brought them together; nor had they any great need of language to communicate their deſigns to each other; but, having put them in execution, they parted with the ſame indifference they met. The mother gave ſuck to her children at firſt for her own ſake; and afterwards out of an affection acquired by habit, as cuſtom had made them dear to her: but theſe, as ſoon as they had gained ſufficient ſtrength to go in ſearch of their own food, forſook her of their own accord; and, as they had hardly any other method of not loſing each other than that of remaining continually in ſight, they preſently forgot each other, and were totally ſtrangers when they happened to meet again. It is farther to be obſerved, that the child, having all his wants to explain, and of courſe more to ſay to his mother than the mother could have to ſay to him, the taſk of invention muſt be upon him, and the language he ſhould make uſe of be his own device; ſo that hence the number of languages would be equal to that of the individuals ſpeaking them, and their variety would be increaſed by their vagabond and roving life, which would not allow of time enough for any to arrive at a conſiſtency of idiom. For, to pretend that the mother would have dictated to her child the words neceſſary for him to employ in aſking her for this thing or the other, is to begin explaining in what manner languages already formed are taught, but does by no means explain in what manner languages were originally formed.

We will ſuppoſe, however, that this firſt difficulty is obviated. Let us juſt for a moment then

then conſider ourſelves arrived on this ſide of that vaſt ſpace, which muſt have divided a pure ſtate of nature from that in which languages were become neceſſary; and, after admitting ſuch a neceſſity, let us inquire how languages could at firſt be eſtabliſhed. Here we have a new difficulty to grapple with, ſtill more ſtubborn than the preceding; for if mankind ſtood in need of ſpeech in order to learn to think, they muſt have ſtood in much greater need of the art of thinking to be able to invent that of ſpeaking. And though we might poſſibly form ſome conception how the articulate ſounds of the voice came to be taken for the conventional interpreters of our ideas, it would ſtill remain for us to inquire what could have been the interpreters of this very convention with regard to thoſe ideas, which, not anſwering to any ſenſible objects, could not be indicated either by geſture or voice; in ſo much that we can hardly form any tolerable conjectures about the riſe of this art of communicating our thoughts and eſtabliſhing a correſpondence between intellectual minds: an art ſo ſublime, that, although ſo far diſtant from its origin, philoſophers ſtill behold it at ſuch an immeaſurable diſtance from the point of its perfection, that I never found one of them raſh enough to affirm it would ever arrive at it, even though the revolutions produced by time ſhould be ſuſpended in its favour, tho' the prepoſſeſſions of our academies ſhould be baniſhed or condemned to ſilence, and even though theſe learned ſocieties ſhould devote their application for whole ages to the inveſtigation of this intricate ſubject.

The firſt language of mankind, the moſt uni-

verſal and pathetic of all others, in a word the only language man ſtood in need of before he had occaſion to exert his eloquence to perſuade aſſembled multitudes, was the ſimple cries of nature. But as theſe were never extorted unleſs from the force of inſtinct on urgent occaſions, to demand aſſiſtance in caſe of danger, or relief in caſe of ſuffering, it could be of little utility in the ordinary occurrences of life, in which moderate ſentiments prevail. When the ideas of men began to expand and multiply, and a cloſer perſonal communication took place among them, they ſtrove to invent more numerous ſigns, and to deſire a more copious language. The inflections of the voice were then multiplied, and geſtures were ſuperadded; which latter are in their own nature more expreſſive, and leſs ſubject to prior convention. Viſible and moveable objects were therefore expreſſed by geſtures, and audible ones by imitative ſounds. But, as hardly any thing can be indicated by geſtures, except objects actually preſent, or viſible actions eaſily deſcribed; as they are not of univerſal uſe, from the interpoſition of darkneſs or any opake medium; and as, beſides, they rather require than engage our attention; mankind bethought themſelves at length of ſubſtituting the articulate ſounds of the voice; which, without bearing the ſame relation to any particular ideas, are better calculated to expreſs them all, in quality of conventional or inſtituted ſigns. Now this inſtitution of arbitrary ſound, it is plain, could only have been made by common conſent, and muſt have been effected in a manner not very eaſily put in practice by men whoſe groſs organs had not been accuſtomed to ſuch exer-

exerciſe. Such an inſtitution is alſo ſtill the more difficult to be conceived, ſince the very motives to ſuch a common agreement muſt have been by ſome means expreſſed, and therefore ſpeech ſeems even to have been neceſſary to eſtabliſh the uſe of it. It is reaſonable to ſuppoſe, that the words firſt made uſe of by mankind had a much more extenſive ſignification in their minds, than thoſe made uſe of in languages already formed; and that, ignorant as they were of the diviſion of diſcourſe into its conſtituent parts, they at firſt gave to every ſingle word the ſenſe of a whole propoſition. When they afterwards began to perceive the difference between the ſubject and the attribute, and between the noun and the verb; a diſtinction which it required no common effort of genius to make; the ſubſtantives were at firſt only ſo many proper names; the infinitive was the only tenſe of the verbs; and with regard to adjectives, the very idea of them muſt have been with great difficulty developed; becauſe every adjective is expreſſive of an abſtract idea, and to form abſtract ideas is a painful and not very natural operation.

Every object at firſt received a peculiar name, without regard to genus or ſpecies; circumſtances which theſe primitive inſtitutors were little qualified to diſtinguiſh; every individual preſenting itſelf to their minds in a ſtate detached from every other, as it ſeems in the picture of nature. If they called one oak A, another oak was called B; ſo that in proportion as their knowledge of things was confined, their dictionary muſt have been copious. The embarraſſment attending the uſe of ſuch a vocabulary

ry could not be eaſily removed: for to arrange the ſeveral beings under their common and generical denominations, it became neceſſary to be acquainted with their diſtinguiſhing properties; it required men to be poſſeſſed of many more obſervations and definitions, that is to ſay, of a greater ſhare of natural hiſtory and metaphyſics, than fell to the lot of thoſe primitive ages.

Add to this, that general ideas cannot be ſuggeſted to the mind without the aſſiſtance of words, nor can the underſtanding lay hold of them but by means of verbal propoſitions. This is one of the reaſons why mere animals cannot form ſuch ideas, nor ever acquire that capacity for improvement which depends on it. When a monkey, or a ſquirrel, goes from one nut to another, are we to conceive that he entertains any general idea of that kind of fruit, and that he compares its archetype with each of the individual nuts? Aſſuredly he does not: but the ſight of one of theſe nuts recalls to his memory the ſenſations which he received from the other; and his eyes, being modified after a certain manner, give information to the palate of that modification it is going to receive. Every general idea is purely intellectual; if the imagination meddles with it ever ſo little, the idea becomes immediately particular. You may endeavour to trace in your mind the idea of a tree in general, but you will never be able to effect it. It will, in ſpite of all you can do, ſeem great or little, bare or leafy, of a light or a dark green; and were you capable of ſeeing nothing in it but what is common to all trees, the image would no longer reſemble any tree at all.

Thus

Thus beings purely abſtracted are perceivable in the ſame manner, or are only conceivable by the help of language. It is only the definition of a triangle that can give you a true idea of it: the moment a triangle is formed in the imagination, it is immediately ſome particular triangle, and one cannot avoid deſcribing it by palpable lines and a coloured area. We muſt make uſe of propoſitions, therefore, and of language, in order to form general ideas. For no ſooner doth the imagination ceaſe to operate, than the underſtanding proceeds only by the aſſiſtance of words. If therefore the firſt inventors of ſpeech could give names only to thoſe ideas which they poſſeſſed, it follows that the primitive noun-ſubſtantives could be nothing more than proper names.

But when our new Grammarians, by means which I have no conception of, began to extend their ideas and generalize their terms, the ignorance of the inventors muſt have confined this method to very narrow limits; and, as they had at firſt gone too far in multiplying the names of individuals, for want of being acquainted with their genus and ſpecies, they made afterwards too few of theſe diſtinctions, for want of having conſidered beings in all their ſpecific differences. It required, indeed, more knowledge and experience than they could have acquired, and more pains than they would have beſtowed on the inveſtigation, to have carried theſe diſtinctions to their proper length. Now, if even at this time we are daily diſcovering new ſpecies which have before eſcaped obſervation, let us reflect how many of them muſt have eſcaped the obſervation of men who judged

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of things merely from their firſt appearance. It is ſuperfluous to add, that, as to the primitive claſſes and the moſt general notions, theſe muſt neceſſarily have eſcaped their notice alſo: how, for inſtance, could they have underſtood or thought of the words matter, ſpirit, ſubſtance, mode, figure, motion, when even our philoſophers, who have ſo long been conſtantly making uſe of them, can themſelves hardly underſtand them, and (as the ideas attached to them are purely metaphyſical) there are no models of any of them to be found in nature?

But I ſtop at what hath been already ſaid, and beſeech my judges to ſuſpend their attention a while, to conſider, with regard to the invention of phyſical ſubſtantives, which by the way is the eaſieſt part of language to invent, that we have ſtill a great way to go before we ſhall arrive at a perfect form of ſpeech capable of expreſſing all the ſentiments of the human mind, of ſuſtaining itſelf unvaried, and of anſwering the purpoſes of public elocution. I beg of them to conſider how much time muſt have elapſed, and how much knowledge was requiſite to find out numbers (14), terms of abſtraction, the aoriſts and all the tenſes of verbs, the particles, ſyntax, the method of connecting propoſitions, laying down ſyllogiſms, and of forming all the logic of diſcourſe.

As to myſelf, I am ſo deterred by the increaſing difficulties which preſent themſelves, and ſo well convinced of the almoſt demonſtrable impoſſibility that languages ſhould owe their riſe and eſtabliſhment to mere human means, that I leave, to any one who will undertake it, the diſcuſſion of this difficult problem.

blem: "Which was moſt neceſſary, the eſtabliſhment of ſociety to the invention of language, or the invention of language to the eſtabliſhment of ſociety?" But be the origin of language and that of ſociety as they may, it may be at leaſt inferred, from the little care which nature hath taken to aſſemble mankind by mutual wants, and to facilitate the uſe of ſpeech, that ſhe has contributed few preparatives to their ſociability, and has lent as little aſſiſtance to the pains they have taken in the formation of ſocieties. It is impoſſible in fact to conceive why, in a ſtate of nature, one man ſhould ſtand more in need of the aſſiſtance of another, than a monkey or a wolf of the aſſiſtance of another animal of the ſame kind: or, granting that he did, what motives ſhould induce that other to aſſiſt him; or, even then, by what means he who required aſſiſtance, and he of whom it was required, could agree about the conditions. I know it is inceſſantly repeated, that man would in ſuch a ſtate have been a moſt miſerable creature; and indeed, if it be true, as I think I have proved, that he muſt have lived many ages without having either a deſire or opportunity of emerging from ſuch a ſtate, this circumſtance would only ſerve as the grounds of an accuſation againſt nature, and not againſt the being which ſhe had thus unhappily conſtituted. But if I rightly comprehend the uſe of the term *miſerable*, it is a word which either has no meaning at all, or ſignifies only a painful privation of ſomething, or a ſtate of ſuffering either in body or ſoul. Now I ſhould be glad to have explained to me, what kind of miſery a free agent, whoſe heart is at eaſe and whoſe body is in health, can

can poſſibly ſuffer? I would aſk alſo, which is moſt likely, a ſocial or a natural life, to become inſupportable to the perſons who enjoy it? Look but around you, and you will hardly find an human creature in civil ſociety who does not lament his exiſtence. We ſee many deprive themſelves of as much of it as is in their power, while neither laws human or divine are capable of entirely putting a ſtop to the diſorder. I aſk, if it was ever known that a ſavage took it into his head, when at liberty, to complain of life, or to make away with himſelf? Let us therefore judge, with leſs pride and vanity, on which ſide is found actual miſery. On the contrary, nothing could be more unhappy than ſavage man, dazzled by flaſhes of ſcience, tormented by his paſſions, and reaſoning about a ſtate different from his own. It appears that Providence moſt wiſely determined, that the faculties which he virtually poſſeſſed ſhould not develop themſelves but in proportion as occaſions offered to exerciſe them, in order that they might not be ſuperfluous or perplexing to him by prematurely appearing, nor ſlow and uſeleſs when he might have occaſion for them. In inſtinct alone, he poſſeſſed every thing requiſite for him to live in a ſtate of nature; and with an improved underſtanding he has but juſt enough to ſupport life in a ſtate of ſociety.

It appears, at firſt view, that men in a ſtate of nature, having no kind of moral relations or determinate obligations ſubſiſting between them, they could not be either good or bad, virtuous or vicious; unleſs we take the terms *vice* and *virtue* in a phyſical ſenſe, and call thoſe qualities *vices* which may prove injurious to the pre-

preſervation of the individual, and thoſe qualities *virtues* which contribute to that ſelf-preſervation; in which caſe, he muſt of courſe be accounted moſt virtuous who ſhould give the leaſt check to the impulſes of nature. But without deviating from the ordinary ſenſe of the words, it will be proper to ſuſpend the judgment we might otherwiſe be led to form of ſuch a ſtate, and be on our guard againſt the force of prejudice, till we have weighed the matter in the ſcale of impartiality, and ſeen whether the virtues or vices preponderate in civil ſociety; till we have examined, whether the progreſs of the ſciences is a ſufficient indemnification for the miſchiefs men do each other, in proportion as they are better informed of the benefits they ought to do; or whether they would not be, on the whole, in a much happier condition if they had nothing to fear or to hope from any one, than as they are, ſubjected to an univerſal dependence, and obliged to receive every thing from thoſe who engage to give them nothing.

Let us not by any means conclude, with Hobbes, that becauſe man hath no idea of goodneſs, he muſt be naturally wicked; that he is vicious becauſe he does not know what is virtue; that he always refuſes to do his fellow-creatures thoſe ſervices which he thinks they have no right to demand; or that by virtue of the right he claims in every thing he wants, he fooliſhly imagines himſelf the ſole proprietor of the whole univerſe. Hobbes had ſeen clearly the defects of all the modern definitions of natural right: but the conſequences which he deduces from his own, ſhew that he underſtands it in a ſenſe equally falſe and exceptionable. In

reaſoning upon the principles which this author hath laid down, he ought to have ſaid, "the ſtate of nature, being that in which the care of our own preſervation is the leaſt prejudicial to that of others, was conſequently the beſt calculated for peace, and the moſt agreeable to mankind." But he advances the direct contrary, in conſequence of having improperly admitted into the care of ſavage man's ſelf-preſervation, the gratification of a variety of paſſions which owe their riſe to ſociety, and which have rendered laws neceſſary. A bad man, ſays he, is a robuſt child. But it remains to be proved whether man in a ſtate of nature be this robuſt child: and, though we ſhould grant him that he is, what would he infer from it? Why truly, that if this man, when robuſt and ſtrong, were dependent on others as he is when feeble, there is no extravagance he would not be guilty of; that he would beat his mother when ſhe was too ſlow in giving him the breaſt; that he would bite and tear his younger brothers, and even ſtrangle them, when they ſhould be troubleſome to him. But theſe ſuppoſitions are in themſelves contradictory; to be, in a ſtate of nature, ſtrong, and at the ſame time dependent. Man is feeble when he is dependent, and is his own maſter before he comes to his full ſtrength. Hobbes did not reflect, that the ſame cauſe which prevents a ſavage from making uſe of his reaſon, as our civilians pretend, prevents him alſo from abuſing his natural faculties; as Hobbes himſelf allows. So that it may be juſtly ſaid, the ſavages are not bad merely becauſe they are ignorant of what is good; for it is neither the improvement of the underſtanding, nor the reſtraint

of

of law, that hinder them from doing ill; but the calmneſs of their paſſions, and their ignorance of vice: *tanto plus in illis proficit vitiorum ignorantia, quam in his cognitio virtutis.* There is another principle beſides, which hath eſcaped the ſagacity of Hobbes; and which, being beſtowed on mankind, to moderate, on certain occaſions, the impetuoſity of ſelf-love, or the deſire of ſelf-preſervation previous to the birth of that paſſion (*15), tempers the ardour with which he purſues his own welfare, by an innate repugnance to behold the ſufferings of a fellow-creature. I do not think I have any contradiction to fear, in allowing man to be poſſeſſed of the only natural virtue, which could not be denied him by the moſt violent declaimer againſt human virtues; I mean, that of compaſſion: a diſpoſition ſuitable to creatures ſo weak, and ſubject to ſo many evils, as we certainly are: a virtue by ſo much the more univerſal and uſeful to mankind, as it takes place of all manner of reflection; and at the ſame time ſo natural, that the very brutes themſelves give ſometimes evident proofs of it. Not to mention the tenderneſs of mothers for their offſpring, and of the perils they will themſelves encounter to ſave their young from danger, it is well known that horſes ſhew a reluctance to trample on living bodies; that one animal never paſſes by the dead carcaſs of another of the ſame ſpecies without being ſenſibly affected: nay, there are even ſome who give their fellow-brutes a kind of burial; while the mournful lowings of the cattle when they enter the ſlaughter-houſe, ſufficiently publiſh the impreſſions made on them by the horrid ſpectacle with which they are ſtruck. We

find, with pleaſure, the author of the Fable of the Bees obliged to own that man is a compaſſionate and ſenſible being; and to lay aſide his phlegm and ſubtlety of ſtyle, in the example he gives us, to preſent us with the pathetic deſcription of a man who, from a place of confinement, is compelled to behold a wild beaſt tear a child from the arms of its mother, grinding its tender limbs with its murdering teeth, and dragging out its palpitating entrails with its claws. What horrid agitations muſt not the eye-witneſs of ſo ſhocking a ſcene experience, although not perſonally concerned? What anxiety muſt he not ſuffer at not being able to give any aſſiſtance to the fainting mother and expiring infant?

Such is the pure emotion of nature prior to all kinds of reflection! ſuch the force of natural compaſſion, which the greateſt depravity of manners hath as yet hardly been able to deſtroy! for we daily find, at our theatrical exhibitions, that thoſe very men are affected and ſympathize with the unfortunate, nay ſhed tears at their ſufferings, who, if in the tyrant's place, would probably add to the torments of their enemies. Mandeville well knew, that, in ſpite of all our morality, men would have never been otherwiſe than monſters, had not nature beſtowed on them a ſenſe of compaſſion in aid of their reaſon; but he did not ſee that from this quality alone flowed all thoſe ſocial virtues, of which he diſputed man's being in poſſeſſion. In fact, what is generoſity, clemency, or humanity, but compaſſion applied to the weak, to the guilty, or to mankind in general? Nay, even benevolence and friendſhip, if we judge rightly, will

appear

appear to be only the effects of compaſſion conſtantly exerted towards a particular object: for to wiſh that another perſon may not ſuffer pain and uneaſineſs, what is it leſs than to wiſh him happy? Were it even true, as is pretended by ſome, that pity is no more than a ſentiment which puts us in the place of the ſuffering object; a ſentiment obſcure though lively in a ſavage, developed though feeble in civilized man; this truth would have no other effect than to confirm my argument. Our compaſſion muſt, in fact, be ſo much the more ſtrong, the more intimately the animal, beholding any kind of diſtreſs, takes part or identifies himſelf with the animal that ſuffers. Now, it is plain that ſuch identification muſt have been much more perfect in a ſtate of nature than it is in a ſtate of reaſon. It is reaſon that engenders ſelf-love, and it is reflection that cultivates and confirms it: it is that which makes man ſhrink into himſelf: it is that which makes him keep at a diſtance from every thing that may diſturb or afflict him. It is philoſophy that detaches him from the reſt of the world; that bids him exultingly ſay to himſelf, at ſight of the misfortunes of others, You may periſh if you will, I am ſecure. Nothing but ſuch general evils as threaten the whole community, can diſturb the tranquillity of the philoſopher, or rouſe him from his bed of down. A ruffian may with impunity commit a murder under his very window; he has no more to do than to ſtop his ears, and by a ſyllogiſm or two prevent that nature, which is ſhocked within him, from taking any part with the unfortunate ſufferer. Uncivilized man is deſtitute of this admirable talent; and, for

want of reaſon and prudence, is ever fooliſhly ready to obey the ſlighteſt ſuggeſtions of humanity. It is the loweſt of the populace that flock together at riots and ſtreet-brawls; the wiſe man prudentially ſneaks off. It is the mob, the porters and baſket-women, that part the combatants, and hinder gentle-folks from cutting one another's throats.

It is hence certain that compaſſion is a natural ſentiment, which, by moderating the violence of ſelf-love in individuals, contributes to the preſervation of the whole ſpecies. It is this compaſſion that hurries us, without reflection, to the relief of thoſe who are in diſtreſs: it is this compaſſion which in a ſtate of nature ſupplies the place of laws, morals, and virtues; with this advantage, that none are tempted to diſobey her gentle voice: it is this compaſſion, which will ever prevent a ſturdy ſavage from robbing a weak child or a feeble old man of the ſuſtenance they may have with pain and difficulty acquired, if he ſees even a bare poſſibility of providing for himſelf by other means: it is this compaſſion, which, inſtead of inculcating that ſublime maxim of rational juſtice, *Do to others as you would have them do to you*, inſpires all men with that other maxim of natural goodneſs, much leſs perfect indeed than the preceding, but perhaps more uſeful; *Do good to yourſelf with as little evil as poſſible to others*. In a word, it is rather in this natural ſentiment, than in any ſubtile argumentation, we muſt look for the cauſe of that repugnance, which every man would experience at doing evil, even independently of the maxims of education. Although it might belong to Socrates and other privileged minds

minds of the like caſt, to acquire virtue from reaſon, the human race would long ſince have had a period, had its preſervation depended only on the reaſonings of the individuals compoſing it.

Urged by paſſions ſo inactive, and reſtrained by ſo ſalutary a curb, mankind, being rather wild than wicked, and more intent to guard themſelves againſt the miſchief that might be done them, than to do miſchief to others, were by no means ſubject to very perilous diſſentions. As they maintained no kind of correſpondence with each other, and were conſequently ſtrangers to vanity, veneration, eſteem, and contempt; as they entertained not the leaſt ideas of *meum & tuum*, nor had any true notion of juſtice; as they looked upon every violence to which they were ſubject, rather as an injury that might be eaſily repaired, than as a crime that merited chaſtiſement; and as they never thought of taking revenge, unleſs perhaps mechanically and immediately, as a cur will ſometimes turn about and bite the ſtones which are thrown at him: this being the caſe, I ſay, their quarrels would ſeldom have very bloody conſequences; the ſubject of them being no more highly intereſting than that of ſubſiſtence. But I am aware of a more dangerous one, which remains to be noticed.

Of the various paſſions that agitate the heart of man, there is one which renders the ſexes neceſſary to each other, and is extremely ardent and violent; a paſſion ſo terrible, that it deſpiſes danger, ſurmounts all obſtacles; and which appears in its tranſports rather calculated to bring deſtruction on the human race, than to preſerve it.

it. What muſt become of men abandoned to this brutal and boundleſs rage, without modeſty, without ſhame, and diſputing daily the objects of their paſſion at the expence of their blood?

It muſt, in the firſt place, be allowed, that, where the paſſions are moſt violent, laws are the more neceſſary to keep them under due reſtraint. But, ſetting aſide the inſufficiency of laws to effect this purpoſe, as is evident from the crimes and diſorders to which theſe paſſions daily give riſe, we ſhould do well to inquire if theſe evils did not ſpring up with the laws themſelves: for in this caſe, though the laws ſhould be found capable of repreſſing ſuch evils, it is the leaſt that might be expected from them; as it is in fact no more than giving a check to that miſchief which would not have happened without them.

Let us begin with diſtinguiſhing between the phyſical and moral ingredients in the paſſion of love. The phyſical part of love is that general deſire which urges the ſexes to a perſonal union with each other. The moral part is that which determines and fixes this deſire excluſively upon ſome one particular object, or at leaſt gives it a greater degree of energy toward the object thus preferred. Now it is eaſy to ſee that the moral part of love is a factitious ſentiment, engendered by the cuſtoms of ſociety, and enhanced by the women with much care and addreſs, with a view to eſtabliſh their empire, and render that ſex commanding which ought to obey. This ſentiment, being founded on certain ideas of beauty and merit which a ſavage is not in a ſtate to acquire, and on compariſons which he is incapable of making, muſt be very faint and obſcure

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in him: for as his mind cannot form abſtract ideas of proportion and regularity, ſo his heart is not more ſuſceptible of the ſentiments of love and admiration; which are even inſenſibly produced by our application of thoſe ideas. He liſtens ſolely to the deſires which nature has implanted in his conſtitution, and ſeeks not to taſte thoſe which he could never acquire; ſo that every woman equally anſwers his purpoſe.

Men in a ſtate of nature being confined merely to what is phyſical in love, and happy enough to be ignorant of thoſe excellencies which ſerve to whet the appetite while they increaſe the difficulty of gratifying it, muſt be ſubject to fewer and leſs violent fits of that paſſion, and of courſe it muſt occaſion fewer and leſs violent diſputes among them. The imagination, which cauſes ſo much diſturbance among us, never ſpeaks to the heart of ſavages, who quietly await the impulſes of nature, yield to them involuntarily, and with more pleaſure than ardour; their deſires never ſurviving the phyſical neceſſity of the thing deſired. It is therefore inconteſtable, that even love, as well as all the other paſſions, muſt have acquired in ſociety that glowing impetuoſity, which makes it ſo often fatal to mankind. And hence it appears ſo much the more abſurd and ridiculous to repreſent the ſavages as cutting one another's throats to indulge their brutality, that this opinion is directly contrary to experience; the Caribbeans, a people who have as yet leaſt of all deviated from a ſtate of nature, being in fact the moſt peaceable in their amours, and the leaſt ſubject, of any exiſting, to the paſſion of jealouſy; notwithſtanding they live in a hot climate,

climate, which ſeems ever adapted to inflame the paſſions.

With regard to the inference that may be drawn from the practice of ſeveral ſpecies of animals; the males of which fill our poultry-yards with blood and ſlaughter, or at certain ſeaſons make the foreſts ring with their quarrels for their females; we muſt ſet out with the excluſion of all thoſe ſpecies, in which nature has plainly eſtabliſhed relations, in the comparative power of the ſexes, different from thoſe which ſubſiſt among us: thus we can form no concluſion from the example of fighting cocks that will affect mankind. In thoſe ſpecies where the proportion is better obſerved, their battles muſt be owing entirely to the ſcarcity of the females in compariſon with the males; or, what amounts to the ſame thing, to the intervals during which the female refuſes the embraces of the males; for if the female admits the male but during two months in the year, it is the ſame as if the number of females were five ſixths leſs. Now, neither of theſe two caſes is applicable to the human ſpecies, in which the number of females uſually exceeds that of the males; and among whom it has never been obſerved, not even among ſavages, that the females have, like thoſe of other animals, their ſtated times of paſſion and indifference. Add to this, that among ſeveral ſpecies of the brute creation, the individuals take fire at once, and for ſome time all is confuſion and diſorder among them; a ſcene which is never exhibited among the human ſpecies, whoſe love is not thus periodical. We muſt not conclude, therefore, from the combats of ſuch animals for the enjoyment of the

the females, that the caſe would be the ſame with mankind in a ſtate of nature: and though we might even draw ſuch a concluſion; yet, as we ſee theſe conteſts do not exterminate other kind of animals, we have no reaſon to think they would be more fatal to ours. It is indeed very probable they would do ſtill leſs miſchief, than is done by conteſts on the ſame ſubject in a ſtate of ſociety; eſpecially in thoſe countries in which, morals being ſtill held in ſome repute, the jealouſy of lovers, and the vengeance of huſbands and wives, are the daily cauſes of duels, murders, and even ſometimes, if poſſible, worſe crimes; the mutual obligation of eternal fidelity ſerving only to give occaſion to adulteries, and the very laws of honour and chaſtity neceſſarily tending to the increaſe of debauchery and the multiplication of abortions.

Let us conclude then, that man in a ſtate of nature, wandering up and down the foreſts, without induſtry, without ſpeech, and without home; an equal ſtranger to war and to peace; without ſtanding in any need of his fellow-creatures, or having any deſire to hurt them, and perhaps even without ſeverally diſtinguiſhing them one from another; let us conclude, I ſay, that being thus ſubject to few paſſions, and finding in himſelf all he wanted, he could have no ſentiment or knowledge but ſuch as was proper to his ſituation; that he was ſenſible only of his actual neceſſities, diſregarding every thing but what it immediately concerned him to take notice of; and that his underſtanding made no greater progreſs than his vanity. If by accident he made any diſcovery, he could the leſs communicate it to others, as he did not know even his

his own children. Every art muſt periſh with the inventor, when there was no kind of education among men, generations ſucceeding generations without the leaſt progreſs or improvement; whilſt, all ſetting out from the ſame point, whole centuries muſt have elapſed in the barbariſm of primitive ages, and the ſpecies be already grown old while the individual remained ſtill a child.

If I have expatiated ſo largely on the ſuppoſition of this primitive ſtate, it is becauſe I had ſo many ancient errors and inveterate prepoſſeſſions to eradicate, and therefore thought it incumbent on me to dig to their very root; and to exhibit, in a true picture of nature, how far even the natural inequalities of mankind are from having that reality and influence which ſome writers pretend.

It is in fact eaſy to ſee, that many of thoſe characteriſtical differences which diſtinguiſh mankind, are merely the effect of habit and the different methods of life adopted in ſociety. Thus a robuſt or delicate temperament of body, with the ſtrength or weakneſs attached to it, are more frequently the effects of an hardy or effeminate method of education than of the original conſtitution. It is the ſame thing with regard to the powers of the mind; education not only making a difference between ſuch as are cultivated, and ſuch as are not, but even increaſing that difference which ſubſiſts among the former, in proportion to their reſpective degrees of culture; even as the diſtance between a giant and a dwarf ſetting out on the ſame career conſtantly increaſes at every ſtep they take.

Now, if we compare that prodigious diverſity which

which obtains in the education and manner of life of the various orders of men in a ſtate of ſociety, with the uniformity and ſimplicity of mere animal and ſavage life, in which every individual is ſupplied with the ſame kind of aliment, lives exactly in the ſame manner, and does exactly the ſame things; it may be eaſily conceived, that the difference between man and man in a ſtate of nature muſt be leſs than their difference in a ſtate of ſociety, and that the natural inequality of mankind muſt be greatly increaſed by the inequalities of ſocial inſtitutions.

But, though nature ſhould really affect, in the diſtribution of her gifts, that partiality which is imputed to her, what advantage would the greateſt of her favourites derive from it, to the detriment of others, in a ſtate that admits hardly any kind of relation or connection between them? Where there is no love, of what advantage is beauty? Of what uſe is wit to thoſe who do not converſe, or cunning to thoſe who have no buſineſs with others? I hear every body conſtantly repeating, that, in ſuch a ſtate, the ſtrong would oppreſs the weak; but let them explain to me what they mean by oppreſſion? Some, it is ſaid, would domineer over others, while the latter would groan under a ſervile ſubmiſſion to their caprices. This indeed is exactly what I obſerve to be the caſe in civil ſociety; but I do not ſee with what propriety it can be inferred of men in a ſtate of nature, who could not eaſily be brought to conceive what we mean by the terms dominion and ſervility. One man, it is true, might ſeize on the fruits which another had gathered, on the game he had killed, or on the cave he had choſen for ſhelter; but how

would he be able to exact obedience of him? and what ties of dependance can there be among thoſe who have no poſſeſſions? If I am driven, for inſtance, from one tree, or diſturbed in any one place, what hinders me from going to ſome other? Again, ſhould I happen to meet with a man ſo much ſtronger than myſelf, and at the ſame time ſo depraved, ſo indolent and ſo barbarous, as to compel me to provide his ſuſtenance while he himſelf ſhould remain idle; ſtrong as he is, he muſt take care not to have his eyes off me a ſingle moment; he muſt bind me faſt before he takes his nap, or I ſhould certainly either knock him on the head or make my eſcape. That is to ſay, he muſt in ſuch a caſe voluntarily expoſe himſelf to much greater trouble than any he ſeeks to avoid or can give me. Nay, after all this, let him be off his guard ever ſo little, let him but turn his head aſide at any ſudden noiſe, and I ſhall be inſtantly twenty paces off, loſt in the foreſt; my fetters would be burſt aſunder, and he would never ſee me again.

Without expatiating, however, any longer on particulars, every one muſt ſee that the bonds of ſervitude being formed merely by the mutual dependance of mankind on each other, and the reciprocal neceſſities that unite them, it is impoſſible to make any man a ſlave, unleſs he be firſt reduced to ſuch a ſituation as not to be able to ſubſiſt without the help of others: a ſituation which does not exiſt in a ſtate of nature; in which every one therefore is his own maſter, and the pretended right of the ſtrongeſt is futile and frivolous.

Having proved that the inequality of mankind

kind is in a manner imperceptible, and that its influence is next kin to nothing in a ſtate of nature; it remains for me to ſhew its origin, and trace its progreſs in the ſucceſſive improvements of the human mind. Having ſhewn that human *perfectibility*, or the capacity of man for improvement, together with the ſocial virtues, and thoſe other faculties of which natural man was virtually in poſſeſſion, could never be developed of themſelves; but muſt require the fortuitous concurrence of many foreign cauſes which might never happen, and without which he muſt remain for ever in his primitive ſituation; it now remains for me to collect and conſider the different accidents which may have improved the human underſtanding by depraving the ſpecies, having made him wicked by making him ſociable; and to bring him and the world from that early period to the point at which we now behold them.

I confeſs, that, as the events I am going to deſcribe might have happened in many various ways, I have nothing to determine my choice but conjectures: but ſuch conjectures become in ſome meaſure reaſons, when they are not only the moſt probable that can be drawn from the nature of things, but the only means of inveſtigating the truth. The conſequences, however, which I mean to deduce, will not be barely conjectural; as, on the principles juſt laid down, it is impoſſible to form any other theory that would not furniſh the ſame arguments, and from which I might not draw the ſame concluſions.

This will be a ſufficient apology for my not expatiating particularly on the manner in which

the lapſe of time compenſates for the little probability in the events; on the ſurpriſing power of trivial cauſes, whoſe action is conſtant; on the impoſſibility that ſubſiſts, on the one hand, of deſtroying certain hypotheſes, if on the other we cannot give them that degree of certainty which attends on known matters of fact; on its being within the province of hiſtory, when two facts are propoſed as real, to be connected by a ſeries of intermediate facts unknown, or ſuppoſed to be ſo, to ſupply ſuch facts as may actually connect them; and in the province of philoſophy, when hiſtory is ſilent, to appoint ſimilar facts to ſerve the ſame end; and in fine, on the influence of ſimilitude, with regard to events, in reducing facts to a much ſmaller number of different claſſes than is commonly imagined. It is ſufficient for me juſt to hint theſe objects to the conſideration of my judges; and to have ſo managed the matter that common readers had no occaſion to conſider them at all.

PART THE SECOND.

THE firſt perſon, who, having incloſed a piece of ground, bethought himſelf of ſaying, *This is mine*, and found people ſimple enough to believe him, was the real founder of civil ſociety. From how many crimes, battles, and murders, from how many horrors and miſfortunes, would not that man have ſaved mankind, who ſhould have pulled up the ſtakes, or filled up the ditch, crying out to his fellows, "Beware of liſtening to this impoſtor; you are undone

undone if you once forget that the fruits of the earth belong to us all, and that the earth itſelf belongs to nobody." But there is great probability that things were arrived to ſuch a pitch, that they could no longer continue in the ſame ſtate: for this idea of property depends ſo much on prior ideas, which could only be ſucceſſively acquired, that it could not be ſuggeſted all at once to the human mind. Mankind muſt have made a very conſiderable progreſs, they muſt have amaſſed a great ſtock of knowledge and induſtry, which they muſt alſo have tranſmitted and increaſed from age to age, before they arrived at this laſt term of a ſtate of nature. Let us recur therefore ſtill farther back, and endeavour to trace, under one point of view, that ſlow ſucceſſion of events and diſcoveries as they proceeded in their natural order.

Man's firſt ſentiment was that of his own exiſtence, and his firſt care that of ſelf-preſervation. The produce of the earth furniſhed him with the means, and inſtinct directed him in the uſe of them. Hunger and other appetites made him at various times experience various modes of exiſtence: among theſe there was one which urged him to the propagation of his ſpecies; a blind propenſity, that, having nothing to do with the heart, produced only an act merely animal. This deſire once gratified, the two ſexes had nothing farther to do with each other; even the offſpring of their embraces caring as little for its mother, as ſoon as it could do without her.

Such was the condition of infant man; ſuch the life of an animal limited at firſt to mere ſenſations, and hardly profiting by the gifts be-

ſtowed on him by nature, much leſs capable of entertaining a thought of forcing them from her. But difficulties ſoon preſented themſelves, and it became neceſſary to learn to ſurmount them: the height of the trees, which prevented his gathering their fruits; the competition of other animals deſirous of the ſame fruits; the ferocity of thoſe who attacked his perſon; all theſe things obliged him to apply himſelf to bodily exerciſes. It was neceſſary for him to be active, ſwift of foot, and vigorous in flight. Thoſe natural weapons, ſtones and ſticks, were eaſily found. Thus ſurmounting the obſtacles of nature, he learned to contend, in caſes of neceſſity, with other animals, and to diſpute the means of ſubſiſtence even with other men, or to indemnify himſelf for what he was forced to give up to a ſtronger.

In proportion as the ſpecies grew more numerous, the cares of individuals would increaſe. The difference of ſoils, climates, and ſeaſons, would introduce ſome difference of courſe into their manner of living. Barren years, from long and ſharp winters, or ſcorching ſummers parching the fruits of the earth, would require them to be more than ordinarily induſtrious. On the the ſea-ſhore and the banks of rivers, they would invent the hook and line, and become fiſhermen. In the foreſts, they would make bows and arrows, and become huntſmen and warriours. In cold countries, they would clothe themſelves with the ſkins of the beaſts they had ſlain. The lightning, a volcano, or ſome lucky incident, brought them acquainted with fire; a new relief againſt the rigour of winter: they next learned the way to preſerve

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this element; then, the method to reproduce it when extinguiſhed; and at length, that of uſing it to prepare the fleſh of animals, which before they had been accuſtomed to devour raw.

This repeated application of different beings to himſelf, and of one to the other, would naturally give riſe in the human mind to the perceptions of certain relations between them. Thus, for example, the relations which we denote by the terms *great*, *little*, *ſtrong*, *weak*, *ſwift*, *ſlow*, *fearful*, *bold*, and the like, being occaſionally and almoſt inſenſibly compared, would at length produce in him a kind of reflection, or rather a mechanical ſort of prudence, which indicated to him the precautions moſt neceſſary to his ſecurity.

The new lights which would reſult from this developement, would augment his ſuperiority over other animals, by making him ſenſible of it. He would now endeavour, therefore, to enſnare them; would play them a thouſand tricks; and though many of them might ſurpaſs him in ſwiftneſs or in ſtrength, he would in time become the maſter of ſome and the tyrant over others.

It is hence that man, when he firſt looked into himſelf, felt the firſt emotion of human pride; and this it was, that, at a time when he ſcarce knew how to diſtinguiſh the different orders of beings, yet by looking upon himſelf as the firſt of animals, as one of a ſuperior ſpecies, he prepared the way, at a diſtance, for aſſuming pre-eminence as an individual.

Other men, it is true, were not then to him what they now are to us, and he had hardly any greater intercourſe with them than he had with other

other animals; yet they were not neglected in his obſervations. The conformities which he might in time diſcover between them, and between himſelf and his female, led him to form a judgment of others which might not then be perceptible; and finding that they all behaved as he himſelf would probably have done in like circumſtances, he naturally inferred that their manner of thinking and acting was altogether conformable to his own. This important truth, being once impreſſed deeply on his mind, would induce him, from a preſentiment more certain and much quicker than any kind of argument, to purſue the beſt rules of conduct which he ought to obſerve towards them for his own ſecurity and advantage.

Taught by experience, that the love of happineſs is the ſole motive of all human actions, he now found himſelf in a capacity to diſtinguiſh the few caſes in which mutual intereſt might juſtify him in relying upon the aſſiſtance of his fellows; and alſo thoſe, which are ſtill fewer, wherein a concurrence of jarring intereſts might give cauſe to ſuſpect it. In the former caſe, he joined in the ſame herd with them, or at fartheſt in ſome kind of looſe aſſociation, that laid no tie or reſtraint on its members, and laſted no longer than the tranſitory occaſion that formed it. In the latter caſe, every one ſought his own private advantage, either by open force if he was ſtrong enough, or by addreſs and cunning if he found himſelf the weakeſt.

In this manner, mankind might have inſenſibly acquired ſome groſs ideas of mutual engagements, and the advantages of fulfilling them; that is, juſt ſo far as their preſent and ap-

apparent intereſt was concerned: for, with regard to foreſight, they were perfect ſtrangers to it; and were ſo far from troubling themſelves about a futurity far diſtant, that they hardly entertained a thought of the morrow. If a deer was to be taken, every one ſaw, that, in order to ſucceed, he muſt abide faithfully by his poſt: but if a hare happened to come within the reach of any one of them, it is not to be doubted that he purſued it without ſcruple; and, having ſeized his prey, cared very little if by ſo doing he occaſioned his companions to miſs of catching the deer.

It is eaſy to conceive that ſuch kind of intercourſe would not require a language much more refined than that of rooks or monkeys, who aſſociate together much to the ſame purpoſe and in the ſame manner. Inarticulate cries, a multiplicity of geſtures, and ſome imitative ſounds, muſt have been for a long time the univerſal language of our ſpecies; by adding to which, in every country, ſome conventional articulate ſounds, (of which, as I have already intimated, the firſt inſtitution is not very eaſy to explain,) particular languages were produced; but thoſe rude and imperfect, and nearly ſuch as are now to be found among ſeveral ſavage nations. Hurried on by the rapidity of time, by the abundance of things I have to ſay, and by the almoſt inſenſible progreſs of things in their beginnings, I paſs over in an inſtant a multitude of ages; for the ſlower the events were in their ſucceſſion, the quicker may I be allowed to be in their deſcription.

Theſe firſt improvements enable mankind, at length, to make others with greater ſucceſs and rapidity.

rapidity. In proportion as they grew enlightened, they grew induſtrious. They ceaſed to fall aſleep under the firſt tree or in the firſt cave that afforded them caſual ſhelter; but, lighting upon ſome flints, reſembling ſpades and hatchets, they made uſe of them to dig up the earth, and to cut down trees; with the branches of which they built themſelves huts, which they afterwards plaiſtered over with clay and dirt. This was the æra of a firſt revolution, productive of the eſtabliſhment and diſtinction of families; and introductive of a kind of property, the ſource perhaps of a thouſand conteſts and quarrels. As the ſtrongeſt, however, were very probably the firſt who made themſelves cabins, as they were ſenſible they ſhould be able to defend them, it may be concluded that the weak found it much eaſier and ſafer to imitate, than to attempt to diſlodge them: and as to thoſe who were once provided with cabins, none could have any great inducement to appropriate that of his neighbour; not indeed ſo much becauſe it did not belong to him, as becauſe it could be of no uſe to him, being already provided; and as beſides he muſt expoſe himſelf to a deſperate battle with the occupier, before he could make himſelf maſter of it.

The firſt expanſions of the human heart were the effects of a novel ſituation, which united huſbands and wives, parents and children, under one roof. The habit of living thus together ſoon gave riſe to the moſt delightful ſentiments the human heart is capable of entertaining; *viz.* conjugal love, and paternal affection. Every family became a little ſociety, by ſo much the more intimately united as liberty and a reciprocal

cal attachment were the only bonds of their union. The ſexes, whoſe manner of life had been hitherto the ſame, began now to adopt different cuſtoms and manners. The women became more ſedentary, and uſed to ſtay at home with their children, while the men went abroad in ſearch of their common ſubſiſtence. By living alſo a little more at their eaſe, both ſexes began to loſe ſomething of their ſtrength and ferocity: but, if individuals became, on the one hand, leſs able to encounter ſeparately the wild beaſts, they were, on the other hand, more readily called together to make a general reſiſtance.

The ſimplicity and ſolitude of man's life in this new ſituation, the paucity of his wants, and the implements he had invented to ſatisfy them, leaving him a great deal of leiſure, he employed it to furniſh himſelf with many conveniences unknown to his fathers: and this was the firſt yoke he inadvertently impoſed on himſelf, and the firſt ſource of the evils he prepared for his deſcendants. For, beſides continuing thus to enervate both body and mind, theſe conveniences loſing by uſe almoſt all their fitneſs to pleaſe, and even degenerating into real conveniences, the want of them became far more diſagreeable than the poſſeſſion of them had been agreeable. They would have been unhappy to loſe them, tho' the poſſeſſion of them did not make them happy.

One may diſcover a little better here how the uſe of ſpeech inſenſibly took place, and improved in each family; and may form a conjecture alſo concerning the manner in which various particular cauſes might have extended and accelerated the progreſs of language, by rendering it daily more

more neceſſary. Earthquakes or inundations cauſed inhabited diſtricts to be ſurrounded with chaſms or waters. The violent revolutions that have happened in the globe tore off portions from the continent, and conſtituted iſlands. It is readily conceived, that among men thus collected and compelled to live together, a general idiom of ſpeech muſt have taken place much earlier than among thoſe who ſtill wandered thro' the foreſts of the continent. Thus it is very poſſible, that after their firſt eſſays in navigation, the iſlanders brought over the uſe of ſpeech to the continent: and it is at leaſt very probable, that communities and languages were firſt eſtabliſhed in iſlands, and even came to ſome perfection there before either of them were known to the inhabitants of the continent.

Every thing began now to change its aſpect. Mankind, heretofore vagrant in the woods; by taking to a more ſettled manner of life, flocked gradually together, formed ſeparate bodies, and at length in every country a diſtinct nation, united by character and manners; not by any regulations or laws; but by an uniformity of life, a ſameneſs of ſubſiſtence, and the common influence of the climate. A permanent vicinage could not fail of producing, at length, ſome kind of connection between different families. Among the young people of both ſexes, living in contiguous cabins, the tranſient commerce required by nature ſoon induced another kind not leſs agreeable, but from their mutual intercourſe more permanent. Men began now to examine into the difference of objects, and to make compariſons; they acquired imperceptibly the ideas of beauty and merit, which ſoon gave riſe to

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ſentiments of preference and diſtinction. In conſequence of ſeeing each other often, they could not do without ſeeing each other conſtantly. A tender and agreeable mode of ſentiment inſinuated itſelf into the ſoul, which the leaſt oppoſition converted into an impetuous fury: love gave birth to jealouſy; diſcord triumphed, and human blood was ſacrificed to the gentleſt of all the paſſions.

In proportion to the progreſs of ideas and ſentiments, and as the head and the heart proceed in their exerciſe, mankind go on to lay aſide their original wildneſs; their private connections becoming every day more intimate as their general limits grow extenſive. They accuſtom themſelves now to aſſemble round a large tree; while ſinging and dancing, the genuine offspring of love and leiſure, become the amuſement, or rather the occupation, of men and women thus aſſembled together and having nothing elſe to do. Every one begins to reſpect another, and to be deſirous of having reſpect paid him in turn; and thus a value becomes affixed to public eſteem. Whoever ſings or dances beſt, whoever is the handſomeſt, the ſtrongeſt, the moſt dexterous, or the moſt eloquent, becomes the moſt diſtinguiſhed; and this was the firſt ſtep toward inequality, and at the ſame time toward vice. From theſe firſt diſtinctions aroſe, on one ſide, vanity and contempt; and, on the other, ſhame and envy: the fermentation cauſed by which new leavens, produced at length combinations the moſt fatal to innocence and happineſs.

As ſoon as men began to ſhew each other mutual eſteem, and the idea of reſpect had got

footing in the mind, every one of courſe put in his claim to it, and it became impoſſible to refuſe it to any with impunity. Hence aroſe the firſt obligations of civility even among ſavages; and hence every intended injury became an affront; becauſe, beſides the hurt which might reſult from it, the party injured was certain to find in it a contempt for his perſon often more inſupportable than the hurt itſelf.

Thus it is that every man reſenting the contempt ſhewn for him by others, in proportion to his opinion of himſelf, revenge became terrible, and mankind by degrees became ſanguinary and cruel. Such was preciſely the ſtate to which moſt of the ſavage nations, which are known to us, were arrived: and it is for want of having made a proper diſtinction in our ideas, and remarking how very far they were from being in a ſtate of nature, that ſo many writers have precipitately concluded that man is naturally cruel, and requires civil inſtitutions to ſoften him; whereas nothing is more mild and gentle than man in his primitive ſtate, when placed by nature at an equal diſtance from the ſtupidity of brutes and the fatal ingenuity of civilized man. Equally confined by inſtinct and reaſon to the ſole care of guarding againſt the miſchiefs which threaten him, he is reſtrained by natural compaſſion from doing any injury to others; to which he has not the leaſt inducement even in return for injuries received. For, according to the axiom of the ſagacious Mr Locke, *There can be no injury, where there is no property.*

But it muſt be remarked, that the ſociety thus formed, and the relations once eſtabliſhed among mankind, required of them qualities different

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from thoſe which they poſſeſſed from their primitive conſtitution. A ſenſe of morality beginning now to introduce itſelf into human actions, and every one, before the inſtitution of laws, being his own judge and avenger of the injuries done him, that goodneſs which was ſuitable enough to a pure ſtate of nature, was no longer that which agreed with an infant ſtate of ſociety. It was requiſite that puniſhments ſhould be made more ſevere in proportion as the opportunities of offending became more frequent, and that the dread of vengeance ſhould ſtand in the place of the terror of the law.

Thus, though men were become leſs patient, and their naural compaſſion had already ſuffered ſome diminution, this period of the expanſion of the human faculties, keeping a juſt mean between the indolence of his primitive ſtate and the preſent petulant activity of our ſelf-love; it muſt have been the moſt happy and durable epoch of human life. The more we reflect on it, the more we ſhall find, that this ſtate was the leaſt ſubject of any other to change; the very beſt that could be, for mankind; and a ſtate, out of which nothing could have drawn him, but ſome ſiniſter accident, which it had been better for the public good had never happened. The example of the ſavages, moſt of whom have been found in this ſtate, ſeems indeed to prove that mankind were formed ever to remain in it; that this ſituation was the real youth and vigour of the world; and that all ſubſequent improvements have been apparently ſo many ſteps toward the perfection of the individual, but in reality to the decrepitude of the ſpecies.

So long as men reſted content with their ruſtic cabins; ſo long as they were ſatisfied with clothes made of the ſkins of other animals, and the uſe of thorns and fiſh-bones in ſewing theſe ſkins together; ſo long as they conſidered feathers and ſhells as ſufficient ornaments of dreſs; and continued to paint their bodies of different colours, to improve and adorn their bows and arrows, to form with ſharp-edged ſtones their fiſhing boats or clumſy inſtruments of muſic; in a word, ſo long as they undertook ſuch performances only as a ſingle perſon could execute, and abided by ſuch arts as did not require the joint labours of ſeveral hands, they lived free, healthy, honeſt, and happy; at leaſt ſo far as their nature would admit of, continuing to enjoy all the pleaſures of a mutual and independent intercourſe. But from the inſtant they began to ſtand in need of each other's aſſiſtance; from the moment in which it appeared advantageous to any one man to poſſeſs the quantity of proviſions neceſſary for two, all equality diſappeared, property introduced itſelf, induſtry became indiſpenſible; vaſt foreſts became ſmiling fields, which it was found neceſſary for man to cultivate with the ſweat of his brow, and in which ſlavery and miſery were ſeen preſently to germinate and grow up with the harveſt.

Metallurgy and agriculture were the two arts whoſe invention produced this grand revolution. The poets tell us it was gold and ſilver, but the philoſophers aſſure us it was iron and corn, which firſt civilized man, and ruined humankind. Thus both one and the other were unknown to the ſavages of America, who for that reaſon

reaſon have ſtill continued ſavage: there are nations alſo who ſeem to have continued in a ſtate of barbariſm while they exerciſed only one of theſe arts without the other. And one of the beſt reaſons, perhaps, that can be given why Europe hath been, if not ſooner, at leaſt more conſtantly and better civilized than the other parts of the world, is, that it is at once the moſt abundant in iron and the moſt fertile in corn.

It is very difficult to conjecture how mankind came firſt to know the nature and uſe of iron; for it is impoſſible to ſuppoſe they ſhould think of digging the ore out of the mine, and preparing it for ſmelting, before they knew what would be the conſequence of the proceſs. On the other hand, we have the leſs reaſon to ſuppoſe this diſcovery the effect of any accidental fire, as mines are only formed in barren places bare of trees and plants, ſo that it looks as if nature had taken ſome pains to keep ſo hurtful a ſecret from us. There remains, therefore, only the extraordinary incident of ſome volcano; which, by ejecting metallic ſubſtances already fuſed, might ſuggeſt to the ſpectators a notion of imitating the proceſs of nature in that operation. And we muſt even conceive them, after all, poſſeſſed of an uncommon ſhare of fortitude as well as foreſight, to undertake ſo laborious a work, with ſo diſtant a view to the advantages that might reſult from it; yet theſe qualities are rarely thus united in minds more improved than we can ſuppoſe thoſe of theſe firſt diſcoverers.

With regard to agriculture, the principles of it were known long before they were put in practice; and it is indeed hardly poſſible that men, conſtantly employed in drawing their ſub-

ſiſtence from plants and trees, ſhould not readily acquire a knowledge of the means made uſe of by nature for the propagation of vegetables. It was in all probability very late, however, before their induſtry took that turn, either becauſe trees, which together with their land and water game afforded them ſufficient food, did not require their attention; or becauſe they were ignorant of the uſe of corn, or deſtitute of inſtruments to cultivate it; or becauſe they wanted foreſight in reſpect to future exigencies; or laſtly, becauſe they were deſtitute of the means of preventing others robbing them of the fruit of their labours.

On their growing more induſtrious, it is natural to conceive that they began, by the help of ſharp ſtones and pointed ſticks, to cultivate a few pulſe or roots round about their cabins; though it was long before they knew the method of dreſſing corn, or were provided with the implements neceſſary to raiſe it in any large quantity: not to mention how requiſite it is, in order to follow the buſineſs of huſbandry, to conſent to a preſent loſs, in order to reap a future gain; a precaution very foreign to the turn of mind in a ſavage; who, as I before obſerved, hardly foreſees in the morning what he ſhall have occaſion for at night.

The invention of other arts muſt therefore have been neceſſary to compel mankind to apply to that of agriculture. No ſooner were artificers wanted to ſmelt and forge iron, than other labourers were required to maintain them; while the more hands were employed in manufactures, the fewer were left to provide ſubſiſtence for all, though the number of mouths

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to be furniſhed with food continued the ſame: and as ſome required commodities in exchange for their iron, the reſt at length diſcovered the method of making iron ſerve to the multiplication of commodities. By this means the arts of huſbandry and agriculture were eſtabliſhed on the one hand, and the art of working metals, and multiplying the uſes of them, on the other.

As the earth was cultivated, it was neceſſarily diſtributed and parcelled out among the cultivators. Hence came property, and, that once acknowledged, the firſt rules of juſtice: for, before every one could be ſecured in the enjoyment of his own, it was neceſſary for him to have ſomething to enjoy. Beſides, as men began to look forward into futurity, and were all in poſſeſſion, more or leſs, of ſomething capable of being loſt, every one of them in particular had reaſon to apprehend that repriſals would be made on him for any injury he might do to another. This origin is ſo much the more natural, as it is impoſſible to conceive how property can be deduced from any thing but manual labour: for what elſe can a man add to things which he does not originally create, to have any pretence to property in them? It is the huſbandman's labour alone that, giving him a title to the produce of the ground he has tilled, gives him a claim alſo to the land itſelf, at leaſt till he hath reaped the fruits of his labour; which claim, being continued from year to year, forms a conſtant poſſeſſion which eaſily transforms itſelf into property.

When the ancients, ſays Gotius, gave to Ceres the title of Legiſlatrix, and to a feſtival celebrated in her honour the name of Theſmophoria,

phoria, they gave the people by that to underſtand, that the diſtribution of lands was productive of a new ſpecies of right; that is to ſay, a right of property different from that which is deducible from the law of nature.

Things being thus ſituated, an equality might have been kept up, had the talents of individuals been all equal, and if the uſe of iron, for example, and the conſumption of commodities, had conſtantly held an exact proportion with each other. But as this proportion had nothing to ſupport it, it was ſoon broken through: the ſtrongeſt performed the moſt labour; the cunningeſt turned his labour to beſt account; the moſt ingenious deviſed methods to diminiſh his labour: the huſbandman wanted more iron, or the ſmith more corn; and while both laboured equally, the one gained a great deal by his work, while the other could hardly ſupport himſelf. Thus it is that natural inequality diſplays itſelf inſenſibly with that of combination; and that the difference of mankind, unfolded by that of circumſtances, becomes more ſenſible in its effects, and begins to have an influence in the ſame proportion over the lot of individuals.

Things once arrived at this pitch, it is eaſy to conceive the reſt. I ſhall not detain the reader with a deſcription of the ſucceſſive inventions of other arts, the improvements of language, the trial and employment of talents, the inequality of fortunes, the uſe and abuſe of wealth, nor of all thoſe particulars which attend on theſe, and which are eaſily ſuggeſted. I ſhall confine myſelf to the taking a ſlight view of mankind placed in this new ſituation of things.

Behold, then, all the human faculties developed;

loped; the memory and imagination in full play; ſelf-love become intereſted; reaſon rendered active; and the mind arrived almoſt at the higheſt point of its perfection. Behold all the natural qualities put in action; the rank and condition of every man aſſigned him, not merely as to his ſhare of property and his power to ſerve or injure others, but alſo as to genius, beauty, ſtrength or addreſs, merit or talents: and theſe being the only qualities capable of commanding reſpect, it of courſe preſently becomes neceſſary to poſſeſs, or to affect them.

It became now the intereſt of men to appear what they really were not. To *be* and to *ſeem*, became two things totally different; and thus from this neceſſary diſtinction ſprung inſolent pomp and artful knavery, with all the numerous vices that compoſe their train. On the other hand, free and independent as mankind were before, they were now, in conſequence of a multiplicity of new wants, brought under ſubjection, as it were, to every thing in nature, and particularly to one another; each becoming in ſome degree a ſlave even in becoming a maſter: if rich, they ſtood in need of the ſervices of others; if poor, of their aſſiſtance; even mediocrity itſelf not enabling them to do without each other. Man muſt now, therefore, have been perpetually employed in getting others to intereſt themſelves in his happineſs, and in making them apparently at leaſt, if not really, find their advantage in promoting his own. Thus he muſt have been ſly and artful in his behaviour to ſome, and imperious and cruel to others; being laid under a kind of neceſſity to uſe all thoſe perſons ill of whom he ſtood in need, when

when he could not awe them into a compliance with his will, and did not judge it his intereſt to purchaſe ſuch compliance at the expence of being really uſeful to them.

In fine, inſatiable ambition, the thirſt of raiſing their reſpective fortunes, not ſo much from real want as from the deſire of ſurpaſſing others, muſt inſpire all mankind with a vile propenſity to injure each other, and with a ſecret jealouſy, by ſo much the more dangerous, as it puts on the face benevolence, to carry its point with the greater ſecurity. In a word, rivalry and competition on the one hand, jarring and oppoſite intereſts on the other, together with a ſecret deſire on both of profiting at the expence of others, univerſally prevailed. All theſe evils were the firſt effects of property, and the inſeparable retinue of growing inequality.

Before the invention of ſigns to repreſent riches, wealth could hardly conſiſt in any thing but lands and cattle, the only genuine property men can poſſeſs. But, when inheritances were ſo much increaſed as to occupy whole countries and border on each other, it became impoſſible for one man to aggrandize himſelf but at the expence of ſome other; at the ſame time the ſupernumeraries, who had been too weak or too indolent to make ſuch acquiſitions, and were grown poor without ſuſtaining any loſs, becauſe while they ſaw every thing changed around them they remained ſtill the ſame; theſe, I ſay, were obliged to receive their ſubſiſtence, or ſteal it, from the rich; whence there ſoon appeared, according to the different characters of each, dominion and ſlavery, or violence and rapine. The wealthy, on their part, had hardly begun to taſte

taſte the pleaſure of command, before they diſdained all others, and, making uſe of their old ſlaves to acquire new, thought of nothing but ſubduing and enſlaving their neighbours; juſt like thoſe ravenous wolves, which, having once taſted of human fleſh, deſpiſe every other food, and ſeek only to devour men for ever after.

It is thus that the moſt powerful or the moſt miſerable, conſidering their reſpective might or miſery as a kind of claim to the poſſeſſions of others, equivalent, in their opinion, to that of property; the equality being once broken thro', the breach of it was attended with the moſt terrible diſorders. It is thus that the uſurpations of the rich, the thefts of the poor, and the unbridled paſſions of both ſuppreſſing the cries of natural compaſſion and the feeble voice of juſtice, rendered mankind avaricious, ambitious, and vicious. Between the title of the ſtrongeſt and that of the firſt occcupier, there aroſe perpetual conflicts, which never ended but in battles and bloodſhed (17.) The infant ſtate of ſociety thus admitted a horrid ſtate of war; while mankind, thus harraſſed and depraved, were no longer capable of retreat, or renouncing the fatal acquiſitions they had made; but, labouring, in ſhort, by the abuſe of thoſe faculties, which do them ſo much honour, merely to their own confuſion, brought themſelves to the very brink of ruin.

Attonitus novitate mali, diveſque miſerque,
Effugere optat opes; et quæ modo voverat odit.

It is impoſſible that men ſhould not at length reflect on a ſituation ſo wretched, and on the calamities that overwhelmed them. The rich muſt,

muſt, in particular, have preſently been made ſenſible how much they ſuffered by a conſtant ſtate of war, of which they bore all the expence; and in which, though all riſked their lives, they alone riſked their properties. Beſides, however ſpeciouſly they might colour over their uſurpations, they knew in fact that they were founded on precarious and falſe titles; ſo that others might deprive them by force, of what they by force acquired, without their having any room to complain of injuſtice. Nay, even thoſe who were enriched by their own induſtry, could ſcarce found their property on better claims. It was in vain any one repeated, "I built this "well; I gained this ſpot by my induſtry." Who gave you the limits? it might be objected; and what right have you to demand payment of us for doing what we did not require you? Are you ignorant that numbers of your fellow-creatures are ſtarving for want of what you poſſeſs in ſuperfluity? you ought to have had the expreſs and univerſal conſent of mankind, to appropriate to yourſelf more of their common ſubſiſtence than comes to your own private ſhare. Deſtitute of valid reaſons to juſtify and ſufficient force to defend himſelf; capable of cruſhing individuals with eaſe, but eaſily cruſhed himſelf by a troop of banditti; one againſt all, and incapable, on account of mutual jealouſy, to join with his equals againſt numerous enemies united by the common hopes of plunder, the rich man, thus urged by neceſſity, conceived at length the profoundeſt project that ever entered the mind: this was to employ in his favour, the forces even of thoſe who attacked him, to make allies of his adverſaries, to inſpire them with

with different maxims, and induce them to adore other inſtitutions as favourable to him as the law of nature was prejudicial.

With this view, after having repreſented to his neighbours the honour of a ſituation which armed every man againſt another, rendering their poſſeſſions as burdenſome as their wants were inſufferable, and in which no ſafety could be expected either for the rich or the poor, he readily deviſed plauſible arguments to make them cloſe with his deſign. "Let us join, ſaid he, "to guard the weak from oppreſſion, to lay a "reſtraint on the ambitious, and ſecure to every "man the poſſeſſion of what belongs to him: "let us inſtitute rules of juſtice and peace, to "which all may be obliged to conform without exception of perſons; rules that may in "ſome meaſure make amends for the caprices "of fortune, by ſubjecting equally the powerful and the weak to the obſervance of obligations that ſhall be reciprocal. Let us, in a "word, inſtead of turning our forces againſt "ourſelves, collect them in a ſupreme power, "which may may govern us by wiſe laws, may "protect and defend all the members of the "aſſociation, repulſe their common enemies, "and maintain a conſtant harmony among us."

A much ſhorter harrangue to this purpoſe would have been ſufficient to impoſe on men ſo little cultivated, and eaſily ſeduced; eſpecially as they had too many diſputes among themſelves to live without arbiters, and too much ambition and avarice to ſubſiſt long without maſters. All ran headlong into the yoke, in hopes of ſecuring their liberty; for they had juſt wit enough to perceive the conveniences of a political eſta-

bliſhment; they had not experience enough to enable them to foreſee the dangers of it. The moſt capable among them to diſcern theſe dangers were the very perſons who expected to benefit by them; and even the moſt prudent of them judged it not expedient to ſacrifice one part of their freedom to enſure the other; even as a man, dangerouſly wounded in his arm, parts with it, though reluctantly, to ſave the reſt of his body.

Such was, or it is natural to ſuppoſe might have been, the origin of ſociety and laws; which added to the fetters of the poor, and gave new power of dominion to the rich (*18); which brought irretrievable deſtruction on natural liberty, fixed eternally the law of property and inequality, converted an artful uſurpation into unalterable right, and, for the advantage of a few ambitious individuals, ſubjected all mankind to perpetual labour, ſlavery, and wretchedneſs.

It is eaſy to ſee how the eſtabliſhment of one community rendered that of all the reſt indiſpenſibly neceſſary, and how, in order to make head againſt ſuch united forces, it behoved the reſt of mankind to unite in turn. Societies being thus once formed, preſently multiplied and diffuſed themſelves over the face of the earth; in ſo much that ſcarce a corner of the world was left, in which a man could throw off the yoke, and withdraw his head from beneath the ſword which he ſaw perpetually ſuſpended, and that often on a breaking thread, over him. The civil law being thus become the common rule of conduct among the members of each community, the law of nature maintained its place only among

among different communities; where, under the name of the law of nations, it was qualified by certain tacit connections to render their mutual commerce practicable, and ſerve as a ſubſtitute to natural compaſſion; which, loſing, when applied to ſocieties, almoſt all that influence it had over individuals, exiſts no longer except in ſome great minds, ſome true coſmopolites, who, breaking through thoſe imaginary barriers that ſeparate different people, copy the example of our ſupreme Creator, and include the whole human race within the circle of their benevolence. But bodies politic, remaining thus in a ſtate of nature among themſelves, preſently experienced the inconveniences which had obliged individuals to forſake it; this ſtate becoming ſtill more fatal to theſe great bodies than it had before been to the individuals of which they were compoſed. Hence thoſe national wars, thoſe battles, murders, and reprisals, which are ſo ſhocking both to nature and reaſon; together with all thoſe horrid prejudices which place the honour of ſhedding human blood among the virtues. The moſt worthy men hence learned to conſider the practice of cutting each others throats as a moral duty; at length they maſſacred their fellow-creatures by thouſands, without even ſo much as knowing for what; committing more murders in a ſingle fight, and more violent outrages in the ſacking of a ſingle town, than were committed in a ſtate of nature, for a ſucceſſion of ages, over the face of the whole earth. Such were the firſt effects which we may conceive from the diviſion of mankind into different communities. But to return to their inſtitution: I know that

many have imputed another origin to political ſocieties, ſuch as the conqueſt of the powerful, or the aſſociations of the weak. It is, indeed, no matter which of theſe cauſes we adopt in regard to what I would eſtabliſh. That which I have juſt laid down, however, appears to me the moſt natural for the following reaſons.

1*ſt*, Becauſe, in the firſt caſe, the right of conqueſt being no right in itſelf, it could not ſerve as a foundation on which to build another; the victor and the vanquiſhed ever remaining with reſpect to each other in a ſtate of war, unleſs the vanquiſhed being reſtored to the full poſſeſſion of their liberty, they ſhould voluntarily make choice of the victor for their chief. For till then, whatever truce or capitulation may have been made between them, as ſuch capitulations were founded in violence, and of courſe *ipſo facto* void, there could not have ſubſiſted on this hypotheſis either a real ſociety or body politic, or any other law than that of the ſtrongeſt.

2*dly*, Becauſe theſe words *ſtrong* and *weak* are, in the ſecond caſe, ambiguous; for, during the interval between the eſtabliſhment of a right of property, or prior occupancy, and that of political government, the intent of theſe words is better expreſſed by the terms *rich* and *poor*: becauſe, in fact, before the inſtitution of laws, men had no other way to reduce their equals to ſubmiſſion, than by invading their property, or by parting with ſome of their own property to them.

3*dly*, Becauſe the poor, having nothing but their freedom to loſe, it would have been to the higheſt degree abſurd in them to reſign voluntarily the only bleſſing they enjoyed, without receiving

receiving any compenſation for it: whereas the rich, being ſenſible, if I may ſo expreſs myſelf, in every part of their poſſeſſions, it was much eaſier to do them a miſchief, and therefore more neceſſary for them to guard againſt it; and, in ſhort, becauſe it is more reaſonable to ſuppoſe any thing to have been invented by a perſon to whom it could be of ſervice, rather than by one to whom it muſt have proved prejudicial.

Government had, in its infancy, no regular and conſtant form. The want of a competent fund of experience and philoſophy preventing mankind from ſeeing any but preſent inconveniences, they thought not of providing againſt the future till they preſented themſelves. In ſpite of the endeavours of their wiſeſt legiſlators, the political ſtate remained imperfect, becauſe it was little more than the work of chance; and, being ill begun, though time ſufficiently diſcovered its miſtakes, it could never remove its original defects. The work of reparation was conſtantly repeating, inſtead of the area being cleared and the old materials removed, as was done by Lycurgus at Sparta, to erect a ſolid and laſting edifice. Civil ſociety conſiſted at firſt merely of a few general terms of convention, which every member bound himſelf to obſerve, and for his performance of covenants the whole body became ſecurity to the reſpective individuals. Experience only could ſhew the weakneſs of ſuch a conſtitution, and how eaſily it might be infringed with impunity, from the difficulty of being convicted of faults, in which the public alone were to be both witneſs and judge: hence the laws could not fail of being variouſly eluded; diſorders and inconveniences

could not fail of being multiplied, till it became at length neceſſary to commit the dangerous truſt of public authority to the hands of private perſons, and the care of enforcing obedience to the deliberations of the people to the magiſtrates. For, to pretend that chiefs were choſen before ſocial confederacies were formed, and that the adminiſtrators of the laws ſubſiſted before the laws themſelves, is a ſuppoſition too abſurd to merit a ſerious confutation. It would be as little reaſonable to ſuppoſe that mankind at firſt threw themſelves at the feet of an abſolute maſter, without making any conditions with him; or that the firſt expedient which proud and uncivilized men ſhould hit upon for their common ſecurity, was to run precipitately into ſlavery. For what reaſon, in fact, did they take to themſelves ſuperiors at all, if it was not in order that they might by their means be defended from oppreſſion, and protected in their lives, liberties, and properties, which are in a manner the conſtitutional elements of their being? Now, in the relations between individuals, the worſt that can happen to one man being to find himſelf ſubjected to another, it would have been inconſiſtent with common ſenſe to commence by beſtowing on a chief the only things which they wanted his aſſiſtance to preſerve. What equivalent was it in his power to offer them in return for ſo ample a grant? And if he had preſumed to exact it under pretence of defending them, would he not have received the anſwer recorded in the fable; What can we grant more to the enemy? It is therefore beyond diſpute, and indeed a fundamental maxim in politics, that people have preferred chiefs to protect, not

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to enſlave them. If we have a prince, ſaid Pliny to Trajan, it is in order that he may prevent our having a maſter.

Politicians are guilty of the ſame ſophiſtry in regard to the love of liberty, as philoſophers are in reſpect to a ſtate of nature. They judge by what they ſee, of things very different which they have not ſeen; imputing to man a natural propenſity to ſervitude, becauſe the ſlaves within their obſervation are ſeen to bear their yoke without impatience; without reflecting that the caſe of liberty is the ſame with that of innocence or virtue; the value is not known except by thoſe who poſſeſs them, and that a taſte for them is forfeited when they are forfeited themſelves. I know the charms of your country, ſaid Braſidas to a Satrape, who was comparing the manner of life at Sparta with that at Perſepolis, but it is out of your power to taſte the pleaſures of mine.

An unbroken horſe erects his mane, paws the ground, and ſtarts back at the ſight of the bridle; while that which is properly trained ſuffers patiently even the whip and ſpur: ſo ſavage man bends not his neck to that yoke to which civilized man ſubmits without murmuring; but prefers the moſt turbulent ſtate of liberty to the moſt peaceful ſlavery. It is not, therefore, from the ſervility of nations already enſlaved that we muſt form our judgment of the natural diſpoſitions of mankind either for or againſt ſlavery; but rather from the prodigious efforts of every free people to prevent oppreſſion, I am ſenſible, that the former are perpetually declaiming in praiſe of that tranquillity they enjoy in their chains, and that they call a ſtate of

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wretched ſervitude a ſtate of peace; *miſerrimam ſervitutem pacem appellant*: But, when I obſerve the latter ſacrificing pleaſure, peace, wealth, power, and even life itſelf, to the preſervation of that only treaſure, which is ſo much diſdained by thoſe who have loſt it; when I ſee free-born animals daſh their brains out againſt the bars of their cage, out of an innate impatience of captivity; when I behold numbers of naked ſavages, that deſpiſe European pleaſures, braving hunger, fire, the ſword, and even death itſelf, to preſerve their independency; I feel that it belongs not to ſlaves to argue about liberty.

With regard to paternal authority, from which abſolute government and indeed all kinds of ſociety have been deduced by many writers; it will ſuffice, without recurring to the contrary arguments of Locke and Sidney, to remark, that nothing is farther from the ferocious ſpirit of deſpotiſm, than the mildneſs of that authority which regards more the advantage of him who obeys than that of him who commands; that, by the law of nature, the father is maſter over the child no longer than his paternal aſſiſtance is neceſſary; that, after that time, they become both equal, the ſon being perfectly independent of the father, and owing him no obedience but only reſpect. For, as to gratitude; it is a duty which ought to be paid, but which none hath a right to exact. Inſtead of ſaying, that civil ſociety derives its origin from paternal authority, we ought to ſay rather that the latter derives its principal influence from the former. No individual was ever acknowledged as the father of many, till his ſons and daughters ſettled about him. The goods of the father, of which he is really

really the maſter, are the ties of his childrens dependence; and he may beſtow on them, if he pleaſes, a ſhare of his property, in proportion as they may have merited it of him by paying a conſtant obedience to his will. Now, the ſubjects of an arbitrary deſpot are ſo far from having the like favour to expect from their chief, that they themſelves and every thing they poſſeſs are his property, or at leaſt are conſidered by him as ſuch; ſo that they are forced to receive, as a favour, the little he is pleaſed to let them enjoy of their own. When he ſtrips them, he does them but juſtice, and is merciful that permits them to live.

By proceeding to compare, in this manner, the matter of fact with the matter of right, we ſhould diſcover full as little reaſon as truth in the voluntary eſtabliſhment of tyranny. It would alſo be no eaſy matter to prove the validity of a contract, binding only on one of the contracting parties; who ſhould at the ſame time ſtake every thing, and the other party nothing; ſo that none could ſuffer by ſuch contract but he who had bound himſelf by it. This hateful ſyſtem is indeed, even in modern times, very different from that of wiſe and good monarchs, and eſpecially of the kings of France; as may be ſeen by ſeveral paſſages in their edicts, particularly by that celebrated one publiſhed in 1667 in the name and by the orders of Lewis XIV. which contains the following paſſage.

"Let it not, therefore, be ſaid that the ſovereign is not ſubject to the laws of his realm; ſince the contrary propoſition is a maxim in the law of nations; which, tho' flattery hath ſometimes attacked, good princes have always de-

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ſended, as the tutelary divinity of their dominions. How much more juſt and rational is it to ſay, with the wiſe Plato, That the perfect felicity of a kingdom conſiſts in the obedience of ſubjects to their prince, that of the prince to the laws, and in the laws being juſt and conſtantly directed to the public good!"

I ſhall not ſtay here to inquire whether, as free-will is the nobleſt faculty of man, it be not degrading our very nature; reducing ourſelves to a level with the brutes, the mere ſlaves of inſtinct; and even an affront to the Author of our being; to renounce without reſerve the moſt precious of all his gifts, and to ſubject ourſelves to the commiſſion of all the crimes he has forbidden us, merely for the gratification of a mad or cruel maſter; or if this ſublime Artiſt ought not to be leſs irritated at ſeeing his workmanſhip entirely deſtroyed than thus diſhonoured. I ſhall aſk only, what right thoſe, who were not afraid thus to debaſe themſelves, could have to ſubject their poſterity to the ſame ignominy; and to renounce for them thoſe bleſſings which they do not owe to the liberality of their progenitors, and without which life itſelf muſt be a burden to all thoſe who are worthy of it?

Puffendorf ſays, that we may diveſt ourſelves of our liberty in favour of other men, in the ſame manner as we transfer our property from one to another by contracts and agreements. But this ſeems to be a very weak argument. For, in the firſt place, the property I alienate becomes quite foreign to me, nor can I ſuffer from the abuſe of it; but it very nearly concerns me that my liberty is not abuſed; and I cannot, without

without incurring in a great degree the guilt of what crimes I may be compelled to commit, expoſe myſelf to become the inſtrument of any. Beſides, the right of property being only of human inſtitution, men may diſpoſe of what they poſſeſs juſt as they pleaſe: but it is not the ſame with the eſſential bleſſings of nature, ſuch as life and liberty; which every man is permitted to enjoy, and of which it is at leaſt dubious whether any have a right to diveſt themſelves. By giving up the one, we degrade our being; by giving up the other, we do all in our power to annihilate it; and, as no temporal enjoyment can indemnify us for the loſs of either, it would be an offence at once to reaſon and nature to renounce them upon any account whatever.

But, though it were in our power to transfer our liberty, as we do our property; yet there would be a wide difference with regard to our children, who enjoy our ſubſtance only by virtue of a ceſſion of our right; whereas, liberty being a gift frankly beſtowed on them by nature, their parents have no right whatever to diveſt them of it. Hence, to eſtabliſh ſlavery, it was evidently neceſſary to do violence to nature; and thus it became neceſſary to alter nature, in order to perpetuate ſuch a right. In the mean time, the civilians, who have gravely determined that the child of a ſlave comes into the world a ſlave, have decided, in other words, that a man does not come into the world a man.

It appears hence to me inconteſtable, that governments did not commence with arbitrary power; but that this is the depravation, the extreme

treme term of government; bringing it back, at length, to the law of the ſtrongeſt; againſt which it was at firſt deſigned as a remedy. Admitting, however, that they had begun in this manner, ſuch power, as it was illegal in itſelf, could not have ſerved as a baſis to the laws of ſociety, nor of conſequence to the inequality of its inſtitution.

Without entering at preſent upon the diſcuſſion, that ſtill remains to be made, of the nature of the fundamental compact of all government; I content myſelf with adopting the common opinion concerning it, and confine myſelf here to the eſtabliſhment of the political body as a real contract between the people and the chiefs elected by them: a contract by which both parties bind themſelves to obſerve the laws therein expreſſed, which form the ties of their union. The people having, in reſpect to the ſocial relations ſubſiſting between them, concentrated all their wills in one perſon, the ſeveral articles, concerning which this will is explained, become ſo many fundamental laws, obligatory on all the members of the ſtate without diſtinction, at the ſame time that one of theſe laws regulates the choice and the power of the magiſtrates appointed to obſerve the execution of the whole.

This power extends to every thing relative to the ſupport and maintenance of the conſtitution; but not to any thing that may tend to alter it. It is accordingly accompanied by honours, in order to render the laws and the adminiſtrators of them reſpectable. Theſe miniſters are alſo diſtinguiſhed by certain perſonal prerogatives, in order to make them ſome recompenſe for the

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cares and fatigues inſeparable from a good adminiſtration. The magiſtrate, on his ſide, obliges himſelf to uſe the power he is entruſted with, conformably to the deſign of his conſtituents; to maintain them all in the peaceable poſſeſſion of their property; and to prefer on every occaſion the public to his own particular intereſt. Before experience had ſhewn, or a knowledge of the human heart enabled us to foreſee, the unavoidable abuſes of ſuch a conſtitution, it muſt have appeared ſo much the more complete, as thoſe perſons who were charged with the care of its preſervation found themſelves intereſted in it; for the office and privileges of magiſtracy being ſolely built on the fundamental laws of the conſtitution, the magiſtrates would ceaſe to be lawful as ſoon as ever theſe ceaſed to exiſt; the people would no longer owe them obedience; and as the laws, not the magiſtrates, are eſſential to the being of a ſtate, the ſeveral members of it would become entitled to their natural liberty.

If we reflect with ever ſo little attention on this ſubject, we ſhall find new arguments ſuggeſt themſelves in confirmation of its truth, and that we might be convinced alone from the very nature of the contract that it cannot be irrevocable: for, if there were no ſuperior power capable of enſuring the fidelity of the contracting parties, and of obliging them to perform their reciprocal engagements, they would be ſole judges in their own cauſe, and each of them have a right to renounce his contract, as ſoon as he found that the other had violated the terms of it, or that thoſe terms no longer ſuited his private convenience. It is upon this principle

that the right of abdication may poſſibly be founded. Now, to conſider only what is merely human in this inſtitution, it is certain that, if the magiſtrate, who has all the power in his own hands, and appropriates to himſelf all the advantages of the contract, hath a right to diveſt himſelf of his authority; the people, who ſuffer for all the faults of their chief, have a much better right to renounce their dependence on him. But the terrible and innumerable diſorders that would neceſſarily ariſe from ſo dangerous a privilege, ſufficiently demonſtrate how much human governments ſtood in need of a more ſolid baſis than that of mere human reaſon, and how expedient it was for the public tranquility that providence ſhould interpoſe to inveſt the ſovereign authority with a ſacred and inviolable character; which might deprive ſubjects of the pernicious right of diſpoſing of it to whomſoever they pleaſed. If the world had received no other advantages from religion, this alone would be ſufficient to induce mankind to adopt and cultivate it, as it hath been the means of ſaving more blood than fanaticiſm hath cauſed to be ſpilt. But to follow the clue of our hypotheſis.

The different forms of government owe their origin to the inequalities ſubſiſting between individuals at the time of their forming themſelves into a community. If there happened to be any one man among them greatly pre-eminent in power, in virtue, in riches, or perſonal influence, he became ſole magiſtrate, and the ſtate aſſumed the form of monarchy. If ſeveral nearly equal in point of eminence ſtood above the reſt, they were elected jointly, and formed an ariſto-

ariſtocracy. Again, among a people who had deviated leſs from a ſtate of nature, and between whoſe fortune or talents there was no ſuch diſproportion, they retained the ſupreme adminiſtration in common, and formed a democracy. It was diſcovered in proceſs of time, which of theſe forms ſuited mankind the beſt. Some people remained altogether ſubject to the laws; others ſoon became ſlaves to their magiſtrates. The former laboured to preſerve their liberty; the latter, irritated to ſee others enjoy a bleſſing they had loſt, employed their thoughts ſolely in making ſlaves of their neighbours. In fine, the one poſſeſſed themſelves of wealth and conqueſt, and the other of happineſs and virtue.

In theſe different governments, the offices were at firſt elective; and when the influence of wealth was out of the queſtion, the preference was allowed to merit, which gives a natural aſcendant; and to age poſſeſſed of experience in buſineſs, ſedateneſs and deliberation in council. The Elders among the Hebrews, the Geronts at Sparta, and the Senate at Rome, nay the very etymology of our word *Seigneur*, ſerve to ſhew how much grey hairs were formerly held in veneration. But the more frequently the choice fell upon old men, the more frequently it was of courſe to be repeated, and the more the trouble of ſuch repetitions were felt; the intrigues of electioneering took place; factions were formed; parties grew inveterate; civil wars aroſe; the lives of individuals were ſacrificed to the pretended welfare of the ſtate; and at length matters were carried ſo far as to be on the point of relapſing into their primitive ſtate of anarchy and confuſion. The ambition of the chiefs induced them to pro-

fit by theſe circumſtances, to perpetuate their reſpective offices in their ſeveral families: at the ſame time the people, accuſtomed to dependence, to eaſe, and the conveniences of life, and already incapable of breaking their fetters, agreed to augment their ſlavery, in order to ſecure their tranquillity. Thus it was that magiſtrates became hereditary, contracting the habit of conſidering their offices as a family-eſtate, and themſelves as proprietors of thoſe communities, of which they were at firſt but the officers; to regard their fellow-citizens as their ſlaves, and to look upon them as part of their ſtock of cattle; ſtyling themſelves equal to the Gods and Kings of kings.

If we follow the progreſs of inequality in theſe different revolutions, we ſhall find that the eſtabliſhment of laws and the right of property was the firſt term of it; the inſtitution of magiſtrates the ſecond; and the converſion of legal into arbitrary power the third and laſt; ſo that the difference between rich and poor were authoriſed by the firſt; that between the powerful and the weak by the ſecond; and that between maſter and ſlave by the third; the laſt being the ultimate degree of inequality, and that term at which all the reſt having at length arrived remain, till the government is entirely diſſolved by new revolutions, or brought back again to a legal conſtitution.

To comprehend the neceſſity of this progreſs, we are not to conſider ſo much the motives for the eſtabliſhment of bodies politic, as the forms they aſſume in their adminiſtration, and the inconveniences that neceſſarily attend them: for the vices which render ſocial inſtitutions neceſ-

ſary, are the very ſame which render the abuſe of them unavoidable. If we except, alſo, Sparta alone, whoſe laws chiefly regarded education, and where Lycurgus eſtabliſhed ſuch cuſtoms and manners as in a great meaſure rendered laws needleſs; the laws in general, being leſs forcible than the paſſions, reſtrain mankind without altering them; ſo that it would not be difficult to prove, that every government, which ſhould ſcrupulouſly comply with the ends of its inſtitution, carefully guarding againſt change and corruption, hath been unneceſſarily inſtituted: for a country, in which no one ſhould either evade the laws or make an ill uſe of magiſterial power, could require neither laws nor magiſtrates. Political diſtinctions neceſſarily induce ſocial diſtinctions. The inequality increaſing between the chiefs and the people, ſoon becomes perceptible among individuals, and receives various modifications according to paſſions, talents, and circumſtances. The magiſtrate cannot uſurp any illegal power, without diſtinguiſhing his creatures, with whom he muſt ſhare it. Add to this, that individuals ſuffer themſelves to be oppreſſed only in proportion as they are hurried on by a blind ambition; and looking rather below than above them, they come in time to love authority more than independence. When they ſubmit to ſlavery, it is only that they may enſlave others in turn. It is no eaſy matter to make him obey, who has no ambition to command; nor would the moſt refined policy find it poſſible to enſlave a people who ſhould only deſire to be independent. But inequality eaſily makes its way among baſe and ambitious minds, ever ready to run any riſque, and almoſt indifferent whether they command

or obey, as fortune is favourable or adverſe. Thus, there muſt have been a time in which the ſenſes of people were faſcinated to ſuch a degree, that their rulers had only to ſay to the moſt pitiful wretch, "Be great, you and all your poſterity," to make him immediately appear great in the eyes of every one as well as his own. His deſcendents took ſtill more upon them, and that in proportion to their diſtance; the more obſcure and uncertain the cauſe, the greater the effect; the greater number of idlers any family had produced, the more illuſtrious it was accounted.

If this were a place to deſcend to minute particulars, I could readily explain how inequalities in point of credit and authority became unavoidable among private perſons (19), as ſoon as ever their union obliged them to compare themſelves one with another, and to remark the differences which they find by the continual uſe every man muſt make of his neighbour. Theſe differences are of ſeveral kinds: but riches, rank, power, and perſonal merit, being the principal diſtinctions by which men form an eſtimate of each other in a ſtate of ſociety, I could prove that the harmony or incongruity of theſe different forces is the ſureſt indication of the good or bad original conſtitution of any ſtate. I could ſhew, that, among theſe four kinds of inequality, perſonal qualities being the origin of all the others, wealth is that in which they all terminate; becauſe tending moſt immediately to the proſperity of individuals, and being the moſt eaſy of communication, riches are made uſe of to purchaſe every other diſtinction.

We are enabled to judge, by this obſervation, pretty

pretty exactly, how far a people may have deviated from their primitive inſtitution, and how far they have ſtill to go ere they arrive at the extreme term of corruption. I could explain how much this univerſal deſire of reputation, honour, and preference, with which we are all inflamed, exerciſes our faculties and powers; how much it excites and multiplies our paſſions; and, by creating an univerſal competition, or rather enmity among mankind, occaſions numberleſs diſappointments and cataſtrophies among the innumerable pretenders whom it engages to enter on the ſame career. I could ſhew that it is to this deſire of being talked of, to this unremitting rage of diſtinguiſhing ourſelves, that we owe the very beſt and the worſt things among us, our virtues and our vices, our ſciences and our errors, our heroes and our philoſophers; that is to ſay, a great many bad things, and a very few good ones. In a word, I could prove, that, if we have a few rich and powerful men placed on the pinnacle of fortune and grandeur, while the groveling crowd are in want and obſcurity, it is becauſe the former prize what they enjoy only in the degree that others are deſtitute of it; and that, without changing their condition, they would ceaſe to be happy the moment the people ceaſed to be miſerable.

Theſe particulars alone, however, would furniſh matter for a more conſiderable performance; in which might be eſtimated the advantages and diſadvantages of every ſpecies of government, relatively to man in a ſtate of nature; and at the ſame time might be unveiled all the different appearances which inequality hath at times put on to this day, and may hereafter put on, even to the

the end of time, according to the nature of thoſe ſeveral governments, and thoſe alterations in them which muſt unavoidably be occaſioned by time. We ſhould then behold the multitude oppreſſed by domeſtic tyrants, in conſequence of the very precautions taken to guard againſt foreign tyrants. We ſhould ſee oppreſſion continually gain ground, without its being poſſible for the oppreſſed to know where it would ſtop, or what lawful means might be left them to check its progreſs. We ſhould ſee the rights of individuals and the freedom of nations by ſlow degrees extinguiſhed; and the complaints, proteſts, and appeals of the weak neglected as ſeditious murmurings. We ſhould ſee the honour of defending the common cauſe confined by policy to a mercenary part of the people. We ſhould ſee impoſts and taxes rendered neceſſary by ſuch means; and the diſheartened huſbandman leave his fields even in the midſt of peace, and quit the plough to take up the ſword. We ſhould ſee fatal and capricious maxims eſtabliſhed with regard to points of honour; the champions of their country ſooner or latter becoming her enemies, and perpetually pointing their ſwords to the breaſts of their fellow-citizens. The time would even come when they might be heard to ſay to the oppreſſor of their country,

Pectore ſi fratris gladium jugulóque parentis
Condere me jubeas, gravidæque in viſcera partu
Conjugis, invita peragam tamen omnia dextra.

From the great inequality of fortunes and conditions, from the vaſt variety of paſſions and of talents, of uſeleſs and pernicious arts, of frivolous ſciences, would ariſe a multitude of prejudices

judices equally contrary to reaſon, happineſs, and virtue. We ſhould ſee the magiſtrates foment every thing that might ſerve to weaken men united in ſociety, by promoting diviſions among them; every thing that ſows in it the ſeeds of actual diviſion, while it breathes the air of apparent harmony; every thing that can inſpire the different ranks of people with mutual hatred and diſtruſt by an oppoſition of their rights and intereſts, and of courſe ſtrengthen that power which comprehends them all.

It is from the midſt of this diſorder and theſe revolutions, that deſpotiſm, gradually rearing up its frightful head, and devouring every thing that remained ſound and untainted in any part of the ſtate, would at length trample both on the laws and the people, and eſtabliſh herſelf on the ruins of the republic. The times which ſhould immediately precede this laſt change, would be times of trouble and calamity; but at length the monſter would ſwallow up every thing, and the people would no longer have either chiefs or laws, but merely tyrants. From this inſtant there would be no longer any regard paid to virtue or morals: for deſpotiſm, *cui ex honeſto nulla eſt ſpes*, where it prevails, admits of no other maſter; it no ſooner ſpeaks, than probity and duty loſe their influence; the moſt implicit obedience being the only virtue which ſlaves can practiſe.

This is the laſt term of inequality, the point that cloſes the circle, and meets that from which we ſet out. Here it is that private perſons return to their primitive equality, becauſe they are no longer of importance; and that, ſubjects having no longer any law but the will of their maſter,

ſter, nor their maſter any other reſtraint than his paſſions, all notions of moral good and all principles of equity vaniſh. It is here that every thing returns to the law of the ſtrongeſt, and of courſe to a new ſtate of nature, differing from what we ſet out from; as that was a ſtate of nature in its firſt purity, and this the conſequence of exceſſive corruption. There is ſo little difference between the two ſtates in other reſpects, and the contract of government is ſo far diſſolved by deſpotiſm, that the deſpot is no longer maſter than while he remains the ſtrongeſt; but, as ſoon as he can be expelled, he may be ſo without having any right to complain of injuſtice. The popular inſurrection, that ends in the death or depoſition of a ſultan, is as lawful an act as thoſe by which he might, the day before, diſpoſe of the lives and fortunes of his ſubjects. As he was ſupported alone by force, ſo he is by the ſame force ſubverted. Thus every thing takes place according to natural order; and whatever may be the event of ſuch frequent and precipitate revolutions, no one man has reaſon to complain of the injuſtice of another, but only of his own ill-fortune or indiſcretion.

In thus purſuing the almoſt obliterated traces by which man hath paſſed from a ſtate of nature to a ſtate of ſociety; by reſtoring, with the intermediate ſituations which I have pointed out, thoſe which want of time hath obliged me to ſuppreſs, or my imagination hath not ſuggeſted; the attentive reader cannot fail to be ſtruck at the vaſt diſtance which ſeparates the two ſtates. It is in tracing this ſlow ſucceſſion of things he may find the ſolution of a number of problems

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in politics and morals, which philoſophers find it very difficult to ſolve.

He will perceive that, mankind being different in different ages, the reaſon why Diogenes could not find out a man, was, that he ſought among his contemporaries the man of an earlier period. He will ſee that Cato fell with Rome and liberty, becauſe he did not ſuit the age in which he lived; the greateſt of men ſerving only to aſtoniſh that world, which would have readily obeyed him, had he lived five hundred years ſooner. In a word, he will find himſelf in a condition to comprehend how the ſoul and the paſſions of men change as it were by inſenſible alterations their very nature; how our wants and pleaſures in the end change their objects; and how the original man vaniſhing by degrees, ſociety offers to our inſpection only an aſſemblage of artificial men and factitious paſſions; the work of theſe ſeveral new relations, and without any foundation in nature. We are taught nothing on this ſubject by reflection, but what is entirely confirmed by experience. The ſavage and the civilized man differ ſo much with regard to thair paſſions and inclinations, that thoſe things which conſtitute the happineſs of the one would reduce the other to deſpair. The firſt requires nothing but ſuſtenance, liberty, and reſt; he deſires only to live and be exempt from labour: nay, the apathy of the ſtoic falls ſhort of his conſummate indifference for every other object.

Civilized man is, on the contrary, perpetually in motion, ſweating, toiling and racking his brains to find out occupations ſtill more laborious: he continues drudging to his laſt moment, and

and even ſeeks death to put himſelf in a ſituation to live, or renounces life to acquire immortality. He pays his court to men in power, whom he hates; and to the wealthy, whom he deſpiſes; he ſtops at nothing in order to have the honour of ſerving them: he is not aſhamed to value himſelf on his own meanneſs and their protection; while, proud of his own chains, he ſpeaks with diſdain of thoſe who have not the honour of wearing them as well as himſelf.

What a ſight would the perplexing and envied labours of a European miniſter of ſtate preſent to the eyes of a Carribbean! What a cruel death would not this indolent ſavage prefer to ſuch a horrid life, the labours of which are ſeldom even ſweetened by the pleaſure of doing good! But, to ſee into the motives of all this ſolicitude, it is requiſite that the words *power* and *reputation* ſhould have ſome meaning affixed to them in his mind; it is requiſite he ſhould know that there are men who ſet a value on the looks of the reſt of mankind; who can be made happy and ſatisfied with themſelves rather on the teſtimony of other people than on their own. In reality, the ſource of all theſe differences is, that the ſavage lives within himſelf; while the citizen conſtantly lives beſide himſelf, ſtudying only how to live in the opinion of others; inſomuch that he ſeems to receive the conſciouſneſs of his own exiſtence merely from the judgment of others concerning him. It is not to my preſent purpoſe to inſiſt on the great indifference for good and evil which takes riſe from this diſpoſition, in ſpite of our many fine diſcourſes of morality; or to ſhew how every thing of this kind being reduced to appearances,

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all is mere art and mummery, including even honour, friendſhip, virtue, and often even vice itſelf, of which we at length learn the ſecret to make our boaſt; to ſhew, in ſhort, how being ever on the inquiry at others what we are, and never daring to aſk ourſelves ſo delicate a queſtion in the midſt of ſo many ſublime maxims of philoſophy, humanity, and politeneſs, we have nothing to ſhew for ourſelves but a frivolous and deceitful external appearance; honour without virtue, reaſon without wiſdom, and pleaſure without happineſs.

It is ſufficient that I have proved this not to be the original ſtate of man; but that it is merely the ſpirit of ſociety, and the inequality which ſociety produces, that thus transform and diverſify all our natural inclinations.

Thus have I endeavoured to trace the origin and diſplay the progreſs of the inequality of mankind, with the inſtitution and abuſe of political ſocieties, as far as theſe things are capable of being deduced from the nature of man merely by the light of reaſon, and independent of thoſe ſacred tenets which give the ſanction of divine right to ſovereign authority. The inferences which may be drawn from a view of this exhibition, are, *firſt*, That as there is hardly any inequality among men in a ſtate of nature, all the inequality which now prevails, owes its ſtrength and growth to the developement of our faculties and the improvement of our underſtanding; becoming at length permanent and lawful by the eſtabliſhment of property and the inſtitution of laws. *Secondly*, It follows, that a moral inequality, authoriſed by any right merely arbitrary, claſhes with natural right, as often

as it does not combine in the ſame proportion as phyſical inequality; a diſtinction which determines ſufficiently what we ought to think of that ſpecies of inequality which prevails in all civilized countries; ſince it is plainly contrary to the law of nature, that infants ſhould command old men, fools conduct philoſophers, and that the privileged few ſhould gorge themſelves with ſuperfluities, while the ſtarving multitude are in want of the common neceſſaries of life.

NOTES.

DEDICATION, Page 130.

(1.) HERODOTUS relates, that after the murder of the falſe Smerdis, the ſeven deliverers of Perſia, being aſſembled in order to deliberate on the form of government which was moſt proper to adopt for the ſtate, Otanes ſtrongly recommended the republican; a piece of advice the more extraordinary as it came from a Satrape, who might have formed ſome pretenſions to the throne: beſides, men in power generally dread more than death a ſpecies of government which obliges them to reſpect other men. This advice of Otanes was, as we may well conceive, totally diſregarded: ſeeing the reſt therefore proceeding to the election of a monarch, and being neither deſirous to command or obey, he voluntarily gave his right to the crown among the other competitors, requiring only that he and his poſterity ſhould remain free and independent, which was granted. Now, though

though Herodotus had not acquainted us with the bounds ſet to this privilege, we ſhould be obliged to ſuppoſe it had ſome limits; otherwiſe Otanes, acknowledging no kind of legal reſtraint, nor being bound to give any one an account of his conduct, would have been ſo powerful, that he might have done what he pleaſed; even more powerful than the king himſelf. But there was little probability that a man, capable of contenting himſelf with ſuch a privilege on ſuch an occaſion, ſhould ever make a bad uſe of it. In fact, it does not appear that this privilege ever cauſed the leaſt diſturbance in the kingdom, either from the prudent Otanes or any of his deſcendants.

PREFACE, Page 134.

(2.) I build with confidence, at my firſt ſetting out, on one of thoſe authorities which are reſpected by philoſophers, becauſe derived from ſolid and ſublime reaſons; which they alone know how to diſcover.

" However intereſting may be the knowledge of ourſelves, I am not clear that we are not much better acquainted with thoſe things that do not belong to us. Furniſhed by nature with organs ſolely adapted to our preſervation, we employ them only in receiving foreign impreſſions. We ſeek only to extend our being, and exiſt out of ourſelves; too buſy in multiplying the offices of our ſenſes, and increaſing the external ſenſe, which contracts us within our real dimenſions, and ſeparates every thing external from our being. It is this ſenſe, however, that we ought to employ in acquiring ſelf-knowledge, as it is the only one by which we can

form a judgment of ourſelves. But the difficulty lies in giving this ſenſe its activity and whole extent, and in clearing the ſoul, wherein it reſides, of every illuſion of the underſtanding. We have loſt the habit of employing it, ſo that it hath long remained in a ſtate of inactivity, amidſt all the tumult of our corporeal ſenſations, dried up by the fire of our paſſions: the heart, the mind, the ſenſes, all have laboured againſt it." *Hiſt. Nat. T.* 4. *p.* 151. *de la Nat. de l'homme.*

DISSERTATION, Page 157.

(3.) The changes which may have been produced in the conformation of man's body by the habit of walking upon two legs, the ſimilitude alſo ſtill obſervable between his arms and the fore-legs of quadrupeds, together with the inferences to be drawn from their manner of walking, are ſufficient to give occaſion to ſome doubt which was the moſt natural to us. Children begin to walk by ſcrabbling on all-fours, and require both precept and example to ſuſtain themſelves upright. There are even ſome ſavage nations, as the Hottentots for inſtance, who, being careleſs of their children, ſuffer them to walk ſo long on their hands, that it is with great difficulty they bring them afterwards to aſſume an erect poſture. It is the ſame with the children of the Caribbeans, and other Weſt-India ſavages. I could even produce ſeveral inſtances of human quadrupeds: particularly that of the child, who was found, in 1344, near Heſſe-Caſſel, where he had been ſuckled by wolves, and who uſed to ſay afterwards at Prince Henry's court, that if it were left to his choice, he

he would rather return to live with the wolves again, than to live among mankind. He had contracted ſo invincible an habit of walking on his hands, that it was neceſſary to faſten pieces of wood to him ſo as to keep him upright on his feet. It was the ſame with another child, found in 1694 in the foreſts of Lithunia, and trained up among bears. M. de Condillac ſays, he did not ſhew the leaſt ſign of reaſon, but walked on his hands and feet, and had no articulate ſpeech, but uttered ſome uncouth ſounds unlike the language of other men. The little ſavage, carried from Hanover to the court of England ſome years ago, was with great difficulty brought to walk upon his legs. In 1719, two other ſavages were found in the Pyrenean mountains, running up and down like quadrupeds. It is objected, indeed, that by walking upon our hands, we ſhould loſe the uſe of them in many other reſpects wherein they are uſeful to us. But, not to inſiſt on the practice of monkeys, by which it is plain the hand may be employed both ways, this argument could only prove, that man may give to his members a more commodious diſtinction than that of nature, but not that nature deſtined man to walk otherwiſe than ſhe teaches him to walk.

But there appears to me much ſtronger reaſons for affirming that man is naturally a biped. In the firſt place, if it could be ſhewn, that man might have originally been formed otherwiſe, and in time become what he now is; this would not be ſufficient to make us conclude that it did really ſo happen. For, though the poſſibility of ſuch a change were proved, it would be ſtill requiſite to ſhew ſome probability at leaſt of its

having actually happened, before we admitted of its certainty. Beſides, admitting that the arms might, in caſe of neceſſity, ſerve for legs, it is the ſole argument in favour of the ſyſtem; whereas there are many others to contradict it. I ſhall mention the principal: in the firſt place, the manner in which the head of man is affixed to his body; inſtead of giving his eyes an horizontal direction, ſuch as thoſe of all other animals have, and as he has himſelf when walking erect, directs them downwards to the earth, a ſituation very unfavourable to the preſervation of the individual. Secondly, the tail, which nature hath not beſtowed on man, and which he hath no need of in walking, is ſo uſeful to quadrupeds that none of them are without it. Thirdly, the poſition of the breaſts of the females is peculiarly adapted to bipeds, which hold their children in their arms; and would be ſo inconvenient to quadrupeds, that not one of them hath thoſe parts in the ſame manner. Fourthly, the legs and thighs are ſo very long in proportion to the hands and arms, that we ſhould be forced to crawl upon our knees in walking on all-fours, and be very ill-proportioned animals and very unfit for walking. Fifthly, if ſuch an animal ſhould lay his foot, as well as his hand, flat on the earth, he would have in the hinder-leg a joint leſs than other animals, viz. that which joins the canon to the tibia. Beſides, ſtanding on the tip of the foot, as he muſt doubtleſs be forced to do, the tarſus, not to inſiſt on its being compoſed of ſo many bones, muſt have been too large to ſerve the purpoſe of the canon; and the articulations with the metatarſus and tibia too near each other to afford

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the leg, in that ſituation, the degree of flexibility obſervable in the legs of quadrupeds. The example of children, being taken from an age at which our natural forces are not as yet developed, nor our limbs arrived at their full ſtrength, proves nothing; and I might as well affirm that dogs are not originally formed to walk, becauſe that for ſome days after they are littered they are able only to crawl. Particular facts are alſo of no great validity againſt the univerſal practice of mankind; even of nations which, having no commerce or communication with others, cannot be ſuſpected of having copied them. A child indeed, deſerted in a foreſt before he had ſtrength to walk, and ſuckled by ſome beaſt, would of courſe follow the example of its nurſe, and endeavour to walk like her. Hence habit might give him a facility of doing what was not intended for him by nature: even as a man, who, having loſt his hands, may bring himſelf by dint of exerciſe to do thoſe things with his feet which he hath been uſed to do with his hands; ſo might ſuch a deſerted child acquire at length a facility of employing his hands to the purpoſes deſtined by nature for its feet.

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(4.) If there ſhould be found among my readers any one of them ſo poor a naturaliſt, as to object to the ſuppoſition of this natural fertility of the earth, I ſhall anſwer him with the following quotation.

" As vegetables derive, for their ſupport, more ſubſtance from the air and water than from the earth, ſo, when they decay, they reſtore more

more to the earth than they received from it: beſides, foreſts engroſs large quantities of rain-water by ſtopping the vapours that would form it. Thus, in woods where the earth lies untouched for any conſiderable time, the ſtratum of earth containing the principles of vegetation muſt have received a great quantity of them. But animals reſtoring to the earth leſs than they derive from it, and men conſuming vaſt quantities of vegetables for fuel and other purpoſes, it follows, that, in populous countries, the ſtratum of vegetating earth is conſtantly on the decay, and muſt become at laſt like the ſurface of Arabia Petrea, and many other parts of the eaſt (the parts of the world which in fact were earlieſt inhabited,) where nothing is at preſent to be found but ſalt and ſand, the fixed ſalt of plants and animals always ſtaying behind, while all the other parts of bodies become volatile and fly off." *Mr de Buffon, Hiſt. Nat.*

To this may be added the teſtimony of matter of fact, in the vaſt quantity of trees and plants of every kind, with which the deſert iſlands, diſcovered in the latter centuries, were found covered; and in the immenſe woods which we learn from hiſtory have been cut down in all parts of the world, in proportion as they became more populous, and the people more civilized. On this I ſhall make the three following remarks. The firſt is, that, if there are any vegetables capable of replacing the vegetable matter conſumed by animals, according to Buffon, they muſt be ſuch trees as by their leaves and branches collect the greateſt quantity of water and vapour. The ſecond is, that the deſtruction of the ſoil, *viz.* the loſs of

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ſubſtance fit for vegetation, cannot fail to increaſe in proportion as the earth is cultivated, and as its inhabitants, grown more induſtrious, conſume its productions in greater quantities. The third and moſt important obſervation is, that the fruits of trees afford animals a more plentiful nutriment than they can expect from other vegetables. This I have myſelf experimented; having compared the produce of two pieces of land of equal area and quality, the one ſown with wheat, and the other planted with cheſnut trees.

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(5.) Among quadrupeds, the two moſt univerſal diſtinctions of the carnivorous tribes are deduced, one from the figure of the teeth, and the other from the conformation of the inteſtines. The animals that ſubſiſt on vegetables have all of them blunt teeth, as the horſe, the ox, the ſheep, the hare; but the teeth of carnivorous animals are ſharp, as thoſe of the cat, the dog, the wolf, and the fox. As to the inteſtines, the frugivorous have ſome, ſuch as the colon, which are not to be found in the carnivorous animals. It ſeems therefore, that the teeth and inteſtines of man being like thoſe of frugivorous animals, he ſhould naturally be ranged in this claſs. This queſtion alſo is not only confirmed by anatomical obſervations, but is greatly favoured by the monuments of antiquity.

" Dicearchus, ſaith St Jerom, relates in his " books of Grecian antiquities, that during the " reign of Saturn, when the earth was as yet " fertile of itſelf, no man eat fleſh, but all lived " upon the fruits and pulſe which were natu-

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"rally produced." (*Lib.* 2. *Adv. Jovinian.*) It will be ſeen here, that I give up many advantages of which I might avail myſelf in this argument. For prey being almoſt the ſole object of quarrel among carnivorous animals, while the frugivorous live together in conſtant peace and harmony, it is evident, that, if men were of this laſt kind, they would find it much more eaſy to ſubſiſt in a ſtate of nature, and much leſs occaſion to leave it.

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(6.) All thoſe ſciences which require reflection, that are not to be attained without purſuing a chain of ideas, and that can only be brought to perfection ſucceſſively, ſeem to be entirely beyond the reach of ſavage man, for want of communication with his fellow ſavages; that is to ſay, for want of the inſtrument which ſhould ſerve to ſuch communication, and of thoſe wants which render it neceſſary. His knowledge and induſtry are confined to leaping, running, fighting, throwing ſtones, and climbing trees. But if on the one hand he can do nothing more, he is on the other hand much more expert at theſe exerciſes than we. Yet as ſkill and expertneſs in ſuch exerciſes depends altogether on practice, and cannot be communicated or tranſmitted from one individual to another, the firſt man might poſſibly have been as dexterous at them as the lateſt of his poſterity.

The relations of voyagers are full of examples of the vigour and ſtrength of men in barbarous countries; they ſpeak little leſs alſo of their addreſs and agility; and as men ſtood in need only of their eyes to make ſuch obſervations, no-

nothing prevents our giving credit to the teſtimony of ocular witneſſes on theſe occaſions. I ſhall cite a few examples from the firſt books that come to hand.

"The Hottentots, ſays Kolben, are better fiſhermen than the Europeans who reſide at the Cape. They are equally dexterous at the uſe of the hook, the net, or the dart; in the creeks, on the ſea-ſhore, and in the rivers. They are no leſs expert alſo at catching fiſh with their hands: at ſwimming they are incomparable; having ſomething very peculiar and ſurpriſing in their manner; which is to carry themſelves erect with their hands above water, ſo that they appear to walk upon the ground; and even upon the moſt mountainous ſea to dance, in a manner, on the backs of the waves, riſing and deſcending with them like pieces of cork."

We are told, by the ſame author in another place, that the Hottentots are amazingly dexterous at hunting; and that their ſwiftneſs of foot is altogether inconceivable. He wonders that they do not more frequently make a bad uſe of this agility; for that they do it ſometimes we may learn by the following example, which he relates of them.

"A Dutch ſea-man, coming aſhore at the cape, engaged an Hottentot to carry for him to the town a roll of tobacco about twenty pounds weight; but when they had got to ſome little diſtance from the reſt of the company, the Hottentot aſked the ſailor if he could run. Run? anſwered the Dutchman, yes, very well. Come on then, let us ſee, replied the African; and, immediately taking to his heels, was out of ſight with the tobacco in an inſtant. The ſailor, aſtoniſhed

ſtoniſhed at the ſwiftneſs of the ſavage, deſpaired of overtaking him, and never ſaw either his porter or his tobacco afterwards."

"Their ſight is ſo quick, and their hand ſo certain, that the Europeans cannot come near them in theſe reſpects. They will, for inſtance, throw a ſtone at a mark no bigger than a half-penny, and hit it at an hundred paces diſtance; and, what is ſtill more ſurpriſing, inſtead of fixing their eyes on it, they run to and fro, and writhe their bodies ſo ſtrangely all the while, that one would be apt to think the ſtone was directed by an inviſible hand."

Father du Tertre tells nearly the ſame ſtory of the ſavages of the weſtern iſlands, as we read in Kolben of the Hottentots of the cape of Good Hope: but he extols chiefly their dexterity in ſhooting with arrows ſo as to hit the birds as they fly, and the fiſh as they ſwim, which they afterwards take by diving for them. The ſavages of North America are no leſs famous for their ſtrength and dexterity; nor are thoſe of South America behind them, if we may judge from the following example.

In the year 1746 an Indian of Buenos Ayres, having been condemned to the gallies at Cadiz, propoſed to the governor to purchaſe his liberty by hazarding his life at an enſuing public feſtival; engaging to attack the moſt furious bull they ſhould bring, without any other weapon than a rope; to bring him to the ground, and faſten his rope to any part of him he ſhould be ordered; to ſaddle him, bridle him, and then, mounting on his back, to fight two more of the moſt furious bulls they could turn out of the Torillo, and kill them both one after another

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at the word of command; and all this alone, and without any aſſiſtance whatever. The governor accepted the propoſal, and the Indian was as good as his word; performing every thing he had promiſed. For a deſcription of the manner he went about it, and the other particulars of this extraordinary engagement, I refer the reader to the firſt volume of *Mr Gautier's Obſervations on natural hiſtory*, from which I have taken the above account.

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(7.) "The length of life in horſes, Mr de Buffon tells us, is proportionable to the length of time elapſed during their growth, as it is in every other ſpecies of animals. Man, who is fourteen years growing, may live ſix or ſeven times as long, that is, ninety or an hundred years. The horſe, whoſe growth is performed in four years, may in like manner live ſix or ſeven times as long, *viz.* twenty-five or thirty years. The examples which may be cited in contradiction to this rule are ſo few, that they ought not to be regarded as exceptions from which any conſequences may be drawn to invalidate the rule itſelf: but as large horſes reach their full ſize in a much ſhorter time than thoſe of a more ſlender and delicate make, ſo they are ſhorter lived, and even old at fifteen."

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(8.) I ſee another difference, methinks, between carnivorous and frugivorous animals, ſtill more general than that laid down in note (5); as it extends even to the birds. This difference conſiſts in the number of their young;

which with thoſe animals that live upon vegetables never exceeds two at a litter, but is generally greater with thoſe of the carnivorous kind. It is eaſy to ſee the deſign of nature in this reſpect by the number of teats; which is never more than two in females of the firſt kind, as the mare, the cow, the goat, the doe, the ſheep, *&c.* and always ſix or eight in females of the other kind, as the bitch, the cat, the wolf, the tygreſs, *&c.*——As to birds, the hen, the gooſe, the duck, which are all carnivorous, as are alſo the eagle, the ſparrow-hawk, and the owl, they all lay and hatch a great number of eggs; a circumſtance never known of the pigeon, the dove, or thoſe other birds which eat nothing but grain. Theſe rarely lay and hatch more than two eggs at a time. The reaſon for this difference may be, that thoſe animals who ſubſiſt altogether on plants and herbs, being obliged to ſpend the greater part of the day in foraging, and thus requiring a great deal of time to feed themſelves, it would be impoſſible for them to give ſuck to many young ones; whereas carnivorous animals making their meal in a minute or two, may with greater eaſe and frequency go and come between their young and their prey, repairing the waſte of ſo great a quantity of milk. Many other obſervations and reflections might be made with propriety on this head; but this is not the place for them: it is alſo ſufficient for my purpoſe that I have, in this part of my performance, pointed out the moſt general ſyſtem of nature, a ſyſtem which affords a new reaſon for removing man from the claſs of carnivorous to that of frugivorous animals.

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(9.) A celebrated author, in calculating the good and evil of human life, and comparing the the ſums total of our pains and pleaſures, hath diſcovered that the firſt greatly exceeded the laſt; ſo that, every thing conſidered, human life is no ſuch valuable gift. I am not ſurpriſed at theſe concluſions; as this writer drew his arguments from a view of man in his civilized ſtate. Had he taken a retroſpect to him in a ſtate of nature, it is plain the reſult of his inquiries would have been very different, and that man would have appeared to him ſubject to very few evils but thoſe of his own creating; to the exculpation of nature. It hath coſt us not a little to make ourſelves ſo miſerable as we are. When we conſider, on the one hand, the immenſe labours of mankind, the many ſciences brought to perfection, the arts invented, the powers employed, the deeps filled up, the mountains levelled, the rocks torn aſunder, the rivers made navigable, the tracts of land cleared, lakes emptied, marſhes drained, enormous ſtructures erected on land, and the floating caſtles that cover the ſea; and, on the other hand, eſtimate with ever ſo little attention the real advantages that have accrued from all theſe works to mankind, we cannot help ſtanding amazed at the vaſt diſproportion there is between theſe things, and deploring the infatuation of man, which, to gratify his ſilly pride and I know not what ſelf-admiration, induces him eagerly to purſue all the miſeries he is capable of feeling, and which beneficent nature had kindly placed at a diſtance from him.

Men are actually wicked; deplorable and conſtant experience renders any argument to prove this unneceſſary: man, however, is naturally good; this I think I have demonſtrated. What can have depraved him then to ſuch a degree, except the changes that have happened in his conſtitution, his improvements, and the knowledge he hath acquired? We may affect to admire the oeconomy of ſociety as we pleaſe; it will not be the leſs true that it neceſſarily leads men to hate each other in proportion as their intereſts claſh; or that it induces men to do each other apparent ſervices, while they are really doing each other all imaginable miſchief. What can be thought of a commerce, in which the intereſt of every individual dictates maxims directly oppoſite to thoſe which the public good determines to be for the intereſt of the community in general; a commerce in which every man finds his account in the miſfortunes of his neighbour? There is not perhaps any man in eaſy, or opulent, circumſtances, whoſe death his avaricious heirs, and perhaps his children, do not ſecretly wiſh for; not a ſhip at ſea, whoſe loſs would not be good news to ſome merchant or other; not a houſe, which ſome debtor would not be glad to ſee reduced to aſhes with all the papers it contains; not a nation which does not rejoice at the diſaſters that befal its neighbours. Thus it is that we find our advantage in the miſfortunes of our fellow-creatures, and that the loſs of one man almoſt always conſtitutes the proſperity of another. But what is ſtill more pernicious, public calamities are ever the objects of the hopes and expectations of particular perſons. Some wiſh

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for ſickneſs, others for mortality, ſome for war, and ſome for famine. I have ſeen men wicked enough to weep for ſorrow at the appearance of a plentiful ſeaſon; and the great and fatal fire of London, which coſt ſo many unhappy perſons their lives or their fortunes, proved the making of the fortunes perhaps of above ten thouſand other perſons. I know, that Montaigne cenſures Demades the Athenian, for having cauſed an artiſan to be puniſhed, who, ſelling his coffins very dear, was thereby a great gainer by the deaths of his fellow-citizens; but the reaſon alledged by Montaigne would argue for every man's being puniſhed, and tends to confirm my argument. Let us penetrate, therefore, the ſuperficial appearances of benevolence, and take a ſurvey of what paſſes in the inmoſt receſſes of the heart. Let us reflect on what muſt neceſſarily be the ſtate of things, in which men are forced to careſs and injure each other at the ſame time; and in which they are born enemies by duty, and knaves by intereſt. It will be objected perhaps, that ſociety is ſo formed that every man is a gainer by ſerving the reſt. It may be ſo, but does he not gain ſtill more by injuring them? There is no lawful profit ſo great, but it may be greatly exceeded by what may be made unlawfully; for we always gain more by hurting our neighbours than by doing them good. Nothing more is required than for us to know how to act with impunity; and to this end the powerful employ all their force, and the weak all their cunning.

Savage man, when he has dined, is at peace with all nature, and the friend of all his fellow-creatures. If a diſpute ſhould ever happen a-

bout a meal; he rarely comes to blows, without having firſt compared the difficulty of conquering his antagoniſts, with the trouble of finding ſubſiſtence elſewhere; and, as pride has no ſhare in the ſcuffle, it ends in a few blows; the victor eats, and the vanquiſhed ſeeks his proviſion in ſome other place, and all is quiet. The caſe is quite different with man in a ſtate of ſociety; for whom neceſſaries are firſt to be provided, then ſuperfluities; delicacies next follow, then wealth, then ſubjects, and then ſlaves. He enjoys not the leaſt relaxation: but, what is moſt extraordinary, the leſs natural and preſſing his wants are, the more headſtrong are his paſſions, and, what is ſtill worſe, the more he has it in his power to gratify them; ſo that after a long ſeries of proſperity, after having ſwallowed up treaſures and ruined multitudes, the hero cloſes the ſcene by cutting every throat till he finds himſelf at laſt ſole maſter of an empty world. Such is in miniature the moral picture, if not of human life, at leaſt of the ſecret pretenſions of civilized man.

Compare without partiality the ſtate of the citizen with that of the ſavage, and trace out, if you can, how many inlets the former hath opened to pain and death, beſides thoſe of his vices, his wants, and his misfortunes. If you reflect on the mental afflictions that prey on us, the violent paſſions that waſte us, the exceſſive labour with which the poor are burdened, the ſtill more dangerous indolence in which the wealthy are immerſed, and which bring the one to the grave through want, and the other thro' exceſs: reflect but a moment on the heterogeneous

ous mixture, and pernicious manner of ſeaſoning ſo many kinds of food; the corrupt ſtate in which they are frequently uſed; on the adulteration of medicines, the tricks of thoſe who vend and the miſtake of thoſe who adminiſter them, with the poiſonous qualities of the veſſels in which they are prepared: think but ſeriouſly on the epidemic diſeaſes bred by foul air in conſequence of great numbers of men being crowded together, or thoſe occaſioned by our delicate method of living, by our alternate tranſitions from the cloſeſt parts of our houſes into the open air, by the putting on or throwing off our clothes with too little precaution, and by all thoſe conveniences which a boundleſs ſenſuality hath converted into neceſſary habits, and the neglect of which ſometimes coſts us our life or health: take note of the conflagrations and earthquakes, which, devouring or overwhelming whole cities, deſtroy the wretched inhabitants by thouſands: ſum up, in fine, the dangers with which theſe cauſes are always attended; and you will then ſee how dearly nature makes us pay for the contempt with which we have treated her dictates.

I ſhall not here repeat what I have elſewhere ſaid of the calamities of war; but wiſh that thoſe who have ſufficient knowledge for that purpoſe, were willing or bold enough to oblige us with a detail of the villanies committed in armies by the contractors for ſubſiſtence and hoſpitals, we ſhould ſee plainly that their monſtrous frauds, already too well known, are the occaſion of greater deſtruction among the ſoldiers than is the ſword of the enemy; and that to ſuch a degree as to make whole armies vaniſh,

niſh, as it were inſtantaneouſly, from the face of the earth.

The number of people who periſh annually at ſea, by famine, the ſcurvy, pirates, and ſhipwrecks, affords matter for another ſhocking calculation. Beſides, we are to place to the account of the eſtabliſhment of property, and of conſequence to the inſtitution of ſociety, the aſſaſſinations, poiſonings, robberies on the highway, and even the puniſhments inflicted on the wretches guilty of theſe crimes; which, though expedient to prevent greater evils, yet, by making the murder of one man prove the death of two, doubles the loſs of the human ſpecies.

What ſhameful methods are ſometimes practiſed to prevent the birth of men, and put a cheat on nature; either by ſuch brutal and depraved appetites as debaſe her moſt beautiful work; appetites unkown to ſavages or to mere animals, and which can ſpring only from the corrupt imagination of mankind in civilized countries; or by ſecret abortions, the effects of debauchery and vitiated notions of honour; or by multitudes of infants falling victims to the poverty of their parents, or the cruel baſhfulneſs of their mothers; or in fine, by the mutilation of unhappy wretches, part of whoſe being, with that of poſterity, is given up for an idle ſong, or, what is ſtill worſe, the brutal jealouſy of other men; a mutilation which, in the laſt caſe, becomes a double outrage againſt nature, from the treatment of thoſe who ſuffer it, and by the ſervices to which they are deſtined. What if I ſhould undertake to ſhew human-kind attacked in its very ſource, and even its moſt ſacred ties;

in forming which, fortune is conſulted before nature; while the diſorder of ſociety confounding all virtue and vice, continence becomes a criminal precaution, and a refuſal to give life to a fellow-creature, an act of humanity? But, without drawing aſide the veil, which ſerves to hide ſuch numerons horrors, let us content ourſelves with having pointed out the evil, to which others ought to apply the remedy.

To all this let us add, the multiplicity of unhealthy trades, which ſerve to abridge human life, or deſtroy the conſtitution of the body: ſuch as working in the mines, and the preparing of metals and minerals, particularly lead, copper, mercury, cobalt, and arſenic: as alſo thoſe other pernicious occupations which are daily ſo fatal to tylers, carpenters, maſons, and miners: let us unite, I ſay, all theſe objects; and then we may ſee, in the eſtabliſhment and perfection of ſocieties, the reaſons of that diminution of our ſpecies which has been ſo frequently obſerved by the philoſophers.

Luxury, impoſſible to be prevented among men tenacious of their own conveniences and of the reſpect paid them by others, preſently completes the evil which ſociety had begun; and under the pretence of giving bread to the poor, whom it ſhould never have made ſuch, impoveriſhes all the reſt, and ſooner or later depopulates the ſtate. Luxury is a remedy much worſe than the diſeaſe it pretends to cure; or rather it is in itſelf the greateſt of all evils, to every ſtate, whether great or ſmall: for, in order to maintain that number of ſervants and vagabonds it creates, it brings oppreſſion and ruin on the citizen and labourer; juſt as thoſe ſcorch-

ſcorching winds, which covering the trees and plants with devouring inſects, deprive uſeful animals of their ſubſiſtence, ſpreading famine and death wherever they blow.

From ſociety, and the luxury it gives birth to, ariſe the liberal and mechanic arts, commerce, letters, and all thoſe ſuperfluities which make induſtry flouriſh, enrich and ruin nations. The reaſon of ſuch deſtruction is very plain. It is eaſy to ſee, from the very nature of agriculture, that it muſt be the leaſt lucrative of all the arts; becauſe its produce being moſt univerſally neceſſary, the price of it muſt be proportioned to the abilities of the very pooreſt of mankind.

From the ſame principle may be deduced this rule, that the arts in general are the more lucrative in proportion as they are leſs uſeful; and that, in the end, the moſt uſeful becomes the moſt neglected. From all which we may learn to form a judgment of the real advantages of induſtry and the actual effects of its progreſs.

Such are the palpable cauſes of all the miſeries into which opulence at length plunges the moſt celebrated nations. In proportion as arts and induſtry flouriſh, the ſlighted huſbandman, burdened with the taxes neceſſary to the ſupport of luxury, and deſtined to paſs his days between labour and hunger, forſakes his native field, to ſeek that bread in town which he ought to carry thither. The more our capital cities ſtrike the vulgar eye with admiration, the greater reaſon is there to lament the ſight of large tracts of land that lie uncultivated, of the roads crowded with unfortunate citizens turned beggars or high-

highwaymen, and doomed to end their wretched lives either on a dunghil or at the gallows. It is thus the ſtate grows rich on the one hand, and grows feeble and is depopulated on the other; the mightieſt monarchies, after having taken immenſe pains to enrich and depopulate themſelves, falling at laſt a prey to ſome poor nation, which hath yielded to the fatal temptation of invading them, and then, growing opulent and weak in its turn, is itſelf invaded and ruined by ſome other.

Let any body condeſcend to inform us, what could produce thoſe ſwarms of barbarians, which over-ran Europe, Aſia, and Africa, during ſo many ages. Was their prodigious increaſe owing to the induſtry of their arts, the wiſdom of their laws, or the excellency of their police? Let the learned tell us why, inſtead of multiplying to ſo great a degree, theſe fierce and brutal men, without ſenſe or ſcience, without education, without reſtraint, did not deſtroy each other hourly in quarrelling for the ſpontaneous productions of their fields and woods. Let them tell us how theſe wretches could have the preſumption to oppoſe men trained up to military diſcipline, and poſſeſſed of ſuch excellent legal inſtitutions: why, in fine, ſince ſociety hath been brought to perfection in the more northern climates, and ſo much pains have been taken to inſtruct their inhabitants in their ſocial duties, we ſee thoſe countries no longer produce ſuch numberleſs hoſts, which they formerly uſed to ſend forth to the plague and terror of other nations. I am apprehenſive ſomebody may at laſt anſwer me, by ſaying, that all theſe fine things, viz. arts, ſciences, and laws, were wiſe-

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ly invented by men, as a ſalutary plague, to prevent the too great multiplication of mankind, leſt the world, which hath been given us for an habitation, ſhould in time be found too little for its inhabitants.

What, then, is to be done? Muſt ſocieties be totally aboliſhed, muſt *meum* and *tuum* be annihilated, and muſt we return again to the foreſts to live among bears? A conſequence this, in the manner of my adverſaries; which I had as lieve anticipate as let them have the ſcandal to draw. O ye, by whom the voice of heaven hath not been heard, who think man is deſtined only to live and die in peace; ye who may be able to reſign, in the midſt of populous cities, your fatal acquiſitions, your reſtleſs ſpirits, your corrupt hearts and endleſs deſires; do you reſume, ſince it depends entirely on yourſelves, your ancient and primitive innocence: retire to the woods, there to loſe the ſight and remembrance of the crimes of your cotemporaries; nor be apprehenſive of degrading your ſpecies, by renouncing its improvements in order to renounce its vices. With regard to men like me, whoſe paſſions have deſtroyed their original ſimplicity, who can no longer ſubſiſt on plants or acorns, or live without laws and magiſtrates; thoſe who were honoured in their firſt parents with ſupernatural inſtructions; who diſcover, in the deſign of giving at firſt a morality to human actions which they muſt otherwiſe have been ſo long in acquiring, the reaſon of a precept in itſelf indifferent and inexplicable by every other ſyſtem; thoſe, in fine, who are perſuaded that the divine Being hath called all mankind to be partakers of the happineſs and perfection of ce-

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leſtial intelligences, all theſe will endeavour to merit the eternal prize they are to expect from the practice of thoſe virtues, to which they oblige themſelves in learning to diſtinguiſh them. They will reſpect the ſacred bonds of their reſpective communities; will love their fellow-citizens, and ſerve them with all their might: they will pay a religious obſervance to the laws, and all thoſe who make or adminiſter them; they will particularly do honour to thoſe wiſe and good princes, who diſcover means to prevent, cure, or even palliate, the crowd of evils and abuſes with which we are conſtantly threatened; they will animate the zeal of their deſerving chiefs, by ſhewing them, without flattery or fear, the importance of their office and the ſeverity of their duty. But they will not therefore have leſs contempt for a conſtitution, which cannot ſupport itſelf without the aid of ſo many reſpectable characters, who are much oftener wiſhed for than obtained; and from which, notwithſtanding all their pains and ſolicitude, there always ariſe more real calamities than even apparent advantages.

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(10.) Among the different ſpecies of men we are acquainted with, either from the information of hiſtory, or the relations of travellers; ſome are black, others white, and others red; ſome wear long hair, others have on their heads only wool; ſome again are in a manner covered all over with hair, while others have not ſo much as a beard. There have been, and doubtleſs ſtill are, whole nations of people of a gigantic ſize. As to the ſtory of the pigmies, I ſhall not

inſiſt upon it, as it may be an exaggeration; but it is known of a certainty, that the Laplanders, and eſpecially the inhabitants of Greenland, are greatly below the middle ſtature: it is even pretended that there are nations with tails like quadrupeds; and, without pinning our faith on Herodotus and Cteſias, we may at leaſt draw this probable concluſion from their relations, that if good obſervations could have been made in thoſe early times, when the cuſtoms and manners of mankind differed more than they do at preſent, ſtill greater diverſities would have appeared in the figure and habit of their bodies. Theſe facts, of which inconteſtable proof may be given, can only aſtoniſh thoſe who never conſider any objects but ſuch as immediately ſurround them, and are ſtrangers to the powerful influence of different modes of life, climate, air, food, and above all the ſurpriſing effects of the ſame cauſes when acting continually on a ſucceſſion of generations.

In our day, when commerce, navigation, and conqueſts, have more generally united the different inhabitants of the earth, and their cuſtoms daily acquire a greater reſemblance to each other in conſequence of a more frequent intercourſe, there has been a great diminution of national differences. It is plain, for inſtance, that the modern French are very unlike thoſe light-haired, fair-ſkinned bodies deſcribed by the Latin hiſtorians, though it might be imagined, that time, aided by the mixture of Franks and Normans equally fair, ſhould have reſtored what the climate might have loſt, by the frequent viſitation of the Romans, of its influence over the natural conſtitution and complexion of the inhabitants.

habitants. Theſe obſervations on the diverſities, which a multitude of cauſes may produce, and in effect have produced, in the human ſpecies, have led me to doubt whether ſeveral animals, which travellers for want of properly examining them have taken for beaſts, on account of ſome difference in their external form, or merely becauſe they wanted ſpeech, were not, after all, real men in a ſavage ſtate; whoſe race being early diſperſed in the woods, never had any developement of their faculties, but ſtill remained in their primitive ſtate of nature. To give an example of what I am ſaying. The tranſlator of the *Hiſtory of Voyages, &c.* tells us, that there are found in the kingdom of Congo, a great number of thoſe large animals called, in the Eaſt Indies, Orang-Outang; forming a kind of middle order of beings between men and baboons. Battel relates, that in the foreſts of Mayomba in the kingdom of Loango, there are two ſorts of monſters, the biggeſt of which are called Pongos and the other Enjokos. The former, ſays he, are exactly like men, but much larger and taller. Their face is human, but hath very hollow eyes. Their hands, cheeks, and ears, are quite bare of hair to their eye-brows, which are very long. The other parts of their bodies are pretty hairy, and the hair is of a brown colour. In fine, the only thing, by which they can be diſtinguiſhed from the human ſpecies, is the form of their legs, which have no calves. They walk erect, holding the hair of their neck in their hands. They reſide in the woods, where they ſleep in the trees, making a kind of roof over them to ſkreen them from the rain. They never meddle with animal fleſh, but live on

nuts and other wild fruits. The negroes, who, in travelling through foreſts, uſually light fires in the night time, remark, that, as ſoon as they ſet off in the morning, the Pongos gather about the fire and ſtay there till it goes out; for, though theſe animals are very dexterous on ſome occaſions, they have not wit enough to keep the fire in by ſupplying it with freſh fuel.

"They march ſometimes in companies, and kill the negroes who traverſe the foreſts. They even attack the elephants that come to feed near their haunts, and belabour them ſo heartily with fiſts and ſticks, that they make them roar and put them to flight. The Pongos when full grown are never taken alive; for they are then ſo robuſt, that ten ordinary men would not be able to manage one of them. The negroes, however, ſometimes take the young ones after killing their mother; to whoſe body they cling ſurpriſingly faſt. When one of theſe animals dies, the others cover the body with an heap of leaves or branches of trees. Purchaſs adds, that in the converſation he had with Battel, he was told by him, that a Pongo carried off from him a little negro, who ſtayed a whole month among theſe creatures; for it ſeems they do no harm to their captives, provided they do not look at them, as the little negro obſerved. Battel has not deſcribed the ſecond kind of monſter.

"Dapper confirms, that the kingdom of Congo is full of thoſe animals which in India are called Orang Outang, or the inhabitants of the woods, and which the Africans call Quojas Morros. This creature, ſays he, bears ſo near a reſemblance to man, that ſome travellers have been fooliſh enough to think it might proceed from

from a woman and a monkey; a chimerical notion, exploded even among the negroes. One of these animals was formerly brought over from Congo to Holland, and presented to Frederick Henry, then Prince of Orange. It was about as tall as a child three years old, moderately corpulent, but square-built and well-proportioned; very active and lively; its legs strong and thick; the fore-part of the body without hair, and all the back-part covered with hair of a black colour. At first sight, its face resembled that of a man, but its nose was flat and snubbed; its ears were like those of the human species; its breasts, for it was a female, were full, its navel indented, its shoulders well hung, its hands divided into fingers and thumbs, and the calves of its legs and its heels plump and fleshy. She often walked erect, and could raise and carry burdens not over heavy. When she drank, she took hold of the lid of the vessel with one hand, and of the bottom with the other; wiping her mouth, after drinking, very decently. She lay down, with her head on a cushion, to sleep; covering herself up with so much dexterity, that one would think it was an human creature in bed. The negroes tell very strange stories of this animal; assuring us that the male will not only ravish women and girls, but that he hath the courage to attack even men though they are armed: in a word, there is a great appearance that this is the satyr of the ancients. Perhaps Merolla speaks of these very animals, when he says that the negroes sometimes catch wild men and women when they go a-hunting."

In the third volume of the same history of voyages, mention is made also of this species of

anthropoform animals, under the name of Beggos and Mandrils. But to confine ourſelves to the foregoing relations; there is, in the deſcription of theſe pretended monſters, a ſtriking conformity in ſome particulars with the human ſpecies, and ſtill more minute differences than are ſometimes to be found between individuals among mankind. It does not appear from theſe paſſages, what reaſons the authors might have for refuſing the appellation of wild men to the animals in queſtion. But we may gueſs it was on account of their ſtupidity and want of ſpeech; weak arguments with thoſe who know that ſpeech itſelf is not natural to man whatever its organs it may be, and who are aware that the capacity of improvement in the human ſpecies may have raiſed civilized man infinitely above his original condition. The few words beſtowed on the above deſcriptions is ſufficient alſo to ſhew with what prejudice they have been obſerved, and how ſuperficially they have been examined. For inſtance, they are repreſented as monſters, and at the ſame time it is admitted they propagate their ſpecies. Battel ſays, in one place, that "the Pongos kill the negroes they meet in the woods." Purchaſs ſays, in another, that "they do them no harm provided the negroes do not look at them too intently." "The Pongos, ſays he, gather about the fires lighted by the negroes, when the latter leave it; and leave it themſelves in their turn, when it goes out." This is the fact; obſerve the comment—"for, with all their dexterity, they have not wit enough to keep the fire in by ſupplying it with fuel." By what means did Battel, or his compiler Purchaſs, know that the Pongos retired

retired rather out of ſtupidity than out of inclination? In ſuch a climate as that of Loango, animals can ſtand in little need of fire; and, if the negroes make fires, it is not ſo much with a view to warm themſelves, as to frighten and keep at a diſtance the wild beaſts with which the country abounds. It were but natural in the Pongos, therefore, after having amuſed themſelves for ſome time with the blaze, or warmed themſelves ſufficiently, to grow tired of ſtanding ſtill in the ſame place, and to return to their buſineſs of procuring ſuſtenance; which conſiſting of fruits, would require a larger time, as before obſerved, than the fleſh of animals. It is beſides well known, that moſt animals, and even man himſelf, are naturally indolent; and give themſelves no trouble about any thing they can make ſhift without. It ſeems, on the whole, very ſtrange, that the Pongos, whoſe ſtrength and addreſs are ſo much boaſted, who know how to bury their dead, and to make themſelves awnings with leaves and branches, ſhould not know how to keep up a wood-fire by puſhing the half-burnt ſticks into it. I myſelf remember to have ſeen a monkey do the ſame thing which Battel and Purchaſs will not admit that a Pongo has ſenſe enough to do. It is certain, that not having then a turn for ſuch kind of obſervation, I committed the very fault for which I am now cenſuring the travellers: for I neglected to examine whether the monkey's deſign was to keep up the fire, or whether he acted only in mere imitation of thoſe he had ſeen do the ſame thing. Be this, however, as it may, it is plain the monkey does not belong to the human ſpecies; not

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only becauſe he wants the faculty of ſpeech; but principally becauſe his ſpecies is incapable of improvement, a capacity for which is the ſpecific characteriſtic of the human ſpecies. Now it does not appear that the ſame experiments have been made on the Pongos and the Orang-Outang, with care enough to furniſh the ſame concluſion. There is indeed a method, by which the moſt illiterate obſervers might come at the certain knowledge, whether the Orang-Outang or ſuch other animals are of the human ſpecies: but a ſingle generation would not be ſufficient for ſuch an experiment. It muſt be looked upon as impracticable alſo, becauſe it is requiſite, that what is now only a ſuppoſition ſhould be proved a fact, before the experiment neceſſary to aſcertain the reality of it could be innocently made.

Haſty inferences, and ſuch as are not the effects of an enlightened underſtanding, are apt to be carried too far. Our modern travellers make beaſts, under the names of Pongos, Mandrils, and Orang-Outang, of the very beings which the ancients exalted into deities under the title of ſatyrs, fauns, and ſylvans. More exact inveſtigations will poſſibly ſhew them to have been men. It ſeems to me, in the mean time, to be full as reaſonable to confide in the account given us by Merolla, a learned eccleſiaſtic, an ocular witneſs, and who with great candour was alſo a man of genius, as in that of Battel a mere merchant, or thoſe of Dapper, Purchaſs, and others, who were mere compilers.

What would ſuch obſervers have ſaid of the child diſcovered in 1699, of which I have before ſpoken? He ſhewed not the leaſt marks of reaſon,

ſon, walked upon his hands and feet, had no articulate ſpeech, but uttered ſounds totally unlike the human voice. He was for a conſiderable time (ſays the naturaliſt, from whom I take this account) incapable of ſpeaking any more than a very few words, and thoſe in a barbarous and imperfect manner. As ſoon as he could ſpeak intelligibly, he was aſked about his primitive ſituation; but of this he remembered no more than we do of what happened to us in the cradle. Had this child had the misfortune to have fallen into the hands of our travellers, they would have regarded only his ſilence and ſtupidity; and thence have either turned him looſe again into the woods, or have ſhut him up in ſome menagery; publiſhing a very learned account of him, as of a very curious beaſt not very much unlike a man.

The inhabitants of Europe have, for three or four centuries paſt, been employed in running over the other parts of the world, and are conſtantly publiſhing new collections of voyages; I am nevertheleſs of opinion, that the people of Europe are the only men upon earth we are as yet well acquainted with. Nay, to judge from the ridiculous prepoſſeſſions which prevail to this day among men of letters, very few of them mean any thing more, by the pompous title of the *ſtudy of mankind*, than the ſtudy of their own countrymen. Particular perſons may go and come as they will, modern philoſophy appears to be no traveller, and thus that of one nation is very ſuitable to another. The cauſe of this is manifeſt, at leaſt with regard to countries far diſtant. There are but four kinds of people who make long voyages; theſe are ſea-

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men, merchants, ſoldiers, and miſſionaries. Now it is hardly to be expected that the three firſt ſhould be very good obſervers; and with reſpect to the laſt, even were they not, like the reſt, ſubject to the prejudices of their occupation, we may conceive they are too much taken up by the immediate duties of their ſublime vocation, to deſcend to engage in reſearches which may ſeem calculated merely to gratity curioſity, and which would interfere with the important labours to which they are devoted. Beſides, in order to preach the goſpel with ſucceſs, zeal alone is ſufficient, the grace of God does all the reſt; but to ſtudy mankind with ſucceſs, talents are requiſite, which God hath not engaged to beſtow on any man, and which do not always fall to the ſhare even of the ſaints. We can hardly open a book of voyages without meeting with ſome deſcription of characters and manners; but it muſt ſeem ſurpriſing that theſe travellers, who deſcribe ſuch a multiplicity of things, ſay hardly any thing that every reader is is not previouſly acquainted with; and that they had not ſenſe enough to obſerve more at the other end of the world than they might have done without going the length of a ſtreet; while the really diſtinguiſhing features of nations, which muſt ſtrike every judicious eye, have almoſt always eſcaped them. Hence comes that notable adage, ſo hackneyed by the philoſophers, That men of all countries are the ſame; and thus having every-where the ſame paſſions and the ſame vices, it is uſeleſs to endeavour to characterize different nations: a method of reaſoning this, little better than if we were to conclude it is impoſſible to diſtinguiſh between Peter and James,

James, becauſe they have each a mouth, a noſe, and a pair of eyes.

Will thoſe happy times never return, in which the populace did not preſume to philoſophiſe; but when a Plato, a Thales, and a Pythagoras, excited by the deſire of knowledge, undertook the longeſt voyages merely for the ſake of information, and viſited the remoteſt parts of the earth, to throw off the yoke of national prejudice, to learn to diſtinguiſh men by the actual conformity and difference between them, and gain that general inſight into nature, which belongs not to any one age or country excluſive of others, but, being co-exiſtent with every time and place, forms as it were the common ſcience of the wiſe?

We admire the magnificence of thoſe curious perſons, who have themſelves travelled at a great expence, or have ſent others to the eaſt, accompanied by men of letters and painters to take drawings of ruins, and to decypher or copy inſcriptions; but I can hardly conceive how it is, that in an age wherein uſeful and polite literature are ſo much affected, there are not two men properly connected and rich, the one in money and the other in genius, both fond of glory and aſpiring after immortality; one of which ſhould be willing to ſacrifice twenty thouſand crowns of his fortune, and the other ten years of his life, to make a juſtly celebrated voyage round the world: not to confine their obſervations, in ſuch voyage, to plants and minerals, but for once to ſtudy men and manners, and, after ſo many ages ſpent in meaſuring and ſurveying the houſe, to make themſelves really acquainted with thoſe who live in it.

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The academicians who viſited the northern parts of Europe and the ſouthern parts of America, had more in their view to do it as geometricians than as philoſophers. As they were both one and the other, however, we cannot look upon thoſe countries, which have been ſeen and deſcribed by a Condamine and a Maupertuis, as altogether unknown. Chardin, who travelled like Plato, has left nothing to be ſaid on the ſubject of Perſia; China ſeems to have been well obſerved by the Jeſuits. Kempfer gives a tolerable account of the little he ſaw in Japan. But except what we learn from theſe relations, we know nothing of the inhabitants of the Eaſt Indies: for though theſe countries are frequently viſited, it is by people much more intent on filling their pockets with money than their heads with uſeful knowledge. The whole continent of Africa and its numerous inhabitants, equally ſingular with regard both to character and colour, ſtill remain unexplored; the earth is indeed covered with nations of which we know nothing but the names; and yet we ſet up, truly, for judges of human kind!

Let us ſuppoſe that a Monteſquieu, a Buffon, a Diderot, a Duclos, a D'Alembert, a Condillac, or men of the like ſtamp, engaged in a voyage for the information of their countrymen, obſerving and deſcribing, in the manner they are capable of doing, the ſeveral countries of Turky, Egypt, Barbary, the empire of Morocco, Guinea, Caffraria, the inner parts and eaſtern ſhores of Africa, Malabar, the Mogul's country, the banks of the Ganges, the kingdoms of Siam, Pegu, and Iva, China, Tartary, and above all Japan; then, in the other hemiſphere, Mexico, Peru, Chili,

lio, Terra Magellanica, not omitting the real or imaginary Patagonians, Turcomania, and if poſſible Paraguay, Brazil, the Caribbee iſlands, Florida, and all the ſavage countries; the moſt important and difficult part of the whole voyage: let us ſuppoſe then that theſe new Herculeſes ſhould ſit down, at their return from thoſe famous expeditions, to compoſe, at leiſure, a phyſical, moral, and political hiſtory of all they had ſeen. A new world would undoubtedly riſe up before our eyes, and we might thence learn to form ſome tolerable judgment of our own. I ſay, that when ſuch obſervers ſhould affirm of one animal that it was a man, and of another that it was a brute, we ought to believe them; but it would be the higheſt inſtance of ſimplicity, to put the ſame confidence, with regard to theſe matters, in ſuch illiterate travellers, as would ſometimes ſuggeſt to us the very ſame doubt of themſelves as they take upon them to determine about other animals.

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(11.) This ſeems to be very evident, and I cannot conceive whence our philoſophers deduce all the paſſions they attribute to natural man. If we except the mere phyſical neceſſaries which nature immediately requires, all our wants are the effects of habit, which till we acquired we had no wants; or of our deſires; but we never deſire any thing we are not in circumſtances to know. It follows hence, that, as ſavage man deſires nothing but what he knows, and knows nothing but what he poſſeſſes or can readily acquire, nothing can be more calm and diſpaſſion-

ate than his ſoul, nor ſo limited as his underſtanding.

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(12.) In Mr Locke's treatiſe on civil government, I find one objection that appears too ſpecious to be here paſſed over. It is as follows: "§ 79. For the end of *conjunction between male and female*, being not barely procreation, but the continuation of the ſpecies; this conjunction betwixt male and female ought to laſt, even after procreation, ſo long as is neceſſary to the nouriſhment and ſupport of the young ones, who are to be ſuſtained by thoſe that got them, till they are able to ſhift and provide for themſelves. This rule, which the infinite wiſe Maker hath ſet to the works of his hands, we find the inferior creatures ſteadily obey. In thoſe viviparous animals which feed on graſs, the *conjunction between male and female* laſts no longer than the very act of copulation; becauſe the teat of the dam being ſufficient to nouriſh the young till it be able to feed on graſs, the male only begets, but concerns not himſelf for the male or young, to whoſe ſuſtenance he can contribute nothing. But in beaſts of prey the *conjunction* laſts longer: becauſe the dam not being able well to ſubſiſt herſelf, and nouriſh her numerous off-ſpring by her own prey alone, a more laborious as well as more dangerous way of living than by feeding on graſs, the aſſiſtance of the male is neceſſary to the maintenance of their common family, which cannot ſubſiſt till they are able to prey for themſelves, but by the joint care of male and female. The ſame is to be obſerved in all birds, (except ſome domeſtic

domeſtic ones, where plenty of food excuſes the cock from feeding and taking care of the young brood) whoſe young needing food in the neſt, the cock and hen continue mates till the young are able to uſe their wing and provide for themſelves.

"§ 80. And herein I think lies the chief, if not the only, reaſon, *why the male and female in mankind are tied to a longer conjunction* than other creatures, *viz.* becauſe the female is capable of conceiving, and *de facto* is commonly with child again, and brings forth too a new birth, long before the former is out of a dependency for ſupport on his parents help, and able to ſhift for himſelf, and has all the aſſiſtance is due to him from his parents: whereby the father, who is bound to take care for thoſe he hath begot, is under an obligation to continue in conjugal ſociety with the ſame woman longer than other creatures, whoſe young being able to ſubſiſt of themſelves before the time of procreation returns again, the conjugal bond diſſolves of itſelf, and they are at liberty, till *Hymen* at his uſual anniverſary ſeaſon ſummons them again to chuſe new mates. Wherein one cannot but admire the wiſdom of the great Creator, who having given to man foreſight, and an ability to lay up for the future, as well as to ſupply the preſent neceſſity, hath made it neceſſary, that *ſociety of man and wife ſhould be more laſting* than of male and female amongſt other creatures; that ſo their induſtry might be encouraged, and their intereſt better united, to make proviſion and lay up goods for their common iſſue, which uncertain mixture, or eaſy and frequent ſolutions of conjugal ſociety, would mightily diſturb."

The ſame love of truth, which induced me faithfully to exhibit this objection, leads me alſo to accompany it with a few remarks, if not to refute, at leaſt to contribute ſomething to its illuſtration.

1. I ſhall obſerve, in the firſt place, that moral arguments are of no great validity in phyſical diſputes; and that they ſerve rather to account for facts which exiſt, than to aſcertain the real exiſtence of facts themſelves. Now, ſuch is the ſpecies of argument made uſe of by Mr Locke in the paſſage above-quoted: for though it may be to the intereſt of mankind that the union between the male and female ſhould be permanent, it does by no means follow that ſuch an union was eſtabliſhed by nature; for otherwiſe it muſt be admitted, that nature inſtituted civil ſociety, arts, commerce, and every thing elſe pretended to be uſeful to mankind.

2. I know not where Mr Locke diſcovered, that among animals of prey the connection between the male and female laſts longer than among thoſe who ſubſiſt on graſs, and that the male aſſiſts the female in nurſing their young: we do not perceive that the dog, the cat, the bear, or the wolf, ſhew more regard to their females, than the horſe, the ram, the bull, the ſtag, or any other quadrupeds ſhew to theirs. It appears, on the contrary, that, if the aſſiſtance of the male were neceſſary to the female for the preſervation of their young, it would be particularly ſo among ſuch animals as ſubſiſt altogether on graſs; becauſe the females take up more time to feed in this way, and is obliged all the while to neglect her young; whereas a ſhe-bear or wolf devours her prey in a very ſhort time

time, and has therefore more to beſtow on the care of her litter, without ſuffering any thing from hunger. This remark is confirmed by the relative number of teats and of young ones that diſtinguiſhes the carnivorous from the frugivorous kinds, as hath been already obſerved in a preceding note. If this obſervation alſo be juſt and general, a woman's having but two breaſts, and ſeldom bearing more than one child at a time, affords another and a very ſtrong reaſon for doubting the human ſpecies to be naturally carnivorous: ſo that, in order to draw Mr Locke's concluſion, the terms of his argument ſhould be inverted. There ſeems to be as little validity in the ſame diſtinction when applied to birds: for who can conceive the connection between male and female is more laſting among vultures and ravens than among doves?

There are two kinds of domeſtic birds, *viz.* the duck and the pigeon, which afford us examples directly oppoſite to this writer's ſyſtem. The pigeon, who lives entirely upon corn, is ever conſtant to his female, and both feed their young ones in common. The drake, on the other hand, whoſe voracioufneſs is notorious, takes no care either of the young or their mother-duck. Among cocks and hens, who are not much leſs ravenous, the former are never known to trouble themſelves about eggs or chickens: and, if among ſome other ſpecies the male ſhares in the care of feeding the young, it is becauſe ſuch birds, being unable to fly as ſoon as hatched, cannot ſubſiſt ſo well without the aſſiſtance of the male, as quadrupeds, who, for ſome time at leaſt, are ſuckled by the female, and require nothing more.

3. There is much uncertainty in the principal fact which ſerves as the baſis of Mr Locke's argument: for, in order to know whether, as he pretends, woman in a ſtate of nature generally becomes pregnant, and brings forth a new child, long before the former is capable of providing for itſelf, ſome experiments are neceſſary to be made, which Mr Locke certainly had not made, and which nobody indeed is in a ſituation to make. The conſtant cohabitation of huſband and wife in a ſtate of ſociety, affords ſuch an occaſion for the latter to expoſe herſelf to a new pregnancy, that it is hardly likely accidental encounters or ſudden guſts of paſſion ſhould produce ſuch effects ſo frequently in a ſtate of nature, as in that of conjugal ſociety. This delay, however, would very probably contribute to render the children more robuſt; and would be at the ſame time compenſated for, by extending the ability of conception in women to a more advanced age, as they would the leſs abuſe it in their youth. As to children, there are many reaſons for concluding that their organs and abilities unfold themſelves later among us than they did in the primitive ſtate of man. The original imbecillity, which they derive from the weak conſtitution of their parents; the care taken to bind up, ſtrain, and cramp all their limbs; the tenderneſs with which they are treated; and perhaps their uſe of the milk of a woman that is not their mother; every thing, in ſhort, ſerves with us to oppoſe and check the firſt operations of nature. The application they are obliged to beſtow on various objects, to which we conſtantly direct their attention, while their corporeal faculties remain unexerciſed, may contribute

alſo

alſo much to retard their growth. So that if, inſtead of overcharging and perplexing their minds, we ſhould permit them to exerciſe their bodies in that continual motion which nature ſeems to require, it is probable they would be much ſooner capable of walking about and providing for themſelves.

4. In fine, the moſt that Mr Locke proves, is, that ſavage man might have a motive to live with a woman when ſhe had brought him a child; but he by no means proves that he had any inducement to live with her, before her delivery, during her nine months pregnancy: and if the pregnant woman ſhould come to be indifferent to the man by whom ſhe is pregnant during thoſe nine months, if ſhe ſhould even be entirely forgot by him, as is not improbable to ſuppoſe, why ſhould he aſſiſt her after her delivery? Why ſhould he aid her to rear a child which he does not know to be his, and whoſe birth he neither foreſaw nor intended? It is plain that Mr Locke has ſuppoſed the thing itſelf that was in queſtion; for we do not inquire why a man ſhould continue to live with a woman after her delivery, but why he ſhould continue attached to her after conception. When the appetite is once ſatisfied, the man ſtands no longer in need of any particular woman, nor the woman of any particular man. The latter troubles himſelf no more about what has happened, and perhaps hath not the leaſt notion of what muſt enſue. One of them goes one way, and the other another, in ſo much that there is little room to think that they ſhould remember at the end of nine months that they had ever ſeen each other before. For this kind of memory,

mory, by means of which one individual gives to another the preference for the act of generation, requires, as I have proved in the text, a greater degree of improvement or corruption of the human underſtanding, than man can be ſuppoſed to have attained in the ſtate of animality now in queſtion. Any other woman, therefore, may ſerve to gratify the new deſires of the man, as well as ſhe whom he hath before known; and in like manner, any other man may gratify thoſe of the woman, ſuppoſing her to be ſubject during her pregnancy to the ſame appetite; a circumſtance, however, that may be reaſonably queſtioned. And if the woman in a ſtate of nature does not feel the paſſion of love after conception, there is ſtill a greater obſtacle to her aſſociating with man, as ſhe has no longer any occaſion for the man by whom ſhe became pregnant, or indeed any other. There is therefore no motive on the ſide of the man for his coveting the ſame woman, nor on the woman's for coveting the ſame man. Mr Locke's argument therefore is defective, nor hath the logic of this philoſopher ſecured him from the miſtakes which Hobbes and others have committed.

Their buſineſs was to explain a fact in the ſtate of nature; that is, in a ſtate in which every man lived by himſelf without any connection with other men; a ſtate in which no one had any inducement to aſſociate with another, nor, what is worſe, mankind in general any inclination to herd together. It never ſuggeſted to them that they ſhould take a retroſpect beyond the commencement of ſociety; ſince which individuals had always a motive for aſſociating

ſociating with this or that particular man or woman.

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(13.) I ſhall beware of launching forth into thoſe philoſophical reflections, which may be made on the advantages and diſadvantages of the inſtitution of languages. It is not for ſuch men as me to think of being ſuffered to attack vulgar errors; the herd of men of letters are too fond of their prejudices to bear my pretended paradoxes with any kind of patience. I ſhall let thoſe ſpeak, therefore, in whom it hath not been deemed criminal to dare ſometimes to take part with common ſenſe againſt the opinion of the multitude. "Nec quidquam felicitati humani generis decederet, ſi, pulſa tot linguarum peſte et confuſione, unam artem callerent mortales, et ſignis, motibus, geſtibuſque licitum foret quidvis explicare. Nunc vero ita comparatum eſt, ut animalium quæ vulgo bruta creduntur, melior longe quam noſtra hac in parte videatur conditio, ut pote quæ promptius et forſan felicius, ſenſus et cogitationes ſuas ſine interprete ſignificent, quam ulli queant mortales, præſertim ſi peregrino utantur ſermone." *Iſ. Voſſius* de Pœmat. Cant. et Viribus Rythmi, p. 66.

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(14.) Plato, in ſhewing how far the ideas of diſcrete quantity and its relations are requiſite in the moſt inſignificant arts, ridicules thoſe authors of his age, and with great reaſon, who pretended that Palamedes invented numbers at the ſiege of Troy; as if it were poſſible, ſays he, that Agamemnon ſhould not know till then how many

many fingers or toes he had. In effect, every one muſt ſee how impoſſible it was that ſociety and the arts ſhould have attained that degree of perfection at which they certainly were arrived at the time of that celebrated ſiege, unleſs mankind had been acquainted with the uſe of numbers and calculation. But the neceſſity of underſtanding numbers, previous to the acquiſition of other ſciences, does not aſſiſt us to account for the invention of them. When the names of numbers are once known, it is eaſy to explain the meaning of them, and to excite the ideas their names preſent; but in order to invent them, it was neceſſary, previous to the conception of theſe ideas, that the mind of man ſhould have been in a manner familiarized with philoſophical ſpeculations, and ſhould have exerciſed itſelf in conſidering beings purely according to their eſſence, and independently of its perceptions: an abſtract mode of thinking very difficult and metaphyſical, not to ſay in ſome meaſure unnatural; without which, notwithſtanding, theſe ideas could never have been communicated from one mind to another, nor numbers ever have become univerſal.

A ſavage might ſeparately conſider his right leg and his left leg, or look upon them together under the indiviſible idea of a pair, without ever thinking he had two; for the repreſentative idea which deſcribes an object to us is one thing, and the numerical idea which determines it another. He would be ſtill leſs able to count as far as five; and tho', on the application of his hands to each other, he might remark that the fingers exactly anſwered, yet he might be very far from thinking on their numerical quality. He knew as little about the num-

number of his fingers as of his hairs; and if, after giving him to underſtand what numbers are, any one had told him that he had no more fingers than toes, he would in all probability have been greatly ſurpriſed to find, on comparing them, that they were exactly equal in number.

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(15.) We ſhould not confound ſelfiſhneſs with ſelf-love; as they are two very diſtinct paſſions both in their nature and effects. Self-love is a natural ſentiment, which inclines every animal to regard its own preſervation; and which, when directed by reaſon and qualified by compaſſion, is productive of humanity and virtue. Selfiſhneſs is a relative and factitious ſentiment, formed in the midſt of ſociety, and inclining individuals to ſet a greater value on themſelves than upon other men; a ſentiment which excites men to all the miſchief they do to each other, and is the true ſource of modern honour.

This being well underſtood, I proceed to affirm that ſelfiſhneſs does not exiſt in a primitive ſtate of nature; for every man in particular conſidering himſelf as the only perſon by whom he is obſerved, as the only being in the univerſe intereſted in him, as the only judge of his own merit, it is not poſſible that he ſhould entertain a ſentiment ariſing from compariſons he has it not in his power to make. A man of this kind muſt, for the ſame reaſon, be a ſtranger to malice and hatred, paſſions which the notion of our having ſuffered ſome inſult can only excite. As it is contempt alſo, or an intent to injure, and not the injury itſelf, that conſtitutes an affront,

front, thoſe men, who know not how to ſet a value on themſelves, or enter into a compariſon with each other, may do one another a great deal of miſchief, as often as they can hope any advantage from it, without ever affronting each other. In a word, every man in a ſtate of nature, ſeldom looking upon his fellows in any other light than he would animals of a different ſpecies, may rob and plunder another man if weaker than himſelf, or be plundered in his turn by another that is ſtronger, without conſidering ſuch acts of violence in any other light than as natural events, without the leaſt ſenſe of reſentment or malice, and without any other paſſion than grief or joy at his good or ill ſucceſs.

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(16.) It is a thing very remarkable, that, although the Europeans have been endeavouring, for ſo many years paſt, to bring over the ſavages of different parts of the world to our manner of living, we have not been able as yet to prevail on one of them; not even with the aſſiſtance of the motives of Chriſtianity; for it is certain, that tho' our miſſionaries have converted ſavages into Chriſtians, they never have been able to civilize them. There is no poſſibility of ſurmounting their invincible reluctance to our cuſtoms and manners. But if theſe poor people are really ſo unhappy as ſome repreſent them, by what unaccountable depravity is it that they ſo obſtinately refuſe to ſubmit to our government, or to live happy among us? Whereas we read frequently of Frenchmen and other Europeans, who have voluntarily taken refuge and ſpent the remainder of

of their lives among ſavages, without being able to quit them. Nay, we have inſtances of very ſenſible miſſionaries, that have with tears regretted the calm and innocent days they had ſpent among the ſimple mortals we ſo much deſpiſe. If it be objected that they have not underſtanding enough to judge properly of the difference of conditions, I reply, that happineſs is not ſo properly eſtimated by the underſtanding as by the heart. Beſides, this objection may be retorted with greater force on ourſelves; for our notions are far more remote from the diſpoſition of mind neceſſary for us to taſte the reliſh which the ſavages find in their way of life, than their notions are from thoſe by which they may enter into the reliſh we find in ours. In fact, it is eaſy for them to ſee, after a very few obſervations, that all our endeavours are employed on two objects, *viz.* on the conveniences of life, and the reſpect paid us by others. But, how ſhall we be able to conceive that kind of pleaſure, which a ſavage finds in ſpending his time in ſolitude, in the woods, in fiſhing, or in blowing into a wretched flute, without being able to make it ſound a note, or taking any trouble to learn better?

There have been ſavages frequently brought to Paris, London, and other places; and no pains ſpared to inſtil into them ſublime ideas of our luxury, our wealth, and uſeful and curious arts; they were never ſeen, however, to expreſs any thing more than a ſtupid admiration of thoſe things, without the leaſt appearance of coveting them. I remember, among other circumſtances related of the chief of ſome American Indians who was about thirty years ago in London, a

number of things were ſhewn him, in order to ſee what preſent might be acceptable to him, but without fixing upon any thing he happened to like. Our arms ſeemed clumſy and inconvenient; our ſhoes hurt his feet; our clothes incumbered his limbs; he would in ſhort accept of nothing: at length, however, he was obſerved to fix his eye on a blanket, which he wrapped with a ſeeming pleaſure over his ſhoulders. On this, the people about him remarked that he muſt allow this to be an uſeful piece of furniture. Yes, replied the Indian, it ſeems to me almoſt as good as the ſkin of a beaſt. Not that he would have allowed even this, had he compared the different wear of both in a ſhower of rain. It may perhaps be ſaid it is from habit that, different people liking their own way of life beſt, the ſavages are hindered from perceiving the pleaſures of ours. Upon this footing, however, it muſt appear at leaſt very extraordinary, that habit ſhould have more influence to preſerve in ſavages a reliſh for their miſery, than in the Europeans a taſte for the enjoyment of their felicity. But to make an unanſwerable reply to this objection; and that without taking notice of the many young ſavages, whom no endeavours have been able to civilize; or the natives of Greenland and Iceland, whom it has been ſeveral times attempted to educate in Denmark, and who have either pined away with grief aſhore, or periſhed at ſea in attempting to ſwim back to their own country; I ſhall content myſelf with the citation of one well-atteſted example, and leave it to the determination of thoſe who ſo greatly admire the police of European ſtates.

"The Dutch miſſionaries have not been able, with

with all their endeavours, to convert a ſingle Hottentot. Vander Stel, their governor at the Cape, having procured an Hottentot child, had him educated in the principles of the Chriſtian religion, and the manners and cuſtoms of Europe. He had him richly clothed, and inſtructed in various languages; while the boy's improvement was equal to the pains beſtowed on him. The governor, full of expectations from his pupil's capacity, ſent him to the Indies with a commiſſary general, who employed him in tranſacting the company's buſineſs. On his return, however, to the Cape, after the death of the commiſſary, he made a viſit to his Hottentot relations; in which he took a reſolution to throw off all his European finery, and to clothe himſelf again in a ſheep's-ſkin. Thus equipped, he returned to the fort, bringing with him his other clothes in a bundle, and preſenting them to the governor, addreſſed him in the following words. 'Be ſo good, Sir, as to take notice that I renounce for ever this dreſs. I renounce, likewiſe, for ever the Chriſtian religion; my reſolution being to live and die in the religion, the manners, and cuſtoms of my anceſtors. The only favour I aſk of you, is to permit me to wear this collar and hanger. I will keep them for your ſake.' Having ſaid this, without waiting for an anſwer from the governor, he diſappeared in an inſtant, and was never after ſeen at the Cape." *Hiſtoire des Voyages, tom.* v. *p.* 175.

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(17.) It might be objected here, that, in ſuch a ſtate of turbulence and diſorder, mankind

would have diſperſed, inſtead of obſtinately cutting each others throats, had their diſperſion been limited. But, in the firſt place, their limits would only have been thoſe of the whole earth; and if we reflect on the great population reſulting from a ſtate of nature, we ſhall find that in ſuch a ſtate the earth would have been covered, in a very ſhort time, with men, thus forced to keep cloſe together. Beſides, had the progreſs of the evil been rapid, they would have diſperſed, or had it been a change ſuddenly effected. But they brought their fetters with them into the world; they were even in their infancy too much inured by cuſtom to the weight of them, to feel them troubleſome ever after. In fine, they were accuſtomed to a variety of conveniences, which obliged them to herd together: it was not ſo eaſy for them to diſperſe now as in thoſe early times when, no man ſtanding in need of any other, every one did what he liked beſt, without waiting for any other's conſent.

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(18.) Marſhal de V— uſed to relate, that the frauds of one of the contractors for the army, in one of his campaigns, having occaſioned a very general complaint among the troops, he ſent for the offender, and, after rating him pretty handſomely, threatened him with the gallows. To all which the hardened raſcal calmly replied, that ſuch threats did not at all affect him, but that he was glad of an occaſion of telling the Marſhal, that a man is not ſo readily hanged who has an hundred thouſand crowns at his diſpoſal. And I know not how it happened, added,

ded the Marſhal ingenuouſly, but ſo it was, the ſcoundrel eſcaped hanging, notwithſtanding he had deſerved it an hundred times.

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(19.) Diſtributive juſtice, indeed, would oppoſe this rigorous equality of a ſtate of nature, even were it practicable in civil ſociety; and as all the members of the ſtate owe it their ſervices in proportion to their talents and abilities, ſo they ought, on their part, to be diſtinguiſhed and favoured in the ſame proportion to the ſervices they have actually rendered it. It is in this ſenſe we muſt underſtand that paſſage of Iſocrates, in which he extols the primitive Athenians, for having determined which of the two kinds of equality was the moſt uſeful, *viz.* that which conſiſts in dividing the ſame advantages indiſcriminately among all the citizens in common, or that which conſiſts in diſtributing them to each according to his merit. Theſe able politicians, adds the orator, baniſhing that unjuſt inequality which makes no diſtinction between bad men and men of probity, adhered inviolably to that which rewards and puniſhes every man according to his deſert.

But, in the firſt place, there never exiſted a ſociety, to whatever degree of corruption ſome have arrived, wherein no difference was made between the good and bad: and with regard to manners wherein no meaſures can be preſcribed by law exact enough to ſerve as a practical rule to magiſtrates, it is with great prudence, that, in order not to leave the fortune or quality of the citizens to their diſcretion, ſhe prohibits their paſſing judgment on perſons, and confines it to

actions. There are no manners, unleſs ſuch as are pure, as were thoſe of the ancient Romans, that can bear with the office of cenſors; ſuch a tribunal among us would throw every thing into confuſion. The difference between good and bad men is determined by public eſteem; the magiſtrate being only a judge of what is ſtrictly juſt and right; whereas the public is the trueſt judge of manners, a judge of ſuch integrity and penetration, that, altho' it may be ſometimes deceived, it can never be corrupt. The rank of citizens ought, therefore, to be regulated, not according to their perſonal merit, as this method would put it in the power of the magiſtrate to make an almoſt arbitrary application of the law; but according to the actual ſervices they do the ſtate, which are capable of being ſubjected to a more exact eſtimate.

A DISSERTATION ON POLITICAL ECONOMY.

THE word *Economy*, or *Oeconomy*, is derived from οἶκος, *a houſe*, and νόμος, *law*, originally ſignifying only the prudent and lawful government of an houſe for the common good of the whole family. The meaning of this term hath been ſince extended to the government of the great family, the ſtate. In diſtinguiſhing theſe two acceptations of the word, the latter is called *general* or *political* œconomy, and the other *domeſtic* or *particular* œconomy. It is the firſt only which is diſcuſſed in the preſent tract.

Should it be admitted, that there is as great a conformity as many authors pretend between the connections of a ſtate and thoſe of a private family, it would not thence follow, that the rules of conduct proper for one of theſe ſocieties would be alſo proper for the other. They differ too much in magnitude and extent to be regulated in the ſame manner; for there will be always a wide difference between the domeſtic government, in which a father may be himſelf an eye-witneſs of the whole, and the government of a political ſociety, where the chief ſees hardly any

any thing but through the eyes of other people. To put both on an equality, therefore, in this reſpect, it is requiſite that the talents, power, and all the other faculties of a father, ſhould be augmented in proportion to the greatneſs of his family, and that the ſoul of a powerful monarch ſhould be in proportion to that of an ordinary man, as the extent of his empire is to that of a private perſon's eſtate.

But how doth the government of a ſtate reſemble that of a private family, the baſis of which is ſo very different? The father being naturally ſtronger than his children, his paternal authority over them may be reaſonably ſaid to be eſtabliſhed by nature, ſo long as they ſtand in need of his aſſiſtance. But in the great family of the ſtate, all the members of which are naturally equal, the political authority, being purely of arbitrary inſtitution, muſt be founded only on mutual conventions, the magiſtrate having no authority over others, but what he derives from the laws. The duty of a father is dictated to him by his natural ſentiments, and in ſuch a manner that he is ſeldom capable of neglecting it. The chiefs of political ſociety have no ſuch rule, and are only bound to the people by what they themſelves have promiſed to do, and which the people have therefore a right to require of them. Another important difference is this; children have nothing but what they receive of their father, it is plain that every right of property muſt be derived from him; the caſe is quite the contrary in the political family, the general adminiſtration of whoſe government is eſtabliſhed only to ſecure the property of individuals, which is antecedent.

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The principal object of the labours of a private family, is that of preſerving and increaſing the patrimony of the father, to the end that he may one day diſtribute it among his children without impoveriſhing them; whereas the wealth of the exchequer affords only the means of ſupporting a few individuals in luxury and eaſe.

In a word, the parental family is deſtined to extinction, and to be one day reſolved into many other families of the like nature: but the political one is calculated to remain always in the ſame ſtate.

It is plain, for ſeveral reaſons, deduced from the nature of the thing, that a father ought to govern in his own family. In the firſt place, the authority ought not to be equally divided between father and mother, but ſhould be perfectly ſingle; for in all caſes of divided opinions, there ſhould be one determinate voice to decide. 2dly, However lightly we may regard the peculiar inconveniences attending the ſex, yet, as they neceſſarily occaſion intervals of inaction, this is a ſufficient reaſon for excluding them from the ſupreme authority: for when the balance is perfectly equal, a ſtraw ſuffices to turn the ſcale. Beſides, the huſband ought to have the ſuperintendency of his wife's conduct, becauſe it is of conſequence to him to be aſſured that the children, which he is obliged to acknowledge and maintain, belong to nobody but himſelf. 3dly, Children ſhould be obedient to their father, at firſt through neceſſity, and afterwards from gratitude: after having had their own wants ſatisfied by him during one half of their lives, they ought to conſecrate the other half to the gratification of his. 4thly, With

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regard to domeſtics, they owe him their ſervice in exchange for the proviſion he makes for them. I ſay nothing here of abſolute ſlavery, becauſe this is contrary to nature, and cannot be authoriſed by any law.

There is nothing, however, of all this in political ſociety; in which the chief is ſo far from having any natural intereſt in the happineſs of individuals, that it is not uncommon for him to ſeek his own happineſs in their miſery. If the magiſtracy be hereditary, a community of men are frequently governed by a child. If it be elective, innumerable inconveniences ariſe from ſuch election; while in both caſes the advantages of paternal connection is entirely loſt. If you have but a ſingle chief, you lie at the diſcretion of a maſter who has no reaſon to love you: and if you have ſeveral maſters, you have at once to ſupport their tyranny over yourſelves, and their quarrels with each other. In a word, abuſes, and their fatal conſequences, are inevitable in ſociety, where the public weal and the laws have no natural influence, and are perpetually attacked by perſonal intereſt, and the paſſions of the chief and its members.

Although the functions of the father of a family, and of the chief magiſtrate, ought to tend to the ſame purpoſe, they ought to effect it by different means. Their duties and their prerogatives are ſo eſſentially different, that we cannot confound them together, without forming very falſe ideas of the fundamental laws of ſociety, and falling into errors very fatal to mankind. In fact, if the voice of nature be the beſt guide to which a father can liſten in the diſcharge of his duty; it is, with regard to the magiſtrate,

giſtrate, a falſe director, leading him conſtantly out of the way of his duty, and which ſooner or latter will bring on the ruin of himſelf or of the ſtate, unleſs prevented by the moſt ſublime virtue. The only precaution neceſſary for the father of a family, is to guard againſt depravity, and to hinder the corruption of his natural inclinations; whereas it is the perfection of theſe which corrupt the magiſtrate. In order to act aright, the firſt hath nothing to do but conſult his own heart; the other becomes a traitor the moment he conſults his. Even his own judgement is juſtly to be ſuſpected; nor hath he any other rule of conduct than that of the public judgment, which is the law. Thus nature hath made many good fathers of families; but it is doubtful whether, from the very beginning of the world, human wiſdom hath ever made ten men capable of governing mankind.

It follows, from what I have obſerved, that *public* oeconomy is very juſtly diſtinguiſhed from *private*; and that, the ſtate having nothing in common with a particular family, the obligations which their ſeveral chiefs lie under of making them happy, as well as their rules of conduct, cannot be ſame. I thought it neceſſary to ſay as much, in order to overthrow that odious ſyſtem which Sir Robert Filmer hath endeavoured to eſtabliſh in his Patriarchate; a work to which two celebrated writers have done too much honour in refuting it. Beſides, this error is very ancient; Ariſtotle himſelf having thought proper to controvert it, as may be ſeen in the firſt book of his Politics.

I muſt here beg of my readers to make another proper diſtinction; and this is, between

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public oeconomy, which I call *government*, and the ſupreme authority, which I call *ſovereignty*; a diſtinction which conſiſts in this, The one hath a legiſlative power, and in certain caſes is obligatory on the whole body of the nation; while the other hath only an executive power, and is obligatory merely on individuals.

I ſhall take the liberty to make uſe of a very common, and in ſome reſpects inaccurate, compariſon, though proper enough to illuſtrate my meaning in this particular.

The body politic, taken in itſelf as an individual, may be conſidered as an organized, living body, reſembling that of man. The ſovereign power repreſents the head: the laws and cuſtoms are the brain; the ſource of the nerves, and ſeat of the underſtanding, the will, and the ſenſe; of which the judges and magiſtrates are the organs: commerce, induſtry, and agriculture are the mouth and ſtomach which prepare the common ſubſiſtence: the public finances are the blood, which a prudent *oeconomy*, in performing the functions of the heart, diſtributes through the whole body, to give it nutriment and life: the citizens are the body, and the members which cauſe the machine to move and operate; no part of which machine can be wounded or injured without cauſing a painful impreſſion on the brain, if the animal be in a ſtate of health.

The life of both the one and the other, is the perſonal identity common to the whole, the reciprocal ſenſibility and interior correſpondence of all its parts. When this communication ceaſes, the formal unity is gone, and the contiguous parts belong to each other only by juxtapoſition,

poſition, the man is dead, or the ſtate is diſſolved.

The body-politic, therefore, is a moral being poſſeſſed of a will; and this general will, which tends always to the preſervation and welfare of the whole and of every part, and which is the ſource of the laws, is with regard to all the members of the ſtate the rule of what is juſt and unjuſt: a truth which ſhews, by the way, how idly ſome writers have treated as theft the ſubtilty preſcribed to the Spartan youths in obtaining their frugal repaſts, as if every thing ordained by the law was not lawful.

It is neceſſary to remark, however, that this rule of juſtice, though certain with regard to the citizens among each other, may be defective with regard to foreigners; the reaſon of which is evident. The will of the ſtate, however general and obligatory with reſpect to its own members, is not binding on other ſtates or their members, but becomes, with regard to them, a particular and individual will, whoſe rule of juſtice is to be found in the law of nature; a circumſtance which is included nevertheleſs in the principles laid down. For in ſuch a caſe, the great city of the world becomes a body-politic; whoſe general will is always the law of nature, and of which the different ſtates and people are only the individual members. It is from theſe diſtinctions, applied to each political ſociety and its members, that flow the moſt certain and univerſal rules, on which we are to form a judgment of a good or bad government, and in general of the morality of all human actions.

Every political ſociety is compoſed of other ſmaller ſocieties of different kinds, each of

which hath its peculiar intereſts and maxims: but thoſe ſocieties which every body perceives, becauſe they have an external and authoriſed form, are not the only ones that actually exiſt in a ſtate: all thoſe individuals who are united by a common intereſt, compoſe many others, either tranſitory or permanent; whoſe influence is not the leſs real becauſe it is leſs apparent, but the proper obſervation of whoſe various relations conſtitute the true ſcience of manners. It is the influence of all theſe tacit or formal aſſociations, that gives ſuch different modifications as are obſervable in the appearance of the public will. The will of theſe particular ſocieties hath always two relations: the one to the members of the aſſociation, which is a general will: the other to the great ſociety of which they are members; and this is a particular will, which is often right with regard to the firſt object, and wrong as to the ſecond. An individual may be a devout prieſt, a brave ſoldier, or a zealous ſenator, yet a bad citizen. In like manner, any particular reſolution may be advantageous to the leſs community, yet very pernicious to the greater. It is true, that particular ſocieties being always ſubordinate to the general, in preference to others, the duty of a citizen takes place of that of a ſenator, and that of a man of thoſe of a citizen: but unhappily perſonal intereſt is always in the inverſe ratio of our duty, and is augmented in proportion as the aſſociation grows more confined, and the engagement leſs ſacred; an irrefragable proof that the general will is always the moſt juſt, and that the voice of the people is in fact the voice of God.

It does not hence follow, that the public de-

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terminations are always equitable; they may poſſibly be otherwiſe when they regard foreigners; for which I have given a reaſon. Thus it is not impoſſible that a republic, though in itſelf well governed, ſhould enter into an unjuſt war with others. Nor is it leſs impoſſible for the council of a democracy to paſs an unjuſt ſentence, and condemn the innocent; but this never happens unleſs the people are ſeduced by private intereſts, which the credit or eloquence of ſome artful individuals ſubſtitutes for thoſe of the ſtate: in which the general will is one thing, and the conſequence of the public deliberation another. Let not the example of Athens be here objected; for Athens was in fact no democracy, but an ariſtocracy, very tyrannical, and governed by philoſophers and orators. Let us carefully determine what paſſes in every public deliberation, and we ſhall ſee that the general will is always for the common good; but that it often admits of a ſecret diviſion, a tacit confederacy, by which the natural diſpoſition of the aſſembly is eluded. The body of ſociety is thus really divided into others, the members of which embrace a general will, which is right and juſt with reſpect to theſe new bodies, but wrong and unjuſt with regard to the whole body, from which each is thus diſmembered.

We ſee thus how eaſily, by the help of ſome leading principles, may be explained thoſe apparent contradictions, which are remarked in the conduct of many perſons who are ſcrupulouſly honeſt in ſome reſpects, and knaves in others; frequently trampling under foot the moſt ſacred obligations, and yet capable of ſacrificing their lives to engagements that are often

ten unjuſt. It is thus we ſee the moſt depraved of mankind pay ſome ſort of homage to public faith; and even robbers, though enemies to virtue in the midſt of ſociety in general, yet pay ſome reſpect to the ſhadow of it among themſelves. In eſtabliſhing the general will as the firſt principle of public *oeconomy*, and the fundamental rule of government, I did not think it neceſſary to inquire ſeriouſly whether the magiſtrates belonged to the people, or the people to the magiſtrates; or whether it was neceſſary in public affairs to conſult the good of the ſtate, or that only of its chiefs. That queſtion indeed hath long been decided one way in theory, and another in practice. It is indeed ridiculous to expect that thoſe who in reality are maſters, will conſult any other intereſt than their own. It would not be improper, therefore, to make a farther diſtinction in public *oeconomy*, into popular and tyrannical. The firſt is that of the whole ſtate, in which the intereſt and will of the chiefs and the people are united: the other will neceſſarily exiſt every where, when the government and the people have different intereſts, and of conſequence oppoſite wills. The maxims of the latter are deſcribed at large in the archives of hiſtory, and the ſatires of Machiavel.

The others are found only in the writings of thoſe philoſophers who have ventured to reclaim the privileges of humanity.

1ſt. The *firſt* and moſt important maxim of a juſt and popular government, that is to ſay, of that whoſe object is the good of the people, is therefore to follow univerſally, as I have obſerved, the general will. But to be able to follow this will,

will, it is neceſſary that it ſhould be known, and above all that it ſhould be diſtinguiſhed, from the particular will of the governor: a diſtinction which it is very difficult to make, and requires the aſſiſtance of the the moſt ſublime virtue. As in order to will alſo, it is neceſſary to be free, here ariſes a difficutly no leſs than the former, viz. that of preſerving at once the public liberty and the authority of government. Look into the motives, which have induced men, once united by their common wants into a general ſociety, to unite themſelves ſtill more intimately by particular ſocieties: you will find no other motive than the ſecurity of property, life, and liberty to each member, by means of the protection of all. Now can men be compelled to defend the liberty of any one among them, without treſpaſſing on that of others? And how can they provide for the public neceſſities without alienating the particular property of thoſe who are forced to contribute to them? With whatſoever ſophiſtry all this may be covered over, it is certain, that if any reſtraint be laid on my will, I am no longer free; and that I am no longer maſter of my own property, if it be in the power of others to take any part of it from me. This difficulty, which ſeems to be inſurmountable, has been removed by the moſt ſublime of all human inſtitutions, or rather by divine inſpiration, which teaches mankind to imitate here below the unchangeable decrees of the Deity. By what inconceivable art hath a way been found out, to render men free by ſubjecting them to control? To employ in the ſervice of the ſtate the properties, perſons, and lives of all its members, without conſulting them, or

laying them under any conſtraint? To confine their will by their own conſent? To oppoſe that conſent to their refuſal, and to compel them even to puniſh themſelves when they act againſt their own will? How can it be, that all ſhould obey, yet nobody take upon him to command; that they ſhould all ſerve, and yet have no maſters? Being ſo much the more free as they lie under apparent ſubjection, none loſe any part of their liberty but that which might be hurtful to another! Theſe prodigies are the effect of the law. It is to the law alone that men are indebted for juſtice and liberty. It is this ſalutary organ of the general will, which eſtabliſhes in civil right the natural equality of mankind. It is this celeſtial voice which dictates to every citizen the precepts of public reaſon; teaching him to act according to the maxims of his own underſtanding, and not to behave inconſiſtently with himſelf. It is by this voice alone that political chiefs ſhould ſpeak when they affect to command: for no ſooner doth one man, ſetting aſide the law, pretend to ſubject another to his will, than he departs immediately from the ſtate of civil ſociety, and oppoſes him in a pure ſtate of nature; in which obedience is never preſcribed but by neceſſity.

The moſt preſſing intereſt of the chief, and even his moſt indiſpenſable duty, therefore, is to ſee that thoſe laws are obſerved, of which he is the miniſter, and on which his whole authority is founded. At the ſame time, if he exacts the obſervation of them from others, he is the more ſtrongly bound to obſerve them himſelf, who enjoys all their favour. For his example is of ſuch influence, that although the people might

might even permit him to ſhake off the yoke of the law, he ought to be cautious of uſing ſo dangerous a prerogative; leſt others ſhould in time uſurp the ſame privilege, and that to his prejudice. In reality, as all ſocial engagements are reciprocal, it is impoſſible for any one to ſet himſelf above the law, without renouncing the advantages of it; for nobody is bound by any obligation to him, who pretends that he is bound under no obligation whatever to others. For this reaſon, no exemption from the law ſhould be annexed to any title whatever in a well regulated government. Thoſe citizens who have deſerved ever ſo well of their country, ought to be rewarded with honours, but never by privileges: for that republic is on the brink of ruin, whoſe members begin to think it is agreeable or advantageous not to obey the laws. But if the nobility or the ſoldiery ſhould adopt ſuch a maxim, all is loſt beyond redemption.

The influence of the laws, however, depends ſtill more on their own propriety and wiſdom, than on the ſeverity of the adminiſtrators; as the public will derives alſo its greateſt weight from the reaſon by which it is dictated. Hence it was that Plato looked upon it as a very neceſſary precaution, to place at the head of all edicts a preamble, ſetting forth their juſtice and utility. In fact, the firſt of all laws, is that which enjoins a reſpect to the laws: the ſeverity of penalties is only a vain reſource, invented by little minds in order to ſubſtitute fear in the place of that reſpect, which they knew not how to obtain. It hath been conſtantly remarked, that in thoſe countries whoſe legal puniſhments are moſt ſevere, they are alſo the moſt frequent:

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ſo that the cruelty of ſuch puniſhments is a proof only of the multitude of criminals; whilſt, by puniſhing all with equal ſeverity, thoſe who are guilty of ſmall crimes are induced frequently to commit greater in order to avoid detection.

But though the government be not maſter of the law, it is a charge of great importance to adminiſter it, and to poſſeſs a thouſand means of commanding a reſpect. It is in this alone conſiſts the art of reigning. When poſſeſſed of the power, there is no art required to make the whole world tremble: nor does it indeed require much to conciliate univerſal affection; for experience hath long ſince taught mankind to conſider as a great merit in their chiefs the evil they abſtain from doing, and to adore them if they have not abſolutely reaſon to hate them. An idiot, if obeyed, may puniſh offenders, as well as a wiſe man: but the true ſtateſman is he who knows how to prevent crimes, extending his reſpectable empire over the inclinations of men rather than their actions. If he could bring things to ſuch a paſs, that every one ſhould act aright, he would then have nothing to do; and the maſter-piece of his labours would be that of remaining idle for want of employment. It is certain, at leaſt, that the great art of governors is to diſguiſe their power, in order to render themſelves leſs odious; and to conduct the ſtate ſo peaceably as to make it ſeem to ſtand in no need of conductors.

I conclude, therefore, as the firſt duty of a legiſlator is to render the laws conformable to the general will, the firſt rule of public oeconomy is, that the adminiſtration of juſtice ſhould be

be conformable to the laws. It would be even ſufficient to prevent the ſtate's being ill-governed, if the legiſlator ſhould have provided, as he ought, for all exigencies of place, climate, ſoil, manners, vicinity, and the reſt of the relations peculiar to the people he hath inſtituted. Not but that an infinity of circumſtances, regarding the police and oeconomy, ſtill remain; which muſt be left entirely to the wiſdom of government: but there are two infallible rules for its good conduct on theſe occaſions; one is, that the ſpirit of the law ought to determine in every caſe that is not particularly foreſeen and provided for; the other is, that the general will, the ſource and ſupplement of all laws, ſhould be conſulted wherever they are defective. It may be aſked indeed, how that general will is to be known in regard to caſes about which it hath not been explained? Muſt a whole nation be aſſembled together at every new and unforſeen event? No, certainly. It ought the leſs to be aſſembled, becauſe it is by no means certain that its deciſion would expreſs the general will; beſides, the method would be impracticable in a great people, and is hardly ever practiſed under a well-meaning government: for the chiefs are very ſenſible that the general will is always for that which is moſt favourable to the public intereſt; that is to ſay, for that which is the moſt equitable; ſo that they have only to act juſtly, to be certain of following the dictates of the general will. When this is infringed too openly, it fails not of being perceived, in ſpite of the formidable reſtraint of public authority. I ſhall cite a few examples that may be followed in ſuch caſes.

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In China, the emperor holds it a conſtant maxim to be againſt his officers, in every diſpute that ariſes between them and the people. If bread be too dear in any province, the intendant of that province is thrown into priſon. If there be an inſurrection in another, the governor of it is diſmiſſed, and every mandarin anſwers with his head for all the miſchief that happens in his department. Not that theſe affairs do no not undergo a ſubſequent and regular examination, but long experience hath ſhewn this anticipation of judgment to be ſafe and ſalutary. It is very ſeldom that any injuſtice hath been thus committed: in the mean time, the emperor, being well perſuaded that a public outcry is never raiſed without cauſe, diſcovers always through the ſeditious clamours which he puniſhes, thoſe real complaints for which he affords redreſs.

It is doing a great deal, to preſerve peace and order throughout all the parts of a large republic; it is doing a great deal, to keep the ſtate tranquil, and cauſe the law to be reſpected: but if nothing more is done, there will be in all this more of appearance than reality; for that government will not eaſily be obeyed which confines its views to mere obedience. If it be good to know how to employ mankind, being ſuch as they are, it is much better to make them ſuch as it is requiſite they ſhould be. The moſt abſolute authority is that which penetrates into the interior part of man, exerciſing itſelf not only on his actions, but on his ſentiments. It is very certain, that every people become in time what the government cauſes them to be; are warriors, citizens, men, if it ſo pleaſes; or are merely populace, a vulgar mob, if ſo it requires them.

them. Hence every prince who deſpiſes his ſubjects, diſhonours himſelf, in confeſſing he knows not how to make them reſpectable. Form, therefore, men, if you would command men: if you would have them obedient to the laws, order it ſo that they ſhall reſpect thoſe laws, and then they will need only to know what is their duty to put it in practice. This was the great art of the ancient governments, in thoſe early times when philoſophers gave laws to mankind, and made uſe of their authority only to render them wiſe and happy. Hence the many ſumptuary laws, the many regulations of manners, and the many public maxims admitted or rejected on the matureſt conſideration. Even tyrants themſelves did not forget this important part of the adminiſtration; but were as attentive to corrupt the manners of their ſlaves, as the magiſtrates were to correct thoſe of their fellow-citizens. But our modern governments, who imagine they have done every thing when they have deviſed ways and means for raiſing money, conceive it is unneceſſary and even impoſſible to go a ſtep farther.

2dly. The *ſecond* eſſential rule of public oeconomy is no leſs important than the firſt. Would you have the general will accompliſhed? Order it ſo that the wills of particulars are conformable to it; or in other words, as virtue is nothing more than the conformity of the particular wills of individuals with the general, enforce the influence and practice of virtue.

If our politicians were leſs blinded by their ambition, they would ſee how impoſſible it is for any eſtabliſhment whatever to ſubſiſt agreeable to the ſpirit of its inſtitution, unleſs confined

fined within the limits of moral duty: they would perceive that the greateſt ſupport of public authority lies in the breaſts of the citizens, and that nothing can be ſubſtituted in the place of morals, for the ſupport of government. It is not only men of probity who know how to adminiſter the laws properly; but in reality it is none but ſuch who know how to obey them. The man who once gets the better of remorſe, will ſoon come to deſpiſe corporal puniſhments, leſs ſevere, leſs durable, and which there is hope at leaſt of eſcaping: whatever precautions are taken, thoſe who only require impunity to do evil, will not fail to find means of eluding the law, and avoiding its penalties. In this caſe, as the private intereſts of particulars unitedly acts againſt the general intereſt of the public, which is no longer that of indivuals, the public vices will have a greater effect toward enervating the laws, than the laws will have power to repreſs ſuch vices: ſo that the corruption of the people and of their chiefs, will at length extend itſelf to the government, however prudent or ſagacious. The worſt of all political abuſes is, the paying an apparent obedience to the laws, in order to break them with the greater ſecurity. For hence the beſt laws become the moſt pernicious; and it would be an hundred times better thoſe laws had never exiſted. In ſuch a ſituation, edicts may be publiſhed upon edicts, and laws be enacted after laws, to no manner of purpoſe. All this would ſerve only to introduce new abuſes, without correcting the old. The multiplicity of laws renders them contemptible; and to appoint new officers to ſee them put into execution, is only to inſtitute new violators of them,

them, either to join with the old, or to plunder apart by themſelves. The reward of virtue preſently becomes that of robbery; the vileſt of men riſe into greateſt credit; the greater they are, the more deſpicable they become; their infamy diſcovers itſelf even in their dignities, and their very honours contribute to diſhonour them. If they purchaſe for themſelves the patronage of the chiefs or the protection of their women, it is only that they may ſell juſtice, duty, and the ſtate, in their turn: in the mean time, the people who do not ſee that their vices are the firſt cauſe of their misfortunes, murmur and complain that "all their evils are derived from thoſe whom they pay to protect them."

The ſuggeſtions of duty no longer influence the people, while their rulers are obliged to ſubſtitute in their room the threats of terror, or the glimmerings of apparent intereſt, by which they deceive their creatures. It is in this ſituation that they are reduced to have recourſe to thoſe petty and deſpicable ſhifts which they call *maxims of ſtate* and *myſteries of the cabinet*. The little power that remains of government is employed by its members in ruining and ſupplanting each other, while the public buſineſs is neglected, or is tranſacted only as perſonal intereſt requires and directs. In ſhort, all the art of thoſe great politicians lies in faſcinating the eyes of thoſe they ſtand in need of, in ſuch a manner that each may think that he is labouring for his own intereſt in working for theirs: I ſay *theirs*, on the falſe ſuppoſition of its being the real intereſt of rulers to annihilate a people in order to make them obedient, and to ruin

their own property in order to ſecure its poſſeſſion.

But, when the citizens are fond of their duty, and the guardians of the public authority ſincerely apply themſelves to cultivate that fondneſs by their own example and aſſiduities, all the difficulty of adminiſtration vaniſhes; and the government are diſpenſed with making uſe of that dark kind of policy, whoſe obſcurity is its only myſtery. Thoſe enterpriſing ſpirits, ſo dangerous and ſo much admired, all thoſe great miniſters, whoſe glory is inſeparable from the miſeries of the people, are no longer regretted: the public morals ſupply the want of genius in the rulers; while the more virtue prevails, the leſs need is there for extraordinary talents. Even ambition itſelf is better ſerved by duty than uſurpation: when the people are convinced that their rulers labour only for their happineſs, they ſave them the trouble of labouring to confirm themſelves in power: and hiſtory ſhews us in a thouſand places, that the authority of a perſon beloved over thoſe who love him, is an hundred times more abſolute than all the tyranny of uſurpers. Not that it is here meant, the government ought to be afraid to make uſe of its power, but that it ought to make uſe of it only in a lawful manner. We find in hiſtory a thouſand examples of puſillanimous or ambitious princes, ruined by their effeminacy or pride; but not on one who ſuffered by having been ſtrictly juſt. But we ought not to confound negligence with moderation, or candour with weakneſs. To be juſt, it is neceſſary to be ſevere; to ſuffer vice when one has the right and

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the power to ſuppreſs it, is to be vicious one's ſelf.

It is not ſufficient merely to ſay to the citizens, *be good;* they muſt be inſtructed to be ſo; and even example, which is in this reſpect the firſt leſſon, is not the only means to be employed; the love of one's country is the moſt efficacious: for, as I have already obſerved, every man is virtuous when his particular will is conformable to the general will of the community, and we are naturally led to have the ſame inclinations as thoſe we love. It appears that the ſentiment of humanity evaporates and grows feeble in embracing all mankind, and that we cannot be affected with the calamities of Tartary or Japan, in the ſame manner as we ſhould be by thoſe of European nations. It is neceſſary in ſome degree to confine and compreſs our ſenſe of compaſſion in order to give it activity. Now, as this ſentiment cannot be uſeful but to thoſe with whom we live, it is proper that our humanity, confined to our fellow-citizens, ſhould receive a new force from the habit of ſeeing them, and by the common intereſt which unites them. It is certain that the moſt miraculous efforts of virtue have taken riſe from patriotiſm: this agreeable and lively ſentiment which gives to the force of ſelf-love all the beauty of virtue, gives it alſo an energy, which, without making it unnatural, renders it the moſt heroic of all paſſions. It is this which hath produced ſo many immortal actions, the glory of which dazzles our weak eyes: it is this which hath produced ſo many great men, whoſe antiquated virtues have paſſed for mere fables ever ſince patiotiſm hath been turned into deriſion. Not that this

is a matter of ſurpriſe; the tranſports of ſuſceptible hearts appear in like manner altogether chimerical to thoſe who have not, or cannot experience them; and the love of one's country, an hundred times more lively and delightful than a paſſion for a miſtreſs, cannot be conceived by thoſe who have never felt it. But it is eaſy to remark, in every heart that is warmed by it, in all the actions it inſpires, a more glowing, more ſublime ardour, than attends the pureſt virtue when ſeparated from this paſſion. Let us oppoſe Socrates even to Cato; the one was the greater philoſopher, the other more of the citizen. Athens was already ruined in the time of Socrates, and he had no other country than the univerſe. Cato had the cauſe of his country ever at heart; he lived only for its welfare, and could not ſurvive its deſtruction. The virtue of Socrates was that of the wiſeſt of men; but Cato, compared with Cæſar and Pompey, ſeems to be a God contending with mere mortals. Socrates inſtructed a few individuals, oppoſed the ſophiſts, and died a martyr to truth: but Cato defended his country, its liberty and laws, againſt the conquerors of the world; and at length reſigned his breath, when he no longer had a country to ſerve. A worthy pupil of Socrates would be the moſt virtuous of his cotemporaries; but a worthy follower of Cato would be one of the greateſt. The virtue of the former would conſtitute his happineſs; the latter would ſeek his happineſs in that of the whole ſociety. We ſhould be inſtructed by one, and directed by the other; and this alone is ſufficient to determine the preference between them: for there never were a people made philoſophers,

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but it is not impoſſible to make a people happy.

Are we deſirous a people ſhould be virtuous? Let us begin, therefore, by making them love their country: but how can they love it, if their country be nothing more to them than to ſtrangers, and that it affords them nothing but what it refuſes to nobody? It would be ſtill worſe, if they did not enjoy the privileges of ſocial ſecurity; and that their lives, liberties, and properties, lay at the mercy of certain powerful individuals, without their being permitted, or its being poſſible for them, to obtain relief from the laws. For, in that caſe, being ſubjected to the duties of civil ſociety, without enjoying even the common privileges of a ſtate of nature, and without being able to employ their ſtrength in their own defence, they would of courſe be in the worſt condition freemen could poſſibly be, and the word *country* would only be to them a ridiculous and odious term. It muſt not be imagined that a man can break his arm, or have it cut off, without feeling pain in his head: nor is it any more to be conceived that the general will can conſent, than any one member of the ſtate, in what rank ſoever, ſhould injure or deſtroy another, than it is to be ſuppoſed that the hands of a man in his ſenſes ſhould wilfully ſcratch his eyes out. The ſecurity of individuals is ſo intimately connected with the public confederacy, that, if no regard were paid to human weakneſſes, that confederacy would in point of right be diſſolved, if a ſingle citizen were ſuffered by the ſtate to periſh who might be relieved, or if he ſhould be confined wrongfully in priſon, or if his property ſhould be injured by an unjuſt ſentence. For the fundamental laws

of the ſocial convention being broken, there exiſts no longer either obligation or intereſt that ſhould preſerve the ſocial union of the people; unleſs they were reſtrained indeed by force, which alſo diſſolves the civil compact.

In fact, the engagement entered into by the whole body of the nation, binds it to provide for the ſecurity of the meaneſt individual with the ſame care as for that of all the reſt; the welfare of each ſingle citizen being as much a common cauſe as that of the whole ſtate. Will it be ſaid that it is proper for one to periſh for all? I ſhould admire that ſaying indeed when coming from the lips of a virtuous and worthy patriot voluntarily and dutifully ſacrificing himſelf for the good of his country: but if we are to underſtand by it, that it is lawful for the government to ſacrifice an innocent man for the good of the multitude, I look upon it as the moſt execrable maxim that tyranny ever invented, the greateſt falſehood that can be advanced, and the moſt directly contrary to the fundamental laws of ſociety. Any one perſon ought to be ſo far from ſuffering for all, that all have engaged their lives and properties to defend thoſe of each, in order that the weakneſs of individuals may be protected by the ſtrength of the public, or each member by the whole ſtate. Let us take from the whole people, by ſuppoſition, every individual one after another, and then preſs the advocates for this maxim to explain more particularly what they mean by the *body of the ſtate*, and we ſhall ſee it at length reduced to a ſmall number of perſons, who are not the people, but the officers of the people, and who, being obliged by perſonal oath to periſh themſelves for

for the ſecurity of the people, would thence infer that the people are to periſh for theirs.

Do we require examples of the protection which the ſtate owes to its members, and the reſpect it owes their perſons? It is only in the hiſtory of the moſt illuſtrious and magnanimous nations that they are to be found; it is only among a free peoole that the dignity of man hath been ever properly reſpected. It is well known into what perplexity the whole republic of Sparta was thrown, when the puniſhment of a criminal citizen came under conſideration.

In Macedon, the life of a man was an affair of ſo much importance, that Alexander the Great, in the zenith of his glory, durſt not in cold blood put a Macedonian criminal to death, till the accuſed had been permitted to make his defence before his fellow-citizens, and had been legally condemned. But the Romans diſtinguiſhed themſelves above all other people on earth by the regard which their government paid to individuals, and by its ſcrupulous attention to preſerve inviolable the rights and privileges of all the members of the ſtate. Nothing was more ſacred among them than the life of a citizen; no leſs than an aſſembly of the whole people being required to condemn one. Not even the ſenate, nor the conſuls, in all their majeſty, were inveſted with this prerogative; but the crime and puniſhment of a citizen were held as objects of public calamity among the moſt powerful people in the world. Capital puniſhments were indeed thought ſo ſevere in any caſe whatever, that, by the law of Porcia, the penalty of death was commuted into that of baniſhment, for all thoſe who were deſirous of

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ſurviving the loſs of ſo amiable a country. Every thing both at Rome, and in the Roman armies, breathed that love for their country and fellow-citizens, that reſpect for the Roman name, which raiſed the courage and fired the virtue of every one who had the honour to bear it. The cap of a citizen delivered from ſlavery, the civic crown of him who had ſaved the life of another, were looked upon with the greateſt pleaſure amidſt the pomp of their triumphs; and it is remarkable, that, among theſe vernal crowns beſtowed on the ſucceſsful in war, the civic crown and that of the triumphant hero himſelf only were formed of laurel, all the others were of mere gold. It was thus that Rome was virtuous, and became the miſtreſs of the world. Ambitious rulers! An herdſmen governs his dogs and his cattle, and yet is only one of the meaneſt of mankind. If it be a fine thing to command, it is when thoſe who obey us are capable of doing us honour. Shew reſpect, therefore, to your fellow-citizens, and you will render yourſelves reſpectable; ſhew reſpect to liberty, and your power will daily increaſe. Stretch not your prerogatives, and they will ſoon become unlimited.

Let our country, therefore, ſhew itſelf the common mother of her citizens; let the advantages they enjoy in their country ſerve to render it dear to them; and let the laws appear to them only the guardians of their common liberty. Theſe privileges, great as they are, belong to all mankind: but without ſeeming directly to attack them, the ill deſigns of their rulers may in fact eaſily reduce them to nothing. The law, which they thus abuſe, ſerves the powerful at

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once as an inſtrument of offence, and as a ſhield againſt the weak; while a pretence to the public good is always a dangerous ſcourge to the people. What is moſt neceſſary, and perhaps the moſt difficult in government, is a rigid integrity in doing ſtrict juſtice to all; and in particular to protect the poor againſt the tyranny of the rich. The greateſt evil is already effected, when there are poor to be defended, and rich to be reſtrained. It is on the middling people alone the whole force of the laws is exerted; being equally incapable to withſtand the opulence of the rich and the penury of the poor. The firſt eludes them, and the ſecond eſcapes them. The one breaks the ſnare, and the other paſſes over it.

It is therefore one of the moſt important objects of government, to prevent an extreme inequality of fortunes; not by taking away the wealth of the poſſeſſors, but in depriving them of means to accumulate them; not by building hoſpitals for the poor, but by preventing the citizens from becoming poor. The unequal diſtribution of the inhabitants of a country, ſome being thinly ſcattered over a large tract of land, while others are aſſembled together in crowds in cities; the encouragement of the agreeable, inſtead of the uſeful, arts; the ſacrificing agriculture to commerce; the mal-adminiſtration of the finances; and, in ſhort, that exceſs of venality which ſets public eſteem at a pecuniary value, and rates even virtue at a market-price: theſe are all the moſt obvious cauſes of opulence and of poverty, of the public intereſt, the mutual hatred of the citizens, their indifference for the common cauſe, the corruption of the people,

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and the weakening all the ſprings of government. Such are of courſe the evils which are with difficulty cured when they are perceived, but which a wiſe adminiſtration ought to prevent, in order to maintain, together with good morals, a reſpect for the laws, a love for one's country, and the influence of the general will.

But all theſe precautions will be inſufficient, if things are not taken ſtill nearer the root. I finiſh this part of the public œconomy in the place where it ought to have begun. One's country cannot ſubſiſt without liberty, nor liberty without virtue, nor virtue without citizens: you would have every thing by forming citizens; without that, you will have nothing but wretched ſlaves, and the firſt of theſe will be the rulers of the ſtate. Now, to form citizens, is not the work of a day; and, in order to have men, it is neceſſary to educate children. It will be ſaid, perhaps, That whoever hath men to govern, ought not to look for a degree of perfection of which their nature is not ſuſceptible; that we ought not to exterminate the paſſions of mankind, and that ſuch an attempt is no more deſirable than it is poſſible. I will agree, farther than all this, that a man without paſſions would certainly make a very bad citizen; but it muſt be confeſſed alſo, that, if men are not taught to love ſomething, it is impoſſible to inſtruct them to prefer one object before another, to prefer that which is truly beautiful to that which is deformed. If, for example, they were early accuſtomed to regard the individual only according to its relations with the body of the ſtate, and to be ſenſible of their own exiſtence, if I may ſo expreſs myſelf, merely as it forms a

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part of the public; they may at length come to identify themſelves in a degree with the great whole, to feel themſelves members of their country, and to love it with that exquiſite ſenſibility which every independent being hath only for itſelf; to raiſe their mind perpetually to this great object, and thus to transform into a ſublime virtue that dangerous diſpoſition which gives riſe to all our vices. The poſſibility of theſe new directions of ſentiment are not only demonſtrated by philoſophy, but hiſtory furniſhes us with a thouſand ſtriking examples. If they are rare indeed among us moderns, it is becauſe nobody troubles himſelf whether citizens exiſt or not; and ſtill leſs doth any body think of taking the trouble to form them. It is too late to change our natural inclinations, when they have already taken their courſe, and ſelf-love is confirmed by habit: it is too late to lead us out of ourſelves when once the human individual, concentrated in our hearts, hath acquired that contemptible activity which abſorbs all virtue and conſtitutes the life and being of little minds. How can the love of one's country germinate in the midſt of ſo many other paſſions by which it is ſuppreſſed and ſtifled? And what can remain, for the citizen, of an heart already divided between avarice, a miſtreſs, and vanity?

Men ought to begin to learn to merit life, the firſt moment of it; and, as at the inſtant of our birth we partake of the rights and privileges of citizens, that inſtant ought to be the commencement of the exerciſe of our duty. If there are laws for the age of maturity, there ought to be laws for infancy, teaching obedience to the others:

others: and as the reaſon of any one man is not the ſole arbiter of his duty, government ought ſtill leſs indiſcriminately to abandon to the ignorance and prejudices of fathers the education of their children, as that education is of much greater importance to the ſtate than to ſuch fathers themſelves: for, according to the courſe of nature, the death of the father often deprives the child of the finiſhing part of that education; but his country ſooner or later perceives its effects. Families diſſolve, but the ſtate is permanent.

Should public authority, in taking the place of fathers, and charging itſelf with that important function, acquire their prerogatives by diſcharging their duties; thoſe fathers would have ſo much the leſs ſubject to complain, as in that reſpect they would only change their name, and have in common, under the appellation of *citizens*, the ſame authority over their children as they now exerciſe ſeparately under the name of *fathers*, and would not be leſs obeyed when ſpeaking in the name of the law, than they were in ſpeaking after the voice of nature. A public education, therefore, under proper regulations preſcribed by the government, and under magiſtrates appointed by the ſovereign, is one of the fundamental maxims of popular or lawful government. If children are educated in common and as equals; if they are taught a reſpect for the laws and the maxims of the general will; if they are inſtructed to reſpect theſe above all things; if they are ſurrounded by examples, and objects which are conſtantly reminding them of the tender mother which hath nouriſhed them, of the love ſhe bears them, of the ineſtimable value

value of what they have received from her, and of the return which is due to her, we cannot doubt that they would hence learn to cheriſh each other mutually as brothers, to will nothing contrary to the general will of the ſociety, to ſubſtitute the actions of men and citizens in the place of the futile and vain babble of ſophiſts, and to become in time defenders and fathers of a country which ſo long has nouriſhed them as her children.

I ſhall ſay nothing of the magiſtrates deſtined to preſide over ſuch an education, which is certainly the moſt important buſineſs of the ſtate. It is eaſy to ſee, that if ſuch marks of public confidence be conferred on ſlight grounds, if this ſublime function be not confined to thoſe who have worthily diſcharged all the other offices, as the reward of their labour and the honourable repoſe of their old age; if it be not held as the higheſt honour they can arrive at; the whole enterpriſe would be uſeleſs, and the ſcheme of education void of ſucceſs. For wherever leſſons are not ſupported by authority, and precepts by example, all inſtruction is fruitleſs; and virtue itſelf is diſcredited by the lips of him who teaches without practiſing it. But let thoſe illuſtrious warriours who bend under the burden of their laurels, be the perſons appointed to inculcate valour: let upright magiſtrates, grown grey in the adminiſtration of juſtice, be the men made choice of to teach it. Such teachers as theſe would thus form virtuous ſucceſſors, and tranſmit from age to age, through ſucceſſive generations, the experience and talents of rulers, the courage and virtue of citizens, and excite an univerſal emulation in all to live and die for their country.

I know of but three people who formerly practiſed this method of public education, *viz.* the Cretans, the Lacedemonians, and the ancient Perſians: among all of whom it was attended with the greateſt ſucceſs, and indeed effected prodigies among the two laſt. When the world is divided into nations too great to be well governed, this method is no longer practicable; many other reaſons alſo will ſuggeſt themſelves to the reader, why ſuch a thing has never been attempted by any modern people. It is very remarkable that the Romans were able to ſubſiſt without it: but Rome was for five hundred years one continued miracle which the world muſt not expect to ſee again. The virtue of the Romans, ariſing from their hatred to tyranny and of the crimes of tyrants, added to an innate principle of patriotiſm, made the houſes of individuals all ſo many ſchools for the education of citizens; while the unlimited power of fathers over their children made the domeſtic policy ſo very rigid, that the father was more feared than the magiſtrate, and was in his family tribunal both a cenſor of manners and executor of the laws.

It is thus a careful and well-deſigning government, watching inceſſantly over the people's love for their country, and over their morals, may prevent thoſe evils which ſooner or later reſult from the indifference of the citizens for the fate of the republic; and would confine within narrow bounds, that perſonal intereſt which renders individuals ſo detached and independent, that the ſtate ſuffers from their power, and hath nothing to hope from their good will. Wherever the people love their country, reſpect

the laws, and live ſimply, little is wanting to render them happy; and in a public adminiſtration, wherein chance hath leſs to do than with the fate of individuals, wiſdom is ſo nearly allied to happineſs, that the two objects are inſeparable.

3dly. It is not enough to have citizens and to protect them, it is alſo neceſſary to provide for their ſubſiſtence. To provide for the public wants is an evident conſequence of the general will, and the *third* eſſential duty of government. This duty is not, as it ſhould ſeem, to fill the granaries of individuals, and thereby to diſpenſe with their labour; but to keep plenty always within their reach, ſo that labour ſhould be always neceſſary to acquire it and never uſeleſs. It extends itſelf alſo to every thing regarding the management of the exchequer, and the expences of public adminiſtration.

Having thus treated of general œconomy with regard to the government of perſons, it remains to conſider it with regard to the adminiſtration of property.

This part preſents no fewer difficulties and contradictions than the preceding. It is certain that the right of property is the moſt ſacred of all civil rights, and even more important in ſome reſpects than liberty itſelf; either becauſe it ſo nearly affects the preſervation of life, or becauſe a man's property being more eaſily injured and with greater difficulty defended than his perſon, the law ought to pay a greater attention to that right which is moſt eaſily infringed; or rather, laſtly, becauſe property is the true foundation of political ſociety, and the genuine ſecurity of all civil engagements: for

if men were not anſwerable in their property for perſonal actions, nothing would be more eaſy than for them to evade their obligations and laugh at the laws. On the other hand, it is not leſs certain that the maintenance and government of a ſtate is expenſive; and as every one who agrees to the end muſt acquieſce in the means, it follows that the members of a ſociety ought to contribute their property to its ſupport. Beſides, it is difficult to ſecure the property of individuals on one ſide, without bearing hard upon it on ſome other: indeed it is impoſſible that all the regulations which regard the order of ſucceſſion, wills, contracts, *&c.* ſhould not lay individuals under ſome conſtraint as to the diſpoſal of their effects, and of courſe be ſome infringement of their right of property.

But beſides what I have above obſerved of the agreement which ſubſiſts between the authority of the law and the freedom of the citizen, there remains an important remark to be made, with reſpect to the diſpoſal of effects, which may remove many difficulties.

This is, as Puffendorf has demonſtrated from the very nature of the right of property, that it extends not beyond the life of the proprietor, but that the moment a man is dead his eſtate no longer belongs to him. Thus, to preſcribe the conditions according to which he is to diſpoſe of it, is in reality leſs altering his right in appearance than extending it in fact.

In general, although the inſtitution of the laws, which regulate the power of individuals to diſpoſe of their own effects, belongs only to the ſovereign, the ſpirit of the laws, which the government ought to follow in their application,

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is that of father to ſon, and from relation to relation, ſo that the eſtate of a family ſhould go as little out of it and be as little alienated as poſſible.

There is a very ſenſible reaſon for this in favour of children, to whom the right of property would be uſeleſs if the father ſhould leave them nothing, and who beſides, having often contributed to the acquiſition of their father's wealth, are aſſociates with him in his right of property. But there is another reaſon more diſtant, though not leſs important; and this is, that nothing is more fatal to manners and to the republic, than the continual ſhifting of rank and fortune among its members; theſe changes being the ſource of a thouſand diſorders, overturning and confounding every thing: for thoſe who are elevated for one purpoſe are often qualified only for another; neither thoſe who riſe, nor thoſe who fall, being able to adopt the maxims, or poſſeſs themſelves of the qualifications requiſite for their new condition, and ſtill much leſs diſcharge the duties of it. But to proceed to the public finances.

If a people could govern themſelves, and there were no intermediate agent between the adminiſtration of the ſtate and the citizens, they would have no more to do than to make aſſeſſments occaſionally, according to the public neceſſities and the abilities of individuals: and as they would all keep in ſight the gathering in and employment of ſuch aſſeſſments, no fraud nor abuſe could happen in the management of them, the ſtate would never be involved in debt, nor the people burdened with impoſts; or at leaſt the certainty of their being well employed,

would be a conſolation for the ſeverity of the tax. But things cannot be carried on in this manner: on the contrary, however ſmall any ſtate may be, it is always too populous to be under the immediate government of all its members. It is neceſſary that the public money ſhould go through the hands of the chiefs, all of whom have, beſides the intereſts of the ſtate, that of their own at heart; which laſt is not always the leaſt attended to. The people, on their part, who perceive rather the avidity and ridiculous expence of their chiefs, than the public wants, murmur to ſee themſelves ſtripped of neceſſaries to furniſh others with ſuperfluities; and when once theſe complaints are embittered to a certain degree, the moſt upright adminiſtration will find it impoſſible to recover their confidence. In ſuch a ſituation, voluntary contributions would produce nothing, and compulſive ones would be unlawful; ſo that it is in this cruel alternative, of the ſtate being ruined, or the ſacred right of property being violated, which is its ſupport, that the great difficulty of a juſt and prudent oeconomy ſubſiſts.

The firſt ſtep which the founder of a republic ought to take after the eſtabliſhment of laws, is to ſettle a ſufficient fund for the maintenance of the magiſtrates and other officers, and for other public expences. This fund, if it conſiſt of money, is called *ærarium*, or the *exchequer*; and the *public demeſnes*, if it conſiſt of lands. This laſt is much preferable to the other, for obvious reaſons. Whoever hath ſufficiently reflected on this matter, muſt be of the opinion of Bodin in this reſpect, who looks upon the public demeſ-

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nes as the moſt reputable and certain means of providing for the neceſſities of a ſtate. It is remarkable alſo that Romulus, in his diviſion of lands, firſt took care to ſet apart a third ſhare for the uſe of the ſtate. I confeſs it is not impoſſible for the produce of ſuch demeſnes, badly managed, to be reduced to nothing; but it is not eſſential to them to be badly adminiſtred.

Previous to all application, this fund ſhould be aſſigned or accepted by an aſſembly of the people, or by the ſtates of the country; which ſhould determine its future uſe. After this ſolemnity, which renders ſuch funds unalienable, they change in a manner their very nature, the revenues becoming ſo ſacred, that it is not only the moſt infamous theft, but actual treaſon, to miſapply them, or pervert them from their original deſtination. It reflects a great diſhonour on Rome, that the integrity of Cato the cenſor was ſomething ſo very remarkable, and that an emperor, on rewarding the talents of a ſinger with a few crowns, thought it neceſſary to obſerve that the money came from his own private purſe, and not from the public treaſury. But if we find few Galbas, where ſhall we look for a Cato? For when vice is no longer diſhonourable, what chiefs will be ſo ſcrupulous as to abſtain from touching the public revenues left to their diſcretion, and even not to affect in time to confound their own expenſive and ſcandalous diſſipations with the glory of the ſtate, and the means of extending their own influence with that of augmenting its power? It is particularly with regard to this delicate part of the adminiſtration, that virtue alone is the only efficacious inſtrument, and that the integrity of the magi-

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ſtrate is the only rein capable of reſtraining his avarice. Books of accounts, inſtead of ſerving to expoſe frauds, tend only to conceal them; for prudence is never ſo ready to conceive new precautions as knavery is to elude them. Never mind account-books and papers therefore, but place the management of the finances in honeſt hands: this is the only way to have them well employed, however they are accounted for.

When the public funds are once eſtabliſhed, the chiefs of the ſtate become of right the adminiſtrators of them: for this adminiſtration conſtitutes a part of government, always eſſential, though not always equally ſo. Its influence increaſes in proportion as that of other reſources is diminiſhed; and it may juſtly be ſaid, that government is arrived at its laſt ſtage of corruption, when nothing hath any influence in it but money. Now as every government conſtantly tends to relaxation, this alone ſhews why no ſtate can ſubſiſt unleſs its revenues are conſtantly on the increaſe.

The firſt ſenſe of the neceſſity of this increaſe, is alſo the firſt ſign of the internal diſorder of the ſtate; and the prudent adminiſtrator, in his endeavours to find means to prevent the preſent neceſſity, will neglect nothing to find out the diſtant cauſe of it; even as a mariner who, finding the water gaining upon his veſſel, neglects not, while he is working the pumps, to ſeek out and ſtop the leak.

From this rule is deduced the moſt important maxim in the adminiſtration of the finances; which is, to ſtudy more to prevent the want of ſupplies, than to increaſe the revenues. For, whatever diligence be employed, the relief

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which only comes after the evil, and ſtill more ſlowly, leaves always ſome injury behind. At the ſame time, while a remedy is providing for one evil, another is felt, and even thoſe remedies themſelves are productive of new inconveniences; ſo that at length the nation is involved in debt, the people are oppreſſed, the government loſes its influence, and is able to do but very little with a great deal of money. I imagine it is to this maxim, well eſtabliſhed, that we are to impute the prodigious things effected by the ancient governments; who did more with their parſimony than ours with all their treaſures: and perhaps it is from hence that the common acceptation of the word *oeconomy* is derived; rather meaning the prudential management of what one has, than the means of acquiring what one has not.

But independently of the public treaſure, which is of ſervice to the ſtate in proportion to the probity of thoſe who govern, a perſon ſufficiently acquainted with the influence of adminiſtration in general, would be aſtoniſhed to reflect on the reſources which the chiefs are poſſeſſed of, to prevent all public wants without treſpaſſing on the properties of individuals. As the governors are maſters of the whole commerce of the ſtate, nothing is more eaſy for them than to direct it in ſuch channels as to provide for every exigence, without appearing to trouble their heads about it. The diſtribution of proviſions, of money, and of merchandiſes, in a juſt proportion according to times and circumſtances, is the true ſecret of the finances and the ſource of their wealth, provided that thoſe who adminiſter them have foreſight enough to ſuffer a preſent apparent loſs

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in order to obtain the immenſe profits of a future gain. When we ſee a government paying a bounty, inſtead of receiving duties, on the exportation of corn in time of plenty, and the importation of it in time of ſcarcity, it is really neceſſary to have the fact before one's eyes to be perſuaded of its reality, and that it is not one of the romances of ancient times. Let us ſuppoſe that, in order to prevent a ſcarcity in bad years, a propoſal were made to eſtabliſh public magazines; would not the execution of ſuch an eſtabliſhment ſerve in moſt countries as a fine pretext for new impoſts? At Geneva, indeed, ſuch granaries, eſtabliſhed and kept up by a prudent adminiſtration, are a public reſource in barren ſeaſons, and the principal revenue of the ſtate at all times. *Alit et ditat* is the beautiful and juſt inſcription which ſtands on the front of the edifice. To exhibit here the oeconomical ſyſtem of a good government, I have often turned my eyes to that of this republic, happy to find in my own country an example of that wiſdom and happineſs which I ſhould be glad to ſee prevail in every other.

If we ſhould inquire into the cauſes of the wants of a ſtate, we ſhould find they generally ariſe in the ſame manner as the wants of an individual; leſs from any real neceſſity, than by the increaſe of uſeleſs deſires; and that the expence is often augmented, only to have a pretext to raiſe the demand: ſo that the ſtate is often a gainer by pretending to be rich, while this apparent wealth is in reality more burdenſome to it than even poverty itſelf. The governors may poſſibly hope to keep a people in a ſtricter ſtate of dependence, by thus giving them with one

one hand what they take from them with the other; and indeed this was the kind of policy which Joſeph made uſe of with the Egyptians: but this political ſophiſtry is by ſo much the more fatal to a ſtate as the money never returns into the hands it went out of; but, on the contrary, ſuch maxims ſerve only to enrich the luxurious and idle at the expence of the honeſt and induſtrious.

A deſire of conqueſt is one of the moſt ſenſible and one of the moſt dangerous cauſes of this augmentation. This deſire, occaſioned often by a different ſpecies of ambition than that which ſeems natural to it, is not always what it appears to be, and has not ſo much for its real motive the apparent deſire of aggrandizing the nation abroad, as a ſecret deſire of increaſing the authority of the chiefs at home, by the augmentation of the troops, and by that diverſion which the objects of war occaſion in the minds of the citizens.

This at leaſt is certain, that no people are ſo oppreſſed and miſerable as conquering nations, their ſucceſſes abroad only increaſing their miſery at home. Did not hiſtory inform us, common ſenſe would, that the greater a ſtate grows, the more burdenſome become its expences in proportion: for it is neceſſary that every province ſhould furniſh its contingent to the general expence of government; and that, beſide this, it ſhould be at the expence of its own particular adminiſtration, which is as if it was really independent. Add to this, that great fortunes are always acquired in one place and ſpent in another; which breaks thro' the equipoiſe of the product and conſumption, and greatly impoveriſhes a whole country merely to enrich one town.

Another ſource of the increaſe of public wants, depending on the foregoing, is is. There may come a time when the citizens, no longer looking upon themſelves as intereſted in the common cauſe, will ceaſe to be defenders of their country, and in which the chiefs would rather have the command of mercenaries than free-men, if it were for no other reaſon than in the end to ſubject the latter more eaſily to the former. Such was the ſtate of Rome toward the end of the republic, and under the emperors; for all the victories of the primitive Romans, like thoſe of Alexander, were won by brave citizens, who would voluntarily ſpill their blood in the ſervice of their country, but would never ſell it on any occaſion. Marius was the firſt who, in the Jugurthine war, diſhonoured the Roman legions, by introducing freedmen, vagabonds, and other mercenaries. The tyrants became the enemies of the very people it was their duty to make happy, maintaining a number of regular troops, in appearance to awe foreigners, but in reality to enſlave the natives. In order to form ſuch troops, it was neceſſary to take off a number of huſbandmen from cultivating the lands; the want of whoſe labour of courſe diminiſhed the quantity of proviſions, and the maintenance of whom introduced thoſe taxes which increaſed their price. The firſt diſorder gave riſe to murmurs among the people; in order to ſuppreſs which, the number of the troops was increaſed, and conſequently the miſery of the people; whoſe deſpair increaſing, rendered ſtill a farther increaſe of the cauſe neceſſary in order to prevent its effects. On the other hand, the mercenaries, whoſe merit we may judge of by the

the price at which they ſold themſelves, proud of their own meanneſs, and deſpiſing the laws that protected them, as well as their fellows whoſe bread they eat, imagined themſelves more honoured in being Cæſar's guards than in being defenders of Rome; thus devoted by their ſituation to a blind and implicit obedience, they had always their poniards at the throats of their fellow-ſoldiers, ready to make uſe of them at the word of command. It were not difficult to ſhow that this was one of the principal cauſes of the ruin of the Roman empire.

The invention of artillery and fortification hath obliged the princes of Europe, in modern times, to re-eſtabliſh the uſe of regular troops, in order to garriſon their towns: but, however lawful their motives, it is to be feared the effect of them may be no leſs fatal. There is no better reaſon now than formerly for depopulating the country to form armies and garriſons; the people ought to be as little oppreſſed to ſupport them; in a word, theſe dangerous eſtabliſhments have increaſed of late years with ſuch rapidity in this part of the world, that they evidently threaten the approaching depopulation of Europe, and ſooner or later the entire ruin of its inhabitants.

But be this as it will, it ought to be obſerved, that ſuch inſtitutions neceſſarily ſubvert the true oeconomical ſyſtem which draws the principal revenue of the ſtate from the public demeſnes, and leaves only the dreadful reſource of ſubſidies and impoſts; of which it remains for me to treat. It ſhould be remembered here, that the foundation of the ſocial compact is property; and its firſt condition, that every one ſhould be

maintained in the peaceful poſſeſſion of what belonged to him. It is true, that by the ſame treaty every one tacitly conſents to be aſſeſſed toward the public wants: but this engagement being incapable of hurting the fundamental law, and ſuppoſing that the evidence of ſuch wants muſt appear to every one who contributes to them, it is plain that ſuch aſſeſſment, in order to be lawful, ſhould be voluntary; not indeed particularly ſo, as if it were neceſſary to have the conſent of each individual, and that he ſhould give no more than juſt what he pleaſed; but ſo far voluntary, as it ſhould be done by the conſent of the majority of the citizens, and upon an equitable and impartial footing.

That impoſts cannot be lawfully eſtabliſhed but by the conſent of the people or their repreſentatives, is a truth generally admitted by all philoſophers and civilians of any reputation, not even excepting Bodin himſelf. If any of them alſo have eſtabliſhed maxims apparently contradictory, their particular motives for it may be eaſily ſeen through; and beſides, they introduce ſo many conditions and reſtrictions, that the argument comes at the bottom to the very ſame thing: for whether the people have it in their power to refuſe, or the ſovereign ought not to exact, is a matter of indifference with regard to right; and if the point in queſtion be only with regard to the power, it is mighty uſeleſs to inquire whether it be lawful or not.

The contributions which are levied on the people, are of two kinds; the one real, which is levied on commodities; and the other perſonal, which is paid by the head. Both one and the other are called impoſts and ſubſidies: when the

the people appoint the particular ſum that is to be paid, it is called a ſubſidy; but when they grant the produce of a tax, it is called an impoſt. We are told, in the Spirit of Laws, that a capitation tax is moſt conformable to ſlavery, and a real tax moſt agreeable to liberty. It might indeed be really ſo, if the circumſtances of every perſon were equal; for otherwiſe nothing can be more diſproportionate than ſuch a tax; and it is in the obſervation of exact proportions that conſiſts the ſpirit of liberty. But if a capitation tax were exactly proportioned to the ſtate and circumſtances of individuals, as what is called the capitation tax in France might be, it would be the moſt equitable and of conſequence the moſt conformable of all others to free-men.

Theſe proportions appear at firſt very eaſy to be obſerved, becauſe as they relate to the rank which every one holds in life, the indications of it are always public: but it is rare that a proper regard is paid to all the elements that ſhould enter into ſuch a calculation, ſetting aſide the deception ariſing from avarice, fraud, and intereſt. In the firſt place, ſhould be conſidered the relation of quantities, according to which, every thing elſe being equal, the perſon who has ten times the property of another man ought to pay ten times as much to the ſtate. Secondly, the relation of cuſtom, that is to ſay, the diſtinction between neceſſaries and ſuperfluities. He who poſſeſſes only the common neceſſaries of life ſhould pay nothing at all, while the tax on him who is in poſſeſſion of ſuperfluities might be juſtly extended to every thing beyond mere neceſſaries. To this the latter will poſſi-

bly object, in regard to his rank, that what may be superfluous to a man of inferior station is necessary for him. But this is false: for a peer of the realm has two legs as well as a cow-herd, and he has but one belly any more than the clown. Besides, these pretended necessaries are really so little necessary with regard to rank, that if he should renounce them on any worthy occasion, he would only be the more honoured and respected. The populace would be ready to adore a minister who should go to council on foot, because he had sold off his equipage to supply a pressing exigence of state.

A third relation, which is never accounted any thing, and which ought to be accounted the chief, is the utility that every person derives from the social confederacy; which powerfully protects the immense possessions of the rich, and hardly leaves the poor the quiet possession of the cottage he builds with his own hands. Almost all the advantages of society are for the rich and powerful. All the lucrative employments are in their hands. All the privileges and exemptions are reserved for them alone; while the public authority is ever partial in their favour. Let a man of eminence and distinction rob his creditors, or be guilty of other knaveries, is he not always sure to do it with impunity? The assaults, assassinations, and even murders committed by the great, are affairs that are hushed up in a few months, and nothing more is thought of them.

But let a great man himself be robbed or insulted, the whole police is immediately in motion, and wo be even to the innocent persons who chance to be suspected of the fact. If he be

be to paſs through any dangerous road, the country is up in arms to eſcort him. If the axletree of his chaiſe breaks, every body flies to his aſſiſtance. Is there a noiſe made at his door? he ſpeaks but a word, and all is ſilent. Is he incommoded by the crowd? he waves his hand, and every one makes way for him. Is his coach met on the road by a wagon? his ſervants are ready to beat the driver's brains out for not making way, as if fifty honeſt people going quietly about their buſineſs had better be knocked on the head than the equipage of an idle lord be interrupted. Yet all this reſpect coſts him not a farthing: it is the privilege annexed to the rank of a rich man, and not purchaſed by his wealth. How very different is the caſe with the poor! the more that is due to him from humanity, the leſs is paid to him by ſociety. Every door is ſhut againſt him, even when he hath a right to its being opened; and if at any time he obtain juſtice, it is with much greater difficulty than others obtain favours. Is the militia to be raiſed, or the highways to be mended? he hath conſtantly the preference here; always bearing the burden which his richer neighbour has intereſt enough to get exempted from. On the leaſt accident that happens to him, every body avoids him: if his cart be overturned in the road, ſo far is he from receiving any aſſiſtance, that he is lucky if he do not get horſe-whipped by the impudent lackeys of the people of quality that happen to paſs by: in a word, all gratuitous aſſiſtance is denied to the poor, merely becauſe they cannot pay for it. But I look upon that poor man as totally undone, who has the

misfortune to have an honeſt heart, a fine daughter, and a powerful neighbour.

There is another remark no leſs important; which is, that the loſſes of the poor are much leſs reparable than thoſe of the rich, and that the difficulty of acquiſition always increaſes in proportion to the neceſſity of it. *Ex nihilo nihil fit*, "nothing comes of nothing," is as true in politics as in phyſics: money is the ſeed of money, and the firſt guinea is ſometimes more difficult to be acquired than the ſecond million. Add to all this, that what is paid by the poor is for ever loſt to them; and remains in, or returns to, the hands of the rich: and as among thoſe only who ſhare in the government or their dependents, ſooner or later all the produce of the impoſts muſt paſs, ſo in paying their ſhare they have always a ſenſible intereſt in augmenting them.

The terms of the ſocial compact between theſe two orders of people may be expreſſed in a few words. "You have need of me, becauſe I am rich and you are poor; we will therefore come to this agreement: I will permit you to have the honour of ſerving me, on condition that you beſtow on me the little that remains in your poſſeſſion, in return for the pains I ſhall take to command you."

Putting all theſe conſiderations carefully together, we ſhall find, that, in order to levy taxes in a truly equitable and proportionable manner, the impoſition ought not to be in the ſimple ratio of the property of the contributors, but in a ratio compounded of the difference of their conditions, and the ſuperfluity of their poſſeſſions. This very important and difficult operation is daily

daily made by numbers of honeſt financiers, ſtilled in political arithmetick; but is what a Plato or a Monteſquieu would not venture to undertake, without great diffidence, and praying to heaven for peculiar underſtanding and integrity.

Another inconvenience attending a perſonal tax is, that it is too openly perceived, and is raiſed with too great ſeverity; which does not hinder it, however, from being frequently evaded; becauſe it is much eaſier for perſons to avoid a tax than their poſſeſſions.

Of all impoſts, the *centieme*, or hundredth penny, on lands, hath been adjudged the moſt advantageous in thoſe countries where greater regard is had to the produce of the tax, and the certainty of levying it, than to the eaſe of the people. It hath been even pretended, that it is neceſſary to burden the peaſant in order to excite his induſtry, and that he would never work if he had no taxes to pay. But univerſal experience confutes this ridiculous notion. In England and Holland the farmer pays very little, and in China nothing: yet theſe are the countries in which the land is the beſt cultivated. On the contrary, in thoſe countries where the huſbandman is taxed in proportion to the product of his lands, he leaves them uncultivated, or juſt reaps ſo much from them as ſuffices him for bare ſubſiſtence. For to him who is doomed to loſe the fruit of his labour, it is ſome gain to do nothing. To lay a tax on induſtry, is alſo a very ſingular expedient for baniſhing idleneſs. From a tax on lands or upon corn, eſpecially when it is very great, reſult alſo ſuch terrible inconveniences, that they muſt neceſſarily depopulate, or in the

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end bring to ruin, every country where it is eſtabliſhed.

The firſt ariſes from a defect in the circulation of ſpecie: for induſtry and commerce draw all the money from the country into the capital cities; while the impoſt deſtroying the proportion which might otherwiſe ſubſiſt between the neceſſities of the huſbandman and the price of his corn, the money goes away inceſſantly, and never returns; and thus the richer the cities, the poorer the country. The produce of the taxes paſſes from the hands of the prince or the financiers into thoſe of the artiſts and traders; while the huſbandman, who receives only the ſmalleſt part of it, is at length exhauſted by paying always the ſame, and receiving conſtantly leſs. How could an human body ſubſiſt that had veins and no arteries, or whoſe arteries conveyed the blood only within four inches of the heart? Chardin tells us, that in Perſia the royal revenues on commodities are paid in kind: this cuſtom, which Herodotus informs us prevailed heretofore in the ſame country till the time of Darius, might prevent the evil of which I have been ſpeaking. But unleſs the intendant, directors, commiſſaries, and ſtore-keepers, in Perſia, are a different kind of people to what they are elſewhere, I can hardly think the ſmalleſt part of this produce ever reaches the king, but that the corn is ſpoilt in all the granaries, and that the greater part of the magazines are conſumed by fire.

The ſecond inconvenience ariſes from an apparent advantage, which aggravates the evil before it be perceived. This is, that corn is a commodity, whoſe price is not enhanced by taxes

taxes in the country producing it, and which, in ſpite of its abſolute neceſſity, may be diminiſhed in quantity without the price being augmented. Hence it is, that many people may die of hunger, although the corn ſhould continue cheap, the huſbandman alone remaining charged with the tax, for which he cannot indemnify himſelf by the price of his corn. It is here neceſſary to obſerve, that we ought not to reaſon upon a land-tax in the ſame manner as on the duties laid on different kinds of merchandiſe, which of courſe raiſe their price, and are leſs paid by the ſellers than by the buyers. For theſe duties, however heavy, are nevertheleſs voluntary, and are paid by the merchant only in proportion to the quantity he buys; while at the ſame time he buys only in proportion to his ſale: but the farmer, who is obliged to pay his rent at ſtated times, whether he ſells or not, cannot wait till his commodity is at the price he ſhould chuſe, and, though he ſhould not be forced to ſell for mere ſubſiſtence, he muſt ſell to pay the taxes; ſo that it is frequently the enormity of the tax that occaſions corn to be ſold at a low price.

It is to be farther remarked, that the reſources of commerce and induſtry are ſo far from rendering the tax more ſupportable through a plenty of money, that they only render it more burdenſome. I ſhall not inſiſt upon a circumſtance that is very evident; *viz.* that, although a greater or leſs quantity of money in a ſtate, may give it a greater or leſs credit in the eye of foreigners, it makes not the leaſt alteration in the real fortune of the citizens, or renders them more eaſy in their circumſtances. But I muſt

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make two important remarks: The one is, that unleſs a ſtate poſſeſſes ſuperfluous commodities, and the abundance of its ſpecie ariſes from its foreign trade, it is only the trading cities who are ſenſible of that abundance; while the peaſant and huſbandman become relatively the poorer. The other is, that the price of every thing being enhanced by the increaſe of ſpecie, the imports will of courſe be augmented in proportion; ſo that the labourer will find himſelf ſtill more burdened, without having more reſources.

It ought to be obſerved, that the tax on lands is a real impoſt or duty laid on the produce of them. It is univerſally agreed, however, that nothing is ſo dangerous as an impoſt on corn, when it is to be paid by the purchaſer: but how comes it we do not ſee that it is an hundred times worſe when this duty is paid by the cultivator or farmer himſelf? Is not this attacking the ſubſiſtence of the ſtate even in its ſource? Is not this directly aiming at the depopulation of a country, and of conſequence at its ruin? for the worſt kind of ſcarcity that can happen to a nation is its want of inhabitants.

It belongs only to the real ſtateſman to elevate his views, in the impoſition of taxes, above the mere object of the finances; to tranſform thoſe heavy burdens into uſeful regulations; and by ſuch means to make the people even doubtful whether ſuch eſtabliſhments were not calculated rather for the good of the nation in general, than for raiſing money to the government.

Duties on the importation of foreign commodities,

modities, of which the natives are fond, and the country ſtands in no need; upon the exportation of thoſe of the growth of the country which are not too plenty, and which foreigners cannot poſſibly do without; on the productions of the frivolous and too lucrative arts; upon the entry of every thing of mere amuſement, and in general on all objects of luxury; ſuch duties, I ſay, might anſwer the two-fold end propoſed. It is by ſuch impoſts, indeed, that the poor are eaſed, and the burden is thrown on the rich. Theſe are the means to prevent the continual augmentation of the inequality of fortunes, the ſubjection of ſuch a multitude of artiſans and uſeleſs ſervants to the rich, and the multiplication of idle people in our cities, and the depopulation of the country.

It is of conſequence, alſo, to keep ſuch a proportion between the value of any commodity and the duties laid on it, that the avarice of individuals may not be too ſtrongly tempted to ſmuggling. To prevent this practice alſo, it is expedient to lay the heavieſt duties on commodities that are the moſt difficult to be concealed. In a word, it is proper that all duties ſhould be rather paid by the conſumer of the commodity taxed, than by the perſon who vends it; as the quantity of duties he is by ſuch means obliged to pay, will lay him under greater temptations, and afford him more opportunities for fraud.

This is the conſtant cuſtom in China, a country where the impoſts are greater and yet better paid than in any other part of the world. The merchant himſelf there pays no duty, but the buyer only, and that without murmurings or ſedition; becauſe the neceſſaries of life, ſuch

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as rice and corn, being abſolutely exempted from taxation, the common people are not oppreſſed, and the duty falls only on perſons in eaſy circumſtances. As for the reſt, all precautions againſt ſmuggling, ought not to be dictated ſo much by the fear of the fact, as by the attention which the government ſhould have to prevent individuals from being ſeduced by exorbitant profits; which tend firſt to make them bad citizens, and afterwards diſhoneſt men.

Heavy taxes ſhould be laid on ſervants in livery, on equipages, rich furniture, fine clothes, on ſpacious courts and gardens, on public entertainments of all kinds; on uſeleſs profeſſions, ſuch as dancers, ſingers, players; and, in a word, on all that multiplicity of objects of luxury, amuſement, and idleneſs, which ſtrike the eyes of all, and which can the leſs be hid as their whole purpoſe is to be ſeen, without which they would be uſeleſs. We need be under no apprehenſions, alſo, that the produce of theſe taxes would be arbitrary, becauſe they are laid on things not abſolutely neceſſary. Thoſe muſt know but little of mankind, who imagine, that, after they have been once ſeduced by luxury, they can ever renounce it: they would an hundred times ſooner renounce common neceſſaries, and had much rather die with hunger than ſhame. The augmentation of their expence would be only an additional reaſon for ſupporting them, when the vanity of appearing opulent would find its account in the price of the thing and the charge of the tax. So long as there are rich people in the world, ſo long will they be deſirous of diſtinguiſhing themſelves from the poor, nor can the ſtate deviſe a revenue leſs burden-

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ſome nor more certain than what would ariſe from this diſtinction.

For the ſame reaſon, induſtry would have nothing to ſuffer from ſuch a ſpecies of oeconomy, which would increaſe the finances, encourage agriculture by relieving the huſbandman, and inſenſibly tend to bring all fortunes nearer to that mediocrity which conſtitutes the genuine ſtrength of the ſtate. It might happen, I confeſs, that theſe impoſts would the ſooner put an end to certain faſhionable articles of dreſs and amuſement; but it would be only to introduce others, by which the artificer would be a gainer, and the exchequer ſuffer no loſs.

In a word, let us ſuppoſe that the ſpirit of government conſtantly tended to tax only the ſuperfluities of the rich, one of theſe two things muſt happen: Either the rich would convert their ſuperfluous expences into uſeful ones, which would redound to the profit of the ſtate; and thus the impoſition of taxes would have the effect of the beſt ſumptuary laws; the expences of the ſtate would neceſſarily diminiſh with that of individuals; and the treaſury would not receive ſo much leſs from this cauſe, as it would gain by having leſs to pay: Or, if the rich did not contract their profuſion, the exchequer would have ſuch reſources in the taxes on it, as would provide for the exigences of the ſtate.

In the firſt caſe, the treaſury would be enriched by what it would ſave from having the leſs to do with its money; and in the ſecond, it would be enriched by the uſeleſs expences of individuals. We may add to all this, a very important diſtinction in matters of policy; and to which governments, conſtantly tenacious of

doing every thing for themſelves, ought to pay great attention. It has been already obſerved that capitation taxes and duties upon the neceſſaries of life, directly treſpaſſing on the right of property, and of courſe the true foundation of political ſociety, are always ſubject to dangerous conſequences, if not eſtabliſhed with the expreſs conſent of the people or their repreſentatives. It is not the ſame with taxes laid on ſuch articles as we might eaſily diſpenſe with: for the individual being under no abſolute neceſſity to pay, his contribution may paſs for voluntary; ſo that the particular conſent of each contributor ſupplies the place of the general conſent of the whole people: for why ſhould a people oppoſe the impoſition of a tax which is to be paid only by thoſe who chuſe it? It appears to me certain, that every thing which is not preſcribed by the laws, nor is contrary to morality, and yet may be prohibited by government, may be alſo permitted by the government on paying a certain duty. Thus, for example, if the government may prohibit the uſe of coaches, it may moſt certainly impoſe a tax upon them; which is a prudent and uſeful method of cenſuring them, without abſolutely interdicting them. In this caſe, the tax may be looked upon as a kind of penalty, the product of which compenſates for the abuſe it puniſhes. It may perhaps be objected, that thoſe whom Bodin calls *impoſteurs*, that is to ſay, thoſe who impoſe or contrive the taxes, being in the claſs of the rich; they will be very careful how they ſpare others in order to load themſelves, or lay a charge on themſelves to the relief of the poor. But this is quite out of the queſtion. If in every nation

tion thoſe to whom the ſovereign hath committed the government of the people are enemies to them by their ſituation, it is not worth while to inquire what they ought to do to render them happy.

END *of the* SEVENTH VOLUME.